STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

CAROLYN W. WALKER, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CASE NO. 77-1463

)

STATE OF FLORIDA, DIVISION )

OF RETIREMENT, )

)

Respondent. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

This case was heard pursuant to notice in Room 114, Collins Building, Tallahassee, Florida, at 9:00 a.m. on September 21, 1977. This case was presented upon the petition of Carolyn W. Walker to the Division of Retirement, Department of Administration, State of Florida, which asserted the Petitioner was entitled to in-line-of-duty death benefits pursuant to Section 121.091(7)(c)1, Florida Statutes, as a result of the death due to accidental and fatal injuries of her husband, Ronnie D. Walker, a member of the Florida Retirement System. This matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings by the Division of Retirement to conduct a formal hearing. The issue for determination is whether the death of Ronnie D. Walker arose out of and in the actual performance of duty required by his employer.

Petitioner's contention was that Walker's death occurred during his regularly scheduled working hours or, in the alternative, during irregularly scheduled working hours as required by his employer and therefore his death was in line of duty. The Respondent's contention was that Walker's death occurred following his regular working hours and did not occur in the regular performance of any duty required by his employer during regularly or irregularly scheduled working hours; and, therefore, his death was not in line of duty as required by Chapter 121, Florida Statutes.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: P. Kevin Davey, Esquire

Douglas, Powell & Davey Post Office Box 1674 Tallahassee, Florida 32302

For Respondent: E. Douglas Spangler, Jr., Esquire

Assistant Division Attorney Division of Retirement

530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. This case is an action for in-line-of-duty death benefits brought pursuant to Sections 120.57, 121.021(14), and 121.091(7), Florida Statutes.

   
   

2. Carolyn W. Walker was the legal wife and is now the widow of Ronnie D. Walker, deceased. Carolyn W. Walker is the natural mother and legal guardian of Melanie L. Walker, age 9; Ronnie D. Walker, Jr., age 5; and Jason W. Walker, age

   6 months; the minor children of Ronnie D. Walker, deceased.

   
   

3. At the time of his death on December 4, 1976, and for the previous six years, Ronnie D. Walker was employed as a sergeant and deputy sheriff for the Leon County Sheriff's Department. Sgt. Walker was killed in an automobile/tank truck collision at the intersection of Woodville Highway and Oakridge Drive, Leon County, Florida.

   
   

4. The location of the accident in which Sgt. Walker was killed was less than one mile from his residence on Oakridge Drive. Based upon the time his shift terminated and the location of the accident, Sgt. Walker had chosen the most direct route from the Leon County Jail to his residence. At the time of his death, Sgt. Walker was in full uniform and was armed.

   
   

5. Sgt. Walker was a member of the Florida Retirement System at the time of his death and was entitled to the benefits provided for in Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. Carolyn W. Walker was the designated beneficiary of Ronnie D. Walker for death benefits payable under the provisions of Chapter 121, Florida Statutes.

   
   

6. Subsequent to the death of her husband, Carolyn Walker made application to the Division of Retirement for in-line-of-duty death benefits, pursuant to Section 121.091(7)(c), Florida Statutes. All information, data and documentation required by the Division of Retirement was furnished by either Mrs. Walker or her attorneys.

   
   

7. Deputies of the Leon County Sheriff's Department work a tour of duty known as a shift. The work day for the Leon County Sheriff's Department was at the time in question in this case divided into three shifts; 7:00 a.m. - 3:00 p.m., 3:00 p.m. - 11:00 p.m., 11:00 p.m. - 7:00 a.m. The deputies worked different shifts on a rotating basis, the times changing on a 28-day cycle. Sgt. Ronnie Walker worked the 11:00 p.m. - 7:00 a.m. shift on the evening of December 3, 1976 and morning of December 4, 1976. Sgt. Walker was the acting shift commander during this particular shift due to the absence of Lt. Ron Koenig, the regular shift commander. Therefore, in addition to his duties as a field deputy, Sgt. Walker assumed a supervisory role with responsibility for efficient operation of the evening shift on the tour of duty preceding his death.

