STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
GEORGE H. STEELE, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) CASE NO. 78-052
)
DISTRICT SCHOOL BOARD )
OF HENDRY COUNTY )
)
Respondent. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Pursuant to notice, the Division of Administrative Hearings, by its duly designated Hearing Officer, James E. Bradwell, held a public hearing in this case on January 10 and 11 and February 27, 1979, in Clewiston, Florida.
Pursuant to leave and stipulation of counsel, the briefing period was extended through August 24, 1979. Respondent's counsel filed a Brief and Proposed Findings of Fact which have been considered by me in preparation of this Recommended Order.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: J. Leonard Fleet, Esquire
4001 Hollywood Boulevard
Hollywood, Florida 33021
For Respondent: John W. Bowen, Esquire and
Andrew B. Thomas, Esquire Rowland, Bowen & Thomas
308 North Magnolia Avenue Post Office Box 305 Orlando, Florida 32802
Owen Luckey, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 865 LaBelle, Florida 33935
ISSUE
The issue posed herein is whether or not the Respondent's recommendation received by the Superintendent made to the School Board that George H. Steel, Petitioner, be terminated for "gross insubordination and willful neglect of duty", as more particularly set forth hereinafter, should be upheld.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the arguments of counsel, and the documentary evidence received during the course of the proceedings, the following relevant facts are found.
The School Board of Hendry County is the governing body of the school district of Hendry County, and as such, is the employer of all personnel within the school system. Section 230.23, Florida Statutes (1977). James C. Edwards, as the Superintendent of Schools for Hendry County, Florida, is the Chief Executive Officer for the entire school system. (TR. I-20). The Superintendent is charged with the responsibility for controlling and directing all employees of the school system. Subsection 230.33(7)(i), Florida Statutes, (1977).
The position of Superintendent of Schools of Hendry County is an elected position. In the November, 1976, general election, George H. Steele, the Petitioner herein, was the incumbent Superintendent. The other candidate in that election was James C. Edwards, who was, at that time, principal in the Hendry County School System under Mr. Steele. Edwards defeated Steel in the election and assumed the office of Superintendent in January, 1977.
Upon leaving office as Superintendent, the defeated Mr. Steele was re- employed by the Hendry County School Board and placed in the position of Director of Pupil Personnel Services for the remainder of the school year.
The basis of the charge of gross insubordination was as follows:
From the months of August through November, 1977, Steele failed to follow specific directives of the Superintendent and School Board policies concerning submitting payrolls through the sub-office.
From the months of August through November, 1977, Steele failed to follow procedures for ordering textbooks and other items through the sub-office.
During the months of September and October, 1977, Steele failed to secure all doors and gates of the school before going off duty each night as he was directed by the Superintendent and his job description.
Steele attempted to undermine the programs of the adult community school by prematurely cancelling classes without proper authorization; improperly discouraging students from registering in the program of the adult community school; complaining about the organization and operation of the school in the presence of students; and being openly hostile and antagonistic toward the coordinator of the community schools.
On November 3, 1977, Steele closed the school without authorization and without following the prescribed procedures as set forth in School Board policy.
The basis of the charge of willful neglect of duty was as follows:
During the months of June through November, 1977, Steele was absent from his assigned work location during the times that he should have been present, such absences not being authorized by duly approved leave.
During the month of September, 1977, Steele failed to secure a teacher for a scheduled class and did not inform the coordinator of the unavailability of the teacher.
On September 29, 1977, Steele was absent from his assigned work location and was not performing his assigned duties while watching a junior varsity football game with students in the night classes.
On December 6, 1977, the School Board suspended Steele without pay pending a hearing on the charges, if requested. On November 29, 1977, prior to the School Board action suspending him without pay, Steele requested a hearing under the Administrative Procedures Act.
