STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

ALL RISK CORPORATION OF FLORIDA, ) GALLAGHER-BASSET INSURANCE SERVICE, ) INC., COMMERCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT, ) INC., R. P. HEWITT & ASSOCIATION, ) INC., PROFESSIONAL ADMINISTRATION, ) INC., SCOTT WETZEL SERVICES, INC., ) SELF INSURED SERVICES, INC., ) WHITING NATIONAL SERVICES, INC., )

RISK MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., ) CASE NO. 81-2079RP GATES, McDONALD & COMPANY, )

CORPORATE GROUP SERVICES, INC., ) FLORIDA ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE ) COMPANIES, and ST. JOSEPH'S )

HOSPITAL, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. )

) STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ) LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, ) DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION, )

)

Respondent. )

)

FINAL ORDER

Pursuant to notice, an administrative hearing was held before R. L. Caleen, Jr., Hearing Officer with the Division of Administrative Hearings, on October 15, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioners: Richard B. Collins, Esquire, and

Samuel R. Neel III, Esquire Post Office Drawer 5286 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

For Respondent: George W. Butler, Jr., Esquire

Suite 117, Montgomery Building 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32301

ISSUE PRESENTED

Whether petitioners have standing to challenge the validity of respondent's proposed rules, 38F-5.30 through 38F-5.70, Florida Administrative Code

I.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

On August 21, 1981, petitioners All Risk Corporation of Florida, Gallagher- Basset Insurance Service, Inc., Commercial Risk Management, Inc., R. P. Hewitt & Association, Inc., professional Administration, Inc., Scott Wetzel Services, Inc., Self Insured Services, Inc., Whiting National Services, Inc., Risk Management Services, Inc., Gates, McDonald & Company, Corporate Group Services, Inc., and Florida Association of Service Companies filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings a petition to determine the invalidity of certain rules 1/ proposed by respondent, Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of Workers' Compensation ("Department"). Although the petition purported to challenge the validity of proposed rules, pursuant to Section 120.54(4), Florida Statutes (1979), the relief requested was that the Department suspend its rulemaking proceedings and convene a separate proceeding pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes (1979). 2/

On August 26, 1981, petitioners filed an amended petition to determine the invalidity of the proposed rules. The amended petition contained additional allegations concerning petitioners' standing and the deficiencies of the Department's proposed rules.

On August 28, 1981, the Department moved to dismiss the initial petition on the grounds that the petitioners failed to state with particularity facts sufficient to show (1) standing to challenge the proposed rules and (2) the invalidity of the proposed rules.

On August 31, 1981, the Director of the Division of Administrative Hearings assigned the undersigned to conduct a hearing on the amended petition pursuant to Section 120.54(4), Florida Statutes (1979). Final hearing was then set for September 22, 1981.

On September 3, 1981, the Department moved to dismiss the amended petition for failure to state with particularity facts sufficient to show that the proposed rules were an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. By order dated September 8, 1981, the motion was denied.

Thereafter, the parties jointly stipulated to a continuance of the hearing; it was reset for October 15, 1981.

On October 13, 1981, St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., moved or joinder as a party-petitioner. The Department also filed a motion to dismiss the amended petition on the ground that the petitioners lacked standing to challenge the proposed rules, that there were not substantially affected persons within the meaning of Section 120.54(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1979).

At hearing, arguments were presented on these two pending motions. St.

Joseph's Hospital, Inc.'s motion to join as a party-petitioner was granted. The Department's motion to dismiss for lack of standing was granted, except as to St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc. evidentiary presentations were then made by the parties.

At the close of hearing, the parties waived the 30-day time period for entry of a final order. They agreed that they would be allowed ten days from the filing of the transcript of hearing to file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 3/ The final order would be due 20 days thereafter. The transcript was filed on November 9, 1981.

On October 22, 1981, the Department, citing State Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Alice P., 367 So.2d 1045 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), filed a "Suggestion of Lack of Jurisdiction over Subject Matter" and renewed its earlier motion to dismiss on grounds of lack of standing. The motion is granted. The assigned petitioners failed to allege, with particularity facts sufficient to show that they would be "substantially affected" by the proposed rules within the meaning of Section 120.54(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1979); thus, there was not a valid proceeding which St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., could subsequently join.

II.

Standing to Challenge a Proposed Rule

Section 120.54(4), Florida Statutes (1979), allows "substantially affected" persons to seek an administrative determination of the invalidity of any proposed rule by filing a request with the Division of Administrative Hearings. The request must be filed within 14 days after notice of the proposed rule is published; it must also state "with particularity facts sufficient to show that the person challenging the proposed rule would be substantially affected by it .