   
   

8. As part of his normal and routine duties, a shift commander or his replacement is responsible for initiating investigations of more serious incidents during his shift. It is not unusual for a shift commander's involvement in such investigations to extend well beyond the termination of the normal tour of duty, to include providing additional information needed as the investigation by the Sheriff's Department is continued. However, the responsibility for making routine investigations passes from the shift commander on duty when he is relieved by the oncoming shift commander. A shift ends when the shift commander checks in the field deputies from their patrol assignments

   and clears them from the Leon County. Once the field deputies have been cleared and relieved the shift commander is relieved.

   
   

9. Deputies below the rank of shift commander, to include Sgt. Walker, were not assigned a sheriff's patrol car 24 hours a day. All shift commanders and above were assigned an official vehicle which they were required to use and have available at all times. Although the Leon County Sheriff at the time would have preferred to provide field deputies with patrol cars, field deputies had to furnish their own transportation to and from work due to lack of money. Field deputies would pick up their official vehicles at the Leon County Jail at the commencement of their tour of duty. Sgt. Walker, as deputy shift commander, was required to provide his own transportation to and from work, and at the time of his fatal accident was driving his personal vehicle.

   
   

10. At the time of his death and for the preceding several years, Sgt. Walker and other deputies of the Leon County Sheriff's Department had been required by their employer, the sheriff of Leon County, to work many overtime hours in addition to the hours of their regularly scheduled formalized shifts. These additional hours of work were required by the sheriff due to the lack of money in the sheriff's budget to employ additional deputies.

    
    

11. Neither Sgt. Walker nor the other deputies of the Leon County Sheriff's Department received regular compensatory pay or compensatory leave for these additional hours of work which they were required to perform.

    
    

12. At the time of his death, having been cleared of his regular shift duties, Sgt. Walker was subject to performance of the following duties prescribed and required by his employer the sheriff of Leon County:

    
    

    1. Walker was required to be available by telephone 24 hours a day except when on leave. If Walker was not at his residence, he was required to advise the Leon County Sheriff's Office of a telephone number in which he could be reached.

       
       

    2. Sgt. Walker was required to enforce the laws of the State of Florida at all times with the exception established by the sheriff of Leon County that minor infractions which did not constitute a hazard to life or property or constitute a breach of the peace were not to be enforced. This policy was based upon a limited manpower of the sheriff's office and the existence of other law enforcement agencies specifically assigned the duty of traffic law enforcement and the enforcement of laws within the corporate city limits of municipalities within Leon County. In addition, Sgt. Walker was required to render assistance at any accident scene or other emergency situations in which he encountered at any time whether in uniform or in civilian clothes.

       
       

    3. Walker was required to carry his identification and a weapon at all times.

       
       

    4. Sgt. Walker was subject to recall to specifically assign duties at any time during the day.

       
       

13. From observations of qualified individuals at the scene of the accident in which Sgt. Walker was killed, there was no indication tat the accident and death was the result of the enforcement of any law. At the time of his death, Walker was subject to the performance of all the duties enumerated in the paragraph above.

    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

    
    

14. Carolyn W. Walker has requested death in-line-of-duty benefits payable under the provisions of Chapter 121, F.S., as a result of her husband's death. Section 121.021(14), F.S., defines death in-line-of- duty as follows: "'Death in-line-of-duty' means death arising out of and in the actual performance of duty required by a member's employment during his regularly scheduled working hours or irregular working hours as required by the employer . . ." This is the same language used to define disability in-line-of duty stated in Section 121.021(13), Florida Statutes. In the case of Bolinger v. Div. of Retirement, State Dept. of Administration, 335 So.2d 568 (1st DCA 1976), the court held that the language of Section 121.021(13), Florida Statutes, had the same meaning as Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes. The court held that the words "arising out of" refer to the origin of the cause of the injury (or death), and that the words "in the actual performance of duty" refers to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident occurred.

    
    

15. There are no cases arising under interpreting the language of Section 121.021(14), F.S. However, the language of this section is the same as the preceding section interpreted the court in Bolinger. There are many cases arising under the Workman's Compensation Law, both in Florida and in other jurisdictions which are applicable to the factual situation presented in this case, interpreting what constitutes origin of the injury or death and what times, places, or circumstances are necessary to the compensated.

