Filed: Mar. 11, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Case: 14-13680 Date Filed: 03/11/2015 Page: 1 of 8 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 14-13680 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 8:12-cv-01755-EAK-TBM DAVID RIGGINS, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus POLK COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Defendant - Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida _ (March 11, 2015) Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and JORDAN, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:
Summary: Case: 14-13680 Date Filed: 03/11/2015 Page: 1 of 8 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 14-13680 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 8:12-cv-01755-EAK-TBM DAVID RIGGINS, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus POLK COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Defendant - Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida _ (March 11, 2015) Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and JORDAN, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: ..
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Case: 14-13680 Date Filed: 03/11/2015 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-13680
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 8:12-cv-01755-EAK-TBM
DAVID RIGGINS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
POLK COUNTY,
a political subdivision of the State of Florida,
Defendant - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(March 11, 2015)
Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 14-13680 Date Filed: 03/11/2015 Page: 2 of 8
David Riggins challenged, on equal protection grounds, a Polk County
ordinance that grants women-owned and minority-owned business enterprises
bidding for municipal contracts the opportunity to match the lowest qualifying bid
if their original bid was within five percent of the lowest bid. The district court
dismissed Mr. Riggins’ action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because Mr.
Riggins lacked Article III standing. Because we agree with the district court that
Mr. Riggins’ company, D.C. Riggins, Inc., and not Mr. Riggins, is the proper
plaintiff in this action, we affirm.
I
“When a district court dismisses a plaintiff’s [complaint] for lack of
standing, we review de novo the court’s legal conclusions, and we review its
factual findings for clear error.” McCullum v. Orlando Regional Healthcare
System, Inc., 768 F.3d 1135, 1141 (11th Cir. 2014). To establish Article III
standing, a plaintiff must show (1) a concrete and particularized injury in fact that
is actual or imminent; (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action
of the defendant; and (3) that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). It is
the burden of the party invoking federal jurisdiction to establish these elements.
Id.
II
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Mr. Riggins, a white male, brought a pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against Polk County, alleging race and gender discrimination in the bidding award
of Polk County Quote 12-037. Mr. Riggins alleged in his amended complaint that
he submitted the lowest qualified bid for Quote 12-037 on behalf of his company,
D.C. Riggins, Inc. He attached to his initial complaint an “Invitation to Quote”
sent from Polk County to D.C. Riggins, Inc., inviting the company to submit a bid
for Quote 12-037 and instructing that the award would be made based on the
overall low bid. Polk County Ordinance 10-005, however, provides a preference
for women-owned and minority-owned business enterprises, which allows such
businesses to match the lowest qualifying bid if their original bid was within five
percent of the lowest bid. Mr. Riggins’ complaint alleged that, by operation of
Ordinance 10-005’s price-matching preference, Quote 12-037 was awarded to the
second-lowest bidder, a business that was given preference because it was owned
by a woman. Mr. Riggins therefore asserted that Polk County discriminated
against him based on his race and gender and that Ordinance 10-005 violated his
equal protection rights.
The district court determined that D.C. Riggins, Inc. was the real party in
interest based on the complaint’s factual allegations and the fact that Mr. Riggins
signed the amended complaint in his capacity as president of D.C. Riggins, Inc. It
directed Mr. Riggins to file a second amended complaint substituting D.C. Riggins,
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Inc. as the plaintiff and ordered Mr. Riggins to comply with Middle District of
Florida Local Rule 2.03(e), which requires that corporations be represented by
counsel. Mr. Riggins filed a second amended complaint that repeated the
allegations of the amended complaint, but removed all references to D.C. Riggins,
Inc. and named himself, individually, as the plaintiff. Mr. Riggins signed the
amended complaint in his individual capacity, rather than as president of D.C.
Riggins, Inc.
The district court ultimately ruled that Mr. Riggins lacked standing to pursue
his action individually. It noted that Mr. Riggins’ second amended complaint
sought injunctive and other equitable relief, as well as the award of attorney’s fees,
but did not request monetary damages. Thus, Mr. Riggins was required to show
that he was likely to suffer future injury at the hands of Polk County and that the
relief he sought would prevent such injury from occurring. The district court
concluded that second amended complaint did not allege a legally cognizable
injury to Mr. Riggins that was distinct from the harm suffered by D.C. Riggins,
Inc. The district court noted that the “Invitation to Quote” was directed to D.C.
Riggins, Inc., and that it was D.C. Riggins, Inc. that submitted a bid to Polk
County. As a result, Mr. Riggins participated in the bidding process only in his
capacity as an officer of D.C. Riggins, Inc., and not in his personal capacity.
