, (a) Ten-day period., In light of relevant Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent, the bankruptcy *73 court did not abuse its discretion in finding the Debtor's failure to file the notice of appeal within the 10-day time limit did not constitute excusable neglect pursuant to Rule 8002(c)(2).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. The trial court must analyze the facts and circumstances of each case. The Debtor had knowledge of his involvement with Freedom Properties but asserted that he did not consider it an asset of the bankruptcy estate because he had no ownership interest in the company.
The bankruptcy court's order determining that the transferee was not entitled to any deduction in the value of the property recovered by the Trustee on the basis of the Debtor's homestead exemption or the transferee's dower interest is a final appealable order. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
v., Sysco Corp., Defendant-Appellant.OPINION, Creditor Sysco Corp. (Sysco) appeals the bankruptcy court's judgment in favor of the Chapter 7 Trustee determining that certain payments to Sysco are recoverable as preferential transfers under 11 U.S.C. § 547. terms for new purchases at that time.
Machine Co., E.T.T.V. CONCLUSION, The bankruptcy court correctly determined there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the Debtor failed to maintain adequate financial records pursuant to § 727(a)(3) and that Turoczy Bonding was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Chase Manhattan sought to impeach the Debtors' testimony that no person known as Taylor Lloyd was present when they executed the mortgage by pointing out that neither Debtor could recall Mr. Williams either, although all parties agree that he was present and conducted the loan closing. instrument.
, A hearing on this motion was originally scheduled for November 19, 1998., NOTES, [1] The notice of appeal filed on November 12, 1998 appealed the bankruptcy court's November 11, 1998 order denying recusal and ordering the debtor to show cause why his case should not be dismissed.
Services., The bankruptcy court explained that Beneke's postpetition work could not satisfy the test for administrative expense priority set forth by the Sixth Circuit in Sunarhauserman, 126 F.3d at 816, because the agreement giving rise to Beneke's claim arose prepetition., 851 F.2d at 162.
, On remand, the bankruptcy court again disallowed Norpak's contingent claim, concluding that an environmental settlement agreement entered into while the matter was on appeal gave the EPA a potentially viable claim against Eagle-Picher. 1489, 123 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1993); Robins Co., 88 B.R.
Bush v. Dictaphone Corp., 161 F.3d 363, 367 (6th Cir.1998) (discovery);, As only the Vulcan Mold Iron business was to be contributed to the Valley-Vulcan partnership, Vulcan's other assets (primarily the Shepard Niles stock) were transferred to Ampco prior to the creation of Valley-Vulcan.
Restricting its holding to the facts, in Isaacman, the Sixth Circuit held that the bankruptcy court should have exercised its equitable powers under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) to correct a mistake in noticing by the clerk's office that reasonably misled a creditor with respect to the complaint deadline.
I. ISSUE ON APPEAL, The issue on appeal is whether the threeyear look-back period in 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(i) for priority income tax debts is tolled during a prior bankruptcy case filed by a debtor.
, The bankruptcy court thoughtfully analyzed the conflicting case law interpreting § 365(d)(3) and concluded that section 365(d)(3) was, at the least, intended to assure the landlord payment of ordinary monthly rent payments which become due during the *390 postpetition prerejection period.
Because of the cross-reference in § 542(a) to § 363, TranSouth's argument that it could withhold possession until the bankruptcy court ordered adequate protection might have statutory support if the property the Debtor sought to use was cash collateral. See Knaus, 889 F.2d at 774-75;
Gary Haines; In other words, `the federal claim is inextricably intertwined with the state-court judgment if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.' Goetzman v. Agribank, FCB (In re Goetzman), 91 F.3d 1173, 1177 (8th Cir.
I. ISSUE ON APPEAL, Whether the seven year period of nondischargeability for student loans under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(A) is measured from the date the original loans first became due or from the date the consolidated loan first became due. that is, the consolidation loan, not the original loan.