On April 18, 1977, Mr. Edwards, the new Superintendent, called Mr. Steele in for a conference regarding his assignment for the next school year. Also present at that conference were William Perry (Director of Vocational, Technical, and Adult Education) and Thomas Conner (Community School Coordinator). Steele's attitude at that meeting has been characterized as belligerent. (TR I-44-46; TR II-231-234.) He started off the meeting by telling the Superintendent which assignments he would refuse to accept. (TR I- 45; TR II-232.) When the Superintendent informed Steele that he was going to be recommended as principal of the Adult Community School, Steele's reaction was openly hostile. (TR I-46.)
Steele appeared at the next School Board meeting to protest his new assignment. At that meeting, he read a prepared statement to the School Board accusing the new Superintendent of "political hatchery". (TR I-49; Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3.) While Steele's right to speak directly to his public employer regarding the operation of the school system is unquestioned, his choice of works and his quarrelsome tone exceeded the bounds of propriety. Although Steel's conduct at this meeting is not cited as grounds for his termination, it is indicative of his attitude, which was repeatedly displayed thereafter, until the Superintendent recommended his dismissal.
In August of 1977, when Steele assumed the position of principal of the Adult Community School, his immediate supervisor was Clarence Jones, the new Community School Coordinator. Jones' supervisor was William Perry, Director of Vocational, Technical and Adult Education. Perry's supervisor, in turn, was Mr. Edwards, the Superintendent. (TR-I-62, 131, 132; TR II-229.)
As a result of Steele's desiring a clarification of his duties in his new position, a meeting was held on August 18, 1977, between the Superintendent and Steele. (TR I-52, 174, 175; TR II-236.) Perry and Jones were also present at this meeting. The Superintendent reviewed Steele's job description explaining, item by item, what he expected of Steele in his new assignment. Steele had a copy of the job description before him during this discussion. (TR I-56, 175; TR II-236.)
Superintendent Edwards reminded Steele that his office hours were to be from 3:30 p.m. to 10:30 p.m., and that he must not leave the campus under any circumstances, except in an emergency. (TR I-63, 175, 176; TR II-237.)
Whenever it became necessary for Steele to leave the campus--either for emergencies or because he was ill--he was instructed to call Jones, Perry, or the Superintendent before leaving. (TR I-63, 175, 176; TR II-237.)
On August 31, 1977, Jones received a call from the Superintendent asking him to meet the Superintendent at the Adult Community School, Clewiston. Jones went to the school and arrived there at approximately 9:58 p.m. Jones and the Superintendent inspected the campus and did not find Steele present. Steele's car was not present. They remained there until approximately 10:30
p.m. (TR I-181.)
On September 15, 1977, Jones went to the school at 10:17 p.m. and found all the lights off and nobody there. Steele's car was not present. He
stayed there until 10:30 p.m. Steele had not called Jones to tell him that he was leaving that night. (TR I-187 and 188.)
On September 19, 1977, Jones went tot he office of the Adult Community School, Clewiston, during the first night of classes to assist in registration. He noticed that on the first night eleven classes had been cancelled. Some of the classes cancelled were some of the most important ones that were offered, such as English, GED, mathematics and drivers education. (TR I-190 and 191.)
The proper procedure and the procedure that has always been followed since the beginning of the program under Steele as Superintendent was that registration was to be held open for two weeks. At the end of two weeks, if the class was under the fifteen students that were needed to continue the class, the class would be cancelled after a conference between Perry and Jones. There was no conference to cancel any of the classes, and if any cancellations occurred, they were done without going through Perry and without following the proper procedures. (TR I-194 and 196; TR II-241, 244, 245 and 247.)
In September, 1977, Steele changed the course offering of shorthand to speedwriting. (TR II-247 and 247; TR III-18.)
The proper procedure for changing a course that had been scheduled would be for the principal, Mr. Steele, to consult with the Coordinator of Community Schools, Mr. Jones, and then consult with the Director of Vocational, Technical and Adult Education, Mr. Perry, and then change the course from what had been offered. Perry had not been consulted before the course was changed from shorthand to speedwriting, but subsequently approved the change after the fact. (TR II-247, 248, 249 and 250.)
During the night of registration for the fall term of 1977, Steele was complaining to the students that he did not know what was going on around the adult school and did not have the authority to do anything and did not know what was happening. Steele's attitude toward Jones that night in front of the students was belligerent. (TR I-191 and 201.)
