We have jurisdiction over these appeals from the final orders of the bankruptcy court. If the Debtor had filed for protection under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, it is likely that Vandiver would have had at least a colorable claim for nondischargeability of the debt at issue.
Co., 828 F.2d at 252 (both noting that trial court may infer fraudulent intent under 727(a)(4)(A) from all facts and circumstances in case, given difficulty of relying only on debtor's testimony on state of mind).
James A. Lostetter;, The bankruptcy court cited In re Strid, 487 N.W.2d 891, 895 (Minn.1992) for the proposition that fraudulent intent, or intent to deceive, is unnecessary to establish liability for intentional misrepresentation. See Hatch v. Kulick, 211 Minn. 309, 1 N.W.2d 359, 360 (1941).
III, The facts in this case present a classic preference with no earmarking implications. Before the address change, Libby was entitled to receive funds from the U.S. Air Force and it was, under its agreement with AlliedSignal, obligated to make payments on its debt to AlliedSignal.
, The debtor, Brian Wayne Burgess (Debtor), appeals the order of the bankruptcy court[1] approving the sale by Joseph H. Badami (Trustee) of the bankruptcy estate's interest in his residence to Tyne Burgess. Rule Bankr.P. The relevant standard is whether the purchaser paid value.
Cityscape Mortgage Corp., Defendant. The bankruptcy court concluded the action was an in rem proceeding that did not seek the imposition of any personal liability and, therefore, held the counterclaim failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957).
Because the Debtors were not making any payments during this time period, the United States Trustee moved to convert the case to Chapter 7, and several creditors joined in the motion. The Trustee also filed a motion objecting to the Debtors' claimed exemption in certain pension plans.
The Debtor deposited $25, 488 before the amendment. The bankruptcy court found that this amount came from the Debtor's share of the gross proceeds because the Debtor was not yet authorized by the amendment to fund the reserve with the City's share of the proceeds. Compton, 831 F.2d at 589.
, Over the years, Ms. Grause used her Universal credit card for relatively minor purchases and cash advances and although she generally made the minimum payments on the account, she often had a rather significant balance on the account. Charges totaled $1, 071.32 and there is no payment reflected.
ISSUE, The issue on appeal is whether the claim of the Minnesota Department of Revenue for income tax liability based on the Debtor's delinquent tax returns filed six days before the Debtor filed his bankruptcy petition is entitled to priority pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(ii).
426 (2000), In re James J. DWYER, Jr. and Noel D. Dwyer, Debtors. On November 18, 1998, the bankruptcy court issued an order stating that the Cohns' motion for summary judgment on Count I of the complaint would be considered a response to Appellant's motion for summary judgment on the cross-claim.
359 (2000), In re Billie Franklin GUSKE, Debtor. However, because the record before us is devoid of any evidence regarding justifiable reliance, we find that Bankruptcy Court clearly erred in concluding that Ms. Guske met her burden of proving that element under § 523(a)(2)(A).
Appellee filed a complaint in federal court in the Western District of Missouri on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, asserting that the Debtor was domiciled in Missouri and the Appellee in Colorado., B. Venue, The venue provision for bankruptcy cases is found at 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (1994).
[3], As a result, we conclude that the Bankruptcy Court in this case did not clearly err in finding that under the plain terms of the Settlement Agreement, Ditto became entitled to these attorneys' fees upon Debtor's default for failure to make the November and December payments.
2150, 115 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1991). Relying on the Supreme Court's reasoning in the Dickerson case, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the deferred adjudication probation after the guilty plea was a prior conviction for purposes of the federal mandatory sentence enhancement statute.
*606 This Court is shocked by the conduct or, rather, misconduct of attorney Richard E. Schwartz.DISCUSSION, On appeal, Schwartz asserts that the Bankruptcy Court erred in both its award of attorneys' fees (in the June 2nd Order) and the additional $100, 000 sanction (in the August 14th Order).
The court observed that the Chapter 7 trustee, who represents all the creditors of the bankruptcy estate, was neither a party nor was in privity with Paula Marlar Davis in the prior state court action. See Sioux Falls Cable Television v. State of South Dakota, 838 F.2d 249, 251 (8th Cir.1988).
Kimmons *43 signed this sworn statement approximately two months after he, Camacho, and Bombardo signed the September 14, 1994, statement of mutual ownership regarding NMS, ISD, and Excess. Kimmons was fired by Blue Cross, and criminal charges were filed against Kimmons which are still pending.
However, the trial court's finding of fraud was affirmed by the state appellate court., Next, because her February 1988 contract with Maurer contains no attorney fee provision, Burt argues that she may recover her attorney fees based on a provision[1] appearing in another contract
Hogge, 161 F.3d at 510., Summary judgment in favor of the Defendant is appropriate where the evidence irrefutably demonstrates that the Chapter 13 Trustee and then the Chapter 7 Trustee discovered or should have discovered the cause of action but failed to file a timely complaint.
