STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS ) REGULATION, DIVISION OF FLORIDA ) LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS AND ) MOBILE HOMES, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CASE NO. 89-4572

)

HUGH D. ROWLES, d/b/a ) SOUTHWINDS MOBILE HOME PARK, )

)

Respondent. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Upon due notice, this cause came on for formal hearing on December 12, 1989 in DeLand, Florida, before Ella Jane P. Davis, a duly assigned Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings.

APPEARANCES

FOR PETITIONER: Eric H. Miller

Assistant General Counsel Department of Business Regulation Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes

725 South Brcnough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007

FOR RESPONDENT: F.A. Ford, Jr., Esquire

145 East Rich Avenue Post Office Box 48

DeLand, Flori.da 32721-0048 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

Did Respondent violate Subsections 723.061(1)(d) and 723.061(2)(a) F.S., as alleged in the July 18, 1989 Notice to Show Cause?

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On July 18, 1989, Petitioner issued and served a Notice to Show Cause on Respondent alleging that Respondent had violated certain provisions of Chapter 723 F.S., "The Florida Mobile Home Act." Respondent subsequently requested a formal administrative hearing, pursuant to Section 120.57(1) F.S. On November 16, 1989, Petitioner filed its Notice of Partial Dismissal, dismissing Count Three from the original Notice to Show Cause, which, by operation of law,

dismissed that count. This cause therefore proceeded to formal hearing only upon the remaining counts as referenced in the foregoing "Statement of the Issue."

Petitioner presented the oral testimony of Beverly Leight and Faye Koch and had one exhibit admitted in evidence. Respondent testified on his own behalf and had two exhibits admitted in evidence.

A transcript of the formal hearing was filed in due course, and all timely- filed proposed findings of fact have been ruled upon in the Appendix to this Recommended Order, pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. As of June 4, 1984, ten or more spaces in Southwinds Mobile Home Park were being leased by individuals who owned the mobile homes in which they resided on the property. Some of those ten or more residents were Beverly Leight, William Daniel, Frank Addison, Keith Hellstrom, Faye Koch, and Helen Sutton.

   
   

2. As of May 25, 1986, ten or more spaces in Southwinds Mobile Home Park were being leased by individuals who owned the mobile homes in which they resided.

   
   

3. On May 25, 1986, Johnny Owens owned the mobile home in which he resided on leased Lot 10.

   
   

4. As of October 28, 1986, ten or more spaces in Southwinds Mobile Home Park were being leased by individuals who owned the mobile homes in which they resided. On that date, Charles and Pauline Murphy owned the mobile home in which they resided on leased Lot 26.

   
   

5. Upon paying the annual fee for southwinds Mobile Home Park, pursuant to Section 723.007 F.S., for the period of October 2, 1987 through October 1, 1988, Respondent Hugh D. Rowles, the park owner, advised Petitioner agency that he had dropped below ten lots available for rent. Respondent had reached this stage by simply not leasing out lots to new tenants as lots were voluntarily vacated by old tenants, and a natural attrition had occurred. The Petitioner's Fees Section accepted Respondent's word on the matter without further investigation, and Petitioner sent Respondent no more statements for the payment of the annual fee. In its business and public records, Petitioner listed Respondent and his park as not under jurisdiction of Chapter 723 F.S.

   
   

6. On December 27, 1988, Respondent Rowles still owned Southwinds Mobile Home Park. As of that date, Beverly Leight, William Daniel, Frank Addison, Keith Hellstrom, Faye Koch, Helen

   Sutton, Johnny Owens, and the Murphys (8 tenants) were still residing in their respective mobile homes on the lots they were leasing from Respondent in Southwinds Mobile Home Park, as described supra. On that date, Leight, who had sold the park to Respondent in 1980, and Daniel, Addison, Hellstrom, Koch, and Sutton had been residents of Southwinds Mobile Home Park for at least three and a half years each; Owens had been a resident approximately two and a half years, and the Murphys had been residents approximately two years. In the park there were also some mobile homes owned' by Respondent which were rented as units--lot and mobile home together.

7. To those individuals who owned their mobile homes and were leasing lots in Southwinds Mobile Home Park, Respondent sent a letter dated December 27, 1988, which provided in pertinent part:

   
   

   To those of you who own your own homes, I want to give you as much advance notice as possible.

   
   

   Sometime within the next few weeks, you will begin seeing land surveyors, soil testing people and others in the park.

   
   

   There is a VERY STRONG possibility that the property will be sold in JUNE of 1989.

   
   

   If and when the property is sold, there will NO LONGER be a trailer park here.

   
   

   It is STRONGLY SUGGESTED that you start making plans NOW for the removal of your trailer.