. ." Id.

In Florida Department of Offender Rehabilitation v. Jerry, 353 So.2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), cert. denied 359 So.2d 1215 (Fla. 1978), the First District Court of Appeal enunciated the requisites for standing to challenge an administrative rule. 4/ The petitioner must allege and prove (1) an "injury in fact" of sufficient immediacy and reality to entitle him to the proceeding, and

(2) injury which is accompanied by continuing, present adverse effects. Id. at 1235, 1236. The court cited with emphasis Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), for the principle that, to have standing, a party

[M]ust himself be among the injured, for it is this requirement which gives a litigant a direct stake in the controversy and prevents the judicial power from becoming no more than a vehicle for the vindication of value inter- ests of concerned bystanders. Jerry, supra at 1234.

The Jerry court, in passing, noted that the federal Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") granted standing to seek judicial review

[O]nly to those who could show that the challenged action had caused them "injury in fact" and where the alleged injury was an interest "arguably within the zone of interest to be protected or regulated" by the statutes that the agencies were claimed to have violated. Sierra Club v. Morton,

The "zone of interest" test for standing to request a hearing was recently adopted in Agrico Chemical Company v. Department of Environmental Regulation, Freeport Sulphur Company, So.2d (Fla. 2d DCA, Case No. 79-2029, Opinion filed October 7, 1981). There, the court held that the Department of Environmental Regulation erred in granting Freeport, as a business competitor to Agrico, a Section 120.57(1) hearing on whether Agrico should be issued an environmental permit. The court noted that Subsection 20.52(10)(b) grants standing to request a Section 120.57(1) hearing to persons "where substantial interests will be affected by proposed agency action . . . ." Id. It concluded:

[T]he statute [Chapter 403] itself did not give the petitioners standing because they were unable to show that their environmental interests were substantially affected by the agency question. See Florida Department of Offender Rehabilitation v. Jerry, 353 So.2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). We believe that before one can be considered to have a sub- stantial interest in the outcome of the pro- ceeding he must show 1) that he will suffer injury in fact which is of sufficient imme- diacy to entitle him to a sec. 120.57 hearing, and 2) that his substantial injury is of a type or nature which the proceeding is designed to protect. The first aspect

of the test deals with the degree of injury. The second deals with the nature of the in- jury. While petitioners in the instant case

were able to show a high degree of potential economic injury, they were wholly unable to show that the nature of the injury was one under the protection of ch. 403.

Chapter 403 simply was not meant to

redress or prevent injuries to a competitor's profit and loss statement. Third-party pro- testants in a ch. 403 permitting procedure who seek standing must frame their petition for a sec. 120.57 formal hearing in terms which clearly show injury in fact to inter- ests protected by ch. 403.

Although the standing provisions for invoking a Section 120.57(1) hearing and a Section 120.54(4) rule challenge differ slightly, 5/ the court seemingly gave them similar effect.

An association may not challenge a rule on the ground that it would substantially affect the interests of its individual members. In Florida Department of Education v. Florida Education Associations United, etc., 378 So.2d 893 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), FEA/United, a confederation of bargaining units representing 30,000 teachers, had challenged a Department of Education rule establishing procedures for revocation and suspension of teaching certificates. The court, citing Jerry, supra, held that FEA/United was without standing to challenge the rule; that it had not sustained or was in immediate danger of sustaining some "direct injury as a result of the challenged rule." Florida Education Association, supra at 894. Accord, Departments of Labor and

Employment Security, Division of Labor v. Florida Home Builders Association, 392 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). For an association to have standing, it must allege and prove that its interest, as an entity, will suffer a direct injury as a result of the challenged rule. Cf., Florida Optometric Association, Inc. v.

Department of Professional Regulation, 399 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).

If the original challengers of a proposed rule are without standing, a substantially affected person filing later, beyond the 14-day period--cannot give validity to an otherwise invalid proceeding:

[O]bviously such joinder contemplates the existence of a valid proceeding. It was never intended by the legislature that such provision [allowing intervention by other substantially affected persons] be construed as being a vehicle for the breathing of life or validity into an otherwise dead or in- valid proceeding.

State, Department Of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Alice P., 367 So.2d 1045, 1053 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).

III.

