STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
RICHARD W. COONEY, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) CASE NO. 84-0183
) STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF ) ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION OF ) RETIREMENT, )
)
Respondent. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
A final hearing was held in this case in Sarasota on May 25, 1984. The issue is whether petitioner, Richard W. Cooney ("Cooney"), is entitled to be a member of the Florida Retirement System ("FRS") from July 1, 1979, forward.
Specifically, the issue is whether Cooney, the School Board Attorney for the Sarasota County School Board, is an "employee" within the meaning of Chapter 121, Florida Statutes and the applicable rules promulgated by the respondent, Department of Administration, Division of Retirement ("Division") an thus entitled to membership or is a "consultant or other professional person" as defined in the Division's rules, and thus not entitled to membership.
FINDINGS OF FACT /1
Petitioner Richard W. Cooney was admitted to the Florida Bar in 1960, after having practiced earlier in the state of New York, and has engaged in the practice of law in Sarasota, Florida since 1960. He has been a sole practitioner since 1979. Aside from his work for the School Board, he is a general practitioner with emphasis on real estate and probate practice. He is now 65 years old.
After an interview and selection process in late 1964, Cooney was first appointed as School Board Attorney in January, 1965. His predecessor, Henry P. Trawick, Jr. had represented the School Board on a retainer basis as an independent contractor. The scope and nature of Trawick's representation of the School Board was similar to that of Cooney, but Trawick had not participated as a member of the then existing retirement system, the State and County Officers and Employees Retirement System (`SCOERS") and was otherwise not treated as an employee.
In discussions with the then chairman of the School Board, and with W.
P. Piddock, the Assistant Superintendent for Business Affairs, Cooney was offered the choice of acting on a retainer basis, as had Trawick, or becoming an employee of the School Board. He chose the employment alternative, and in doing so, took into account various perceived advantages, including the group
insurance and other fringe benefits available, the opportunity to earn retirement benefits with School Board matching contributions, matching Social Security contributions by the School Board, and the guarantee of a reliable regular income. Participation in SCOERS was an important factor, but not the sole or dominant factor, in his decision.
As established in answers to interrogatories furnished by the Division: Cooney was enrolled as a member of SCOERS on January 2, 1965, and was subsequently enrolled in FRS (or his membership converted to FRS) on December 1, 1970; continuous contributions have been made since 1965 for his account as a member of SCOERS and then of the FRS, first on a matching basis, and since 1975 (when the FPS became a non-contributors system) by the School Board alone; Cooney became eligible to receive retirement benefits, or became "vested" on January 2, 1975; and as of July 1, 1979, he had 14.33 years of creditable service for retirement purposes.
Until 1976, Cooney served as School Board attorney by annual appointment, without a written contract. Commencing October 19, 1976, he has served under a succession of seven written contracts which define his compensation and duties. The first five of the contracts are entitled "Contract of Employment." All of the contracts state that Cooney is being employed by the School Board, and beginning with the second of the contracts, dated November 16, 1977, each contract explicitly states and recognizes an employer - employee relationship, and expressly allows Cooney to enjoy fringe benefits as provided to other employees. The contracts fix annual compensation, (once referred to as a retainer), payable monthly or semimonthly, for all services rendered except for: matters involving litigation or the threat of litigation, which Cooney is permitted to bill at hourly rates; bond issues, for which he is permitted to charge as might be agreed upon; and the provision of title insurance, for which he is permitted to charge rates as promulgated by the Florida Insurance Commission. The services to be rendered for the fixed annual compensation have always included attendance at School Board meetings and consultation on any School Board matter, and the most recent two contracts spell out that Cooney shall provide "all legal services to the Board, including but not limited to the following...", after which a wide variety of duties are set forth.
The School Board adopted a job description on July 7, 1981, for the School Board Attorney, in which the duties listed are essentially the same as in Cooney's most recent two contracts, and which states that "The School Board Attorney will be the primary attorney on all, school matters and will act as general counsel for the school district."
In practice, the scope of Cooney's services to the School Board has remained essentially unchanged since 1965. He acts as general counsel to the Board, in the sense that he either handles all of the Board's legal problems, or in situations requiring specialized talent, such as the labor field, he recommends outside counsel but remains responsible for liaison with the Board and its Superintendent, and monitors the services of such counsel. He handles no litigation personally, but recommends and monitors outside counsel who do trial work for the Board. The superintendents Dr. James H. Fox, Jr., looks to Cooney as the "attorney of first resort" in any matter requiring legal advice or work.
From November 4, 1981 through at least June 30, 1982, the School Board also had a "Retainer Agreement" with its labor counsel. Labor counsel was paid a fixed amount, payable monthly from the same fund source and was required to consult with School Board employees and, upon Cooney's request, attend the School Board's two regularly scheduled monthly meetings. Both are entitled to charge on an hourly basis for certain legal services. But that is where the similarities between Cooney's salaried work under his "Contract of Employment" and labor counsel's work under his "Retainer Agreement" end. Both agreements state that they contain all the agreements between the parties. But that is not true in the case of Cooney, who enjoys several employee benefits not enumerated in the contract.
Cooney is permitted to engage in the private practice of law, but his working arrangement with the School Board, confirmed in his most recent contracts, has always required him to be on call at all times to serve the Board on a priority basis. He is required to maintain hours at his law office conforming to those of the Board's administrative staff, in order to be available for consultation. In practice, he does a substantial amount of work for the Board at its administrative headquarters and at other school system facilities located throughout Sarasota County.
As a sole practitioner, Cooney performs personally all of the duties required under his contract. This was also true in the past when he had law partners. The monies paid as salary by the school Board have always been paid to Cooney personally and deposited by him in his personal account. Neither his former partners nor any other attorney have received any share in these salary payments. In contrast, his receipts for separate charges to the School Board under his contracts are deposited in his law office account.
On one or two occasions since 1965, a former partner substituted for Cooney, who was unable to attend the particular School Board meeting. Cooney did not pay his partner, who did as a personal favor to Cooney and the School Board. Cooney also missed one to two meetings when he had arranged for labor counsel to be there under his "Retainer Agreement." On those occasions, labor matters were the only legal matters of significance on the agenda, and there was little Cooney could add.