   
   

   If there is any way that I can assist you in relocating, I will be glad to help you.

   Until further notice, everything remains as usua1.

   
   

8. After serving the letter f December 27, 1988, Respondent served the mobile home owners in Sothwinds Mobile Home Park with no other notice prior to June 1989.

   
   

9. Faye Koch interpreted the letter of December 27, 1988 as requiring her to leave southwinds Mobile Home Park. Beverly Leight, on the other hand, understood it to mean that the park might be sold, but not that it definitely would be sold. In January 1989, Mr. Rowles offered Mrs. Koch $1,000 to leave the park by February 1, 1989. She moved out to a larger, better mobile home, after paying Respondent her overdue rent. Respondent rented the mobile home purchased from Mrs. Koch and the lot it was on, as a unit, to another person foil a short while. Rowles also purchased the mobile home of Keith Hellstrom for $1,000, which he likewise rented to someone else as a unit with his lot for a short time, He purchased Johnny Owens' mobile home for $1,000. Thereafter, Rowles sold each of these mobile homes at a loss. The Koch, Hellstrom, and Owens mobile homes were sold by Rowles for $100, $500, and $100, respectively.

   
   

10. In March 1989, Respondent Rowles was contacted by a representative of Petitioner, apparently from the Enforcement Section, who had been contacted by Mrs. Leiht, and who advised Rowles of Petitioner agency's position that the tenancies of the remaining mobile home owners in Southwinds Mobile Home Park were subject to the protections of Chapter 723 F.S. Respondent advised Petitioner's representative that he did not regard his park as covered by Chapter 723 F.S. Respondent also requested Petitioner's representative to show Respond.ent that Chapter 723 FS was applicable to him and his park and advised the agency representative that, if he was subject to the agency's jurisdiction, he would comply. Respondent received no written response from the agency until the Notice to Show Cause was filed on July 18, 1989.

11. On April 6, 1989, Respondent and his wife entered into a contract for the sale of the property comprising Southwinds Mobile Home Park to a third party. An addendum to the contract required Respondent to remove or pay for the removal of all personal property (that is, the mobile homes) located on the parcel upon being given thirty days notice from the third party buyer. The contract c6ntemplated that the property would continue to operate as rental property until the new owners elected to close it down or change its function. The closing on this contract for sale still had not occurred as of the date of formal hearing.

    
    

12. The purchasers of the property comprising Southwinds Mobile Home Park have never given Respondent notice to remove any personal property from the park, nor has permitting of the property occurred such as would entitle the buyers to demand removal of such personal property.

    
    

13. At the time Respondent entered into the April 6, 1989 contract for sale of Southwinds Mobile Home Park, only four mobile home owners were still leasing lots in the park. It may be inferred from the testimony as a whole that these were month to month tenancies.

    
    

14. Respondent attempted to negotiate purchase of those four mobile homes. He did not suggest to any residents that they had any other options besides moving their mobile homes out of his park or selling them to him. Mrs. Leight held out for $2,500 and refused to move. She was joined in her refusal by Mr. Daniel, Ms. Sutton, and a Miss Warnock, all of whom were residing in their own mobile homes on Respondent's lots.

    
    

15. On June 1, 1989, Respondent notified the fourmobile home owners remaining in Southwinds Mobile Home Park toremove their mobile homes no later than June 30, 1989. Thisnotification is in accord with the standards of Section 83.03(3)F.S. for month-to-month tenancies. At that point, Leight, Daniel, and Sutton were four-year residents There is noinformation as to Warnock's term of residency at southwindsMobile Home Park.

    
    

16. On August 4, 1989, Respondent shut off waterservice to the mobile home owners remaining in southwinds MobileHome Park. As a result of Respondent's action, Beverly Leightwas compelled to move out of her mobile home in order to complywith health department requirements. In so doing, she incurredcosts of 4,486, for which she has not been reimbursed; however,she is one of the four remaining mobile homed owners (Leight,Daniel, Sutton, and Warnock) who left the subject property on orbefore October 30, 1989, pursuant to a stipulation with the Respondent whereby the Respondent deposited $10,000 with their attorney pending a judicial determination as to whether themobile home lot tenancies were governed by Chapter 723 or by Chapter 83, Parts II F.S. The Circuit Court action wherein the stipulation was filed had not yet resulted in such adetermination as of the date of formal hearing.

    
    

    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

    
    

17. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter to this cause. See, Section 120.57(1) F.S.

    
    

18. The authority upon which the Petitioner may bring this proceeding is set out in Section 723.005 and Subsections 723.006(5)(a), (b) , and (d)1. F.S.

