Filed: Dec. 16, 2014
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Case: 13-11987 Date Filed: 12/16/2014 Page: 1 of 12 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 13-11987 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 2:12-cv-00604-MHT-TFM STEVEN THOMASON, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus ONE WEST BANK, FSB, INDY MAC BANK, Defendant - Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama _ (December 16, 2014) Before WILLIAM PRYOR, MARTIN and JORDAN, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: The district c
Summary: Case: 13-11987 Date Filed: 12/16/2014 Page: 1 of 12 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 13-11987 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 2:12-cv-00604-MHT-TFM STEVEN THOMASON, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus ONE WEST BANK, FSB, INDY MAC BANK, Defendant - Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama _ (December 16, 2014) Before WILLIAM PRYOR, MARTIN and JORDAN, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: The district co..
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Case: 13-11987 Date Filed: 12/16/2014 Page: 1 of 12
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-11987
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:12-cv-00604-MHT-TFM
STEVEN THOMASON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
ONE WEST BANK,
FSB, INDY MAC BANK,
Defendant - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
________________________
(December 16, 2014)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, MARTIN and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The district court dismissed the pro se complaint of Steven Clayton
Thomason on the grounds that the complaint failed to sufficiently allege any
Case: 13-11987 Date Filed: 12/16/2014 Page: 2 of 12
claims for relief. Mr. Thomason appeals that ruling, as well as the district court's
denial of his request for leave to amend. While we find no error in the district
court’s ruling that Mr. Thomason’s initial complaint failed to state a claim for
relief, we conclude that Mr. Thomason should have been given leave to file an
amended complaint.
I
On July 11, 2012, Mr. Thomason filed a pro se civil rights complaint against
OneWest Bank, FSB and IndyMac Mortgage Services, a division of OneWest. Mr.
Thomason asserted three claims. First, he alleged that OneWest violated the Home
Affordable Modification Program (“HAMP”) 1 because it refused to modify his
wife’s loan after she died and attempted to foreclose on his property. Second, Mr.
Thomason maintained that OneWest violated the Home Affordable Foreclosure
Alternatives Program (“HAFA”), because it refused to allow him to sell his
property through a short sale. Third, Mr. Thomason claimed that OneWest
violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. § 2601,
et seq., because it failed to comply with his qualified written requests for
documents during two previous bankruptcies. He requested $88,000.00 in
monetary relief, as well as the right to sell his property.
1
The Making Home Affordable Program, a program that includes HAMP and HAFA, was created by
Department of the Treasury pursuant to the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), 12 U.S.C. §§
5201–5261. See Miller v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, 677 F.3d 1113, 1115-16 (11th Cir. 2012). See also U.S.
Dep’t of Treasury, Performance and Accountability Report: Fiscal Year 2010, 209-10 (Nov. 15, 2010).
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OneWest moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), and
argued that Mr. Thomason’s complaint was vague and failed to plead any facts to
support a civil rights violation. OneWest noted that it was a private entity not
subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and further argued that there were no
private causes of action available for alleged HAMP or HAFA violations. Finally,
OneWest asserted that Mr. Thomason’s RESPA claim was subject to dismissal
because a bare averment of a RESPA violation was not sufficient to state a claim
for relief.
The magistrate judge issued an initial report and recommendation (“R&R”)
that recommended dismissal of the complaint with prejudice pursuant to Rule
12(b) (6). The magistrate judge determined that, to the extent Mr. Thomason
attempted to raise a civil rights claim under § 1983, he could not do so because
OneWest was a private entity. In addition, Mr. Thomason could not raise claims
under HAMP or HAFA because neither program provides a private cause of
action. Finally, the magistrate judge concluded that Mr. Thomason failed to allege
sufficient facts to state a claim under RESPA.
Mr. Thomason filed objections to the R&R, combined with a motion to
amend his complaint, in which he sought to add new defendants and claims. He
also filed a second motion to amend, reiterating his new claims. Mr. Thomason’s
motion to amend sought to add the following defendants: (1) Donald McKinley,
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counsel for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; (2) EvaBank; (3) Mortgage
Electronic Registration System ("MERS"); and (4) Deutsche Bank. Mr. Thomason
alleged that he was a borrower on two loans, a $66,000 loan and a $12,375 loan.
He wanted to assert claims related to these loans under the Federal Debt Collection
Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §1692, et seq.; the Truth in Lending Act
("TILA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq.; the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. §
3605; and the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Acts, Alabama Code § 8-19-1,
et seq.