On September 20, 1977, the first night that the class of bookkeeping was scheduled to begin, Steele called Jones about 3:40 p.m. and informed Jones that Steele did not have a teacher for the bookkeeping course that was to begin at 7:00 p.m. that night. There were twenty people enrolled in the class. It is the principal's responsibility to be sure that each class that is to be taught has a teacher and it is unusual for a class to start without a teacher, particularly when there are twenty people enrolled in it. Jones had to secure the person to teach the class. (TR I-203, 206; TR II-245.)
On September 21, 1977, Jones went to Steele's work location at 10:00
p.m. and found that Steele was not present. Jones called the Superintendent and the Superintendent arrived at the school at approximately 10:12 p.m. and remained until about 10:30 p.m. During that period of time Steele was not present. (TR I-66 and 213.)
On September 22, 1977, Jones went to Steele's work location at 10:05
p.m. and Steele was not present. Jones and Phifer, the principal of Clewiston High School, walked around the campus to see if they could find Steele, but could not find him. Jones remained there until approximately 10:30 p.m. and Steele was not present. Steele had not called him to inform him that he would not be there. (TR II-9 and 10.)
On October 11, 1977, at 10:05 p.m. Jones went to Steele's work location and found that Steele was not on duty. He found the gates were not locked and that both access gates on the north side of the campus were standing open and unlocked. Jones secured the campus and inspected the entire campus, but could not find Steele. There were no cars present at the campus. He was there until around 10:30 p.m. and did not see Steele the entire time. Steele had not called in to say that he would not be there. (TR II-56, 57 and 58.)
On October 14, 1977, Jones went to Steele's work location at approximately 9:30 p.m. and all the lights were out and doors were locked. Steele was not on campus and had not called Jones to say that he would not be there. Jones inspected the campus and did not find Steele. There were no cars on the campus. Jones stayed there for about twenty minutes and Steele did not return. (TR II-59.)
On October 21, 1977, Jones went to Steele's work location at 8:30 p.m. and found that Steele was not there. All the doors were locked and lights were out. Steele had not called him about leaving. Jones discovered that Steele had filed a leave form for October 21, 1977, but it was filed in the county office in LaBelle and did not come through the suboffice as instructed by the Superintendent. (TRII-60 and 61.)
On November 2, 1977, at 9:55 p.m. Jones went to Steele's work location and Steele was not present. The lights in the office were out and all doors were locked. Jones searched the entire campus and Steele was not there. Jones remained there for about forty minutes. Steele had not called him to say that he would not be there. (TR II-65, 66 and 67.)
The Superintendent also directed Steele to send his payrolls through the county sub-office in Clewiston, where Jones maintained an office, rather than directly to the district office in LaBelle.
Similarly, the Superintendent directed Steele to send all purchase orders for materials, books and supplies through the county sub0office in Clewiston for Jones' review, rather than directly to the supplier.
The Superintendent also directed Steele to send all sick leave forms, whether for himself or his employees, through Jones in the county sub0office in Clewiston. In short, the Superintendent re-emphasized that Jones was Steele's supervisor.
Finally, the Superintendent directed Steele to insure that the school plant was secure each night before he left campus. (TR I-64.)
At the conclusion of this August 18, 1977, meeting, the Superintendent requested Steele to conform to all School Board policies and all of the orders that he had been given at the conference. There can be little doubt that Steele fully understood the Superintendent's orders. After each item, the Superintendent asked Steele if he understood what he had just been told; on each occasion, Steel acknowledged that he understood his instruction. (TR I-65, 177; TR II-239, 240.) In closing, the Superintendent warned Mr. Steele that if he did not follow each and every directive of the Superintendent and adhere to School Board policy, the Superintendent would consider each breach an act of gross insubordination. (TR I-65, 177; TR II-239.) Steele indicated that he understood the import of the Superintendent's orders. (TR I-65, 177; TR II-239, 240.) The tone of the meeting was very serious and the other administrators
present testified that they had no problem understanding exactly what the Superintendent had directed Steele to do. (TR I-178.)