19. Count Three of the Notice to Show Cause having previously been dismissed, Respondent is charged only with eight violations of Subsection 723.061(1)(d) [as to the remaining eight tenants in residence on December 27, 1988] and with four violations of 723.061(2)(a) F.S. [as to the four tenants remaining on June 30, 1988]. These Subsections provide, respectively, as follows:

    
    

    723.061 Eviction; grounds, proceedings.--

    1. A mobile home park owner may evict a mobile home owner or a mobile hore only on one or more of the grounds provided in this section.

       (d) Change in use of the land comprising the mobile home park, or the portion thereof from which mobile homes are to be evicted, from mobile home lot rentals to some other use, provided all tenants affectd are given at least l year's notice of the projected change of use and of their need to secure other accommodations.

       and,

    2. In the event of eviction for change of land use, homeowners must object to the change in land use by petitioning for administrative or judicial remedies within 90 days of the date of the notice or they will be barred from taking any subsequent action to contest the change in land use. This

       any homeowner from objecting to a zoning change at any time.

       1. Within 90 days from the time the park owner gives the 1-year notice, he shall notify the homeowner of his election to either buy the mobile home, relocate the mobile home to another park owned by the park owner, or pay to relocate the mobile home to another mobile home park, ....

          
          

20. For the foregoing alleged violations, Petitioner seeks to impose a

    $5,000 fine and require the payment of $2500 each to the four remaining tenants. Respondent counters by asserting that when, by natural or calculatad attrition, his park ceased to rent at least 10 lots to owners of their own mobile homes, he and his park ceased to be governed by Chapter 723 F.S. and that therefore he cannot be prosecuted or held guilty of wrongful evictions under its statutory provisions. Respondent also contends that Petitioner, in its business/public records, reached the same conclusion of lack of jurisdiction over him.

    Respondent further asserts that the notice he gave his tenants complied with Chapter 83, Part II, F.S., which is all he was required to do as of June 1, 1989. In further support of his position, Respondent puts forth that the December 27, 1988 letter he sent the eight tenants in residence on that date was not precluded under Section 723.061(1)(d) F.S., and that because that December 27, 1988 letter did not constitute notice pursuant to Section 723.061(1)(d) F.S., the 90-day advance notice specified therein for notification by an owner of the owner's election to buy or relocate, at the owner's expense, the tenants' mobile homes never began to run. Lastly, Respondent asserts a number of mitigating circumstances which would affect penalty.

21. The chronology of operative facts to which the statutes must be applied is that Respondent owned and operated a mobile home park under Petitioner's Chapter 723 F.S. jurisdiction at least until December 27, 1988.

    By that date, at the latest, natural or calculated attrition had reduced the "rented or leased lots" to eight, and Respondent was no longer offering any lots for lease unless he rented both his mobile home and lot to the tenant as a unit. Prior to that date, Respondent had notified Petitioner he did not consider his park to be operating under its jurisdiction and had received at least silent acquiescence in this assumption from the agency. Regardless of how one or more tenants interpreted that letter, the clear Language of the December 27, 1988 letter shows that on that date, Respondent gave a written but still equivocal notice that the property might be sold and suggested that the tenants make plans for removal of their mobile homes. Thereafter, Respondent gave repeated actual, but oral, notices of eviction but gave no further written notices. Turning off the water had the effect of forcible eviction of the remaining four homeowners in August 1989, and so the facts that the contract for sale of the parcel has not yet been closed on and therefore sale of the property has yet to take place is diminished in significance. Respondent clearly followed a course of conduct calculated to remove the mobile home owners from his rented real property.

    
    

22. Although the thrust of Chapter 723 F.S. and the cases cited thereunder by Petitioner clearly establish the legislative intent of the Chapter as a whole to be to accord those mobile home owners who place their privately owned mobilehomes on property rented from another a greater degree of protection, that is, notice of eviction, than that which isaccorded by either Chapter 723 to those who merely rent as a unit mobile homes already in place on a rental lot or by Chapter 83 to any other tenant, the clear and unequivocal language of Section723.002 does not provide either discipline for Respondent orrelief for the complaining witnesses in the instant situation.That section, governing jurisdiction of the chapter and agency,

    provides, in pertinent part:

    
    

    723.002 Application of chapter.--

    1. The provisions of this chapter app1y to any residential tenancy in which a mobile home is placed upon a rented or leased lot in a mobile home park in which 10 or more lots are offered for rent or lease. This chapter shall not be construed to apply to any other tenancy. ... When both the mobile home and lot are rented or when fewer than 10 lots are available for rent or lease, the tenancy shall be governed by the provisions of part Il of chapter 83, the `Florida Residential Landlord and Tenant Act." (Emphasis supplied)

       
       

23. A clear reading of the foregoing statute restricts jurisdiction regardless of how the limitation of ten lots was achieved, whether through unilateral attrition by the Respondent or otherwise. If the drafters had intended to protect residents based on the number of lots for rent on the date they placed their mobile homes in the park or had intended to limit Respondent from unilaterally reducing the number of lots he chose to offer for rent, they could have done so, and since they did not, the law must be interpreted as they have, in fact, written it.

