STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL )

REGULATION, DIVISION OF )

REAL ESTATE, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CASE NO. 86-0140

)

ROBERT CHARLES HURBANIS, )

PAULINE P. SEELY, JOHN M. )

PARKS, and JEAN MAXWELL, )

)

Respondents. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Pursuant to notice, this cause came on for formal hearing before P. Michael Ruff, duly designated Hearing Officer, on May 26, 1987, in Fort Myers, Florida. The appearances were as follows:

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: James H. Gillis, Esquire

Division of Real Estate

400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802

For Respondent: John P. Milligan, Jr., Esquire Hurbanis: Suite 201, Royal Palm Square

1400 Colonial Boulevard Fort Myers, Florida 33907

For Respondents Kenneth G. Oertel, Esquire Seely and 2700 Blair Stone Road, Suite C Maxwell: Tallahassee, Florida 32301

For Respondent John W. Parks, pro se

Parks: c/o The Realty Shoppe of Lee County 12635 Cleveland Avenue

Fort Myers, Florida 33907

This cause concerns an Administrative Complaint filed by the Petitioner against the above-named Respondents alleging, in six counts, that with regard to various real estate sales transactions the Respondents jointly and severally conspired with sellers and buyers for submission of bogus contracts to institutional lenders from whom financing for the property involved in the sales was sought. Specifically, it is alleged that an actual sales contract with an accurate purchase price depicted thereon would be entered into between the buyer and seller, prepared by and authorized by the Respondents. Thereafter, a second

contract would be prepared and entered into by buyer and seller, again at the Respondents' behest, allegedly depicting a higher purchase price. The use of such bogus or "double contracting" allegedly was designed to induce the banks or other lenders, who normally lend less than 100 percent of the purchase price of a piece of property to, in effect, lend 100 percent or more of the actual purchase price. The inducement to do so being that the second contract, submitted to the lender, bore a higher than true purchase price, so that if the bank lent mortgage funds at its normal percentage of the purchase price amount, it would, in effect, be lending 100 percent or more of the true purchase price in the original contract, which allegedly was not disclosed to the lenders.

At the outset of the proceeding, the Petitioner voluntarily dismissed Count IV of the complaint. Additionally, the Petitioner stated at the outset of the hearing that it did not intend to present any evidence regarding the charge against Respondent Jean Maxwell. Thereupon, by motion by Respondent Maxwell's counsel, a Motion to Dismiss all counts as they relate to Jean Maxwell, was granted. Indeed, it was stipulated that Jean Maxwell did not commit a violation of applicable real estate statutory provisions of Chapter 475 nor related rules.

After the proceeding, the parties elected to obtain a transcript and ask for an extended briefing schedule. They concomitantly waived the time requirements of Rule 28-5.402, Florida Administrative Code. The Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted by the parties have been considered herein and are addressed once again in the Appendix attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein.

The issues in this proceeding concern whether the Respondents committed the various violations of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, charged in the Administrative Complaint as to those real estate sales transactions referenced in the factual allegations. If the proscribed conduct charged was committed, appropriate penalties must be determined.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with licensing and regulating the practice of real estate salesmen and brokers by the various provisions of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Included in those duties and enforcement authorities is the duty to investigate conduct by realtors allegedly in violation of Chapter 475, and related rules, and prosecuting administrative proceedings filed as a result of such investigations in order to seek imposition of disciplinary measures against the licensure status of miscreant realtors.

   
   

2. The Respondents, at all times pertinent hereto, were licensed real estate brokers or salesmen in the State of Florida, having been issued the license numbers depicted in the Administrative Complaint. Respondent Hurbanis last was issued a license as a broker/salesman located at Sanibel Realty, Inc., Sanibel, Florida. Respondent Pauline Seely was last licensed as a broker/salesman located at VIP Realty Group, Sanibel, Florida. Respondent John

   M. Parks was licensed as a broker/salesman, last issued for a location at The Realty Shoppe of Lee County in Fort Myers, Florida. Respondent Jean Maxwell was licensed as a broker/salesman located at Suite 205, 1619 Periwinkle Way, Sanibel, Florida. At all times pertinent hereto, the Respondents were licensed and operating in the real estate brokerage business in the employ of VIP Realty Group, Inc., a licensed corporate real estate broker.