Following that August meeting, Steele, based on the acts and conduct set forth above, failed or refused to follow the standards of conduct laid down by the Superintendent, ultimately resulting in the Superintendent's recommendation to the School Board that Steele be terminated for gross insubordination and willful neglect of duty. The particular conduct by Steel is detailed below.
On numerous occasions after the August meeting, Steele left school early without informing Jones, Perry or the Superintendent. (TR I-66, 97, 181, 188, 213; TR II-9, 10, 56-61, 65-67.) He refused to send his payrolls through Jones at the sub-office, but persisted in sending them directly to the county office in LaBelle (TR II-11, 65; Respondent's Exhibit Nos. 2 & 4), in clear violation of the Superintendent's express orders. He also refused to send his book orders and his requisitions for materials and supplies through Jones, choosing instead to send them directly to the suppliers. (TR II-13, 14,15, 17, 18; Respondent's Exhibit Nos. 3 & 4.) He consistently failed to send his sick leave forms through Jones in the sub-office (TR II-60, 61), as he had been specifically instructed to do. On several occasions, he failed to secure the school plant before leaving the campus. (TR II-56, 57 &58.)
In addition to repeatedly disobeying various lawful orders of the Superintendent, Steele openly displayed a hostile and contemptuous attitude toward his supervisors. From the first meeting between Jones and Steele, Steele was contemptuous and hostile toward Jones. (TR I-51.) Jones, as was his practice, recorded those encounters with Steele which he considered out of the ordinary, either favorable or unfavorable. (TR I-141.)
Steele's attitude towards his immediate supervisor, Clarence Jones, was particularly disrespectful, discourteous, and belligerent -- not only in private, but in public. On occasion, he would totally ignore Jones in the presence of others, under circumstances where his refusal to acknowledge Jones' presence could reasonably be considered as an attempt to demonstrate his contempt for Jones. On other occasions, Steele displayed open hostility toward his supervisor. For example, he angrily slammed a handful of papers down on his desk and invited Jones outside to settle the matter of who was going to be principal of the school. (TR I-288.) In view of the circumstances, Jones perceived Steel's statement as an invitation to fight; however, Steele -- further displaying his contemptuous attitude toward Jones -- claimed he would never challenge Jones to a fight because he did not feel Jones was a man. (TR III-104, 170.) On another occasion, Steele told Jones' supervisor, Mr. Perry, that he thought Jones was a "pip squeak" and that he "would like to bust him in the mouth" (TR II-260.)
Steele's insolent attitude toward Jones became apparent to others, as well. In September, 1977, a student, Margaret DeCastro, wrote a letter to Perry commenting on the rude and disrespectful attitude Steele had displayed toward Jones in her presence.
Upon receiving Ms. DeCastro's letter, Perry requested a report from Jones about his relationship with Steel. In response, Jones detailed all the problems he had with Steele up to that point. Perry, in turn, reported this matter to the Superintendent.
However, Clarence Jones was not the only administrator to face Mr. Steele's wrath: Steele also acted in a disrespectful manner toward William Perry, who was director of all adult and vocational-technical programs in Hendry County. For example, in the latter part of September, 1977, Steele upbraided Perry in front of several staff members. (TR II 256-260.) Mr. Perry was sufficiently upset by the incident that he wrote a letter to Steele directing him to change his attitude. (TR II-261; Respondent's Exhibit No. 7.)
Finally, Steele's hostile, belligerent, and insubordinate attitude extended directly to the Superintendent. In a meeting with Steele on November 7, 1977, in the presence of Perry and Jones, the Superintendent informed Steele that he and Clarence Jones had, on several occasions as set forth above, discovered that Steele was absent from his assigned work location during duty hours. Steele angrily responded that anybody who said that he had not been at his work location when he was supposed to be was "a damn liar and full of shit." (TR II-267.)