The contributions made to SCOERS, and to FRS for Cooney's account have always been made based only upon his salary paid. Cooney inquired of the Division in 1973 as to the possibility of making contributions with respect to additional charges paid to him by the School Board, and received an answer in February, 1973 from the Division's Retirement Services Supervisor which stated:
"You can only pay retirement on the salary received. Legal fees cannot be claimed for retirement."
Consequently, neither the School Board nor Cooney have ever sought to make retirement contributions based upon Cooney's billings to the Board for additional chances permitted under his contracts. Cooney since 1965 has received an annual statement from the Division showing the total of his contributions on deposit.
The School Board and its Superintendent administratively treat Cooney in much the same way as other key noninstructional administrative employees. His office is listed on the official organization chart in a direct "line" relationship with the Board, as is the Superintendent. His salary as School
Board Attorney is included in the budget adopted by the Board. The ongoing "functioning budget," which traces fund expenditures, contains a cost center detail report for Legal Services. Cooney is in charge of and responsible for this cost center, with an assigned fund source code, function code, and object code - a responsibility reserved to employees only.
Cooney is and has been paid his contracted salary from the School Board's regular salaries and wages account when no federal funds are involved, Fund Source 1000, Unrestricted General Funds. Cooney also is listed in the payroll journal cost center detail which shows his salary payments and Board contributions for his social security and retirement accounts. The Board annually supplies Cooney with Internal Revenue Service Form W-2, reflecting the deductions from his salary for social security and for federal income taxes.
As noted earlier, the Board adopted a job designation for Cooney's position as School Board attorney in July, 1981. In March, 1984, the Board adopted a revision to its salary schedule which for the first time included not only the School Board Attorney's salary, but also that of the Superintendent himself, and his Deputy and Associate Superintendents. This was done as the result of audit criticism by the Auditor General in June, 1983, which suggested that the formal addition of these positions to the salary schedule was required if the School Board intended these personnel to be employees.
Cooney at all times has participated in the fringe benefits provided by the School Board to its employees, including group medical and life insurance, a tax sheltered annuity program and membership in the employee credit union. He is covered under the Board's worker's compensation insurance and its errors and omissions coverage although no claims have been made under either relating to Cooney.
Until a change in the Internal Revenue Code approximately two years ago, Cooney's FRS membership precluded him from maintaining an IRA account.
Cooney accrues paid annual vacation and sick leave, and his accumulated leave days are recorded in the School Board's payroll prelist. He reports leave taken or proposed in the form of letters to the Superintendent, whose secretary transmits the information to the payroll department. Neither the School Board nor Cooney pay a great deal of attention to the details of Cooney's use of sick and annual leave. Cooney is not required to work on School Board matters during specific hours and is free to work on other matters during normal office hours so long as these activities do not interfere with his obligation to be available to the School Board at all times during those hours. In addition, much of Cooney's School Board work consists of thinking about School Board problems which Cooney can do, and does, anytime and anyplace. For these reasons, for example, Cooney does not take sick leave unless he is hospitalized.
As a result of these circumstances, there is a dispute between Cooney and the School Board about the time for which he is charged on the school system's records for leave days taken and uncertainty over the number of earned days of leave to which he is entitled. The payroll prelist shows days of accumulated vacation and sick leave, and Cooney's salary check stubs have likewise reflected entries for "vacation available" and "sick leave earned" since March, 1983, when these entries first began to appear on all salary checks issued by the School Board. In the event Cooney should be absent from his duties after exhausting his available leave, he would be treated (as other employees) as being on leave without pay.
In the performance of his duties, Cooney is similar to Dr. Fox, who regards both Cooney and himself as on duty "24 hours a day." The Superintendent and the Board Attorney are the only persons directly hired by the School Board; both are directly instructed by the Board; both are evaluated by the Board; both have authority, in cases of necessity between Board meetings, to determine the need for and to engage outside assistant, and to submit these actions for later Board ratification; and both are free to do outside consulting or other professional work (although Fox must take annual leave to do consulting during regular business hours.)
The Board directs Cooney's work by referring and assigning problems or requesting legal assistance. The Superintendent, while he does not direct Cooney, routinely requests advice and assistance for himself and his senior administrators. Cooney routinely responds, and has never refused such a request. He also is required to account for time spent on school Board matters and report the status of those matters to the Board.
Although Cooney is not required to devote a fixed number of hours per day or week to School Board work, he is available pursuant to his contract for consultation during the regular working hours of the school system, from 8:00 AM. to 4:30 PM. daily, and is expected by the Superintendent to be so available. He normally works an average of 40 to 60 hours each month for the Board, but has no control over the time demands which may be made upon him, and is not free to accept or reject assignments of work by the Board. The majority of his work for the Board is performed at the administrative offices, at Board meetings, and at other school facilities as the nature of problems demand.
Cooney does not supervise any employees of the School Board, but all are available to him for assistance. While the nature of his work does not demand much secretarial assistance, he uses the secretarial staff in the Superintendent's office and, more often, the secretary in his law office to do Board work as necessary. The Board supplies Cooney with legal publications, including Florida Statutes, State Board and school district rules and administrative regulations, and school law summary materials. The Board also furnishes copying services. The Board pays Cooney's dues for membership in the Florida School Board Attorneys Association and the National Organization on Legal Problems in Education, and pays his expenses to meetings of these associations, as well as to other conferences on matters of law and education. His expenses for these meetings and other travel are reimbursed in accordance with Sec. 112.051, Florida Statutes.
The School Board does not provide an office for Cooney in Board facilities. He has never requested office space nor a secretary at Board expense; nor has he asked for stationery or Postage. Cooney's law office is located within ten to fifteen minutes' driving time from the Board administration building, and other School Board offices in which Cooney must attend to business are scattered throughout the county. Neither Cooney nor the Board have felt the need for special office space in the administration building. However, Dr. Fox testified that if Cooney should at some time request an office, secretary, or supplies, there would be nothing irregular or improper in such a request, and it would be considered routinely in light of practical and budgetary constraints.