Sufficiency of the Amended Petition to Determine the Invalidity of a Proposed Rule

For purposes of the Department's motion to dismiss, the petitioners' factual allegations relating to standing are accepted as true. Cf., Ellison v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 175 So.2d 198 (Fla. 1965). These can be summarized as follows:

The petitioners are 11 service companies and one statewide association of service companies. The service companies provide services to employers (including their self-insurer funds) who choose to operate or join a workers' compensation self- insurance program;

The Department's proposed rules, Section 38F-5.30 through 38F-5.70, will affect petitioners by increasing the cost of non-refundable bond premiums; this, in turn will have the "potential impact of depriving the self-insurers and self- insurer funds of the right to operate

as self-insurers;

Two petitioners, an association of ser- vice companies and an individual service company, have been authorized by one self-insurer, Cedars of Lebanon Hospital Corporation, to represent it in this proceeding;

One individual service company has been

authorized by a self-insurance fund, Florida Hospital Workers' Compensation, to represent it in this proceeding.

By these allegations, the petitioners effectively limited their attack to Section 38F-5.48, that portion of the proposed rules which imposes surety bond requirements on self-insured employers.

These allegations of fact are insufficient as a matter of law; they fail to "state with particularity facts sufficient show that . . . [petitioners] would be substantially affected" by the challenged rule, Section 38F-5.48, Florida Administrative Code. See, Section 120.54(4)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes (1979)

Petitioners failed to allege personal injury-in-fact which is accompanied by continuing adverse effects; they failed to show that their injury would be real and immediate. Jerry, supra at 1235, 1236. We are left to speculate on the injury to their personal interests. Id. at 1236. They have not shown, by their amended petition, how they would be "in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the challenged rule." Florida Home Builders Association, supra at 22. Neither have petitioners shown that they would suffer injury of a type or nature which is arguably within the "zone of interest" to be protected or regulated by Section 38F-5.48. See, Jerry, supra at 1233; Agrico Chemical Company, supra. If their "potential" injury is an economic one, it does not fall within the proposed rule's "zone of interest."

One cannot obtain standing as a stalking-horse for another. The injury which the proposed rule will allegedly inflict on individual self-insurers and self-insurer funds cannot be assigned or transferred to petitioners by agreement. To have standing, a person "must himself be among the injured," Jerry, supra at 1234; this requirement is what ensures that the challenger has a real, bona fide, and direct interest in the outcome of the proceeding. See, e.g., Florida Wildlife Federation v. State Department of Environmental Regulation, 390 So.2d 64, 68 (Fla. 1980).

Neither category of petitioners, the individual service companies or the statewide associations of service companies, may claim standing derivatively by representing an individual self- insurer or self-insurance fund which may be injured by the proposed rule. Florida Home Builders Association, supra at 21.

Finally, St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., purporting to be an individual self- insured, sought and was allowed to join the proceeding as a party-petitioner on October 12, 1981. Its October 12, 1981, motion and amended petition were beyond the 14-day period from publication of notice of the proposed rule (August 7, 1981); it thus had no power to invoke a Section 120.54(4) rule challenge proceeding.

By joining or intervening, St. Joseph's Hospital accepted the present invalid status of the proceeding; it could not breath new life into an otherwise dead or invalid proceeding. See, Alice P., supra at 1053. Its late entry into the case cannot remedy the legal insufficiency of the petitioners' earlier amended petition.

IV.

Dismissal Without Leave to Amend

Ordinarily, litigants are allowed to amend pleadings found to be legally insufficient. See, Demko v. Judge, 58 So.2d 692 (Fla. 1952; Florida Gas Company v. Arkla Air Conditioning Company, 260 So.2d 220 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972).

In this case, petitioners had two opportunities to file a petition conforming to Section 120).54 (4) (b) Florida Statutes (1979).

During the pendency of a petition challenging the validity of a proposed rule, the rule cannot be adopted. Section 120.54 (c) Florida Statutes (1979). To minimize disruption and delay of the rulemaking process, the legislature enacted strict time limits for disposing of rule challenge petitions. Id.

The Department's proposed rules were noticed for adoption in August, 1981; they have yet to become effective. To allow petitioners another opportunity to amend their petition would unduly delay the rulemaking process, a result which the legislature sought to avoid. 6/

Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED:

That petitioners' amended petition to determine invalidity of a proposed rule, filed on August 26, 1981, is DISMISSED without leave to amend. Upon reconsideration, it necessarily follows that the subsequently filed motion and amended petition of St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., must be and are denied and dismissed, respectively.

DONE AND ORDERED this 24th day of November, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida.

R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer

Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building

2009 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

(904) 488-9675

Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of November, 1981.

