Petitioner timely filed Forms 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, and Forms 990-T, Exempt Organization Business Income Tax Return, for the years in issue.

On its Forms 990 for the years in issue, petitioner reported that PB&T had paid it the following amounts of royalties: $ 74,703 for 1989, $ 105,797 for 1990, and $ 114,364 for 1991. Petitioner did not report these amounts as unrelated business taxable income on the Forms 990-T that it filed for those years. Petitioner reported that it had received $ 2,500 of advertising income for 1989, $ 2,500 for 1990, and none for 1991. On its Forms 990-T for 1989, 1990, and 1991, petitioner reported taxable income from the sale of merchandise including rings and watches. Petitioner reported commission income on insurance on Forms 990-T for 1989 and 1990.

OPINION

A. Taxation of Unrelated1997 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 473">*492 Business Income and Royalties

Section 511(a)(1) imposes a tax on the unrelated business taxable income (UBTI) of certain tax-exempt organizations. Petitioner is subject to tax on its UBTI under section 511(a)(2) because it is tax exempt under section 501(c). As a general rule, income is UBTI if: (1) The income arises from a trade or business, (2) the trade or business is regularly carried on, and (3) the trade or business is not substantially related to the organization's tax-exempt purpose. Sec. 512(a)(1); Veterans of Foreign Wars v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 7">89 T.C. 7, 89 T.C. 7">19-20 (1987).

Royalties are excluded from UBTI. Sec. 512(b)(2). Whether income is a royalty is decided on the basis of all the facts and circumstances. Texas Farm Bureau v. United States, 53 F.3d 120">53 F.3d 120, 53 F.3d 120">123 (5th Cir. 1995); sec. 1.512(b)-1, Income Tax Regs. The taxpayer bears the burden of proof. Rule 142(a).

A royalty is a payment for the right to use valuable intangible property rights; it is not a payment for services rendered by the owner of the property. Texas Farm Bureau v. United States, 53 F.3d 120">53 F.3d at 123-124; Sierra Club, Inc. v. Commissioner, 86 F.3d 1526">86 F.3d 1526, 86 F.3d 1526">1531-1532 (9th Cir. 1996),1997 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 473">*493 affg. T.C. Memo. 1993-199 and affg. in part and revg. in part on other grounds and remanding 103 T.C. 307">103 T.C. 307 (1994); ³Disabled Am. Veterans v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 60">94 T.C. 60, 94 T.C. 60">70 (1990), revd. on other grounds 942 F.2d 309">942 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1991).

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit discussed the degree1997 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 473">*494 of activity the recipient of a royalty under section 512(b) may conduct as follows:

Thus, to the extent the Commissioner claims that a tax-exempt organization can do nothing to acquire such fees (e.g., providing a rate sheet listing the fee charged for use of each copyrighted design or retaining the right to approve how the design is used and marketed), the Commissioner is incorrect. However, to the extent that Sierra Club appears to argue that a "royalty" is any payment for the use of a property right--such as a copyright--regardless of any additional services that are performed in addition to the owner simply permitting another to use the right at issue, we disagree. [86 F.3d 1526">Sierra Club, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at 1535.]

Thus, we must carefully review the actions by an organization to ensure that fees are paid for the use of intangible property and not for services. See Alumni Association of the Univ. of Or., Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-63; Oregon State Univ. Alumni Association, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-34.

Respondent contends that petitioner's income 1997 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 473">*495 from the affinity credit card program during the years in issue arises from a trade or business which petitioner regularly carried on and which is substantially unrelated to its tax-exempt purpose, and that petitioner's affinity credit card income is not a royalty under section 512(b)(2). ⁴ For reasons discussed below, we hold that the payments at issue are royalties. In light of this holding, we need not decide whether petitioner's affinity credit card program is a trade or business.

