In the motion, Doral represented that it did not receive notice of either the Debtors' emergency motion requesting their discharge or the Order Vacating Relief from Stay. The sale was authorized by the Court in the debtors' previous bankruptcy petition and the debtors failed to appeal.
, In the First Circuit, parties may file a Rule 60(b) motion in the trial court regarding orders which have been appealed without leave of the appellate court. U.S. Steel, 315 F.3d at 51. The fact that Gail Ness was the title owner of the Enfield Property was a matter of public record., A. Right.
, HAINES, Bankruptcy Judge. If one ignores the $150 monthly vehicle repair and/or replacement expense added by the court (and for which there is no supporting record evidence), Lorenz would have sufficient funds to make monthly payments on the guaranteed loan shortly after entering the workforce.
In April 2005, a Massachusetts state court entered a default judgment against the Debtor in the amount of $2, 115.00. In the Debtor's view, the bankruptcy court erred by concluding that the status of the student loan obligation was not transformed by the state court judgment. See Roy, 189 B.R.
, United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit.CONCLUSION, For the reasons set forth above, the bankruptcy court's order overruling the Trustee's objection to the Debtor's claim of homestead exemption in real property under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 188, § 1, is AFFIRMED.
, 704 F.2d 12, 17 (1st Cir.1983); see also Jones v. Garcia (In re Jones), 63 F.3d 411 (5th Cir.1995) (affirming bankruptcy court judgment that modified automatic stay to retroactively validate purchase of property at foreclosure by appellee creditors without notice of bankruptcy filing);
In re Spenlinhauer, 261 F.3d at 118., When the bankruptcy court granted the appellants' motion seeking relief from stay and assignment of Shkolnikov's rights against Metropolitan (and others), its order conveyed to them the very rights that were the subject of the trustee's sale motion.
, The bankruptcy court denied both the Motion for Determination and the Motion to Reimpose the Automatic Stay, holding that section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay in its entirety, i.e., with regard to the debtor, the debtor's property, and property of the estate. See TI Fed.
In relevant part, the report stated that the tax priority language in § 507 retains two important priority rules of present [i.e., pre-Bankruptcy Code] bankruptcy law: first, for tax claims for which the tax return was due not more than three years before the bankruptcy petition was filed.
(2) whether the Town's prepetition water bill and the postpetition interest on that water bill, which were not included in the Town's proof of claim, were discharged in the Debtor's Chapter 13 bankruptcy;
, Beyond its reliance on O'Brien, the bankruptcy court's findings concerning the four elements of § 727(a)(2)(A) are limited to the following:, Well, we have a motion for summary judgment on very traditional facts.
, To determine whether the bankruptcy court erred in granting summary judgment, we must review the court's ruling that the entering of a not guilty plea in the criminal murder case rendered the Appellants' claims subject to a bona fide dispute. Matter of Busick, 831 F.2d 745, 750 (7th Cir.1987).
, Miguel A. Orsini Santos (the Debtor) appeals from an order of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico (the bankruptcy court) denying *764 his second motion for reconsideration of an order allowing the unsecured claim of Reinoldo Espino Colon (Espino).