At that same November meeting, the Superintendent also questioned Steele about closing the adult school on the evening of November 3, 1977, without prior permission from Jones, Perry or Edwards. District policy prohibits principals from closing their schools without first receiving approval from the County office. (TR I-101.) Mr. Steele had been instructed to comply with all School Board policies at the August 18, 1977, meeting between Steele, Edwards, Perry and Jones. (TR I-65, 177; TR II-239.) Steele admitted that he had closed the school that evening; however, he claimed the weather was extremely bad and contended that he was justified in closing the school. (TR I- 102; TR II-73, 266.) While Steele's decision to close the school may have been sound, in view of the weather, he had once again failed to follow School Board policy, and the Superintendent's direct orders that he advise Jones, Perry or the Superintendent of the conditions so that they could make the decision. School Board policy did not give a principal, such as Steele, the discretion to close a school without first consulting with the Superintendent or his delegate. The mere fact that his decision may have ultimately proved proper does not excuse Steele from his obligation to follow the procedures set down by the Superintendent.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
A Principal with continuing contract status may be dismissed for gross insubordination or willful neglect of duty. Subsection 231.36(5), Florida Statutes (1977).
The harmful effect of an administrator's insubordinate attitude on the operation of the school system has long been recognized. For example, in Board of Education of the City of Los Angeles v. Swan, 250 P.2d 305 (Cal. 2d DCA 1952) the Court, citing precedent, noted:
A teacher, and more particularly a principal, in the public school system is regarded by the public and pupils in the light of exemplar, whose words and conduct are likely to be followed by the children taught. An important part of the education of any child is the instilling of a proper respect for
authority and obedience to necessary discipline.
Lessons are learned from example as well as from percept. The example of a teacher who
is continually insubordinate and who refuses to recognize constituted authority may seriously affect the discipline in a school, impairs efficiency and teach children lessons they should not learn. Such conduct may unfit a teacher for service in a school even
though her other qualifications may be sufficient. Johnson v. Taft School District, 19 Cal.App.
2d 912, 913; Voorhees, Law of Public Schools,
p. 136. Id. at 309 (emphasis added).
Unfortunately, the term "gross insubordination" has not yet been defined by Florida courts. However, in conformity with a fundamental rule of statutory construction, the term should be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning. Pederson v. Green, 105 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1958).
Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (1976 Ed.) defines "insubordination" as "unwilling to submit to authority." In the context of public education, the term has been defined as: "A constant or continuing intentional refusal to obey a direct or implied order, reasonable in nature, and given by and with proper authority." Ray v. Minneapolis Board of Education, 202
N.W. 375, 378 (Minn. 1972). Another Court has stated:
Insubordination imports a willful disregard of express or implied directions of the employer, and a refusal to obey reasonable
orders. McIntosh v. Abbot, 231 Mass. 180, 120 N.E.
383.
A practically indentical definition is found at 21A, Words and Phrases, Insubordination, 554, and was applied to uphold the dismissal of a teacher in Ellenburg v. Hartselle City Board of Education, 349 So.2d 605, 509,
n. 2d (Ala.Civ.Appl1977):
Insubordination imports willful disregard of express or implied directions or such defiant attitude as to be the equivalent thereto. (emphasis supplied)
In the single Florida case construing the term, a teacher's dismissal for insubordination was upheld where he displayed "a disobedience of orders, infractions of rules, or a generally disaffected attitude toward authority." Muldow v. Board of Public Instruction of Duval County, 189 So.2d 415 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966).
Lack of cooperation has been considered "a subtle species of insubordination." School District No. 8 v. Superior Court of Pinal County, 433 P.2d 28, 30 (Ariz. 1977). However, Florida Statutes requires something more than "a subtle species of insubordination" in order to terminate a continuing contract. The Continuing Contract Law says that the attitude or conduct of the educator must be "gross insubordination." Subsection 231.36(6), Florida Statutes (1977).
The modifier "gross" when used with the term "insubordination" may also be interpreted in its common sense: "glaringly noticeable." Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (1976 Ed.).