As mentioned earlier, Cooney was enrolled as a member of SCOERS in January, 1965, and as a member of the FRS in December, 1970. It was not established whether these enrollments indicated the position which he held. Neither the Division nor anyone else sought further information or questioned Cooney's eligibility until much later. Effective July 1, 1979, the Division substantially amended its rules and as one of the many changes set forth guidelines for categorizing, as ineligible for membership, a consultant or other professional person." Before the new rules, the Division considered Cooney eligible for FRS membership. The Division now believes, however, as a result of the new rules, that Cooney is no longer eligible for continued membership. /2 The Division in July, 1979 sent a memo to all FRS reporting agencies, including the School Board, summarizing its various rule changes, and held seminars in different areas of the state to explain the changes. A similar memo was sent to the agencies by the Division in September, 1979, and in January, 1981, said memos specifically concerned with the eligibility of "professionals."
The Division did not establish that the earlier 1979 memos were brought to Cooney's attention.
In any event, Cooney became aware of the Division's new criteria, insofar as they affected retirement eligibility for professional persons, some time in 1980 through discussions at meetings of the Florida School Board Attorneys Association. He took no action to obtain a declaratory statement from the Division concerning his status under the new rules. In December, 1980, the Division sent a letter to Dr. Fox enclosing a questionnaire to be completed with respect to Cooney's eligibility, and stating:
"Upon receipt of the completed question naire, a determination will be made con cerning the employee's eligibility.
The questionnaire was completed and returned to the Division on January 18, 1981 by Malcolm C. Zweibel, the Deputy Superintendent. A copy of Cooney's contract with the Board was attached, and Zweibel unequivocally affirmed Cooney's status as an employee rather than an independent contractor.
Cooney heard nothing further until he received a letter from the Division dated October 3, 1983, advising him that, upon review of the questionnaire, the Division was of the opinion that he was "not eligible to participate as a member of the FRS" and intended to remove him from membership as of July 1, 1979. A response was made to the Division by Cooney's counsel, followed by a final letter to Cooney from the State Retirement Director dated November 23, 1983, giving the Director's "final decision" to remove Cooney, and advising him of his right to a hearing under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. This proceeding was then commenced.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division Has The Burden of Proof and Persuasion.
At the outset of the hearing, Cooney's reguest, it was ruled that the Division has the burden of proof end persuasion. For the reasons set forth in the Final Order, Blair v. Division of Retirement, infra, that ruling is
reaffirmed. As reflected in the Findings of Fact, the evidence in this case establishes that the Division considered Cooney eligible before the new rules but ineligible after the new rules. Therefore, it is the Division, not Cooney, that is seeking to change the status quo and seeking to establish the affirmative of the issue at hand.
Cooney Has a Vested Interest in Retirement Benefits.
It is clear from the Division's statements and admissions, as well as from the provisions of Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, that Cooney became vested with the right to retirement benefits on January 2, 1975, upon completing ten years of creditable service as a member of SCOERS and then of the FRS. The Division does not contest Cooney's continued membership prior to July 1, 1979, the effective date of its rule changes, but seeks to deny him continued eligibility after that date.
Cooney's vested status is not a bar to the Division's attempt to disenroll him either prospectively or retroactively as of July 1, 1979. Several Division determinations belie Cooney's contention to the contrary. See Final Order, Blair v. Division of Retirement, DOAH Case No. 83-746, entered May 4, 1984; Final Order, Potter v. Division of Retirement, DOAH Case No. 83-1747, entered March 2, 1994; and Final Order, Bryan v. Division of Retirement, DOAH Case No. 82-3460, entered June 7, 1983. See also Florida Sheriffs Association
v. Department of Administration, 408 So.2d 1033 (Fla. 1982)
The decision in Henry v. Department of Administration, Division of Retirement, 431 So.2d 677 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), is distinguishable in that the Division sought to disenroll Henry retroactively between January 1974 and June 1978, i.e., before the Division promulgated new rules addressing the status of professionals on contract. In this case, the Division seeks to disenroll Cooney only as of July 1, 1979, the effective date of the new rules. Thereafter, the Division sent memos to all FRS reporting agencies, including the School Board, in July and September 1979 advising about the new rules. No later than 1980, Cooney had actual knowledge of the rule changes.
Cooney Meets the Requirements for Eligibility for FRS Membership After July 1, 1979.
Prior to July 1, 1979, there were no rules to clarify the question whether a person such as petitioner Cooney is eligible for membership in the FBS. At all times pertinent to this case, Section 121.021(22), Florida Statutes (1983), defined the term "compensation" and stated: Under no circumstances shall compensation include fees paid professional persons for special or particular services." Section 121.021(22) might require the conclusion that such a person is ineligible for FRS membership if all his compensation is attributable to fees for special or particular services which cannot be included as part of his "compensation," as that term is defined by 121.021(22). But, it does not require the conclusion that professionals who charge fees for special or particular services are ipso facto ineligible for FRS membership. See Frank
A. Howard, Jr. v. Department of Administration, Division of Retirement, 4 FALR 542A (DOA, DOR 1981)
Section 121.051(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1983), provides that membership in the FRS is "compulsory as to all officers and employees Section 121.021(11), Florida Statutes (1983) states: "`Officer or employee' means any person receiving salary payments for work performed in a regularly established position.
A review of all the pertinent statutes and rules demonstrates that the question whether Cooney is entitled to membership in FRS after July 1, 1979 (i.e., whether his salary payments are salary payments for work performed in a regularly established position"), turns on whether Cooney's position is that of a "consultant or other professional person on contract" as Rules 22B-1.04(6)(e)6 and 22B-6.01(12), Florida Administrative Code, use that phrase. See Final Order, Blair v. Department of Administration, Division of Retirement, supra. Rule 22B-1.04 (6)(e)6, Florida Administrative Code, provides that "Consultants and Other Professional persons on contract [as defined in 22B-6.01(12)] are considered to be in "temporary positions" for retirement purposes and therefore ineligible for membership in the FRS. Rule 22B-6.01(12), Florida Administrative Code, provides:
(12) CONSULTANT OR OTHER PROFESSION PERSON--Means an individual who: agrees
to provide certain services; works according to his own methods: is not subject to the control of his employer, except as to the results of his work; and does not enjoy the fringe benefits offered by the employer. A consultant or other professional person usually: is compensated from another salaries and wages account; does not earn annual or sick leave; and may frequently
do a majority of his work in his own office rather than on the employer's premises. (See 22B-1.04(6)(e)6.)
Although located among rules which define eligibility in terms of the permanency of the position, it is evident that Rule 22B-1.04 (6)(e)6 actually does not concern itself with whether a professional or consultant on contract" is filling a "temporary position." Rather, it concerns itself with whether the "contract" is an "employment contract" or an "independent contract," as those terms are used in the common law.