ENDNOTES

1/ Proposed rules 38F-5.30 through 38F-5.70, Florida Administrative Code. 2/ See, Section 120.54(16), Florida Statutes (1979).

3/ No proposed findings of fact were subsequently filed because this case was disposed of on standing grounds.

4/ In Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Alice P., 367 So.2d 1045, 1052 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), the same court held: "There is no difference between the immediacy and reality necessary to confer standing whether the proceeding is to challenge an existing rule or a proposed rule."

5/ Standing to invoke a hearing is granted to persons whose "substantial interests will be affected by proposed agency action, "Sections 120.52 (10)(b) and 120.57, Florida Statutes (1979); standing to challenge a proposed rule is granted to persons who will be "substantially affected" by it, Section 120.54(4)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes (1979).

6/ As to the possibility of an unsuccessful challenge instituting a Section

120.56 challenge of the rule after it became effective, see, Alice P., supra at 1051.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Richard B. Collins, Esquire, and Samuel R. Neel III, Esquire

Post Office Drawer 5286 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

George W. Butler, Jr., Esquire Department of Labor and

Employment Security

Suite 117, Montgomery Building 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Wallace E. Orr, Secretary Department of Labor and

Employment Security

206 Berkley Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Liz Cloud

Florida Administrative Code Department of State

The Capitol, Room 1802 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Carroll Webb, Executive Director Joint Administrative Procedures

Committee

Room 120, Holland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301

=================================================================

DISTRICT COURT OPINION

=================================================================

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

ALL RISK CORPORATION OF FLORIDA, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO GALLAGHER-BASSETT INSURANCE, FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND SERVICE, INC., COMMERCIAL RISK DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED. MANAGEMENT, INC., R.P. HEWITT &

ASSOCIATION, INC., PROFESSIONAL CASE NO. AI-27 ADMINISTRATION, INC., SCOTT DOAH CASE NO. 81-2079RP WETZEL SERVICES, INC., SELF

INSURED SERVICES, INC., WHITING NATIONAL SERVICES, INC. RISK MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., GATES, McDONALD & COMPANY CORPORATE GROUP SERVICES, INC., FLORIDA ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE COMPANIES and, ST. JOSEPH'S HOSPITAL, INC.,

Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION,

Appellee.

/ Opinion filed March 25, 1982.

An Appeal from an Order of Division of Administration Hearings, R. L. Caleen, Jr., Hearing Officer.

Richard B. Collins of Perkins & Collins, Tallahassee, for Appellants.

George W. Butler, Jr. and Michael Rudicell of the State of Department of Labor and Employment Security, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

JOANOS, J.

This appeal is from the order of an administrative hearing officer dismissing the amended petition of the appellants for lack of standing without leave to amend. We note at the outset that concession was made at oral argument that one of the appellants, Florida Association of Service Companies, does, in fact, lack standing. We shall, therefore, treat that association as having withdrawn for purposes of this opinion.

The Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of workers' Compensation, properly (the parties have so stipulated) announced its intent to repeal Rule 38F-5.01 through 5.23, and simultaneously adopt revised rules for Chapter 38F-5, involving self-insurers in workers' compensation law. All of the appellants except for St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc. filed a timely petition questioning the validity of the proposed rules and requesting a drawout hearing pursuant to Section 120.54(16), Florida Statutes(1979).

Subsequently, those same petitioners filed an amended petition questioning the invalidity of the proposed rules. Those petitioners alleged that they were individual service companies for individual self-insurers and self-insurer funds. Both petitions alleged that the petitioners would be affected by the rules "in that the proposed rules will create an increased cost for non- refundable bond premiums and will have the potential impact of depriving the self-insurers and self-insure funds of the right to operate as self-insurers pursuant to Florida Statutes, Section 440.38." The amended petition further alleged that one of the individual service companies had been authorized by one self-insurer, Cedars of Lebanon Hospital Corporation, to represent it in this proceeding and that one individual service company bad been authorized by a self-insurance fund, Florida Hospital Workers' Compensation, to represent it in the proceeding.

The Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of workers' Compensation (hereinafter referred to simply as the Department) filed a motion to dismiss the initial petition on the ground that the petitioners had not shown with particularity facts sufficient to show that they would be substantially affected by any of the proposed rules. Another ground was asserted which is not relevant here. The Department also filed a motion to dismiss the amended petition, on other grounds.