    
    

16. In a most recent case, Warg v. City of Miami Springs, 249 So.2d 3 (1971), the Florida Supreme Court held that injuries received by a police detective of the City of Miami Springs in an automobile accident while driving home from work by the most direct route were compensable. Detective Warg had worked a regular duty shift from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. but was on 24-hour call. He was paid a flat salary and did not receive overtime for work performed in excess of 40 hours. He was required to carry a gun at all times. The court based its decision in Warg on an exception established in the case of Sweat v. Allen, 200 So. 341 (1941) to the "coming and going" rule. In that case, Allen was a deputy sheriff assigned duties as a jailer. Allen was injured while proceeding on foot to a bus stop on the way to work about one hour before his regular hours of work began. The court found that Allen, although a jailer, was charged as a deputy to enforce the law on a 24-hour basis. This requirement was part of his employment not withstanding the fact that Allen was assigned duties in the jail. Because the word employment as used in the Workman's Compensation Act referred to the whole period of time or sphere of activities regardless of whether the employee was actually engaged in his duties when injured, the court found that while Allen was not on the street pursuant to any order, however, being there he was charged with duties connected with his employment. There existed the same "casual connection" between Allen's employment and his injuries as would have existed had Allen's been injured arresting a drunken driver. In Warg the court determined that the case for compensation of the detective to whose duty was to enforce the law in the field was even stronger than in the case of Sweat. The fact that Detective Warg was on the way home while Jailer Allen was on his way to work was not in the courts view a material difference.

    
    

17. Under the interpretation of the words "arising out of and in the actual performance of duty" stated in Bolinger, there must be a casual relationship existing between Walker's employment and his death and the death must occur in the actual performance of duty as it relates to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident occurred. The court has held in two

    cases with essentially the same fact pattern presented in the instant case that the injuries to Warg and Allen are out of and in the actual course or performance of their duties.

    
    

18. Based upon the foregoing, the death of Sgt. Ronnie D. Walker arose out of and in the actual performance of his duties as a deputy sheriff of Leon County and therefore Carolyn Walker is entitled to death in-line of-duty benefits pursuant to Chapter 121, Florida Statutes.

RECOMMENDATION

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer RECOMMENDS:

That the application of Carolyn W. Walker for death in-line-of duty benefits, based upon the death of he husband, Ronnie D. Walker, be approved and that she receive the death in-line-of-duty benefits payable under the provisions of Chapter 121, Florida Statutes.

DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of November, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida.

STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304

(904) 488-9675

================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER

=================================================================

STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION

DIVISION OF RETIREMENT

CAROLYN W. WALKER,

Petitioner,

vs. CASE NO. 77-1463

STATE OF FLORIDA, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT,

Respondent.

/

AGENCY FINAL ORDER

A petition for formal proceedings having been duly filed, and a request for hearing officer having been duly made, a hearing was held in the above-styled cause pursuant to the provisions of Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, (1976 Supplement) before the Honorable Stephen F. Dean, Hearing Officer, in Room 114, Collins Building, Tallahassee, Florida, at 9:00 a.m. on September 21, 1977.

Petitioner, Carolyn W. Walker, asserts that she is entitled to in-line-of-duty death benefits pursuant to Section 121.091(7)(c)1, Florida Statutes, as a result of the death of her husband, Ronnie D. Walker. The issue for determination is whether the death of Ronnie D. Walker arose out of and in the actual performance of duty required by his employer, or occurred in the line of duty.

APPEARANCE AT THE HEARING: P. Kevin Davey, Esquire

Douglas, Powell, & Davey Post Office Box 1674 Tallahassee, Florida 32302

For the Petitioner

E. Douglas Spangler, Jr., Esquire

Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C - Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303

