STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ) TRAINING COMMISSION, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) CASE NO. 91-1000
)
ROBERT F. ANDREWS, )
)
Respondent. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Pursuant to notice, the Division of Administrative Hearings by its duly designated Hearing Officer, William R. Cave, held a formal hearing in the above captioned matter on September 25, 1991 in Lakeland, Florida.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: Michael R. Ramage, Esquire
Florida Department of Law Enforcement
P.O. Box 1489
Tallahassee, Florida 32302
For Respondent: Joan Stewart, Esquire
Florida Police Benevolent Association, Inc.
P.O. Box 11239
Tallahassee, Florida 32302 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Whether Respondent's law enforcement certificate should be revoked, suspended or otherwise disciplined under the facts and circumstances of this case.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
By an Administrative Complaint dated June 27, 1990 but filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on February 13, 1991, the Petitioner, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (Commission) seeks to revoke, suspend or otherwise discipline the law enforcement officer certification of the Respondent, Robert F. Andrews, and as grounds therefor alleges that Respondent
(a) intentionally committed a battery upon a male 1/ and (b) unlawfully and knowingly made false statements concerning these matters during an internal investigation which violated the provisions of Section 943.1395(5) and (6), Florida Statutes, and Rule 11B-27.001(4)(a) and (c), Florida Administrative Code, in that the Respondent failed to maintain the qualifications set out under Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes. By an Election of Rights dated July 26, 1990 and filed with the Commission that same day, the Respondent denied the
allegation and requested a formal administrative hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. The matter was transferred to the Division of Administrative Hearings by letter dated February 12, 1991 and the matter proceeded to hearing on September 25, 1991.
At the hearing, the Petitioner presented the testimony of Robert C. Hansell, Ida Lisa Bowen, Stuart R. Hudson, and Michael D. Ryan. Petitioner's exhibits 1 through 16 were received into evidence. Respondent testified in his own behalf and presented the testimony of Tom Rademacher. Respondent's exhibits 1, 3, 4 and 5 were received into evidence. Chapters 517 and 626, Florida Statutes, Sections 776.05 and 784.045, Florida Statutes, were officially recognized.
A transcript of this proceeding was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on October 18, 1991. However, Respondent filed a motion for extension of time for filing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and with the concurrence of the Petitioner the motion was granted with the understanding that the time frame imposed on the issuance of a Recommended Order pursuant to Rule 28-5.402, Florida Administrative Code was waived in accordance with Rule 22I-6.031(2), Florida Administrative Code. The parties timely filed their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law within the extended time frame. A ruling on each proposed finding of fact submitted by the parties has been made as reflected in an Appendix to the Recommended Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
At all times material to this proceeding, the Respondent was a certified law enforcement officer having been certified by the Commission on August 5, 1983 and issued certificate number 43-86-017-01. Respondent had previously been certified as a law enforcement officer by the Commission in December 1974 but that certificate expired while Respondent was attending college.
At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was employed as a deputy sheriff by the Osceola County Sheriff's Office. However, Respondent began his employment as a law enforcement officer in 1974 when he worked for the Windermere Police Department in Orange County, Florida, and since July 1990 has worked part-time for the Davenport Police Department.
Respondent has been employed full-time as a financial consultant with Merrill Lynch since February 1990. Respondent is licensed in Florida under Chapter 517, Florida Statutes to conduct securities transaction and licensed under Chapter 626, Florida Statutes to conduct business in annuities, life insurance and health insurance. Licensure under both Chapter 517, Florida Statutes and Chapter 626, Florida Statutes, requires, among other requirements, that the licensee be of good moral character.
On September 29, 1989, Respondent was on duty as an Osceola County Sheriff's Department deputy assigned to the southwest portion of Osceola County. At approximately 1800 hours, Respondent was dispatched to a residence in the community of Poinciana to talk to the parents of two minor females (ages fourteen and sixteen) who were allegedly provided alcoholic beverages by three adult males earlier in the day. The juveniles, who had skipped school, advised Respondent that the three males had taken them to a lake and allowed them to drink beer and go swimming.
The three males involved were pointed out to Respondent, who then went to the males and questioned them. During this questioning, a "field contact card" was completed on each male. The time of completion of the cards is indicated on the cards to be 1830 hours (6:30 p.m.).
By reason of the completion of the cards, Respondent identified the names of the three males (Robert Miller, William Troy, and Clayton Daniel Worley), their ages (27, 26, and 19 years, respectively), their addresses, phone numbers, physical descriptions, social security numbers, and, for Miller and Worley, drivers license numbers. Worley was identified as owner of the red pickup truck on the scene.
After completing the contact cards, Respondent returned to the victims. One victim, J.B., age 14, reported that while she was in the water, Robert Miller started feeling her breasts and that Clayton Worley also grabbed her and started fondling her breasts. According to J.B., she told Miller and Worley to leave her alone, and she went ashore.
J.B. then related that William Troy then asked her to go for a walk and that during the walk, Troy grabbed J.B. and tried to kiss her, than pulled his penis from his pants and forced her hand into it. J.B. indicated she pulled away but Troy grabbed her again and tried to force her to touch his penis. J.B. indicated Troy repeatedly asked her to perform various sex acts and she refused.