3. Concerning the charges in Count I, one Eric Rosen, a real estate salesman employed by VIP Realty Group, Inc., the same firm employing Respondent Pauline P. Seely, obtained Nicholas Fontana and John Priebbe as purchasers of a certain piece of property by sales contract which was owned by Clarence Liebscher and Joseph Kubosch. The sales contract was entered into June 3, 1983, and reflected a purchase price of $315,000, including the sale of certain furniture and other personal property. The complaint alleges that former Respondent Rosen and Respondent Hurbanis, together with the purchasers and sellers, conspired to enter into a second bogus sales contract (so called "double contracting") substantially similar to the first contract, except the sales price was shown to be $350,000 and the terms concerning sale of furniture and other personalty was deleted. It is alleged that this contract was prepared by Rosen under the direction and approval of Respondent Hurbanis for the purpose of obtaining a mortgage loan from a lending institution in an amount greater than the normal percentage of the sales price that the banking laws and policies of such lenders provide as the maximum amount of mortgage financing which can be obtained on a given piece of property. It is alleged that these Respondents were thus attempting to obtain a loan commitment in an amount greater than could have been obtained had the actual sales price of $315,000 been revealed to the lender. The bogus contract showing the $350,000 sales price was allegedly submitted to the lender, AmeriFirst Savings and Loan Association, without the Respondents notifying AmeriFirst that the actual sales price was $315,000.

   
   

4. Although witness Rosen for the Petitioner, testified that he believed the contracts involved in this count had been discussed with Mr. Hurbanis he could not say for certain and could not recall the conversation. In fact, another Petitioner witness, Brandy Vallois, stated several times that Mr. Hurbanis was on vacation during the time that the contract was negotiated, executed and submitted to the lender and that, although Respondent Hurbanis was the office manager at VIP Realty Group at the time, others were serving in his stead at the time he was on vacation (the time of the incident alleged in Count I). Although the Department elicited testimony to the effect that seminars had been given where the Respondent, as well as other realtors, had discussed "creative financing," there was no testimony or other evidence that such lectures by the Respondent or others advocated a policy of "double contracting" or in effect deluding lenders into lending more money for real estate purchases than they normally would have if true purchase prices were disclosed. In any event, both the seller and buyer were aware of the situation concerning this transaction and the lender was never deceived or misled because in fact the loan never closed and no funds were disbursed. There was no evidence that the true particulars of this transaction were not disclosed to the lender.

   
   

   Count II

   
   

5. Count II concerns a transaction in which Respondent John Parks was the listing and selling salesman and Respondent Hurbanis was the office manager with the same real estate firm. Allegedly, Respondent Hurbanis directed and approved Respondent Parks' preparation of two sales contracts on or about December 16, 1982, calling for the purchase and sale of certain real estate by Mike Volker from Dr. Robert Pascotto and Gaspar Turanna. Both contracts were similar and pertained to the same parcel of property, but one reflected an actual sales price of $149,000, whereas the allegedly bogus, second contract reflected a total sales price of $157,000. It is thus alleged that these two Respondents conspired with the purchasers and sellers to enter into the higher priced, bogus contract for the purpose of obtaining a mortgage loan commitment principal amount at a greater percentage of the sales price than could have been obtained if the actual sales price had been disclosed to the lender. It is alleged that

   these two Respondents submitted the bogus contract reflecting the $157,000 false sales price together with loan application documents to First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Fort Myers without informing that institution that the actual sales price was $149,000. No competent, substantial evidence was offered, however, to show that Respondent Parks was anything other than the listing salesman. It was not established that he drafted the contract nor that he submitted either contract to the lender.