B. Whether PB&T Paid Petitioner To Use Valuable Intangible Property Rights

PB&T obtained the right to use valuable intangible property rights in the 1987 and 1991 agreements. Under the agreements, PB&T could use petitioner's name, its letterhead, the signature1997 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 473">*496 of its executive director on promotional materials, a list of names and addresses of petitioner's members, and MSU's "walking bulldog" trademark. Payments for the right to use these items may be royalties. See 86 F.3d 1526">Sierra Club, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra; Alumni Association of the Univ. of Or., Inc. v. Commissioner, supra;Oregon State Univ. Alumni Association, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra.

Respondent points out that MSU gave PB&T permission to use the "walking bulldog" trademark without charging PB&T or petitioner and contends that this means PB&T did not pay to use it. Respondent's contention takes MSU's permission out of context. When viewed in context, it is clear that MSU handled it this way so PB&T's payments to use the "walking bulldog" trademark would go to petitioner, not to let PB&T use the "walking bulldog" without cost.

We conclude that PB&T paid petitioner for the right to use valuable intangible property rights.

C. Whether PB&T's Payments Were for Services

Respondent contends that PB&T paid petitioner to perform services relating to the affinity credit card program and contends that petitioner performed a1997 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 473">*497 large number of services for PB&T. We disagree. Petitioner's activities were minimal and infrequent, were not conducted like a commercial business, and were not services for which PB&T paid.

1. Petitioner's Use of the Program for Its Exempt Purposes

Respondent mischaracterizes some of petitioner's activities as services for PB&T or credit card promotional activities. For example, respondent refers to the messages petitioner included in the credit card bills as promotional materials, even though they were used only to promote petitioner's activities to its members; the messages were not used to promote the card. Respondent characterizes petitioner's maintenance and updating of its mailing list as a substantial service for PB&T and as administration of its affinity credit card program. We disagree; these actions are more fairly viewed as part of petitioner's communication to its members, which is central to its exempt purpose.

2. PB&T's Access to Petitioner's Intangible Property

Respondent contends that petitioner's providing its mailing list to PB&T was a service. We disagree; the mailing list was valuable intangible property. Alumni Association of the Univ. of Or., Inc. v. Commissioner, supra;1997 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 473">*498 Oregon State Univ. Alumni Association, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra; see also Sierra Club, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-199. Providing the list to PB&T was essential to PB&T's use of that property. Respondent also contends that petitioner's agreement to use its best efforts to maintain MSU's permission to use the "walking bulldog" was a service. We disagree. MSU had already decided to let PB&T use the MSU trademark for the credit card agreement. No activity by petitioner was required. Even if petitioner had to act so that PB&T could continue to use the "walking bulldog" trademark, that effort would have been undertaken to provide intangible property to PB&T, not to provide a service.

Similarly, contrary to respondent's contention, the facts that PB&T substantially agreed to the terms outlined by petitioner's initial letter and the program generated increasing income for petitioner each year do not speak to whether the income was a royalty.

3. Activities of MSU and PB&T

Respondent contends that the article in Alumnus written about the credit card program is an activity by petitioner. We disagree; the article1997 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 473">*499 was written by the Office of University Relations, not petitioner. Respondent points out that the article said: "Additional information on the Bulldog Card can be obtained by calling the MSU Alumni Association * * * or The Peoples Bank", and contends that this shows petitioner was marketing the credit card program. We disagree. It merely means that the author was telling readers that petitioner had information about the credit card program.

Respondent contends that petitioner permitted PB&T to distribute credit card applications at a football game. We have not so found because the record indicates that MSU, not petitioner, permitted PB&T to conduct this activity.

Respondent suggests that petitioner was involved in employing MSU students to insert credit card applications in bags at the MSU bookstore. There is no basis in the record for respondent's suggestion.

4. Petitioner's Marketing Coordinator

Respondent contends that petitioner's hiring of a marketing coordinator shows that the payments at issue were for services because Grafton projected that the person hired could generate enough funds to pay his or her own salary. We disagree. It is not surprising that the marketing1997 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 473">*500 coordinator for a fundraising organization would raise more money than he or she was paid.