RECOMMENDATION

Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes enter a final order dismissing the Notice to Show Cause.

DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of March, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida.

ELLA JANE P. DAVIS

Hearing Officer

Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

(904) 488-9675

Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of March, 1990.

APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 89-4572

The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2)

F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner's PFOF:

Accepted: 1-17, 19.

Rejected as mere characterization of testimony and argument of counsel: 18 (with footnote)

Respondent' s PFOF:

Accepted: 1-3, 5-10, 12 Except for irrelevant, immaterial, subordinate or unnecessary material, the following PFOF are accepted: 4

Rejected as containing a conclusion of law: 11

COPIES FURNISHED:

Eric H. Miller

Assistant General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007

F.A. Ford, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box-48

DeLand, Florida 32721-0048

E. James Kearney, Director Florida Land Sales, Condominiums

and Mobile Homes

725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000

Stephen R. MacNamara, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000

Joseph A. Sole, General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000

=================================================================

AGENCY FINAL ORDER

=================================================================

STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION

DIVISION OF FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS AND MOBILE HOMES 725 SOUTH BRONOUGH STREET - JOHNS BUILDING

TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-1030

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION, DIVISION OF FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS AND MOBILE HOMES,

Petitioner, DOAH CASE NO. 89-4572 vs. DBR DOCKET NO. MH89399

HUGH D. ROWLES, d/b/A SOUTHWINDS MOBILE HOME PARK,

Respondent.

/

FINAL ORDER

Pursuant to notice, a Final Hearing was conducted in the above-captioned matter on December 12, 1989 in DeLand, Florida, before the Honorable Ella Jane

1. Davis, a duly assigned Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings. The Hearing Officer entered a recommended Order dated March 6, 1990, a copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit "A". Neither the Petitioner nor the Respondent filed exceptions to the Recommended Order.

   
   

   The issues for resolution and procedural history of these proceedings as stated in the Recommended Order are incorporated herein. After examining the Recommended Order and reviewing the record,

   IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, as follows:

   
   

   FINDINGS OF FACT

   
   

   The Findings of Fact made by the Hearing Officer in the Recommended Order are adopted aid incorporated herein as the Findings of Fact by the Division.

   
   

   CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

   
   

   1. Conclusions of Law 1 - 3, inclusive, made by the Hearing Officer in the Recommended Order are approved, adopted, and incorporated herein as Conclusions of Law by the Division.

      
      

   2. Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, applies to residential tenancies" in which a mobile home was placed on a rented or leased lot in a mobile home park with ten (10) or more lots offered for rent or lease to those who own their homes. Section 723.002(1), Fla. Stat. (1987). The provisions of the chapter applies to the tenancy regardless of whether the lot was leased pursuant to a written agreement. Section 723.031(2), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1988).

      
      

      Whether a given mobile home owner is entitled to the protections of chapter 723 depends upon the number of lots offered for rent or lease at the time the tenancy became subject to the statute, not at the time the park owner takes action to remove the home owner. The laws of Florida existing at the time the contract is created become part of the agreement. Department of Insurance v.

      Teachers Insurance Corporation, 404 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1981). As provided in section 723.031(2), the terms of the statute became part of the conditions under which the home owner rented the lot; this included the restrictions on terminating tenancies and removing home owners specified in section 723.061, Florida Statutes. No lot rental agreement could permit the mobile home owner's tenancy to be terminated except for one of the grounds provided in section 723.061(1), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1988). Section 723.032(1), Fla. Stat.

      (1987).

      
      

      By enumerating certain conditions the park owner must meet before ending the tenancy without the home owner's consent, the Legislature intended to exclude all other methods of unilateral park owner action. As reducing the number of lots offered for lease to mobile home owners was not a method of tenancy termination specified in section 723.061, such action by the park owner did not remove the statutory protection from those home owners.