   
   

   Concerning Respondent Hurbanis, although it was shown that he was the office manager at the time of the incident, it was not established that he directed or approved the drafting of either contract, directed or approved the submission of either contract to the named lender nor that he was involved in the negotiation or closing stage of the transaction in any way. In fact, although the two contracts show differing purchase prices, neither contract depicts any different amount to come from mortgage financing by First Federal. In fact, both contracts reflect that a mortgage would be obtained from First Federal in the amount of $125,600. Nothing any different was disclosed to First Federal. The difference comes in a differing deposit amount held in escrow by VIP Realty Group, Inc., according to the terms of the contract. One contract, that with the lower purchase price, reflects $7,000 in deposit money toward the purchase and the second contract reflects $15,000 deposit money held toward the purchase. This accounts for the $8,000 difference in the amount of the two contracts, but, in any event, the amount to be obtained by mortgage funds from First Federal was the same on each contract. There was no evidence to prove that the deposit amounts depicted on either contract were bogus or other than the result of bona fide arm's length negotiations between the parties. In any event, there was no evidence that First Federal or its lending officers were not aware of any of the particulars in the transaction. There was no showing that that the lender relied on either contract to its detriment.

   
   

   Count III

   
   

6. Respondent Pauline Seely, as listing salesman and owner of certain real property, with former Respondent (since dismissed) James O'Neill as selling salesman, and allegedly with Respondent Charles Hurbanis' direction and approval, prepared and obtained execution of two sales contracts on or about December 30, 1982, for the purchase and sale of her real property by Thomas and Sheila Floyd. Both contracts were substantially similar and pertained to the same parcel, but one contract reflected an actual earnest money deposit of

   $8,660 and a purchase money mortgage in the amount of $24,000, whereas the supposed bogus, second contract reflected a total earnest money deposit of

   $14,000 and a purchase money mortgage in the principal amount of $18,660. It is alleged that the Respondents then submitted this to the lending institution for the purpose of obtaining a greater percentage of the sales price in mortgage funds than could have been obtained had the actual sales price, terms and conditions been revealed to the lender.

   
   

   In fact, testimony of record and Respondent Seely's Exhibit 2 reveals that the lender was furnished all documents with regard to this transaction which revealed to the lender, as the loan officer involved stated in the letter constituting this exhibit, that the buyers and the seller had agreed that the seller would take back a second mortgage in the amount of $24,000 and that a contract addendum existed (which is in evidence) reflecting this second agreement. Thus, AmeriFirst, the lender, did in fact have a copy of the agreement stating that the seller would hold the second mortgage for the above amount and that AmeriFirst was aware of all details concerning the transaction. In point of fact, both contracts in evidence, one of which reflects a purchase

   money mortgage of $18,660 which the seller would hold and which reflects that

   $7,000 would be paid in cash to the seller at the time of contracting, and the second contract, are identical as to purchase price. The second contract also shows a purchase price of $125,000, the difference being essentially that the second contract shows the $24,000 purchase money mortgage amount instead of the figure of $18,660 shown on the first contract. Both contracts merely call for assumption of a mortgage already made in favor of AmeriFirst in the amount of

   $92,340. There is no evidence that any additional funds are being sought from AmeriFirst at all. There was no evidence that any action by the Respondents would result in any impairment of the security of AmeriFirst's first mortgage lien on the premises.

   
   

   The purchase money mortgage referenced in the testimony and evidence, regardless of its ultimate amount as that relates to the manner in which the total purchase price would be paid the seller, would, in all events, be a subordinate mortgage lien and it is difficult to see how AmeriFirst could rely on either contract to its detriment, even had it not known of one of the contracts. They both represented a purchase price of $125,000 and merely varied as to ways the purchase price would be paid, over and above the $92,340 outstanding first mortgage loan (which was to be assumed). In all events, however, AmeriFirst and its lending officer was fully aware of all details of this transaction and had no objection to the manner in which the transaction was to be closed and disbursements made, nor to the conditions of the assumption of its mortgage.

   
   

7. The so called "double contract" that Ms. Seely is alleged to have entered into was shown thus to be an innocent modification of terms of the original sales contract. No wrongdoing or concealment was shown to have been committed by Respondent or any person who participated in the sale of Pauline Seely's property to Thomas and Sheila Floyd.