Respondent contends that Andrews regularly devoted a substantial amount of time to the credit card program. We disagree. Andrews, Grafton, and Brown testified without contradiction that Andrews worked only a negligible amount of time on the credit card program.

Andrews' effort to sell advertising for the credit card program to PB&T was not a service to PB&T; it was an effort to increase petitioner's advertising revenue. Respondent implies that the fact that Andrews suggested changes to the 1987 agreement so petitioner could get more use from the message included in the monthly billing statement and contacted other universities to seek ideas for the addendum for the 1991 contract were services for PB&T. We disagree; this was work she did to assist petitioner in its dealings with PB&T.

5. Endorsement and Review of Marketing Materials

Respondent points out that petitioner endorsed the program and reviewed marketing materials prepared by PB&T. Respondent contends that these actions were services to PB&T for purposes of section 512(b). We disagree.

PB&T or advertising firms hired by PB&T1997 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 473">*501 wrote endorsement messages over a facsimile of Grafton's signature which were printed on petitioner's letterhead. Petitioner did not write or pay for the letters. Grafton spent only 3 to 5 minutes reviewing each endorsement letter, and he did not change the letters. An organization's review of marketing materials which bear its name is reasonably related to protecting the organization's name and does not disqualify payments from being royalties. Alumni Association of the Univ. of Or., Inc. v. Commissioner, supra;Oregon State Univ. Alumni Association, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra;Sierra Club, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-199. The Commissioner has ruled that endorsement of products through the use of likenesses and signatures of professional athletes does not prevent payments from being royalties. Rev. Rul. 81-178, 1981-2 C.B. 135. That ruling discusses two situations. The first situation is substantially like this case, in which the income from the endorsement of products, use of signatures and trademarks, and review of licensed products is a royalty. 1997 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 473">*502 Id. The second situation involves much more activity, such as personal appearances. The Commissioner ruled that income in that situation is not a royalty. Id.

We conclude that petitioner's review of marketing material and endorsement of the program were not services to PB&T.

6. Credit Card Application Forms

Respondent contends that petitioner helped PB&T market the affinity credit cards, that petitioner's employees "regularly" took credit card applications to chapter meetings. We have not so found because the record does not indicate how often petitioner's employees took applications to chapter meetings or how often chapters met. Petitioner had application forms available for members, took an unspecified number of application forms to some meetings with its other membership information, and mailed some in response to specific requests from members. We disagree that petitioner's actions are fairly characterized as marketing or services for PB&T, or that PB&T paid petitioner for these minimal actions. These actions are too insignificant to preclude a finding that petitioner's income from the credit card program is a royalty.

7. Advertising

Respondent contends that1997 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 473">*503 Alumnus did not accept paid advertising before 1990, on the basis of the fact that Andrews and Deann Williams wrote letters which refer to the September 1990 issue of Alumnus as the first to accept paid advertising. Grafton, who, unlike Andrews, worked for petitioner before 1990, testified that Alumnus accepted paid advertising in 1988 and possibly earlier. PB&T bought a 3/4-page color advertisement featuring the person who broadcasts MSU football games in the fall 1988 issue of Alumnus and paid for artwork for the ad. Respondent speculates that PB&T paid only petitioner's costs for advertising in Alumnus, but the record does not so indicate.

Respondent contends that petitioner and PB&T had an understanding that petitioner would participate in advertising the credit cards. This contention is at odds with the contracts between PB&T and petitioner and Grafton's and Brown's testimony that there was no unwritten understanding. Petitioner did not participate in advertising the credit cards.

8. Mailing List With MSU Students and Faculty

Respondent contends that petitioner gathered and gave to PB&T the names and addresses of MSU faculty and the parents of MSU students, that those 1997 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 473">*504 names were not in petitioner's data base, and that doing so was a service to PB&T. Respondent's contention is speculative and based in part on the fact that petitioner billed PB&T for 4,000 envelopes and sheets of petitioner's stationery and for 3,124 mailing labels for the MSU faculty and staff. There was no testimony about this bill. A handwritten note on it says that it was for stationery and supplies; it does not say that it was for services.

