, In this case from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Puerto Rico, Doral Financial Corporation (Doral) appeals (1) the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Chapter 7 trustee in an avoidance action under 11 U.S.C. § 549; An order approving a sale of property is also final.
, *2 Herbert Weinberg, Esq., Hannah B. Aroesty (the Debtor) appeals from the bankruptcy court's order sustaining objections by Francis Sullivan and Carolyn A. Bankowski, Chapter 13 Trustee (the Trustee), to the Debtor's claim of homestead exemption to the extent the exemption exceeds $125, 000.
As to the 2004 tax refund the court found that [t]here was no hiding of assets. Thus, if we disregard the two transfers the bankruptcy court found fraudulent, we are left with the titleholders of the West Newbury property being Mr. and Mrs. Hill, without the benefit of any homestead declaration.
The Debtor did not appeal that order., Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the Debtor violated Bankruptcy Rule 9011(b) when he filed the Discharge Motion, and that sanctions were appropriate as a result of this violation.
The United States Trustee (the UST) disagrees with the conclusion of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Hampshire (bankruptcy court) denying the UST's motions to dismiss the captioned cases for abuse under § 707(b)(1).i.e., the means test. 1942, 147 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2000);
, Kimberly Preston (the Appellant) appeals from the bankruptcy court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Andrew S. Richardson, the chapter 7 trustee (the Trustee), on his fraudulent transfer complaint. Bowers, 99 F.3d at 155. The earliest transfer at issue occurred on September 26, 2002.
, The court set the motion for reconsideration for hearing, during which counsel for the Plaintiffs stated that they had filed the motion pursuant to Rule 60(b). Rodriguez Camacho v. Doral Fin.CONCLUSION, For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the Dismissal Order and the Order Denying Relief.
The bankruptcy court denied the Debtor's discharge under the continuous concealment doctrine, and denied the Debtor's homestead exemption because he had filed the declaration of homestead in violation of a state court order. Corp. v. Hill (In re Hill), 387 B.R.
, The Debtor appeals from the bankruptcy court's order denying her discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A).CONCLUSION, The bankruptcy court's finding that the Debtor acted with a fraudulent intent in omitting five credit card debts from her bankruptcy schedules was not clearly erroneous.
The bankruptcy court's determination that Reale had an interest in the transferred property presents such a question., We review a successor judge's decision to decide a case after a trial conducted by another judge for abuse of discretion.
Camacho v. Doral Fin. See McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 96 n. 7 (2d Cir.2007) (interpreting Hoblock and Exxon Mobil). The court of appeals disagreed, stating that the husband was, in fact, seeking federal review of a state court's order enforcing the Affidavit of Support in his divorce case.
, This appeal is taken from the bankruptcy court's order (the Order) sustaining the Debtors' objection to the Appellant's amended proof of claim on the grounds that the Appellant failed to produce evidence of assignment or authority with respect to Chase credit card account ending 2954. See TI Fed.
[12] Because Bankruptcy Rule 8014 only provides for the recovery of costs, the Appellee is not entitled to attorneys' fees under that rule, and even if we construed the Appellee's request as one for damages and costs for a frivolous appeal under Bankruptcy Rule 8020, [13] that request would fail.
Bankruptcy No. 05-24337-JBR., VOTOLATO, Bankruptcy Judge., Additionally, the Massachusetts homestead statute provides that when property is subject to a mortgage that was executed before a declaration of homestead was filed, the claim of homestead is not effective as against the mortgagee.
A bankruptcy appellate panel may hear appeals from final judgments, orders and decrees [pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 158(a)(1) ] or with leave of the court, from interlocutory orders and decrees [pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 158(a)(3)]. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 12 F.3d 908, 914-15 (9th Cir.
[1] The Debtors dispute the bankruptcy court's interpretation of the statute and argue that, because the time period set forth therein runs from the date of filing of the earlier case to the date of filing of the subsequent case, Mr. Gagne is eligible for a discharge. 3245, 73 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1982).
, United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit. The Notice was filed and the claim was assigned a recording number by the Clerk, but the actual Notice does not appear in the Sunapee Town Clerk's UCC/lien file, which in this case consists of a cardboard box. 5 Casey Fed.
The outcome of both matters turned on the bankruptcy court's finding that Pritchett's claim, which consisted entirely of penalties for late alimony payments, is a domestic support obligation within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A). Credit Union v. DelBonis, 72 F.3d 921, 928 (1st Cir.1995);
On March 29, 2004, the bankruptcy court entered an Order (the Standing Order), denying the Debtor's Opposition Motion and concluding that the Appellee had sufficient interest in the dismissal of the case to satisfy the standing requirement.[9] Accordingly neither claim nor issue preclusion apply.