   
   

   Count V

   
   

8. Concerning Count V, it is alleged that Respondents Seely, Parks and Hurbanis obtained two sales contracts on or about January 24, 1983, for the purchase and sale of certain real property by Computer Maintenance Corporation, purchaser, from James and Loretta Cottrell as sellers. Both contracts pertain to the same piece of real property. Both contracts showed a "purchase price" item of $310,000. One contract, however, actually reflected a total price of

   $344,000, arrived at by combining a $279,000 "90 percent mortgage loan" with a

   $60,000 purchase money mortgage and a $5,000 cash deposit. This contract contains a notation at the bottom that the "seller agrees that a separate contract for purchase will be given to the Savings and Loan for loan approval." The other contract related to this sale lists a total purchase price of $310,000 only, with a $5,000 deposit noted with no purchase money mortgage being shown, rather there is shown, in addition to the $279,000 90 percent mortgage loan, a balance of $26,000 cash being paid to the seller. This contractual situation is somewhat mysterious and it may indeed be that an attempt was made to conceal the

   $60,000 purchase money mortgage on the first contract and make it appear to the lender that the purchaser was actually putting up an additional $26,000 in cash at the closing as an inducement to obtain the principal first mortgage of

   $279,000 from Naples Federal Savings and Loan, AmeriFirst or some other lender. In point of fact, however, the witness, Ms. Heavener, from AmeriFirst indicated

   that the bank did not act upon the advice contained on the face of the contract, but rather loaned a percentage of their own independent appraisal value and thus did not act to its detriment upon any information contained on the face of either contract. She indicated that that lender was fully informed about all aspects of this transaction in any event.

   
   

   The evidence does not reflect that Mr. Hurbanis nor Ms. Seely had any part in drafting the contract nor presenting it to the lender. Seely's only involvement was as listing agent, that is, the realtor who obtained the listing from the sellers. There is no evidence to indicate that she participated in any fashion in the sale of the property, the negotiations, nor the drafting or presenting of the contracts. No evidence was offered to show for what purpose, whether illicit or innocent, the two different contracts were drafted. In any event, Ms. Seely was not involved in the preparation of the contracts. Mr.

   Hurbanis was not connected by any competent, substantial evidence, with any activity concerning the drafting of the contracts nor the presenting of them to the lender. A representative of the lending institution testified that she did not recall any discussions at all with Mr. Hurbanis concerning this transaction and upon cross-examination clearly indicated that the lending institution had protected itself against a "double contract" situation by reliance upon its own independent appraisal in making its lending decision, rather than the contract or contracts themselves.

   
   

   Count VI

   
   

9. In this count, it is alleged that Hurbanis obtained a sales contract on January 22, 1983, between T N T Partners, a general partnership as seller and Christopher Smith as purchaser. The pertinent terms of the sale were $30,000 total purchase price, $3,000 deposit and $4,500 cash to be allegedly furnished at closing, together with a $22,500 new note and mortgage on the property. It is alleged, in essence, that Respondent Hurbanis falsely represented to Naples Federal Savings and Loan Association that the purchaser would pay $4,500 cash at closing. The transaction closed on April 15, 1983, but instead of the cash, the seller took back a purchase money mortgage in the amount of $4,500. Thus, the issue here is whether the $4,500 mortgage was properly disclosed to the lender.

   
   

   The evidence is silent as to any connection of Mr. Hurbanis with this transaction. In any event, however, it would appear from the face of the contract itself that the lending institution could not have been deceived by the parties to the contract nor any realtor involved, since the contract itself does not require cash in the amount of $4,500 but rather requires "cash or equivalent at closing." Thus, even if there had been a participation by Respondent Hurbanis in this transaction, which was not proven, it is impossible to detect any concealment or deception since the words "or equivalent" would clearly not preclude the use of a purchase money mortgage in the amount of $4,500 as consideration for this portion of the purchase price, rather than actual cash.

   Indeed, any other thing of equivalent value could have been used as consideration in this particular without violating the terms of the contract, of which the lender clearly had notice.

   
   

   CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

   
   

10. The Division of Administrative Hearings has juris- diction of the subject matter of and the parties to this proceeding. Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.

11. It having been stipulated at the outset of the hearing that Respondent Maxwell did not in any way participate in the preparation of any bogus contracts, and it being agreed that the purchase price for Respondent Maxwell's unit was accurately depicted on the contract with the seller and was duly reported to the bank that financed the transaction, it was agreed that the complaint as filed against Respondent Maxwell should be dismissed.