9. Olympic Gold Coin Program

Respondent contends that petitioner's participation in the Olympic gold coin program shows that the payments from PB&T were not royalties. We disagree. PB&T received a solicitation from a vendor and offered to share with petitioner any commissions for orders it received from petitioner's members. There were no orders. There is no evidence that petitioner did anything except receive a letter from PB&T offering to split the commissions from the program.

10. Analysis and Conclusion

PB&T paid petitioner for its endorsement and to use its mailing list and MSU's "walking bulldog" trademark; PB&T did not pay for services related to operating a credit card business. Petitioner's activities were almost entirely1997 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 473">*505 limited to (a) giving PB&T access to those intangibles, (b) achieving some direct member-related benefits such as messages on cardholder statements and indirect benefits such as increased advertising revenues for Alumnus, and (c) protecting petitioner's good will with its members such as by reviewing mailings and responding to occasional inquiries.

Respondent contends that petitioner's activities were as extensive as those of organizations that received income which was not a royalty, such as in Texas Farm Bureau v. United States, 53 F.3d 120">53 F.3d at 125-126; Fraternal Order of Police v. Commissioner, 833 F.2d 717">833 F.2d 717, 833 F.2d 717">723-724 (7th Cir. 1987), affg. 87 T.C. 747">87 T.C. 747 (1986), and Louisiana Credit Union League v. United States, 693 F.2d 525">693 F.2d 525, 693 F.2d 525">533 (5th Cir. 1982). We disagree. Petitioner's activities to support the affinity credit card program were far less substantial than the activities performed by the taxpayers in those cases.

The organization in Texas Farm Bureau, in addition to providing its logo, name, and mailing list, provided clerical and administrative services, telephones, 1997 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 473">*506 office supplies, and other goods and services necessary to conduct an insurance business. 53 F.3d 120">Texas Farm Bureau v. United States, supra at 123-124. In 833 F.2d 717">Fraternal Order of Police v. Commissioner, supra, the taxpayer published a magazine for which the taxpayer could appoint the executive editor, prepare editorials and feature articles, control solicitations of business listings and the bank account, and decide whether an article appearing in the magazine could be reprinted elsewhere. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the organization's income from business listings was commercial advertising and was not a royalty because the organization conducted it like a commercial venture. 833 F.2d 717">Id. at 723.

The taxpayer in Louisiana Credit Union League dealt with commercial insurance vendors, debt collectors, and electronic data processing services for its members. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit said that the taxpayer--

did everything short of actually selling the insurance and collecting the debts itself: it selected the companies whose products and services would1997 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 473">*507 be endorsed, actively marketed and promoted those products and services to member credit unions, and performed the day-to-day administrative tasks essential to the insurance and debt collection operations. [693 F.2d 525">Louisiana Credit Union League v. United States, supra at 533.]

We conclude that PB&T's payments to petitioner under the affinity credit card contracts were for the use of valuable intangible property rights, not for services.

D. Petitioner's Use of Its Mailing List

Respondent contends that, like the taxpayer in Disabled Am. Veterans v. Commissioner, 942 F.2d 309">942 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1991), and Disabled Am. Veterans v. United States, 227 Ct. Cl. 474">227 Ct. Cl. 474, 650 F.2d 1178">650 F.2d 1178 (1981), petitioner regularly rented its mailing list. Respondent argues that, under those cases, income from petitioner's mailing lists is not a royalty. We disagree.

In Disabled Am. Veterans v. United States, 650 F.2d 1178">650 F.2d at 1184, the Court of Claims held that the Disabled American Veterans (DAV) conducted a trade or business of renting its mailing list and that it was not royalty. From 1974 to 1979, DAV rented parts of its donor list 451 times. Disabled Am. Veterans v. Commissioner, 942 F.2d 309">942 F.2d at 311. In doing so, DAV followed the usual practices of the direct mail industry. Id. DAV prepared rate cards showing the rates it charged1997 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 473">*509 to customers. Id. DAV employed two staff personnel full time to administer its list rentals. Id. Petitioner did not use list brokers, employ anyone to administer its mailing list rental, or otherwise try to rent its mailing lists like the taxpayer in 227 Ct. Cl. 474">Disabled Am. Veterans v. United States, supra.