With respect to these claims, Mr. Thomason first asserted that OneWest had
engaged in deceptive business practices and discrimination by telling him that he
was not a borrower on the loan, and therefore had no right to a loan modification
under HAMP or short sale under HAFA. Mr. Thomason also alleged that EvaBank
discriminated against him under FHA because he was Hispanic, and that it engaged
in predatory mortgage lending by approving a mortgage that was impossible to pay
off because of its hidden fees and high interest rate. He further alleged that
OneWest and Deutsche Bank violated the FDCPA by harassing him and lying
during bankruptcy proceedings, and averred that IndyMac called him throughout
the day and before bedtime. Finally, Mr. Thomason asserted that One West
violated RESPA by failing to respond to the qualified written requests that he sent
on November 30, 2011, March 24, 2012, May 10, 2012, and June 4, 2012.
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Mr. Thomason attached various documents to his first motion for leave to
amend showing that, in November of 2005, a mortgage was executed with
EvaBank on a property located at 901 Seibles Road, Montgomery, Alabama. Both
Mr. Thomason and his wife were identified in the mortgage document as
“borrowers,” and both signed the security instrument for the $66,000 loan. He also
attached incomplete documents related to a second mortgage to secure an
additional $12,375 loan secured by the property. He was identified as a
“borrower” on this security instrument as well. Mr. Thomason included a note for
this additional loan, initialed and signed only by his wife.
Mr. Thomason also attached several letters that he sent to IndyMac about the
loan and the foreclosure. In the first letter, dated November 30, 2011, Mr.
Thomson stated that he was a borrower on the mortgage, explained that his wife
had died, and asked OneWest to place his name on the mortgage. In the second
letter, dated May 10, 2012, he asked why he was not listed on the loan despite
having signed the mortgage papers and contributing money to payments. In his
third and fourth letters, both dated June 4, 2012, Mr. Thomason informed IndyMac
that it was in violation of RESPA, provided additional details about the loan, and
requested a HAMP modification package. The letters all included the account
number for the loan.
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In addition, Mr. Thomason attached a letter from IndyMac, dated May 10,
2012, addressed to his wife, which acknowledged receiving a request that was
potentially a qualified written request under RESPA, and stating that a further
response would be sent “when required under applicable laws.” At the bottom of
the letter, it noted that IndyMac was “a debt collector.”
OneWest responded that Mr. Thomason had failed to properly seek leave to
amend his complaint, and was attempting to file an amended complaint that added
new parties and causes of action. OneWest argued that Mr. Thomason’s proposed
amended complaint did not present any new arguments or evidence in support of
his claims, and did not contain allegations sufficient to warrant reconsideration of
the R&R. The magistrate judge issued a supplemental R&R, recommending denial
of the motions to amend, because they did not include any amendments to Mr.
Thomason's causes of action as stated in his complaint. The magistrate judge thus
found the motions moot based upon the reasoning in the initial R&R, and
recommended dismissing Mr. Thomason’s complaint with prejudice.
Mr. Thomason generally objected to the supplemental R&R on the basis that
he had not alleged § 1983 claims, but rather made claims under the FDCPA, TILA,
FHA, RESPA, and the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act. He argued that his
amended complaint was sufficient to survive dismissal and was not moot. The
district court, reviewing the record de novo, summarily overruled Mr. Thomason’s
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objections and adopted the R&Rs, denying his motions for leave to amend and
granting OneWest’s motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice. The district
court then entered a judgment dismissing the complaint with prejudice.
II
We review the grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo,
accepting the facts alleged in the complaint as true, and construing them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Spain v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 363 F.3d 1183, 1187 (11th Cir.2004). Pro se pleadings are held to a less
demanding standard than counseled pleadings and should be liberally construed.
See Gilmore v. Hodges,
738 F.3d 266, 281 (11th Cir. 2013). Nonetheless, the
factual allegations in the complaint must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555,
127 S. Ct.
1955, 1964–65,
167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). Notably, “[a] copy of a written
instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.”
F.T.C. v. AbbVie Products LLC,
713 F.3d 54, 63 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Fed. R.
Civ. P. 10(c)). “At the motion-to-dismiss stage, we consider the facts derived from
a complaint's exhibits as part of the plaintiff's basic factual averments. We even
treat specific facts demonstrated by exhibits as overriding more generalized or
conclusory statements in the complaint itself.”
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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We review a district court’s denial of a motion to amend a complaint for
abuse of discretion. See Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001).
See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (setting forth that leave to amend “shall be freely
given” by district courts “when justice so requires”). “Generally, ‘where a more
carefully drafted complaint might state a claim, a plaintiff must be given at least
one chance to amend the complaint before the district court dismisses the action
with prejudice.’”
Id. (quoting Bank v. Pitt,
928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991)).