According to J.B., the three males agreed to take the girls home and, when the truck stopped at an intersection, J.B. jumped from the truck and sought help.
By the time Respondent learned of the breast fondling and penis exposure allegations, the males had left the scene.
Respondent contacted his supervisor then-Sergeant Robert Hansell who talked with him about probable cause to arrest the three suspects. Hansell further contacted the on-call investigator Detective Andy Strecker who agreed with Hansell that there was probable cause to effect arrests for lewd and lascivious acts committed in the presence of a minor. Strecker contacted Respondent by phone, instructed him to send the parents and juveniles to the Sheriff's Office for sworn taped statements and to effect the arrest of all three suspects, if possible, on the felony charge of lewd and lascivious acts. Neither Hansell nor Strecker advised Respondent to charge sexual battery at that time, although Respondent still considered it a probable charge.
After leaving the victim's home, Respondent attempted to locate the three males. During this attempt, he identified the red pickup truck and made a traffic (felony) stop of the vehicle at the intersection of San Remo Court and Deauville Court in Osceola County.
Respondent recognized the driver as one of the three males who had been questioned by Respondent in conjunction with the "field contact cards" earlier, and knew the driver was not the vehicle owner, Clayton Worley.
The traffic (felony) stop was indicated to the Osceola Sheriff dispatcher by Respondent at approximately 204658 (two seconds before 8:47 p.m.).
Respondent exited his patrol car and ordered Miller to get out of the truck. When Miller reached the front of the patrol car Respondent ordered him to place his hands on the hood of the patrol car. As Miller placed his hands on
the hood of the patrol car, Respondent stepped up behind Miller and advised him he was under arrest. At this time Respondent noticed a bulge in Miller's right rear pocket that was not there earlier when Respondent had asked for identification.
Before Respondent could secure the handcuffs, Miller began acting belligerently by raising his hands and turning around and asking why he was being arrested. Respondent pushed Miller back onto the hood of the patrol car, advised him he was under arrest again, and told Miller to place his hands behind his back.
Miller did not comply but spun around bumping into the Respondent. At this point, Respondent felt a hit against his weapon and a pull on his gunbelt causing Respondent to think that Miller was attempting to get his weapon. As a result, Respondent pushed Miller away and swung his gunside away from Miller.
As Respondent recovered his balance, he turned toward Miller who was on his hands and feet in the roadway beside the driver's side of the patrol car. Respondent grabbed for Miller, but Miller jumped up and ran counter clockwise around the patrol car, west on San Remo Court to Deauville Court, a distance of about 35 feet. Respondent pursued Miller on foot as Miller turned south on Deauville Court.
Other than Respondent's flashlight, the only light in the area was a street light at the southeast corner of San Remo Court and Deauville Court. As Respondent chased Miller away from the street light the area of the chase became less illuminated, and required Respondent to depend more on his flashlight. Since Respondent had failed to switch his flashlight from wide beam to narrow beam the flashlight did not provide sufficient light for Respondent to clearly observe Miller's actions during the chase.
After the Respondent had chased Miller about 77 feet, Miller suddenly stopped about 30 feet from Respondent. Miller then turned toward Respondent with both hands somewhat extended and held close together in front of his body about waist level in what Respondent considered an offensive position. Miller made no effort to raise his hands as to give up.
Since Miller had escaped before Respondent had been able to determine what the bulge was in his rear jeans pocket, Respondent believed that Miller had a weapon and was preparing to shoot him. Because they had moved away from the street light into a less illuminated area during the chase, the Respondent was unable to determine if Miller had a gun in his hands.
Under the circumstances the Respondent feared for his life, and therefore, pulled his weapon, aimed and fired once. Miller then turned and ran south on Deauville Court again with Respondent pursuing him.
Miller ran another 40 or 50 feet, suddenly stopped and pivoted toward Respondent, again holding his hands together low and in front of his body similar to that used to hold a handgun at low port.
When Miller continued to hold his hands in an offensive position, the Respondent, again in fear for his life, fired three rounds. Apparently, Miller turned to run while Respondent was still shooting since Miller was hit in the lower right side of his back just above the hip through the Levi-Strauss patch on his jeans by one of the bullets. Although Respondent thought he had hit
Miller, he began to have doubts that he had hit him when Miller started running again without staggering.
Miller ran a short distance further south on Deauville Court before turning right (southwest) into an area of tall grass and ducked out of sight. Respondent followed Miller a short distance into a wooded area but retreated when he realized he might be shot from ambush because at this point Respondent still assumed that Miller was possibly armed.
At approximately 8:49 p.m., Respondent requested a K-9 unit for searching the area. Respondent made this call for the K-9 unit from his hand- held radio while he was still near the area where Miller had entered the woods. This call was made approximately two minutes after Respondent indicated to the dispatcher that he was making the traffic (felony) stop.