For the Respondent

The hearing officer filed his Recommended Order on November 8, 1977, in which he sustained the Petitioner's assertion, and concluded she was entitled to in-line-of-duty death benefits. This determination is based upon the hearing officer's erroneous conclusions of law and their application to the facts of this case. Therefore, as will be developed more fully herein, the Division rejects the Conclusions of Law contained in the Recommended Order, substitutes its own Conclusions of Law and determines that the death of Ronnie D. Walker did not occur in line of duty.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The Findings of Fact developed in the Recommended Order are a synthesis of the findings of fact proposed to the hearing officer by both the Petitioner and the Division of Retirement. They are all supported by substantial, competent evidence and are the result of proceedings which comply with the essential requirements of law. The Findings of Fact contained in the recommended order are therefore adopted without modification and same constitute the complete set of Findings of Fact for purposes of this final order.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The issue for determination is whether the death of Ronnie D. Walker occurred in line of duty thereby entitling his widow, Carolyn W. Walker, the Petitioner, to the benefits payable pursuant to Section 121.091(7), Florida Statutes, (1975).

Death in line of duty is statutorily defined in Section 121.021(14), Florida Statutes, (1976 supplement) as:

"Death in line of duty" means death arising out of and in the actual performance of duty required by a member's employment during his

regularly scheduled working hours or irregular working hours as required by the employer.

The administrator may require such proof as he deems necessary as to the time, date, and cause of death, including evidence from any available witnesses. Workmen`s compensation records under the provisions of chapter 440 may also be used.

It has been the petitioner's contention throughout this proceeding that at the time of her husband's death he was in the actual performance of his duty as a deputy sheriff and therefore was killed in line of duty. She reasons, and the facts support, that at the time of his death, her husband, although having completed his normal tour of duty required of his employment, sustained an automobile accident and was killed while he was on 24-hour call and was under the high responsibility of enforcing the laws of Florida. In light of the above facts, she reasons that as a matter of law, the accident which killed her husband occurred in line of duty.

She is now supported in her position by the recommended order of the hearing officer which has concluded that the facts of this case are similar to those which arose under the Workmen's Compensation Law, Sections 440.01, et. seq., Florida Statutes, which hold that deputy sheriffs who are injured by accident either on the way to or returning from performance of their regular duties are entitled to receipt of the benefits of that statute. Sweat v. Allen,

145 Fla. 103, 200 So. 348 (1941); Warg v. City of Miami Springs, 249 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1971). They reason that although these cases have been developed as a result of litigation arising under the Workmen's Compensation Law they are nevertheless applicable to and are controlling over similar factual situations which may develop under Chapter 121 relating to in-line-of-duty benefits. Reliance for this proposition is placed on the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Bolinger v. Division of Retirement, 335 So.2d 563 (Fla. 1 DCA 1976) which, they state, holds that the language defining in-line-of-duty retirement benefits has the same meaning as the words in Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes, defining the test of receipt of Workmen's Compensation benefits.

The Division holds that this position is erroneous. It is not correct to interpret Sections 121.021(13)-(14), Florida Statutes, which define disability or death in line of duty to be the functional equivalent of workmen's compensation. The Legislature abandoned an earlier statutory scheme directly tying ILOD disability to Workmen's Compensation standards, Section 122.34, Florida Statutes, and purposefully chose to create in line of duty disability or death benefits in the Florida Retirement System (FRS) despite the availability of like benefits for the same public employee covered by FRS through the Workmen's Compensation Law.

In so doing, they utilized similar, but not identical language. Coverage under workmen's compensation is complete if the accident arises out of and in the course of employment. Under the Florida Retirement System, a member is

entitled to in-line-of- duty benefits if the injury arises out of and in the actual performance of duty.

"In the actual performance of duty" is a phrase which is much narrower in scope than its sister phrase contained in Chapter 440. Because the in-line-of- duty benefits of Chapter 121 are adjunct to the statute creating the principal retirement system for public employees in the State of Florida, it must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the purpose of the creation of retirement benefits. Unlike the Workmen's Compensation Law which has created a system whereby society and industry together bear the burdens caused by industrial accidents and provide an expeditious and fair means to achieve these ends, the Florida Retirement System has been created as a trust for the current use and benefit of all permanent public employees in the State of Florida who are members, the purpose of which is to provide the members with the means whereby they shall have available a fund which will generate a reasonable income when they become unable to continue in their normal employment, usually at their normal retirement age. The terms of the trust, which are expressed by the statute, control entitlement to receipt of benefits.

