Whether or not the State of Florida, Department of Revenue, is entitled to collect documentary surtax pursuant to 201.17, F.S. on the portion of the amounts reflected in the warranty deed from James E. Russell, Jr. as trustee, to Wisconsin Real Estate Investment Trust dated April 11, 1975, and recorded May 20, 1975 in Official Records Book 2620, Page 1812, Public Records of Orange County, Florida; the portion spoken of being for "second" mortgages to the Petitioner herein, said mortgages being in the total amount of $865,854.00. If the documentary surtax is owed, what penalty should be assessed against the Petitioner under the terms of 201.17, F.S.Petitioner does not owe documentary tax on sale of property where no deed changed hands.
Petitioners' alleged liability for documentary stamp tax and penalty under Chapter 201, Florida Statutes.Petitioners were not liable for stamp tax on transfer of Real Estate subject to note.
The issue for determination in this proceeding is whether a trust created by a Florida resident in which the resident reserves the right to amend or revoke with the written consent of the trustees is subject to the Florida intangible personal property tax?Refund intangible personal property tax on trust. Petitioner had no unilateral power to revoke.
The issue in this proceeding is whether the transaction in question was a "package deal", or whether it was a separate purchase of a single family home site and the subsequent independent contract for the construction of a house thereon. The package deal is taken for the purposes of this Recommended Order to mean a concurrent agreement to purchase a house and a home site. If this transaction was a "package deal", then documentary stamp taxes would be due on the total contract price for the land and the dwelling. In this instance, documentary stamp taxes were only paid on the vacant land. The Department of Revenue introduced four exhibits at this proceeding. Those exhibits were are relevant to the disputed issue of fact indicate that the mortgage for the house and the lot were executed on the 25th day of May, 1976 in the amount of $22,750. The Notice Of Intention to begin construction of the single family residence (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2) was also signed May 25, 1976 and the warranty deed for the lot was executed on the same day. In essence, the contract to build the house, the mortgage financing the arrangement and the warranty deed for the property were all signed in what appears to have been a simultaneous transaction. The Petitioner, Emmer Development Corporation, introduced testimony to refute the impression created by the above exhibits. Although the contract for the construction of the house and the purchase of the lot appeared to have been conducted as a simultaneous transaction, the lot was actually purchased by verbal agreement on behalf of Mr. Frank McGee's son. Mr. McGee is the vice- president of Emmer Development Corporation, Petitioner in this case. It was Mr. McGee's intention to reserve the lot for his son and to supervise the construction of this home as an independent venture separate from the activities of the Emmer Development Corporation. The lot in question was one lot out of 119 separate single family home sites developed by Petitioner in Gainesville, Florida. Only after Mr. McGee discussed his intentions with Mr. Schram, vice- president of Emmer Development Corporation, was it agreed that Emmer Development Corporation would also construct the home for, Mr. McGee's son on a cost plus basis. The facts indicate that although the documents relating to these transactions make it appear that this was a package deal, in actuality the agreement to build the house came at a much later time than the agreement to construct the dwelling.Intent of the parties governs whether or not the real estate deal was a package deal or not. Here it was and the Petitioners are liable for the tax on the whole deal.
Petitioner's alleged liability for documentary stamp tax, penalty, and interest under Chapter 201, Florida.Reliance on intermediate court decision which had been stayed pending appeal not enough to defeat taxes owed on transfer of property.