One Federal Circuit Court, in Horton v. Orange County Board of Education, 464 F.2d 536 (4th Cir. 1972) affirming 342 F.Supp. 1244, construed the following actions as "downright" subordination: A teacher required her students to purchase two paperback books, despite a district policy which prohibited teachers from buying books for use in class or selling books to students, or collecting any fee from students, without first obtaining approval from the local Board of Education. When told of her violation, and informed that she must refund student monies, the teacher allowed a student to sell the book, in an apparent effort to avoid the regulation. 342 F.Supp. at 124.
In Delaware, the statutory term analogous to "gross insubordination" is "willful or persistent insubordination", 14 Del. C. Subsection 1411. That term has been judicially defined as: "A constant or continuing intentional refusal to obey a direct or implied order which is reasonable in nature and has been given by and with proper authority." Shockley v. Board of Education, 149 A.2d 331, 334 (Del. Superior Ct., 1959).
Although not dealing in those terms, a sensible and workable distinction between simple insubordination and "gross" insubordination is suggested by the Court in Fernald v. City of Ellsworth Superintending School Committee, 342 A.2d 704 (Me. 1975):
In short, we are not dealing here with a teacher's ephemeral bad mood, minor clerical omission, or arguable negligence or inattention concerning an incidental matter.
Rather, Plaintiff's conduct has the marks
of a persistent, sustained, and unreasonable course of defiance. Such an attitude, over
a course of time, breaches harmonious relations among colleagues and administrators. Id. at 708 (emphasis added). 1/
In other words, an occasional lapse of decorum or failure to follow orders may not be "gross" insubordination, since it may merely reflect an "ephemeral bad mood" rather than a disaffected attitude toward authority. But, when the misconduct is repeated, the breaches are more likely to be the result of persistent defiance rather than an "ephemeral bad mood."
In order to flesh out the concept of insubordination as it applies in the context of public schools, a brief review of the manner in which the term has been applied in several specific cases is helpful.
In Ray v. Minneapolis Board of Education, 202 N.W.2d, 375 (Minn. 1972) a "well-qualified Minneapolis high school teacher" (Id. at 377) was discharged for insubordination based upon his refusal to fill out an eight-page form which was part of the curriculum evaluation study conducted by an independent professional group, the North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools.
1. In Fernald, a teacher had notified the Superintendent that she intended to take leave. When he denied her request, she absented herself from class for two days. Her termination for insubordination was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Maine.
When Mr. Ray finally completed the form, he failed to answer several questions. A month later, when his principal asked him to fill out a second form, Mr. Ray again left several questions blank and answered some of the questions in an unresponsive fashion. At that point, he told his supervisor to quit harrassing him. Thereafter, Mr. Ray was advised by the Associate Superintendent that his failure to complete the form would be regarded as an act of insubordination. When, in April, Mr. Ray once again refused to complete the from, he was dismissed for insubordination.
Even though Mr. Ray had contended that he had a First Amendment right to refuse to fill out the form, the Court found that he was discharged because he deliberately failed to cooperate in a program which was within the scope of his duties as an educator. (Id.) After reviewing the evidence, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that Mr. Ray's refusal to complete the form was insubordinate (Id. at 378).
In Calvin v. Rupp, 334 F.Supp. 358 (E.D. Mo., 1971), the Court rejected Mr. Calvin's contention that the true reason for his dismissal was his union organization activities (Id. at 359). Instead, the Corut--after taking testimony--found that Mr. Calvin "was guilty of undermining the school administration and of insubordination." (Id. at 362.) The specific acts of misconduct which the Court found constituted insubordination were his repeated failure to comply with the District policy regarding the report of drug use by students, coupled with his directing the publications class to cease working on the school newspaper. 2/
2. The specific acts which were cited were:
failure to report evidence of student drug activity, an omission which Mr. Calvin knew violated school policy (Id. at 361);
notifying the Federal Narcotics Bureau about the suspected drug activity without first notifying the school officials (Id.);
conferring with a narcotics agent on school property, without first notifying the school administration (Id.);
discussing his suspicions with a student, after having been ordered by Superintendent Rupp "to say nothing further about the incident to anyone." (ID.); and
directing his publications class to cease work on the student newspaper (Id. at 362).