There is no true definition of a common law "independent contract," as opposed to the "employment contract." In the development of the common law such distinctions have been drawn on a case-by-case basis. Out of this process, certain attributes of the two types of contract have been established. But there remains a gray area of fact patterns which must be determined on a case- by-case basis. Cf., e.q., 2 Fla. Jur. 2d, agency and Employment, Section 107:
There is no absolute rule for determining whether one is an independent contractor or an employee, and each case must be determined on its own facts. The commonly recognized tests of the independent con tractor relationship, although not necessarily concurrent or each in itself controlling, are the existence of a contract for the performance at a fixed price, the independent nature of his employment of assistants with the right
to supervise their activities, his obligation to furnish necessary tools, supplies, and materials, his right to
control the progress of the work except as to final results, the time for which the workman is employed, the method of payment, whether by time or by job, and whether the work is part of the regular business of the employer. One may be an independent contractor, however, even though the company with whom he has the contract happens to be engaged in some places in the same kind of business.
And if his business is in fact operated independently of the company, he will be held to be independent contractor not withstanding the fact that the company owns the physical property on which he has his place of business.
Similarly, Rule 22B-6.01(12) provides guidance, but is not a true definition. It is not a formula into which facts are plugged and from which the answer to the question necessarily follows. On the contrary, questions frequently remain after one attempts to use Rule 22B-6.01(12) as a true definition or formula. The criteria of Rule 22B-6.O1(12) must be examined with the foregoing in mind:
For his salary, Cooney agrees in his contract to "provide all legal services to the Board;" except in matters of litigation, bond issues, or the issuance of title insurance. Cooney's contract contrasts with that of the Board's labor counsel, who is paid and treated by the Board as an independent contractor.
Cooney works according to his own methods no more nor less than any publicly employed lawyer. The Board instructs him and assigns him work, which he is not free to reject, but the Board has no greater or lesser control over the manner in which he performs his work than any public agency has over its employed lawyers. Cooney is bound by the Code of Professional Responsibility to maintain independence of judgment, and neither School Board members nor school administrators have the expertise to control Cooney's lawyering activities.
Cooney enjoys all fringe benefits offered by the Board.
Cooney's salary is paid from the Board's regular salaries and wages account, as are all employees and independent contractors.
Cooney does earn annual vacation and sick leave, although there is some confusion as to how it is recorded and accrued and although Cooney's sick and annual leave benefits seem to be of less importance and benefit to him than they are to other employees of the School Board.
(6) Cooney does some of his School Board work in his law office, and more at School Board offices or other facilities. Cooney's private secretary does most of his secretarial work on Board matters, although Cooney also uses school secretarial assistance. But Cooney has relatively little need of secretarial assistance since most of his work consists of attending meetings of one kind or another, giving oral advice and thinking about legal problems.
As is usual in these cases, the parties in argument strain to contend that Cooney is either (according to Cooney) "clearly an employee" or (according to the Division) "clearly an independent contractor." Unfortunately for the ultimate decider of these cases, it never is so clear. Indeed, these cases are being decided in formal administrative proceedings precisely because a professional like Cooney is neither "clearly an employee" nor "clearly an independent contractor"; rather, he is somewhere in between, having attributes of both. For this reason, the decision-maker cannot (as the advocates are quick to) grasp hold of a single bit of evidence (whether it be a budgeted office, leave benefits, use of Board support staff or the absence of one of those factors) and pronounce with confidence that the petitioner is "clearly" an employee, on the one hand, or "clearly" an independent contractor, on the other hand. Rather, the ultimate decision comes from a process of balancing the conflicting evidence.
Using this approach, it is seen that Cooney is different, in several important respects, from the "employee/independent contractor" attorneys who have been denied FRS membership over the years:
Henry, supra, and at 4 F.A.L.R. 1295A (DOA, DORet. 1982)-
Cooney, as sole practitioner, personally performs essentially all of his School Board work himself, not through partners or associates of his law firm as Henry did to a great extent.
Cooney has indeed taken sick or annual leave, unlike Henry.
As to his compensation, Cooney's is a true annual salary, while Henry's annual salary was strictly computed on an hourly rate basis, with extra time also compensated on the hourly rate.
Finally, the evidence was that Henry's "employee" attributes were transparent bookkeeping changes intended not to change his relationship from that of an independent contractor to that of an employee, but only to make him technically eligible for FRS retirement benefits. Indeed, Henry did not even negotiate his so-called employee relationship with his so-called employer (a municipal hospital) but rather with the City of Tallahassee, a client of Henry's private practice. In contrast, Cooney's employee attributes are bona fide.
Potter, supra. -
Cooney's private office is within a 10-15 minute drive from the School Board's administration office, equally as or more convenient than many of the School Board's other offices scattered about the country. Potter's private office, on the other hand, is in a different county.
Potter does not accrue annual leave or sick leave; Cooney does.
Potter is free to decline School Board work; Cooney may not.
Potter is not required to maintain office hours: Cooney must be available at all times between 8:00 am. and 4:30 PM. on days the School Board is open for business.
Potter does the majority of his school work at his private office; the majority of Cooney's work is done at a School Board office, whether it be the administrative building or one of the satellite offices.
Blair, supra. -
Blair's professional association, through which he conducts his private law practice was under contract to the school board; Blair individually was not.
Blair's employees did school board work for him; again, Cooney does all his himself.
Hulmes v. Division of Retirement, 3 FALR 1592 A (DOA, DORet. 1981).
Hulmes was seeking reinstatement. He and Broward Community College had earlier conceded that Hulmes was not eligible for FRS membership and, accordingly, Hulmes had been disenrolled. In the proceedings for reinstatement, it was established that Hulmes' relationship with the college had not changed in substance. Cooney has been enrolled since 1965 and always believed he was eligible for FRS membership. Until July 1, 1979, the Division did, too. (See Petitioner's Exhibit A)
Hulmes was head of a five-man law firm with two private offices. Hulmes' partners and associates freely substituted for him. Again, as sole practitioner, Cooney does all his School Board work himself.
As petitioner for reinstatement, Hulmes certainly had the burden to prove his eligibility. Therefore, the absence from the Hulmes final order of many "employee" attributes that are present in the Cooney case is the equivalent of a finding against Hulmes on those points.