The district court need not allow an amendment, however, where: (1) there has
been undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, or repeated failure to cure
deficiencies by amendments previously allowed; (2) allowing amendment would
cause undue prejudice to the opposing party; or (3) amendment would be futile.
Corsello v. Lincare, Inc.,
428 F.3d 1008, 1014 (11th Cir.2005).
III
We affirm the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of Mr. Thomason’s §
1983 claims for alleged violations of HAMP and HAFA for the reasons stated in
the magistrate judge’s initial R&R. We must, however, reverse the district court’s
denial of Mr. Thomason’s motions for leave to amend. Our review of Mr.
Thomason’s motions for leave to amend and the proposed amended claim leads us
to conclude that Mr. Thomason has stated a claim for relief under RESPA.
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RESPA is a consumer protection statute that regulates the real estate
settlement process and prescribes certain actions to be followed by entities or
persons responsible for servicing federally related mortgage loans, including how
to respond to borrower inquires. See Hardy v. Regions Mortg., Inc., 449 F.3d
1357, 1359 (11th Cir. 2006). See also 12 U.S.C. § 2605. Under §2605(e)(2), a
lender must respond to a qualified written request from a borrower within sixty
days of receipt. See Bates v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, ___ F.3d ___,
2014 WL
4815564, at *6 (11th Cir. Sept. 30, 2014). A “qualified written request” is defined
as a “written correspondence . . . that (i) includes, or otherwise enables the servicer
to identify, the name and account of the borrower; and (ii) includes a statement of
the reasons for the belief of the borrower . . . that the account is in error or provides
sufficient detail to the servicer regarding other information sought by the
borrower.” § 2605(e)(1)(B).
In responding, the servicer must, “after conducting an investigation, provide
the borrower with a written explanation or clarification that includes—(i) to the
extent applicable, a statement of the reasons for which the servicer believes the
account of the borrower is correct as determined by the servicer; and (ii) the name
and telephone number of an individual employed by, or the office or department
of, the servicer who can provide assistance to the borrower.” Bates, 2014 WL
4814464, at *6 (citing § 2605(e)(2)(B)). “Whoever fails to comply with any
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provision of [§ 2605] shall be liable to the borrower for each such failure in . . . an
amount equal to the sum of: (A) any actual damages to the borrower as a result of
the failure; and (B) any additional damages, as the court may allow, in the case of a
pattern or practice of noncompliance with the requirements of this section, in an
amount not to exceed $2,000.” § 2605(f)(1)(A)-(B).
Mr. Thomason’s initial complaint stated in a conclusory fashion that
OneWest failed to comply with RESPA’s requirements, without providing any
supporting facts. Thus, the initial complaint failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted with respect to that allegation, and the district court did not
err in dismissing it. But Mr. Thomason’s proposed amendments, when construed
liberally in light of his pro se status, however, sufficiently alleged a claim for relief
under RESPA that rose above a speculative level. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Mr. Thomason asserted in his proposed amended claim that OneWest
violated RESPA by failing to respond to the qualified written requests that he sent
on November 30, 2011, March 24, 2012, May 10, 2012, and June 4, 2012. He
alleged that these qualified written requests included his name, his deceased wife’s
name and his account number, and stated his concern that his account erroneously
failed to list him as a co-borrower on the loan with his deceased wife. Mr.
Thomason also alleged that his letters requested documents and further information
from IndyMac concerning his qualification for HAMP and HAFA relief. Finally,
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Mr. Thomason attached as exhibits to his proposed amended claim copies of the
qualified written requests at issue.
Accepting Mr. Thomason’s allegations as true, as we must, Mr. Thomason
was entitled to written explanations in response to his qualified written requests.
The allegations in his proposed amended claim that IndyMac failed to respond
accordingly are sufficient to state a claim for relief under RESPA. See Sinaltrainal
v. Coca–Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1261 (11th Cir.2009) (“A complaint must state a
plausible claim for relief, and a claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”).
IV
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s dismissal with
prejudice of Mr. Thomason’s §1983 claims for violations of HAMP and HAFA.
We conclude, however, that Mr. Thomason’s proposed amended RESPA claim
sufficiently stated a cause of action, and he should have been given leave to
amend.
In closing, we note Mr. Thomason also sought to add additional claims,
including claims under the FDCPA, TILA, the FHA and the Alabama Deceptive
Trade Practices Acts, as well as additional defendants, including the FDIC, Eva
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Bank, MERS, and Deutsche Bank. The district court did not address these
proposed new claims and defendants, but should do so on remand.
We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Thomason’s initial complaint
and reverse the district court’s denial of Mr. Thomason’s motion to amend the
RESPA claim. We remand with instructions to the district court to allow Mr.
Thomason to amend his RESPA claim and to address the proposed new claims and
defendants.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
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