In Barnes v. Fair Dismissal Appeals Board, 548 P.2d. 988 (Oregon Court of Appeals, 1976), a tenured teacher was dismissed for insubordination where, on three separate occasions, he violated district procedures relating to corporal punishment of students. After the first incident, Mr. Barnes was warned by the principal that his conduct did not conform to the district policies. Nevertheless, some three years later, MR. Barnes again violated the district policies.
A year later, in May, 1975, Mr. Barnes again punished a student without following the proper procedures. Two weeks later, the Superintendent notified Mr. Barnes that he was recommending his dismissal or insubordination.
One other event which occurred between the second and third disciplinary incidents was cited by the Superintendent as evidence of Barnes' insubordination:
On or about August 28, 1974, while attending the first day of in-service as a teacher *** you were asked to sign a roster of the record of your attendance. When you were advised it necessary that you do so, you did sign it by scrawling your name completely across the paper and making the remark, 'Give me that thing,
and I will sign it for the son-of-a-bitch.' 548 P.2d at 990 n. 4.
The Fair Dismissal Appeals Board concurred with the Superintendent and the School Board of Scappoose School District that Mr. Barnes' actions constituted insubordination, and upheld his dismissal. The Court of Appeals of Oregon, in the Opinion cited, affirmed the Appeals Board's action. Id. at 991.
In view of the foregoing cases, and the misconduct of Steele cited herein, it is evident that Steele had engaged in a willful and persistent defiance of his duties as laid down by the Superintendent of Schools at the August 18 meeting. Steele's misconduct was exacerbated by his openly hostile and contemptuous attitude toward his immediate supervisor, Clarence Jones, whom he subjected to verbal abuse, snubbing, and even threatened with physical harm. Despite the express orders of the Superintendent, Steele often left school early, occasionally failing to even secure the campus. Apparently, Mr. Steele's defeat at the polls festered within him, and made him unwilling to graciously accept the fact that he was now subject to the direction and control of other administrators, whom he held in contempt.
Steele's behavior during the period August through November, 1977, clearly constitutes gross insubordination and justifies his dismissal.
As with "gross insubordination", the Florida Legislature failed to define "willful neglect of duty", which is another ground for dismissal under Section 231.36, Florida Statutes (1977). However, the term "neglect of duty", as used in Art. IV, Subsection 7, Fla. Const. (1968) and its predecessor, Art. IV, Subsection 15, Fla Const. (1885), was defined in State, ex rel Hardie v. Coleman, 115 Fla. 119, 155 So. 129 (1934):
Failure on the part of a public officer to do and perform some duty or duties laid on him as
such by virtue of his office or which is required of him by law. 155 So. at 132
Although both "gross insubordination" and "willful neglect of duty" involve failure to obey orders, the Legislature must have intended some distinction between the terms, or its use of the two terms in Section 231.36 would be redundant.
Since the Superintendent of Schools has lawful authority to supervise or provide for the supervision and management of all school district personnel, Subsection 230.33(7), Florida Statutes' failure to abide by his orders would constitute willful neglect, if the failure to obey the orders was intentional, and gross insubordination if the disobedience was attended by disrespect.
To avoid the redundancy, then, one must assume that breach of even minor rules could constitute "gross insubordination" where it is repeated, and where the breach is attended by overt defiance or hostility toward one's superiors. For willful neglect of duty, the contemptuous attitude may be lacking, but the rule or order violated must be somewhat more important to the efficient operation of the schools. Thus, for neglect of duty, one should look for the actual harm done; for insubordination, one should look to the attitude displayed towards the employer or supervisor.
Statistical evidence is useful in gauging the extent of the harm Steele caused the Hendry County School System, generally, and the adult evening program, particularly, because of his persistent refusal to follow orders.
The most telling statistic in this regard is the enrollment of the school before, during, and after Steele's tenure as principal. While Steele was principal of the adult evening school, enrollment in October, 1977, was down 40% from the previous year. The following October, after Steele had departed, enrollment was up over 100% above the level of enrollment for October, 1977.