    
    

12. The remaining Respondents, in various counts of the complaint, are charged with fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence, and breach of trust in a business transaction as well as violating duties imposed upon them by law or by the term of a listing agreement; or to have aided, assisted or conspired with any other person engaged in such misconduct. Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes. The gravamen of the charges in the remaining counts of the Administrative Complaint at issue against Respondents Hurbanis, Seely and Parks involve their alleged conspiracy, scheme or design to prepare and enter into "bogus contracts" drafted and presented to various banks and lending institutions for the purpose of obtaining mortgage loans in greater amounts than those banks would have normally issued under their then- current lending policies. The facts, as found above reveal, however, that in each of these instances none of the Respondents were proven to have known that "double contracts" had been submitted to the lending institutions, or in those instances when they did know, there was a bona fide reason for the change in purchase price or method of determining purchase price from one contract to the other, based upon negotiations and re- negotiations between the sellers and buyers after the first contract had been entered into. In all such instances, it was proven that the banks or lending institutions to whom the contracts were submitted knew of the multiple contract situation and were fully advised concerning it or if they did not specifically become aware of a dual contract situation, were not concerned and not harmed because their own internal procedures and safeguards prevented them relying on the higher of the two represented purchase prices or purchase money mortgage amounts, in arriving at the percentage of purchase price or appraised value which they would provide with their contemplated first mortgage loan.

    
    

13. In short, in no case was there shown to be a victim of any fraud, concealment, dishonest dealing or other reprehensible conduct enumerated in the above subsection. Although the Florida Real Estate Act in Section 475.25(1) does not contain as an essential element of guilt of any of the statutory charges enumerated in the paragraphs in this subsection that a victim actually suffer injury or damage, there must at least, be a victim. Here, no one was shown to have been defrauded or deceived in any way. Obviously in each instance the buyer and seller were aware of the true situation concerning the particular real estate transaction in question and in every situation, except that involved in Count V, it was established that the lenders themselves were aware of the duality of contracts concerning the subject transactions and were not concerned by it. The banks being fully advised regarding all pertinent details of these transactions, there can be no deception since there was no misrepresentation made to any person involved. The "bogus contract" in Count III, for instance, was really a modification of the original contract entered into by the parties which was modified prior to the closing to reflect a smaller down payment than originally proposed. The bank was fully advised of these facts and had copies of all relevant documents in its file prior to closing its loan. No wrong doing or concealment was committed by any person who participated in this transaction.

    
    

14. Concerning Count V, it is alleged that Respondent Seely along with Respondents Hurbanis and Parks prepared a bogus contract for the sale of

    property by James and Loretta Cottrell to Computer Maintenance Corporation. The only evidence with regard to Seely's involvement was that she obtained the listing for this property from the sellers. A listing agent is a person who receives authority from a potential seller to act as a sales person for that property. The listing agent will receive a commission from the sale of that property even if another sales person finds the buyer and negotiates the sale.

    Merely being the listing agent does not imply or expressly indicate that the listing agent has any other responsibility concerning the sale or purchase of a piece of property. The Petitioner did not call any witnesses concerning this transaction, neither the buyer or seller nor any other person who might have been aware of whether in fact a "bogus" contract was prepared regarding this sale and submitted to the lender. No evidence was offered as to the purpose, either illicit or innocent, for the existence of different contracts on the same piece of property. It is not unusual or extraordinary for a potential buyer or seller to materially alter an executed contract prior to closing. These changes may reflect the result of continuing negotiations concerning details of contractual terms and obligations or other perfectly legitimate reasons.

    
    

15. In any event, it is clear that Respondent Seely was in no way involved in the preparation of the contracts in question in Count V, nor in their submission to the lenders. Her only participation was in obtaining the listing. Her presence at any of the negotiations was not necessary to the sale and was not proven. The charges concerning Respondent Seely have simply not been established.