Respondent points out that the 1987 agreement ran for 3 years, and petitioner regularly received income from the program. We disagree that this fact shows that PB&T's payments to petitioner were not royalties because royalties are often paid regularly over several years. See, e.g., Kramer v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 768">80 T.C. 768 (1983); Cloward Instrument Corp. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-345, affd. 842 F.2d 1294">842 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1988).

Petitioner had agreements with Wayneco in 1988, 1989, and 1991 for Wayneco to use petitioner's mailing list to sell affinity items to petitioner's members. Petitioner's agreements with Wayneco and PB&T are not remotely like DAV's list rental activity.

Respondent contends that the September 1991 letter Chuck Smith sent to petitioner1997 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 473">*510 shows that petitioner actively rented its mailing lists during the years in issue. We disagree. In that letter, petitioner requested list rental rates for July 1988 to June 1989. It does not show that petitioner was renting its lists during the years in issue.

The taxpayer in Sierra Club, Inc. v. Commissioner, 86 F.3d 1526">86 F.3d 1526 (9th Cir. 1996), set the rental rates, rented its mailing lists, and had the right to review requests to rent the lists and to approve the proposed mailing material and schedule for each mailing, but took no other action. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that payments for rental of mailing lists were royalties because the taxpayer did not provide any services with the mailing lists. Id.

Petitioner's conduct was more like that of the taxpayer in Sierra Club than that in Disabled Am. Veterans. Like the taxpayer in Sierra Club, petitioner maintained its mailing lists to further its tax-exempt function. Sierra Club, Inc. v. Commissioner, 86 F.3d 1526">86 F.3d at 1535. Petitioner employed Carr to maintain the lists on a computer data base. Like the taxpayer in Sierra Club, petitioner1997 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 473">*511 set rental rates and had the right to approve mailing material, but unlike the taxpayer in both Disabled Am. Veterans cases, it did very little else to support the credit card program. PB&T prepared and mailed all of the promotional materials.

Respondent points out that petitioner reported the Wayneco payments from the sale of merchandise, such as watches and rings, as taxable income but not its income from the affinity credit card program. Petitioner reported its income from the sale of merchandise as UBTI but treated its income from the credit cards as a royalty. The record does not show why petitioner treated the Wayneco payments and the payments at issue differently. However, the fact that petitioner did not treat the Wayneco payments and the affinity credit card program payments consistently does not deprive the payments at issue of status as a royalty.

Respondent speculates that the credit card fosters less affinity towards MSU by its members than the items for sale with the "walking bulldog" trademark because those are likely to be viewed by members more often than a credit card that is kept in a wallet. We disagree. Ward and Grafton testified without contradiction that1997 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 473">*512 the credit cards and the items bearing the MSU "walking bulldog" trademark encourage good will between petitioner's members and MSU; nothing in the record supports respondent's view.

E. Failure To Refer to PB&T's Payments to Petitioner as Royalties in the 1987 Agreement

Respondent contends that the payments at issue are not royalties because the 1987 agreement did not call them royalties. Respondent contends that under Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771">378 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1967), vacating and remanding 44 T.C. 549">44 T.C. 549 (1965), petitioner may not assert that payments under the 1987 agreement were royalties.

When the Danielson rule applies, a taxpayer may not disavow unambiguous terms of an agreement to achieve different tax results unless mistake, undue influence, fraud, duress, or other ground exists to set aside the agreement. 378 F.2d 771">Id. at 775. Danielson does not apply here because petitioner is not disavowing any terms of its agreements with PB&T. The 1987 agreement does not characterize the payments; it does not say the payments were (or were not) royalties or income from a trade or business. 1997 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 473">*513 Petitioner's position that the payments are royalties is consistent with the 1987 agreement.