Two days before the scheduled hearing, petitioners filed a motion to amend the amended petition by adding a party, St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., an individual self-insurer. That motion alleged that the issues that St. Joseph's would seek to raise were identical to or substantially similar to the issues already raised and it would therefore, not prejudice the respondent or delay the proceedings if the joinder were permitted. On the same, day the Department filed a motion to dismiss the amended petition on the grounds that petitioners lacked standing to challenge the proposed rules in that they were not substantially affected persons within the meaning of Section 12d.54 (4)(a) Florida Statutes (1979).

After a hearing on both motions, St. Joseph's was allowed to join as a party-petitioner, but the Department's motion to dismiss for lack of standing was granted as to all parties except St.Joseph's. After the hearing, the Department filed a suggestion of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and renewed its earlier motion to dismiss on grounds of lack of standing, citing State, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Alice P., 367 So.2d

1045 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). The Department urged again that the petitioners failed to allege with particularity facts sufficient to show that they would be substantially, affected by proposed rules and, therefore, there was no valid procedure for St. Joseph's to join.

In the final order the hearing officer reviewed thoroughly the law of standing in administrative procedures and determined that the' amended petition was insufficient as a matter of law He further noted that since St. Joseph's attempt to join the proceedings was filed beyond the 14 day period, St. Joseph's had accepted the invalid status of the proceeding and could not breathe new life into it, citing Alice P. The hearing officer concluded that dismissal without leave to amend was appropriate because petitioners bad already had two opportunities to file a petition which did confirm with the statute and the pendency of a petition challenging the validity of a proposed rule prohibited the adoption of the rule. The hearing officer held that to allow the petitioners another opportunity to amend their petition would unduly delay the rulemaking process.

Section 120.54(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), requires that one challenging a proposed rule must "state with particularity facts sufficient to show that the person challenging the proper rule would be substantially affected by it. . ." This Court has interpreted that statute as requiring proof that the rule has a real and immediate effect upon one's case, as well as injury in fact, Professional Firefighters of Florida, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, State of Florida, 396 So.2d 1194 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), and that the alleged interest is arguably within the zone of interest to be protected or regulated. Florida Department of Offender Rehabilitation v. Jerry, 353 So.2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), cert. denied 359 So.2d 1215 (Fla. 1978).

See also, Agrico Chemical Company v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 406 So.2d 478 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).

We agree with the ruling of the hearing officer that the allegations of fact in the petition and amended petition fail to state with particularity facts sufficient to show that . . . [service companies] would be substantially affected by the challenged rules and that the service companies, therefore, lacked standing based on the allegations. We find, however, that the denial of leave to amend was an abuse of discretion. The record here shows that all prior challenges to the service companies' standing had been rebuffed and that, although it is true, as the order states, the service companies had two opportunities to file amended petitions, neither of these amendments had dealt with the question of standing; this may well have been because the prior rulings indicated no need to do so. Evidence presented at the hearing included references to portions of the rules which affect the service companies' ability to obtain or retain certification by the Department of Labor and Employment Security and information relevant to those provisions. See, e.g., Rule 38F-5.40 and 38F-5.41. Under these circumstances, we think petitioners should have been given another opportunity to amend their petition.

The remaining question is whether the dismissal of St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc., the self-insured intervenor was proper. Alice P. specifically held that the 14 day period in which a petition must be filed is jurisdictional and a subsequent attempt to add parties cannot give validity to an otherwise invalid proceeding. Thus, the dismissal of St. Joseph's was proper at the time. Under

the circumstances of our ruling concerning giving the service companies an opportunity to amend, it follows that if the service companies fail to establish that they have standing, St. Joseph's will likewise have no standing. If the service companies succeed in establishing standing, then the motion to add St.

Joseph's as a party should be reconsidered on the merits at that time,.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion

BOOTH and SHIVERS, JJ., CONCUR.

MANDATE

From

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA FIRST DISTRICT

To the Honorable R. L. Caleen, Jr., Hearing Officer.

WHEREAS, in that certain cause filed in this Court styled: Division of Administrative Hearings

ALL RISK CORPORATION OF FLORIDA, GALLAGHER-BASSET INSURANCE SERVICE, INC., COMMERCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT,

INC., et al

v. Case No. AI-27

Your Case No. 81-2079RP

STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION

The attached opinion was rendered on March 25, 1982.

YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED that further proceedings be had in accordance with said opinion, the rules of this Court and the laws of the State of Florida.

WITNESS the Honorable Robert P. Smith, Jr.

Chief Judge of the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District and the Seal of said court at Tallahassee, the Capitol, on this 18th day of June, 1982.

Clerk, District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District

Docket for Case No: 81-002079RP

Orders for Case No: 81-002079RP