    
    

16. Concerning Respondent Hurbanis, there is no evidence that, as to any of the counts of the complaint remaining at issue, he had any part in preparation of any of the contracts nor in presenting them, whether illicit or legitimate, to the only potential victims in any of these transactions, the banks and lending institutions. At most it was merely proven that Respondent Hurbanis was the office manager for the realty company involved, but the closings in each transaction were conducted by the firm's central closing department or handled by the sellers and buyers themselves, not Hurbanis. Parenthetically, it should be noted that to the extent that he was sales agent in any of the transactions, Respondent Parks may have had an active role in arranging the sales and possibly presenting the contracts to the lenders, although that was essentially shown to have been done by buyers. Be that as it may, however, that must be left to speculation since no evidence was presented concerning Respondent Parks' involvement in any of the transactions related to the counts remaining at issue in the Administrative Complaint.

    
    

17. Since Respondent Hurbanis was not shown to have had any direct dealings with the lending institutions, with the sellers or the buyers as to any of these transactions, nor to have had any part in drafting the contracts themselves, it is impossible for the proof to establish that he made any misrepresentation either intentional or inadvertent to any seller, buyer or lending institution. Thus, it is impossible to determine that he engaged in any trick, scheme or device, fraudulent misrepresentation, deceit, dishonest dealing or other of the reprehensible acts enumerated in the above statutory subsection.

    
    

18. Even though Section 475.25(1), Florida Statutes, provides that lack of damage or injury to the victim is immaterial to guilt, it is clear from the evidence herein that there were no victims. Even though in some instances there were discrepancies between the two contracts related to a transaction, there is no evidence whatever to show that the lending institutions involved were "victims." It is clear from the testimony that the lenders in all instances either knew of the discrepancies in the two contracts and knew that there were

bona fide reasons there for or were not really influenced by purchase price figures because of their own internal procedures whereby their lending commitments were based upon their own appraisals. In order for fraud, deceit or the other elements of the statutory basis for the charges to lie, specific intent or scienter must be shown. Shelton vs. Florida Real Estate Commission,

120 So.2d 191, (Fla. 2nd DCA 1960). It was not established by the evidence of record that any of the Respondents had such specific intent to misrepresent, deceive or otherwise conceal, or conspire to conceal the true facts regarding each of these real estate transactions from the lenders or any other parties to the transactions. It was not even demonstrated that any inadvertent or innocent misrepresentation or misstatement of the facts was made by any of the Respondents. In short, the Petitioner has the burden to prove the Respondents' guilt of the charges enumerated in the various counts of the complaint, by clear and convincing evidence. Petitioner's evidence does not meet that standard in view of the substantial evidence adduced of bona fide explanations for most of the details surrounding each transaction. See Ferris vs. Turlington, So.2d (Fla. 1987), (Case No. 69,561; Fla. Sup. Ct. 7/16/87).

RECOMMENDATION

Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the evidence of record, it is, therefore

RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint be dismissed in its entirety as to all Respondents.

DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of October, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida.

P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer

Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building

2009 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

(904) 488-9675

Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of October, 1987.

APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-0140

Petitioner:

Petitioner filed no Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

Respondent Hurbanis:

The Proposed Findings of Fact by Respondent Hurbanis are subsumed in those made in this Recommended Order to the extent that that Respondent's submissions constitute bona fide Proposed Findings of Fact. In the main, the "Findings of Fact" in the Post-Hearing Submission by this Respondent constitute largely recitations of evidence and testimony, discussion of the weight thereof,

inextricably intermingled with Proposed Findings of Fact which cannot be separately ruled upon because of multiple factual findings, legal argument and evidence discussion intertwined in the same paragraph.

Respondents Maxwell's and Seely's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-12. Accepted.

COPIES FURNISHED:

James H. Gillis, Esquire Division of Real Estate

400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802

John P. Milligan, Jr., Esquire Suite 201, Royal Palm Square 1400 Colonial Boulevard

Fort Myers, Florida 33907

Kenneth G. Oertel, Esquire Suite C

2700 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Johnny W. Parks

c/o The Realty Shoppe of Lee County

12635 Cleveland Avenue Fort Myers, Florida 33907

Tom Gallagher, Secretary Department of Professional

Regulation

130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750

William O'Neil, Esquire General Counsel

Department of Professional Regulation

130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750

Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate

400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802

Docket for Case No: 86-000140

Orders for Case No: 86-000140