F. Whether Section 513(h) Applies

Section 513(h) exempts from tax amounts earned by certain tax-exempt organizations from the trade or business of exchanging or renting mailing lists to other tax-exempt organizations. ⁵ Section 513(h) is effective for exchanges and rentals of member lists after October 22, 1986. Respondent contends that the enactment of section 513(h) implies that renting mailing lists is generally a trade or business. Respondent asks us to infer from the enactment of section 513(h) that Congress generally views gross income from the licensing of mailing lists as UBTI, unless excepted by section 513(h). We do not draw that inference.

1997 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 473">*514 The inference asserted by respondent is rejected in the legislative history of section 513(h). A colloquy between Congressmen Daniel Rostenkowski (D-Ill.), Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, and John Duncan (R-Tenn.), Ranking Republican Member of the Ways and Means Committee, occurred in the House of Representatives on the day of the adoption of the conference report accompanying the bill which included section 513(h). Chairman Rostenkowski's comments were as follows:

I also have discussed with Congressman Duncan the issue of whether the provision of the bill which excludes certain income from unrelated trade or business income creates any inference under present law. We have reached a common understanding regarding the following specific issue:

The question relates to section 1601 of the bill which excludes from unrelated trade or business income revenues from the use of a tax-exempt organization's mailing list by another such organization. Section 1601 of the bill, which specifically exempts certain such revenues from the tax on unrelated business income in the future, carries no inference whatever that mailing list revenues beyond its scope or prior to its effective1997 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 473">*515 date should be considered taxable to an exempt organization.

Respondent relies on a concurring opinion in Disabled Am. Veterans v. Commissioner, 942 F.2d 309">942 F.2d at 317 (Martin, J., concurring), which states:

Congress, in enacting * * * [section 513(h)], obviously felt that the court of claims decision in DAV1 was the proper interpretation of "royalties" for purposes of § 512(b)(2) with respect to the payments received by an exempt organization from a commercial organization.

* * * *

The acceptance of DAV's position that the monies it receives from list rental are royalties1997 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 473">*516 under § 512(b)(2) would totally eviscerate section 513(h).

G. Whether Royalty Treatment Is Consistent With the Purpose of the Tax on Unrelated Business Income

Respondent contends that the affinity credit card program at issue here leads to unfair competition between tax-exempt organizations and taxable businesses and that Congress intended to subject that income to the tax on unrelated business income. We disagree.

The tax on unrelated business income was enacted to prevent tax-exempt organizations from unfairly using their tax-exempt status to compete with commercial businesses. United States v. American College of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834">475 U.S. 834, 475 U.S. 834">837-838 (1986).

Respondent contends that petitioner's activities relating to the affinity credit card were like1997 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 473">*517 the insurance activities at issue in United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105">477 U.S. 105 (1986). In that case, the Supreme Court held that the American Bar Endowment (ABE) conducted a trade or business, creating the kind of unfair competition that led to the enactment of section 512. 477 U.S. 105">Id. at 114. We disagree that the facts are similar. ABE provided group insurance policies to its members. 477 U.S. 105">Id. at 107. ABE actively administered the insurance program. Id. ABE chose insurers, negotiated premium rates with insurers, compiled lists of its members, solicited and collected premiums from its members, sent premiums to the insurer, kept files on each policyholder, answered members' questions about insurance policies, and screened claims for benefits. Id. The Supreme Court found that this arrangement created unfair competition because ABE's members could deduct part of their premium payment as a charitable contribution. Unlike ABE, petitioner did not compete with any taxable entity; PB&T, not petitioner, competed with other credit card issuers.

We conclude that petitioner did not engage in any1997 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 473">*518 activity which Congress intended to subject to the tax on unrelated business income.

H. Conclusion

Petitioner's income from the affinity credit card program in the years in issue is a royalty excluded by section 512(b)(2) from the unrelated business income tax.

To reflect the foregoing,

Decision will be entered under Rule 155.