Filed: Jul. 21, 2014
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Case: 14-10340 Date Filed: 07/21/2014 Page: 1 of 6 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 14-10340 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 0:13-cr-60195-DMM-1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus TONY CYRIL FULLER, Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida _ (July 21, 2014) Before TJOFLAT, PRYOR and MARTIN, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Tony Cyril Fuller appeals his convict
Summary: Case: 14-10340 Date Filed: 07/21/2014 Page: 1 of 6 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 14-10340 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 0:13-cr-60195-DMM-1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus TONY CYRIL FULLER, Defendant-Appellant. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida _ (July 21, 2014) Before TJOFLAT, PRYOR and MARTIN, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Tony Cyril Fuller appeals his convicti..
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Case: 14-10340 Date Filed: 07/21/2014 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-10340
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 0:13-cr-60195-DMM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TONY CYRIL FULLER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(July 21, 2014)
Before TJOFLAT, PRYOR and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Tony Cyril Fuller appeals his conviction for being a felon in possession of a
Case: 14-10340 Date Filed: 07/21/2014 Page: 2 of 6
firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2).1 Fuller
raises one issue: Whether the District Court erred in denying his motion to
suppress a firearm and ammunition Detectives of the Lauderhill, Florida, Police
Department obtained during a warrantless search of his backyard and statements he
made following his arrest.
Fuller argues that although the detectives were engaged in the “hot pursuit”
of a stolen-car suspect, their approximately 12-minute pursuit of the suspect had
become “cold” by the time one of the detectives entered his backyard. We find no
error in the court’s ruling and accordingly affirm.
I.
The circumstances under which the police wound up in Fuller’s backyard, as
depicted at the hearing on Fuller’s motion to suppress, are these. On June 10,
2013, at 1:48 p.m., as Detective LaGrasta, his partner, Detective Session, and
another detective of the Lauderhill Police Department were attempting to stop a
stolen automobile, the car’s three male occupants jumped out while the car was
rolling and ran.2 Two went west, a third east. LaGrasta and Session ran after the
two headed west; the third detective remained on the scene, at
3321 N.W. 6th
Court. Detective LaGrasta quickly caught one of the two suspects, the driver of
1
As of the date of his arrest, Fuller had been convicted of multiple felonies—six as a
juvenile and four as an adult—and thus was prohibited from possessing a firearm.
2
After the suspects jumped out of the car, it crashed into a house.
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the car, in the backyard of a house on NW 6th Street, and handed him over to
officers who had arrived at the scene. LaGrasta then hailed a passing motorist
who drove him to the 3300 block of 4th Court, where his lieutenant was after the
second suspect who was running through backyards on 4th Court. At this point,
Detective Ramos, who was driving nearby, said in a radio transmission that two
suspicious people were in the backyard at 3461 4th Court. LaGrasta went there.
Fuller was living at that address with his girlfriend, Sabrina Hampton.
The lot at
3461 N.W. 4 t h Court contains a small house with a lawn in
front and on the sides, and a backyard enclosed by a chain-link fence with a gate
and, on one side, a neighbor’s wooden fence. The fence gate was open. Detective
LaGrasta ran around the house and looked into the backyard. He saw Fuller and
Hampton in the backyard sitting up against the neighbor’s wooden fence. Fuller
eyeballed LaGrasta, who was wearing tactical gear with a police insignia and
standing 15 to 20 feet away, and immediately removed a gun from his waistband
and dropped it into a trash can he was sitting on. At that point, LaGrasta,
concerned for his safety, entered the backyard, ordered Fuller to the ground,
removed a loaded firearm, a .45 caliber Taurus, from the trash can, and placed
Fuller in handcuffs. He searched Fuller and found cocaine powder and a straw
with cocaine residue. Detective Session, who had entered the backyard from the
other side of the house, told LaGrasta that Fuller was not the man he was chasing.
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Fuller was detained at 1:59 pm, just eleven minutes after LaGrasta and
Session began their the pursuit of the suspects, and LaGrasta read him his Miranda
rights. He waived his rights and responded to LaGrasta’s questions. He admitted
owning the firearm; he said he’d purchased it on the street in Ft. Lauderdale for $250.