Bryan, supra. -
A majority of Bryan's work for the St. Lucie County School Board was performed at his private office; a majority of Cooney's work is performed at School Board offices.
Bryan received no annual or sick leave or pay during vacations, holidays or illnesses; Cooney receives annual and sick leave, as previously described.
on Bryan's side of this ledger, Bryan is generally responsible for
`handling all legal matters of his board; Cooney, on the other hand, monitors and is responsible for, but does not "handle" litigation.
At the same time, it cannot be said that Cooney is exactly like the petitioner in Howard, supra:
Howard was furnished a complete, budgeted office at the School Board administrative offices, including all necessary equipment and supplies. While Cooney's department is budgeted, the budget does not include an office or equipment or supplies.
Howard hired, supervised and fired the budgeted support staff of School Board employees for his school board office, including secretaries and assistant school board attorneys. Cooney is the sole member of his School Board's legal staff.
None of Howard's school board work was done at his private office or by his private staff; some of Cooney's is (although not much is required and a majority of his work is done at School Board facilities.) But balancing all of the factors evidenced in this case, Cooney is more like Howard than he is like Henry, Potter, Blair and Hulmes. To deny Cooney FRS membership extended to
Howard would be to do so solely because Cooney's School Board does not need as large a legal department as Howard's did and because it is more frugal than Howard's (or Cooney more generous than Howard) when it comes to paying for its attorney's secretarial help, equipment and supplies. This would be both illogical and unfair. It also would fail to recognize that Cooney has one "employee" attribute that even Howard did not have: Cooney accrues sick and annual leave; Howard did not.
These conclusions have not been drawn without reference to the Final Order entered August 15, 1984 in Hilary U. Albury v. Division of Retirement, DOAH Case No. 83-3941. In that case, the Division denied Albury's eligibility as a member of FRS after July 1, 1979. Factually, Albury's situation is very similar to Cooney's. (The only significant difference is that Albury has an office at his school board's offices; but Albury's office was sparsely furnished, rarely used by him, and shared with all the school board members.) Therefore, if A1bury is denied, Cooney logically should be, too.
However, two of the primary reasons for denying Albury were: (1) the Division's conclusion that it is a conflict of interest for Albury, if an employee, to contract school board litigation and other legal work to his law firm, under Section 112.313, Florida Statutes (1983); and (2) the Division's belief that Albury differed from Howard in that Howard "had fixed hours of work," while Albury does not. As to the first reason, Section 112.313 does not establish that Albury and Cooney are not employees. They could just as easily be employees who are violating the law - as Howard apparently was. See Howard
v. State Commission on Ethics, 421 So.2d 37 (,Fla. 3d DCA 1982). As to the second reason, the Division's belief that Howard "had fixed hours of work" is wrong. In fact, Howard did not have "fixed hours of work." See Howard 4
F.A.L.R. 542A, supra, at 543A.
In conclusion, on balance Cooney is more like an employee than an independent contractor. Therefore, the contract between Richard W. Cooney and the School Board is a contract of employment. Accordingly, after using the criteria of Rule 22B-6.01(12), Florida Administrative Code, it is concluded that Cooney's salary payments are "salary payments for work performed in a regularly established position," under Section 121.021(11) , Florida Statutes (1983) , and that Cooney is entitled to membership in the Florida Retirement System both before and after July 1, 1979.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Division enter a final order declaring Richard W. Cooney eligible for membership in the Florida Retirement System both before and after July 1, 1979.
RECOMMENDED this 6th day of September, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida.
J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON, Hearing Officer
Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building
2009 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
(904) 488-9675
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of September, 1984.
ENDNOTES
1/ All proposed findings of fact have been considered and, except to the extent reflected in the following Findings of Fact, rejected as either being not supported by competent substantial evidence, being contrary to facts proved by the party with the burden of proof, being redundant, being subordinate or being irrelevant.
2/ To the extent that the Division offered evidence to the contrary, that evidence is rejected as less persuasive than the evidence which led to this finding. See Petitioner's Exhibit A.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Frank A. Howard, Esquire
10th Floor Dade Savings Bldg.
101 T. Flagler St. Miami, Florida 33131
Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire Division of Retirement
Cedars Executive Center 2639 N. Monroe St.
Suite 207- Building C Tallahassee, Fl. 32303
Nevin G. Smith Secretary
Department of Administration Carlton Building Tallahassee, Fl. 32301
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AGENCY FINAL ORDER
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STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
RICHARD W. COONEY,
Petitioner,
vs. CASE NO. 84-0183
DOR Case No DR84-1
STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT,
Respondent.
/
FINAL ORDER
Pursuant to Notice, the Division of Administrative Hearings, by its duly designated hearing officer, held a public hearing in this cause on May 25, 1984 in Sarasota, Florida.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner:
Frank A. Howard, Esquire Howard, Browner, Lovett & dePozsgay
10th Floor Dade Savings Building
101 East Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33131
For Respondent:
Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire Division Attorney
Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207-Building C Tallahassee, Florida 32303
Upon consideration of the hearing officer's Recommended Order, the Written evidence, and the testimony and arguments the parties in this matter, the undersigned makes the following findings:
FINDINGS OF FACT
The hearing officer's findings of fact are hereby approved and adopted.
There is competent, substantial evidence to support the the hearing officer's findings of fact.
Petitioner takes his vacation between school board meetings or by asking the school board to be excused from attending said meetings. No leave time is actually used for such absences. (Petitioner's Exhibit O)
Prior to 1979 the Division had not determined Cooney was an employee being paid from a regular salaries account who was eligible for FRS membership. His actual position and employment status was not questioned until 1980. Following an extensive review of Cooney's position, which had not changed since 1965, the Division determined Cooney was not eligible for FRS membership because he was not filling a regularly, established position.
The 1979 rule changes defined "regularly established position", but did not redefine employee.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Department of Administration has jurisdiction, of the subject matter and the parties thereto pursuant to Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.
As a general rule participation in the FRS is compulsory for all officers and employees of an agency of government, including local school boards and county employees. Sections 121.021 and 121.051, Florida Statutes; Rule 22B- 1.04, Florida Administrative code.