      
      

      Section 723.002, Florida Statutes (1987), outlines the basic application of the chapter but was not solely dispositive of jurisdiction under the Mobile Home Act. Basing the protections afforded by chapter 723 on a narrow reading of the lot requirement in section 723.002 either renders void section 723.032(1), which limits the park owner's unilateral termination of tenancies to the conditions enumerated in section 723.061, or includes reduction of lots as an unwritten condition for tenancy termination under section 723.061. Sections 723.002, 723.032(1), and 723.061, are each given reasonable effect only if harmonized to state the Legislature's intent for those mobile home tenancies which become subject to chapter 723 to endure until legally terminated under the Act. 1/

      
      

   3. The Defendant has argued the Division acknowledged the inapplicability of chapter 723 by no longer billing for annual fees under section 723.007, Florida Statute. Each mobile home owner's rights under the law attach by operation of section 723.002 and endure until the tenancy is legally terminated.

      Conversely, the requirement to pay annual fees applies only to mobile home parks subject to Chapter 723 at the time the fees would come due. Thus, the contract rights of mobile home owners and park owners neither vest nor are contingent upon whether the Division issues a bill or collects fees from the park owner.

      
      

   4. Respondent failed to give at least: one (1) year's

      notice of eviction for change of land use to Beverly Leight, William Daniels, and Helen Sutton, each such failure constituting a separate violation of Section 723.061(1)(d), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1988)

      
      

   5. Respondent failed to provide Beverly Leight, William Daniels, and Helen Sutton with a: notice of his election to either buy or relocate their respective mobile homes, within ninety (90) days of giving the notice of change in land use, each such failure constituting a separate violation of Section 723.061(2)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1988).

      
      

   6. Pursuant to Section 723.006, Florida Statutes (1989), the Division may impose a civil penalty for the foregoing violations and may require Respondent to take such action as will carry out the purposes of chapter 723, Florida Statutes.

ORDER

Based upon the adopted Findings of Fact, the foregoing Conclusions of Law, and after a review of the record,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, as follows:

1. Pursuant to that Notice of Partial Dismissal dated November 16, 1989, filed by the Division in DOAH Case No. 89-4572, the allegations of Count Three in the Notice to Show Cause are hereby DISMISSED.

   
   

2. The recommendation by the Hearing Officer to dismiss the remaining allegations against Respondent is rejected as not properly applying the controlling law to the facts of this case. As concluded by the Hearing Officer, under section 723.002, Florida Statutes (1987), none of the protections of the Mobile Home Act would have applied the moment the number of lots offered for lease fell below ten. However, as shown by the Division's Conclusions of Law B and C, above, the mobile home owners continued to be protected by the provisions of chapter 723 even when the number of offered lots declined to less than ten.

Under Section 723.061, Florida Statutes, the park owner may elect in accordance with that section to buy the mobile home, relocate the mobile home to another park owned by the park owner, or pay to relocate the mobile home to another park; or purchase the mobile home and all appurtenances thereto; or reach a mutually agreed to settlement between the park owner and the homeowner. The facts in this case have established that the mobile homes in question have all been relocated to another mobile home park. Therefore in its judgment, the division in carrying out the purposes of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, Orders the Respondent to within ninety (90) days from the date of this Final Order to either pay Beverly Leight, William Daniels, Helen Sutton and Beverly Warnock the cost each incurred for relocation of their mobile home or to reach any other mutually agreed to settlement with each of the aforementioned homeowners.

Respondent shall provide the division with proof of Compliance with this paragraph within one hundred (100) days of the date of this Order.

DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida this 16th day of January, 1990.

Matthew M. Carter II, Director Division of Florida Land Sales,

Condominiums and Mobile Homes Department of Business Regulation State of Florida

ENDNOTE

1/ It is noted the Legislature reiterated this view in 1990 by enacting Senate Bill 230, clarifying its intent for the statutory protections to remain in effect even if the number of lots offered for rent or lease fall below ten.

RIGHT OF APPEAL

THIS FINAL ORDER CONSTITUTES FINAL AGENCY ACTION AND MAY BE APPEALED BY RESPONDENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES, AND RULE 9.110, FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, BY FILING A NOTICE OF APPEAL CONFORMING TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 9.110(d), FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, BOTH WITH THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, ACCOMPANIED BY THE APPROPRIATE FILING FEE, AND WITH THE DOCKET CLERK FOR THE DIVISION OF FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS AND MOBILE HOMES, WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE RENDITION OF THIS ORDER.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished by U.S. Certified Mail, return receipt requested, to F.A. Ford, Jr., Esq., Counsel for Respondent, Post Office Box 48, DeLand, Florida, 32721-0048, this 16th day of July, 1990.

Docket Clerk

Copies furnished to:

Faye Mayberry, Chief Bureau of Mobile Homes

Eric H. Miller

Assistant General Counsel

Docket for Case No: 89-004572

Orders for Case No: 89-004572