To further distinguish, an employee's right to receive workmen's compensation benefits vests with the acceptance of employment. In general, this is not true of the retirement benefits provided by Chapter 121. Although participation in FRS is a requisite of employment covered by the system, an employee's rights to receive the benefits provided by FRS do not vest until after that employee has served his employer for a definite period of time. The only exception to this general rule is in the case of in-line-of-duty (ILOD) death or disability benefits; which are available from the date of employment.

However, the Legislature has carried the concept of tying service to the public employer to receipt of retirement benefits forward into ILOD by requiring that the injury or illness causing death or disability arise out of and in the actual performance of duty required by the employment during his regular hours or irregular working hours as required by the employer, Unlike workmen's compensation which recognizes that a person need not necessarily be in the actual performance of the duty of his employment at the time an accident occurs giving rise to a workmen's compensation claim in order for that accident to be found to have occurred in the course of employment, as long as some benefits accrue to the employer from the practice which causes the accident, Evans v.

Food Fair Stores, Inc., 313 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1975), under FRS, the injury or illness causing the disability or death must occur during and be a result of the actual performance of duty in order to receive in-line-of-duty benefits.

There is no direct correlation between the Workmen's Compensation Law and in-line-of-duty disability retirement despite the fact that the Legislature has provided that records developed under Chapter 440 may be used in a proceeding relating to ILOD retirement. Sections 121.021(13) - (14), Florida Statutes, (1976 Supp.) The statute clearly is written in discretionary terms, such records need not be used and the Legislature included reference to such records as a guide to the Division to a readily available source of information without imposing needless expense on either the member or the Division to duplicate same.

Petitioner used the arguments relating to a close relationship between workmen's compensation and ILOD retirement to justify her position that the exceptions to the "going and coming rules" developed under Chapter 440 for law enforcement officers, more specifically to deputy sheriffs, also applies with equal force to the ILOD provisions. The hearing officer, although not mandating the equation of the two systems, believed a sufficiently close relationship

existed between them to justify the use of compensation cases as precedent. As stated above, the Workmen's Compensation Law is written in broader concepts to facilitate its purposes than is the retirement law, which serves purposes not totally compatible with those of the compensation law. Therefore, reliance on exceptions to the general rules developed under Chapter 440 as precedent in ILOD matters is inappropriate. The "going and coming rule" is applicable to ILOD cases only as a part of the clear statutory mandate that the time, place and circumstances of the disability be in the "actual performance of duty". Such a rule was developed under compensation law obviously to distinguish time spent going to and from employment to one's home or on a personal mission from the "course of employment". Accidents occurring away from duty are clearly not contemplated under Chapter 121; so, the "going and coming rule" is absorbed within the statute and has no separate validity.

However, petitioner and the hearing officer both believe that a similar exception to the one established by the cases Sweat v. Allen, 200 So. 348 (Fla. 1941) and Warg v. City of Miami Springs, 249 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1971) is appropriate for ILOD retirement matters.

The Division is not persuaded that such an exception has any validity in the Florida Retirement System. The need for creation of such an exception must be determined from the terms of the trust itself, without resort to collateral authorities which were developed under another incompatible statute. It is obvious that the exception created in the above-cited cases developed solely because the compensation law required a causal connection between the accident and "employment". As stated earlier, under FRS in line of duty, the causal connection must be made between the disability or death and the "actual performance of duty", a much narrower set of circumstances. The cases establishing such exceptions have no persuasive value.

From a review of the Petitioner's arguments, the recommended order and other cases in addition to Sweat v. Allen and Warg which follow the rule announced in Allen, it is clear that special coverage is intended to be extended to deputy sheriffs over and above that which is available to other employees.

As noted by Commissioner Carson in his dissent in the case of City of Jacksonville v. Beach, IRC Order 2-2495, Feb. 20, 1974, relied upon by Petitioner herein, the reasons for development of the exception to the "going and coming rule" for police officers are twofold. First is "to provide an employee (who serves the public on demand, and receives nothing addition for his supplementary services) with enlarged rewards (in the form of compensation) for the augmented services performed The second is the lack of a reasonable standard whereby it may be determined when a police officer is in fact in the course and scope of his employment . . ."