An employee is defined as". . any person receiving salary payments for work performed in a regularly established position is one which will be in existence for a period of four or more consecutive months Rule 22B-1.04(5)(b), Florida Administrative Code. However, an exception has been created by rule for temporary positions even though they may exist beyond four or more consecutive months. Rule 22B-1.04(6), Florida Administrative, code. A temporary position in a local agency, such as a school board, includes all consultants and other professional persons on contract. Rule 22B-1.04(6)(e)6., Florida Administrative Code. This category of personnel is defined within Rule 22B-6.01(12), Florida Administrative Code.
As a basis for removing Petitioner from the FRS, Respondent contends in brief that Petitioner is a professional person within the meaning of Rule 22B- 6.01(12), that for retirement purposes a professional person is considered to be filling a temporary position (Rule 22B-1.04(6)(c)6., and that an employee filling a temporary position not eligible for membership in the FRS. Rule 22B- 1.04(6). It also argues that under the facts and circumstances in the case at bar, Petitioner is merely an independent contractor vis a vis an employee of the Board of county Commissioners and as such, cannot qualify for FRS membership.
Petitioner disagrees and asserts his employment status is that of an employee rather than an independent contractor, and that he does not fall within the purview of the cited Division rules. He also relies upon the rationale contained in Re: Frank A. Howard, Jr., v Dept. of Admin., Div. of Retirement, DOAH Case No. 81-417, Final order entered December 11, 1981, which held a school board attorney for Dade County to be an employee of the Board and, therefore, eligible to participate in the retirement system.
4 The crucial issue in this case is whether Petitioner within the definition of a professional person as defined by Rule 22B-6.01(12) If he does, other pertinent rules make clear that Cooney's petition must fail.
The rule in question defines a professional person as follows: "an individual who: agrees to provide
certain services; works according to his
own methods; is not subject to the control of his employers except as to the results of his work; and does not enjoy the fringe benefits offered by the employer. A consul
tant or other professional person usually is compensated from an other salaries and wage account; does not earn annual or sick leave; and may frequently do a majority of his work. in his own office rather than on the employer's premises.
Petitioner has alleged his retainer to mean that the school board transforms him from a professional person on contract to that of "employee" however, there is no support in law for Petitioner's conclusion.
Whether the relationship is an employer/employee or independent contractor does not turn on the statements of the parties, but an examination of all the circumstances of the dealings between the parties.
A review of Petitioner's contract reveals no employer/employee relationship was created, rather the contracts establish, an agency/independent contractor status which was not intended to be covered under the Florida Retirement System for its public employees. An "employee" is one who, for a consideration, agrees to work, subject to the orders and directions of another, usually for regular wages but not necessarily so, and further agrees to subject himself at all times during the period of service to the lawful orders and directions of the others in respect to the work to be done. This exercise of control over the employee as well as the performance of the work to the extent of prescribing the manner in which the work shall be executed is the ultimate test of the nature of the relationship between employer and employee.
These essential elements are not present in Petitioner's contract. It is clear from the contracts submitted Petitioner is merely subject, by the contracts, for the results obtained rather than methods employed, i.e., to perform legal services for the Sarasota County Board. Otherwise, stated, other than an occasional board meeting, Petitioner is free to work wherever and as much as he deems necessary. Petitioner has contracted, for a stated sum, presently $28,000.00 per year, to provide specific legal services to the Sarasota County School Board as specified in Paragraph 4 of his current contract (although Petitioner testified he does not do every item in Paragraph such as conducting lawsuits and other items such as bond and title insurance are separately billed). Importantly, Petitioner does not actually earn, use or accrue annual leave or sick leave like other employees, nor is his office budgeted and operated like other school board offices. Although Petitioner claims to be in charge of a cost center, none of the cost center funds are utilized to fund the operation of his office.
The independent nature of the business Petitioner is engaged in also suggests the attorney is an independent contractor. Petitioner offers the identical services -- legal -- services -- to the members of the general public, as he has offered those services to the school board in this case. Just as all lawyers must do, Petitioner is required to avoid conflict in representing different clients.
An attorney has no power to act for another as legal advisor or counsel by virtue of his license alone. He must have a contract by employment, express or implied, with the party for whom he purports to act. Yet, because of the unique nature of the work the attorney requires a certain amount of independence in doing his work. Petitioner was given his independence
The contracts also make it clear the Petitioner was not retained as an "employee" full time or otherwise. Rather, a primary claim was placed on his services through the retainer for a full year.
No distinction in employment status is discernable between the petitioner's relationship with the agency and the relationship of a private attorney contracting to provide legal services to a client. In each case an attorney was engaged primarily for specified services. Cooney, like labor counsel Daniel Kunkel, is paid out of the same salaries account, #1000 unrestricted General Funds.
Where the status of the employment for retirement purposes an issue, as it is in the instant case, it is important to characterize the status of the employment as an "employee" or "independent contractor" in order to determine if the employer, must pay contributions under the retirement law and whether the employee is entitled to benefits under the act. Similar inquiries have been made by the court: Whether, for example, an employer must pay contributions under the unemployment insurance act, Farmers and Merchants Bank v. Vocelle, 106 So.2d 292 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958); whether an employee is entitled to benefits under the act, Florida Industrial Commission v. State, 155 Fla. 772, 21 So.2nd
599 (1954); and whether benefits are payable under the Worker's' Compensation Act, Pan-American Construction Co. v. Searcy, 84 So.2d 540 (Fla. 1954)
The difference between an independent contractor and a servant is well recognized. Gentile Brothers Co. v. Florida Industrial Commission, 151 Fla. 857, 10 So.2d 568 (1942).
Concededly, the line between an independent contractor and an employee is not always easy to draw. Probably one of the best tests is set forth in 2 Fla. Jur., 2d. Agency and Employment, ss.107.
"There is no absolute rule for determining whether one is an independent contractor or an employee, and each case must be determined on its own facts. The commonly recognized
tests of the independent contractor relationship although not necessarily concurrent or each in itself controlling, are the existence of a contract for the performance at a fixed price, the independent nature of his employment of assistants with the right to supervise their activities, his obligation to furnish necessary
tools, supplies, and materials, his right to control the progress of the work except as to final
results, the time for which the workman is employed, the method of payment, whether by time or by job, and whether the work is part of the regular business of the employer. One
may be an independent contractor, however, even though the company with whom he has the contract happens to be engaged in some places in same kind of business. And if his business is in fact
operated independently of the company, he will be held to be independent contractor notwith standing the fact that the company owns the physical property on which he has his place of business." See also AGO 062-120.