Because Mr. Riggins conducted his business as a corporation rather than as an
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individual, the district court found that there was no credible threat of enforcement
of Ordinance 10-005 against Mr. Riggins personally. The district court therefore
concluded that Mr. Riggins did not meet the constitutional requirements for
standing because he did not establish a particularized injury that was likely to be
redressed by a favorable decision, and it dismissed the case without prejudice for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
This appeal timely followed.
III
On appeal, Mr. Riggins contends that he is the proper plaintiff in this action
because Polk County considered his race and gender in awarding the contract at
issue. Mr. Riggins further argues that requiring him to bring suit on behalf of his
company, D.C. Riggins, Inc., and obtain counsel in compliance with Local Rule
2.03(e), denies him due process because he cannot afford counsel and will
therefore be unable to prosecute his claims.
The district court did not err in dismissing Mr. Riggins’ second amended
complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on Mr. Riggins’ lack of
standing. Although Mr. Riggins removed all references to D.C. Riggins, Inc. in his
second amended complaint, the documents submitted with his initial complaint
indicated that it was the company that participated in the bidding process for Quote
12-037. The invitation to quote was directed at D.C. Riggins, Inc., the bid was
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submitted on behalf of D.C. Riggins, Inc., and Mr. Riggins’ correspondence with
Polk County indicated that he was acting in his capacity as President of D.C.
Riggins, Inc. Indeed, in letters attached to the initial complaint, Mr. Riggins stated
that “[his] company participates in competitive bidding for municipal contracts.”
Taken together, this evidence demonstrates that D.C. Riggins, Inc., and not Mr.
Riggins personally, participated in the bidding process for Quote 12-037.
Given that Mr. Riggins did not participate in the bidding process in his
individual capacity, he cannot demonstrate an injury that is particularized to him
and distinct from the injury to D.C. Riggins, Inc. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, n.1.
D.C. Riggins, Inc., as the entity involved in bidding on Quote 12-037, is the party
injured by the alleged inability to compete on equal footing as a result of
Ordinance 10-005. See Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v.
City of Jacksonville,
508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993) (“[I]n the context of a challenge to a
set-aside program, the ‘injury in fact’ is the inability to compete on an equal
footing in the bidding process.”). Although the injury to the company may affect
Mr. Riggins as a major shareholder in, and president of, D.C. Riggins, Inc., his
rights are merely derivative and he cannot bring suit to redress the company’s
injury in his own name. See KMS Restaurant Corp. v. Wendy’s Int’l, Inc.,
361
F.3d 1321, 1324-25 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that a shareholder lacks standing to
maintain an action to redress injuries to a corporation in his own name).
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Furthermore, any potential injury to Mr. Riggins personally from the application of
Ordinance 10-005 to future bids would be merely hypothetical, as it would be
contingent on Mr. Riggins abandoning the corporate form and participating in the
bidding process as a non-corporate entity. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (stating
that alleged injury must be imminent, not merely hypothetical or conjectural).
With respect to Mr. Riggins’ argument concerning the district court’s
requirement that he obtain counsel to represent D.C. Riggins, Inc. in accordance
with Local Rule 2.03(e), we recognize that Mr. Riggins failed to specify the district
court’s order directing him to comply with Local Rule 2.03(e) in his notice of
appeal. Nevertheless, we will address the argument as it is apparent that Mr.
Riggins intended to appeal that ruling and that Polk County is not prejudiced by
our consideration of this issue. See KH Outdoor, LLC v. City of Trussville, 465
F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2006) (“In this circuit, it is well settled that an appeal is
not lost if a mistake is made in designating the judgment appealed from where it is
clear that the overriding intent was effectively to appeal.”).
“We . . . review a district court’s application of local rules for an abuse of
discretion.” Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1302 (11th Cir. 2009). To
show an abuse of discretion, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the
district court made a clear error of judgment.
Id. Middle District of Florida Local
Rule 2.03(e), which provides that “[a] corporation may appear and be heard only
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through counsel admitted to practice” in the district court, M.D. Fla. Local Rule
2.03(e), is consistent with the well-established rule that a corporation cannot
appear pro se and must be represented by counsel. See Palazzo v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
764 F.2d 1381, 1385 (11th Cir. 1985). Importantly, this rule applies even where
the person seeking to represent the corporation is its president and major
shareholder.
Id. We thus conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in ordering Mr. Riggins to obtain counsel in compliance with Local Rule
2.03(e).
IV
Based on the foregoing, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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