There is no problem with the second reason under FRS because, either a member is or is not in the actual performance of duty at the time an injury occurs. This is a question of fact and no special rules are needed to facilitate its being determined. As to the first reason, the conceit that one class of employees may be entitled to increased ILOD coverage not available to others is abhorrent to the entire structure of the retirement system which as a trust for use and benefit of all member public employees must be administered fairly and equally as to all beneficiaries. All members of the Florida Retirement System, whether they be participants in the special risk class, elected state officers, or be they in the regular class have the same rights to qualify for receipt of disability retirement, ILOD or otherwise. While such treatment may he consistent with the purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Law,

police officers should not be placed in a more-favored category for in- line-of- duty purposes under FRS without some compelling reason.

Great lengths have been resorted to in this case to establish that Sgt.

Walker was under a high responsibility and that tremendous potential for future official actions commensurate with his high station as a sworn law enforcement officer existed at the time of his death. Yet the facts are conclusive that at the time of his death, Sgt. Walker was taking no such action but was merely performing the actions of attempting to drive his personal vehicle home following the completion of his shift. In this regard, Sgt. Walker was virtually indistinguishable from any other employee who attempts to negotiate hazardous traffic on the way to or from work. The fact that he had the potential for future duty, not required of those other employees, makes no difference.

In a most recent case, Friese v. City of Fort Lauderdale, IRC Order 2-3268, November 10, 1977, Commissioner Carroll, in a dissenting opinion, had occasion to analyze the entire concept of the going and coming rule as it relates to police officers. That analysis, while a minority at the Industrial Relations Commission, is particularly applicable to these type factual situations as they develop under FRS in line of duty. Commissioner Carroll believed that the exception had come to be misapplied in compensation cases and should only be applied to cases involving "injury by accident during regular duty hours or during necessary official action in non-duty hours." This appears to be a restatement of the statutory test contained in Sections 121.021(13)-(14), Florida Statutes.

As Sections 121.021(13)-(14), Florida Statutes, (1976 Supp.) are being construed herein the accident which caused the death of Sgt. Walker would qualify as an in-line-of-duty event, if the potential for the occurrence of an event required by the duties of his employment had ripened into the actual occurrence of such an event which caused an injury or illness resulting in disability or death. This rule is capable of application with equal force to all employees covered by FRS. As applied to police officers in particular, such a rile would provide coverage for any period of time when official action may be required, not merely during the times when the officer may be driving to and from work.

Applying this rule to the facts herein as found by the hearing officer, it is noted that at the time of his death, Sgt. Walker had completed his normal tour of duty. The responsibility he had as acting shift commander had been transferred to his replacement. He was relieved. He had entered into the "24- hour call" status in which he was required to be available at all times. As a law enforcement officer, he was continuously entrusted with the high responsibility to enforce the law 24 hours a day, with the exceptions of minor traffic or "nitpicking" offenses. Although Sgt. Walker was subject to the performance of all the above duties, and those contained in paragraph 12 of the Recommended Order, the accident did not arise out of or in the performance of any of them. Sgt. Walker was killed as he sat behind the wheel of his car as he was attempting to drive home following the completion of his normal shift, when he collided with a tank truck at the intersection to his street, less than a mile from his home. The evidence did not reveal the need for or any attempt to take official action by Sgt. Walker at the time of his death. Therefore, the death did not occur in line of duty. Accordingly, based on all the foregoing, the Division declines to accept the recommendation of the hearing officer. The petition for in-line-of-duty death benefits filed herein by Carolyn W. Walker,

based on the death of her husband, Ronnie D. Walker, be and the same is hereby Denied.

DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of January, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida.

ROBERT L. KENNEDY, JR.

State Retirement Director Division of Retirement

530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304

Copies Furnished:

P. Kevin Davey, Esquire Douglas, Powell & Davey Post Office Box 1674 Tallahassee, Florida 32302

Stephen F. Dean, Esquire

Division of Administrative Hearings

530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304

E. Douglas Spangler, Jr., Esquire Division of Retirement

Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C - Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303

Docket for Case No: 77-001463

Orders for Case No: 77-001463