Comparing the Petitioner's circumstances to those presented above, we find he carried on independent employment. Cooney, like Daniel Kunkel, had a private contract to do a certain piece of work at a fixed price.
With regard to "furnishing his own assistants", we find that Petitioner was free to choose and paid his own assistant out of his retainer.
The final important factor to be considered is whether the alleged employment is part of Petitioner regular business and not that of the Board. The aim of the Board is to carry out the education of children. Chapter 230, Florida Statutes. The mission of Petitioner's law practice is to contract his legal, services out. This, he has done.
In Bryan W. Henry v. State of Florida, Department of Administration, Division of Retirement, 431 So.2d 677 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), the hearing officer found Bryan Henry's relationship with Tallahassee Memorial Hospital (TMH) was in the nature of private legal representation. Henry, like Petitioner, performed the majority of the legal work for the hospital at his private legal office, maintained his own library (although some books were provided by TMH), utilized his own materials and clerical assistance, did not accrue annual or sick leave, engaged in private practice of law, and handled the representation of TMH as that of Henry's other clients. The District Court found the Division of Retirement had competent substantial evidence in the record to support its finding that Henry was an independent contractor. Id. at page 679. Other Cooney similarities with Henry are:
Cooney, like Henry, does not take sick or annual leave off, rather, he schedules his vacation between meetings.
As to his compensation, Cooney's is a true retainer fee based on an average of 470 annual hours (Petitioner's Exhibit R), while Henry's annual salary was computed on an hourly rate basis, with extra time also compensated on the hourly rate.
Finally, the evidence was that Henry's like Cooney's, "employee" attributes were transparent bookkeeping changes intended not to change his relationship from that of an independent contractor to that of an employee, but only to make him technically eligible for FRS retirement benefits. while, Cooney admits he actually works 40-60 hours per month, his payroll reports show he is paid $15.55 per hour for 7.5 hours per day for 10 days (75 hours) in each two week pay period or a total of $2,333.33 per month. (Exhibits L and N) Also despite Cooney's contractual statement that 11 agreements between the parties were contained within the written agreement Cooney claims he enjoys several
employee benefits...[* NOTE: text line is unreadable in Agency Final Order on file with DOAH and therefore not included in the ACCESS Document]...including annual leave which was never taken by Cooney nor properly documented is another example of transparent bookkeeping changes for Cooney.
In Cooney the employment arrangement is similar to several cases heard by this agency. In Potter v. Division of Retirement, DOAH Case No. 83-1747, entered March 2, 1384, Cooney's private office, like Potter's, is away from the school board's administration office.
Potter does not accrue annual leave or sick leave; Cooney does so transparently only.
Both Potter and Cooney are free to decline school board work. Cooney usually recommends another attorney to handle all litigation.
Potter is not required to maintain office hours. Cooney transparently must be available it all times between 8:00 am. and 4:30 p.m. on days the school board is open for business. Yet, he admits he actually works 40 to 60 hours per month (470 annually) on school board work, including meetings. Potter does the majority of his school work at his private office; the majority of Cooney's work consists of "thinking about, school board problems" which Cooney can do, and does, any time and any place.
In Blair v. Division of Retirement, DOAH Case No. 83-746, entered May 4, 1984 an agency/independent contractor relationship was found:
Blair's professional association, through which he conducts his private law practice was under contract to the school board; Blair individually was not.
Blair's employee, like Cooney's, do school board work. Cooney does all his "thinking" himself, but he has utilized his secretary to type school board work and compensated her out of his salary.
In Hulmes v. Division of Retirement, 3 FALR 1592 A (DOR, 1981), former employment did not create FRS rights:
Hulmes was seeking reinstatement. He and Broward Community College had earlier conceded that Hulmes was not eligible for FRS membership and, accordingly, Hulmes had been disenrolled
.
In the proceedings for reinstatement, it was established that Hulmes' relationship with the college had not changed in substance. Cooney has been enrolled since 1965 and always believed he was eligible for FRS membership. However, no review of his employment relationship was conducted until 1980.
Hulmes was head of a five-man law firm with two private offices. Hulmes' partner and associates freely substituted for him. Again, as solo practitioners Cooney does all the legal school board work himself. However, his former partner attended some school board meetings for him.
In Bryan v. Dept. Of Admin., Div. of Retire., DOAH case No. 82-3460, entered June 7, 1983:
A majority of Bryan's work for the St. Lucie , County School Board, like Cooney s, was performed at his private office.
Bryan received no annual or sick leave or pay during vacations, holidays or illnesses; Cooney received transparent annual and sick leave, as previously described.
On Bryan's side of this ledger, Bryan is generally responsible for "handling" all legal matters of his board; Cooney on the other hand, "monitors" and is responsible for, but does not "handle" litigation. Clearly Cooney too, is an independent contractor.
At the same time, it cannot be said that Cooney is similar to the petitioner in Howard, Supra:
Howard was furnished a complete budgeted office at the school board administrative offices, including all necessary equipment and supplies. While Cooney's department is budgeted, the budget does not include an office or equipment or supplies.
Howard hired, supervised and fired the budgeted support staff of school board employees for his school board including secretaries and assistant school board attorneys. Cooney is the sole member of his school board's legal staff
None of Howard's school board work was done at his private office or by his private staff, whereas, some of Cooney's is.
These conclusions have not been drawn without reference, to the, Final Order entered August 15, 1984 in Hilary U. Albury v. Division of Retirement, DOAH Case No. 83-3941. In that case, the Division denied Albury's eligibility as a member of FRS after July 1, 1979. Factually, Albury's situation is very similar to Cooney's (The only significant difference is that Albury has an office at his school board's offices, but Albury's office as; sparsely furnished, rarely used by him, and shared with all the school board members.) Therefore, since Albury has been denied, Cooney logically should be too.
