, On March 15, 2005, the Debtor filed a motion for sanctions., [5] Mr. Hansen filed the notice of appeal 85 days after entry of the order dismissing his adversary complaint, well beyond the 10-day time period required for filing a notice of appeal under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8002(a).
, FEDERMAN, Bankruptcy Judge.[28] Even before Lamie, and at the time Fiegen filed the Chapter 7 case for On-Line, Section 330 of the Code provided that a debtor's attorney could not be paid out of estate funds for post-petition services unless that attorney is employed by the trustee.
, Creditor Educational Credit Management Corporation (ECMC) appeals an order of the bankruptcy court discharging debtor Lily Rose's student loans. Nevertheless, even without another roommate, the evidence shows sufficient disposable income to not only pay on the loan, but to make the full payment.
Thus, under Missouri law, if it applies, at the time that Guy transferred the property from his joint account with Victor to his joint account with Louise, he may have been the legal owner of the asset, subject to Warren's interest and to payment of the expenses of administration of the estate.
The court held that the judgment for alienation of affections in state court established that Stage willfully and maliciously injured Osborne. The verdict director cites two cases: Miller v. Neill, 867 S.W.2d 523 (Mo.Ct.App.1993); Did so intentionally, refers to the injury, not the harm.
Upon the death of Stephen Griffin, Barbara Freeman is also entitled to receive any rent income from this property. *611 At the same time, Stephen apparently executed and delivered to Barbara a Quitclaim Deed to the real estate., On January 14, 2002, Stephen filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition.
We review the bankruptcy court's entry of summary judgment de novo. Income taxes which qualify for priority under the Bankruptcy Code and are consequently excepted from discharge include those for which a return was last due within three years before the filing of the bankruptcy petition;
, This is an appeal from an order of the bankruptcy court[1] entered on June 21, 2004, sustaining the objection of Charles W. Ries, Chapter 7 Trustee (Trustee) to the amended claim of homestead exemption filed by debtors James W. and Sherri L. Ladd (Debtors). Such is not the case.
The Panel also CONCLUSION, For the reasons stated above, we reverse the order of the bankruptcy court and hereby determine that AgriProcessors Inc., is entitled to an administrative expense claim against the bankruptcy estate of Tama Beef Packing, Inc., in the amount of $45, 014.99.
At that time the court approved the sale of the Remily Mortgage to Bancorp but denied the Trustee's request to abandon the Britton Property, contrary to the parties' stipulation and the court's August 21, 2003 order requiring the Trustee to abandon the property if it could not be sold.
On February 12, 2004 the Delaware bankruptcy court issued an order granting the State of North Dakota's motion to transfer the case from Delaware to North Dakota., When PW objected to the trustee's motion to approve the stipulation the matter became a contested matter under Rule 9014.
, United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Eighth Circuit., [5] Because the court based its holding solely on the Debtor's failure to list the diamond ring in her original schedules, it is not necessary to list the other property disclosed on the amendment to her bankruptcy schedules.
On May 19, 2005, the court held a hearing., [12] Martens argues that she brought a Rule 9014 motion, therefore, the bankruptcy court had to consider her claim that Countrywide had to present the original note to prove it had a valid claim before it could pursue its motion for relief from stay.
The Debtor's net monthly income is now $1, 443. If the Debtor were to elect the William D. Ford Consolidation Program offered by the Appellant, the Debtor's monthly payments on account of the student loan obligation would be $136.33 based on her income as of the petition date. Andrews v. S.D.
The Debtor appeals the order approving the Trustee's Final Report. After the Trustee learned that the bankruptcy estate would receive the distribution from the Debtor's brother's probate estate, the bankruptcy court established March 9, 2004, as the deadline to file proofs of claim.
Clauss testified that Church assured him that, regardless of whether he filed a bankruptcy case, he would not discharge the debt to Clauss, but would pay it in full.[2] We review the legal conclusions of the bankruptcy court de novo., [8] Van Horne, 823 F.2d at 1287; Ophaug, 827 F.2d at 342, n. 1.
v., Michael Binns and Mary Ann Binns, Defendant , Admittedly, Illinois law is not crystal clear on this issue, [8] and the case on which the court relied to conclude that collateral estoppel applies to default judgments could be interpreted to support its conclusion. 892, 79 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1984);
, Filed June 13, 2005.[2] Faced with cross-motions for summary judgment, the bankruptcy court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants and against the Plaintiffs, concluding that the Defendants' actions did not violate the discharge injunction. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986).
, Filed: July 13, 2005. The court began with the definitions of debt and claim in the Bankruptcy Code. Bridge argues that it improperly terminated the lease, and thereby damaged Vancil, Inc. But the dispute between the parties was over the market value of the rent under the option to renew.
, Renee Williams, Plaintiff , The trustee agrees that Mississippi law governs the validity of the acknowledgment, but argues on appeal that Arkansas law governs whether the deed of trust provides notice sufficiently to withstand challenge by the trustee under 11 U.S.C. ยง 544(a)(3).