(TR II-84, 85, 88; Respondent's Exhibit No. 5). Thus, there was a severe dip in enrollment under Steele, followed by a significant rise after he left.
The loss in enrollment under Steele, which is evidence of his neglect of duties, could logically be attributed to incidents such as the following:
On August 17, 1977, Steele displayed his distaste for his new assignment by stating to Jones that he did not intend to be a "flunky" for the Adult Community School Program (TR I-149, 153, 159, 161-162).
On September 19, 1977, the first night of registration for the Adult Community School, eleven classes had already been cancelled by Steele, including ones which Jones considered important, such as driver's education, GED, English and mathematics (TR. I-190-191). Even when Steele was Superintendent, classes were not normally cancelled until two weeks after registration night, (TR I-194, 196; TR II-241, 244, 245, 247).
Steele changed a course in shorthand to speedwriting without first consulting with Jones or Petty, which was the proper procedure. (TR II-247- 250).
More damaging was Steele's apathetic attitude towards the program: On registration night, he openly complained to students that he did not know what
was going on around the school and that, in any event, he had no authority to do anything. (TR I-191, 201). Late in the afternoon of the day the bookkeeping class was to begin, Steele informed Jones that he had not yet secured a teacher for the class, even though it turned out that twenty students had already registered. (TR I-203, 206; TR. II-245.)
As noted earlier, Steele was absent from school during assigned hours on numerous occasions during the fall of 1977. This, in spite of the Superintendent's direct order that he not leave campus without authorization, even to get a newspaper. (TR I-63, 175, 176; TR II-237.)
On October 11, 1977, Steele not only left campus early, he failed to secure the building, as he had been specifically instructed to do. (TR II-59.)
In summary, Steele's persistent failure to follow the rules of conduct laid down by the School Board, the Superintendent, or which are obvious requisites of his job as principal constitute willful neglect of duty and justifies his termination under Section 231.36, Florida Statutes.
The statutory penalty for "gross insubordination" or "willful neglect of duty" is dismissal. For lesser offenses, lesser penalties may be authorized. However, where a continuing contract principal's misconduct constitutes gross insubordination or willful neglect of duty, as it has in the instant case, dismissal is appropriate. I shall so recommend
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties to this action. Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.
The parties were duly noticed pursuant to the notice provisions of Chapter 120, Florida Statutes.
The authority of the Respondent is derived from Chapter 231, Florida Statutes.
Competent and substantial evidence was offered to sustain the Respondent's recommendation that the Petitioner, George H. Steele's termination be upheld.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, is is hereby,
RECOMMENDED:
That the Respondent, District School Board of Hendry County's recommendation that the Petitioner, George H. Steele, be terminated be UPHELD.
RECOMMENDED this 14th day of September, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida
JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
(904) 488-9675
COPIES FURNISHED:
J. Leonard Fleet, Esq. 4001 Hollywood Boulevard Hollywood, Florida 33021
John W. Bowen, Esq. and Andrew B. Thomas, Esq. Rowland, Bowen & Thomas Post Office Box 305 Orlando, Florida 32802
Owen Luckey, Jr., Esq. Post Office Box 865 LaBelle, Florida 33935
Issue Date | Proceedings |
---|---|
Oct. 05, 1979 | Final Order filed. |
Sep. 14, 1979 | Recommended Order sent out. CASE CLOSED. |
Issue Date | Document | Summary |
---|---|---|
Oct. 02, 1979 | Agency Final Order | |
Sep. 14, 1979 | Recommended Order | Petitioner should be terminated for gross insubordination, for willful neglect of duty, and for failure to follow rules of conduct of school board. |
BROWARD COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs LYNN DEERING, 78-000052 (1978)
DADE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs. GEORGE JOHNSON, 78-000052 (1978)
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs ANTHONY C. BROOKS, 78-000052 (1978)
PALM BEACH COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs LONTAY FINNEY, 78-000052 (1978)
DADE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs JANET GRANT-HYMAN, 78-000052 (1978)