In summary, the evidence herein reveals the petitioner
(a) has agreed by written contracts to provide certain legal services; (b) works according to his own methods; (c) is generally not subject to the control of his employers, except as, to the results of his work; (d) does not actually earn, use or accumulate annual or sick leave; (e) does a majority of his work in his own office (or elsewhere where he can think") rather than on the school board's premises; and, (f) bears full expenses for the cost of his office facilities, (other than the actual meetings). While it is true petitioner is paid from a regular salaries account fund source, 1000, unrestricted general funds, the same account used to pay outside independent counsel, that in itself is insufficient to remove him from the category of a professional person. Further, the facts herein are distinguishable from the Howard case, supra, where Howard was provided office space and a staff to operate his office. Howard also supervised and evaluated his full time school board office staff. Instead, petitioner's situation is almost identical to that found in Henry, Albury, Potter and Blair.
Accordingly, it is concluded that petitioner is a professional person" filling a "temporary position" and is, therefore, ineligible to participate in the Florida Retirement System.
NO VESTED FRS INTEREST PREVENTING REMOVAL
Cooney has no vested interest in FRS membership after July 1, 1979.
Petitioner seeks to cut this case short by contending that he has a vested interest in FRS membership after January 1, 1975. A Division determination of prospective ineligibility which withstood appeal belies his contention. See Bryan W. Henry v. Department of Administration, Division of Retirement, 4 FALR 1295A
Where there is a duty on an individual's part of finding out and knowing, negligent ignorance has the same effect in law as actual knowledge. Applefield
Commercial Standard Insurance Co., 176 So.2d 366 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1965) If a person disregards the information on notices and fails to inquire and learn that which he might reasonably be expected to learn upon making inquiry, then he must suffer the consequences of his neglect. Sickler v. Melbourne State Bank, 159 So. 678 (Fla. 1935)
Petitioner contends he did not know the administrative rules existed and, therefore, did not know of his ineligibility until 1983. Yet, he also admits he knew his eligibility was questioned as early as 1980 through questionnaire sent to the agency plus discussions at the Florida School Board attorney's meetings. However, he made no effort to learn of his status from Respondent despite questions of his employee status. None of these facts were present in Henry's case. Despite Petitioner's obvious desire to "chameleon" his facts to fit a Bryan Henry-type result, he is unable to do so.
Respondent has voluntarily chosen to limit its inquiry to the years after the notice or ineligibility contained in its rules. Contrary to Petitioner, Henry participated during the years of 1974-78, prior to the effective date of the rule. When Henry was removed, he was without the benefit of any notice, and he did not have the opportunity to protect himself. Petitioner, on the other hand, had notice of his questionable status and chose not to inquire of his status or protect himself.
Accordingly, the facts and circumstances of this case do not ban removal to July 1, 1979.
BURDEN OF PROOF
The issue before the agency is whether Richard W. Cooney, under the proper interpretation of Section 121.(021(11), Florida Statutes, and Rule 22B-1.04, Florida Administrative Code, has met the requirements for membership in the Florida Retirement System from at least July 1, 1979 to present.
Respondent is not attempting to assert the affirmative of this issue -- rather, it is in a defending posture. As the courts so eloquently stated in Balino v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 348 So.2d 349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) at p. 351, "certainly one who defends a position cannot at the same time be described as having the affirmative of that position."
Once employed in a covered position, the employee becomes a member from the date of employment and creditable service is awarded to the member "beginning with the first day of employment with an employer covered under a state administered retirement system consolidated herein and continuing for as long as the member remains in an employer/employee relationship with an employer covered under this chapter. . ." Section 121.021(38).
Even properly enrolled members can participate only as long as in an employer/employee relationship. If the relationship changes, the employee must reapply and submit appropriate information to enroll as a member. Rule 22B- 1.02(5).
Since petitioner has always been a professional person on contract he has never been properly "classified" as an "employee". His status is contrary to the initial classification of eligibility of Balino.
In Balino, the petitioners were properly enrolled at the time they first applied. There was never any question of their initial eligibility and award of the benefit. Proper enrollment was assumed at the hearing. However, Respondent questions the original enrollment, and does not agree that the original enrollment was proper. The passage of time alone, cannot cure an improper enrollment. Where a person is enrolled in the Florida Retirement System in error and the Division challenges the enrollment, the burden is upon the Petitioner to justify his initial eligibility. Here, Cooney must assert and prove his original eligibility to participate in FRS.
The crucial factors identified above make Cooney an independent contractor with, and not an employee of, the school board (They also distinguish him from Frank A. Howard, Jr., whose case was cited above.) Therefore Cooney's retainer payments are not "salary payments for work Performed in a regularly established position" and he is not eligible for membership in the FRS regardless of how long he has been or will continue to be on retainer, with the school board.
This conclusion is required by the Division's rules and furthers the Division's reasonable policy that an independent contractor should not be permitted to receive FRS retirement, benefits for work performed by his employees, employees who do not receive FRS retirement benefits.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing finding of fact and conclusions of law, it is ORDERED that Richard Cooney is ineligible for membership in the Florida Retirement System after July 1, 1979.
Done and ordered this 29th day of November, 1984.
J. McMullian III
State Retirement Director
FILED WITH THE CLERK OF THE DIVISION OF RETIREMENT THIS
3rd, DAY OF December 1984
COPIES FURNISHED:
Frank A. Howard, Esquire Nevin G. Smith
Howard, Brower, Lovett Secretary
& dePozsgay Department of Administration 10th Floor Dade County Savings 435 Carlton Building Building, 101 East Flagler St. Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Miami Florida 33131
Augustus D. Aikens, Jr.,
J. Lawrence Johnston Esquire, Division Attorney
Hearing Officer Division of Retirement Division of Administrative Hearings Cedars Executive Center 2009 Apalachee Pky, Oakland Bldg. 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Tallahassee, Florida 32303
| Issue Date | Proceedings |
|---|---|
| Feb. 04, 1985 | Final Order filed. |
| Sep. 06, 1984 | Recommended Order sent out. CASE CLOSED. |
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Dec. 03, 1984 | Agency Final Order | |
| Sep. 06, 1984 | Recommended Order | Petitioner more like employee, paid salary, than independent contractor. Petitioner should be allowed membership in State retirement plan. |
CHARLIE CRIST, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION vs HAZEL C. COLLINSWORTH, 84-000183 (1984)
BROWARD COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs HECTOR A. ACOSTA MATOS, 84-000183 (1984)
PAM STEWART, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION vs MORISA FONTAINE, 84-000183 (1984)
RICHARD CORCORAN, AS COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION vs KIMBERLLY VICARS, 84-000183 (1984)