II.
We review the District Court’s denial of Fuller’s motion to suppress as a
mixed question of law and fact. United States v. Franklin,
694 F.3d 1, 7 (11th Cir.
2012). We accept the court’s factual findings in resolving an exigent circumstance
issue unless the findings are clearly erroneous.
Id. “We determine de novo
whether the court erred in applying the law to those facts.”
Id. (quoting United
States v. Bradley,
644 F.3d 1213, 1261 (11th Cir. 2011)).
The Fourth Amendment protects persons and their “houses, papers, and
effects” from “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. This
protection extends to the curtilage of a person’s home, which is “part of the home
itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.” See Florida v. Jardines, __ U.S. __,
133
S. Ct. 1409, 1414,
185 L. Ed. 2d 495 (2013) (quoting Oliver v. United States,
466
U.S. 170, 180,
104 S. Ct. 1735, 1742,
80 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1984)); United States v.
Dunn,
480 U.S. 294, 300,
107 S. Ct. 1134, 1139,
94 L. Ed. 2d 326 (1987). The
Supreme Court has defined the curtilage as the area around the home that harbors
those intimate activities associated with domestic life and the privacies of the
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home.
Dunn, 480 U.S. at 300, 107 S. Ct. at 1139. Thus, “[w]henever government
agents enter into the curtilage they necessarily intrude upon the individual’s
reasonable expectation of privacy.” United States v. Jackson,
588 F.2d 1046, 1053
(5th Cir. 1979).
Under the Fourth Amendment, “searches and seizures inside a home without
a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.”
Franklin, 694 F.3d at 7 (quoting
Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573, 586,
100 S. Ct. 1371, 1380,
63 L. Ed. 2d 639
(1980)). However, a warrantless search or seizure of a home may be justified
“where both probable cause and exigent circumstances exist.”
Id. (quoting United
States v. Tobin,
923 F.2d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir. 1991)). The government bears the
burden of proving an exception to the warrant requirement. United States v.
Holloway,
290 F.3d 1331, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002). The exigent circumstances
doctrine applies only when there is a compelling need for official action, but no
time for law enforcement to secure a warrant.
Id. at 1334. The exigent
circumstances doctrine extends to situations involving “danger of flight or escape,
loss or destruction of evidence, risk of harm to the public or the police, mobility of
a vehicle, and hot pursuit.”
Id.
Under the hot pursuit doctrine, police officers may enter premises without a
warrant when they are in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect. See United States v.
Santana,
427 U.S. 38, 42–43,
96 S. Ct. 2406, 2409–10,
49 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1976). A
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“hot pursuit means some sort of chase, but it need not be an extended hue and cry
‘in and about [the] public streets.’”
Id. at 42–43, 96 S. Ct. at 2410. The Supreme
Court has indicated that a claim of hot pursuit is “unconvincing” where there was
“no immediate and continuous pursuit of the petitioner from the scene of a crime.”
Welsh v. Wisconsin,
466 U.S. 740, 753,
104 S. Ct. 2091, 2099,
80 L. Ed. 2d 732
(1984).
During the approximately 12 minutes between the suspects’ fleeing from the
stolen car and Detective LaGrasta’s arrival at Fuller’s yard, LaGrasta and other
detectives were engaged in a single pursuit that was continuous from the time the
suspects fled the stolen car to the moment LaGrasta entered Fuller’s back yard.
See
Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753, 104 S. Ct. at 2099;
Santana, 427 U.S. at 42–43, 96 S.
Ct. at 2409–10. Fuller does not challenge LaGrasta’s search and detention after he
entered the backyard. What he challenges is whether LaGrasta’s entry was
justified by exigent circumstances because the “hot pursuit” had grown cold. We
agree with the District Court that pursuit had not grown cold. LaGrasta was
engaged in an uninterrupted pursuit, aided by an ongoing dispatch transmission;
hence, his entry was justified.
AFFIRMED.
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