Upon returning to his patrol car, Respondent and Deputy Larry Dodson who had responded to Respondent's call for assistance removed Clayton Worley, the vehicle's owner, from the truck. Worley was unconscious from alcohol consumption but otherwise okay. Respondent explained to Dobson what had transpired and Dobson called Sergeant Hansell and secured the perimeter until the K-9 unit arrived.
K-9 officer, Deputy Lisa Bowen arrived at approximately 9:07 p.m., and although not advised by Respondent that Miller might be armed and dangerous or that Respondent had fired shots at Miller, Bowen had heard the call for assistance and the shots-fired dispatch.
Deputy Bowen proceeded to search the area in accordance with proper procedures, and eventually found Miller and placed him under arrest. Deputy Cutcher who had also responded to the call for assistance handcuffed Miller. Miller advised the deputies that he had been shot and could not move. Deputy Bowen found one bullet entry and requested paramedics and ambulance at approximate 9:48 p.m. Miller was identified from his wallet which had been taken from his pocket by Deputy Cutcher.
When Sergeant Hansell, who had arrived on the scene, learned that Miller had been shot and was possibly armed, he directed the 9MM "spent" shell casings to be secured, that all law enforcement officers be advised that Miller may be armed, and directed Respondent to sit in his patrol car and not to discuss the incident with anyone.
No firearm was found on Miller, and no firearm was found at the scene other than the service firearm secured from Respondent.
Four 9MM "spent" casings from Respondent's service firearm were found at the scene. One "spent" 9MM casing was found in the area where Respondent first fired at Miller and three "spent" 9MM casings were found in the area where Respondent fired at Miller the second time.
No other "spent" bullet casings were found at the scene.
The shot that wounded Miller was fired by Respondent using his service firearm.
Miller was admitted to Humana Hospital in Kissimmee at 11:15 p.m. where the bullet was surgically removed from the abdominal area by Dr. Antonio Ramirez. Miller's blood alcohol content was determined to be 0.18 percent.
Evidence of Benzodiazepine (a class of tranquilizer which includes valium), cannabnoid, and cocaine metabohite were found by a urine drug screen.
The arrest history for Miller indicates two arrests for resisting arrest; one dismissed and one with no disposition, and one charge of battery on a police officer which was dismissed.
Subsequent to the night of the incident, Investigator Ryan, with the assistance of Deputy Bowen and Detective Webster, conducted an experiment at the scene to determine what the Respondent could have observed in regards to Miller's action under the same conditions as on the night of the incident. Notwithstanding the results of this experiment, the most credible evidence of what the Respondent may have seen or thought he saw during the chase of Miller was Respondent's testimony in this regard which is set out in the above Findings of Fact. While I understand Ryan's effort in this regard, none of those involved in the experiment had to make decisions on what they saw while chasing a person who had just escaped and who may possibly be armed. Respondent did not enjoy this luxury on the night of September 29, 1991 while chasing Miller who, Respondent had reason to believe, might be armed.
Stewart R. Hudson, a special agent with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement investigated possible criminal charges against Respondent for aggravated assault concerning the shooting of Miller by Respondent on September 29, 1989. Hudson's investigative report, dated October 9, 1989, was submitted to the State Attorney's Office, Ninth Circuit, and to Sheriff Jon Lane.
On November 7, 1989, the State Attorney's Office presented to the Grand Jury Hudson's investigative report. Agent Hudson, Sergeant Hansell and Major Magnaght testified before the Grand Jury regarding the shooting. The Grand Jury voted No True Bill, apparently finding the shooting to be justifiable use of force pursuant to Section 776.05, Florida Statutes.
On October 11, 1989, an Osceola County Sheriff's Office Investigator interviewed Respondent regarding the shooting of Miller. Subsequently, the investigator asked Respondent to take polygraph examinations on October 19 and October 27, 1989. Each of the exams showed that Respondent was truthful regarding his fear for his life on September 29, 1989, and truthful in answering Sergeant Ryan on October 11, 1989. 2/ Nevertheless Sergeant Ryan indicated that Respondent was untruthful regarding whether Respondent struggled with Miller and whether Miller was facing him with his hands in a threatening manner when Andrews shot him.
When Ryan told Respondent and impressed upon him he did not believe him after the polygraph examinations on October 19 and 27, 1989, Respondent changed his account of the two points which Ryan said showed deception and tried to comport his testimony with what he had been told the polygraph examinations showed. Respondent then requested to be polygraphed again on those questions to prove that he had been truthful in the interview of October 11, 1989, in his incident report and in his interview with Agent Hudson. Ryan indicated that he could not do another polygraph and reported that Respondent had given false information during the internal investigation with the intent to mislead the investigators.
At the meeting when Respondent was dismissed on November 6, 1989, Andrews stood by his report and explained the changes in the October 27, 1989 interview with Sergeant Ryan. When he had finished, Commander Croft asked if Respondent was allowed or given the opportunity to be polygraphed after he
changed his account of the shooting. Ryan indicated that they had already discussed this and told Respondent, "Don't go muddy up the water."
Respondent's employment with the Osceola County Sheriff's Office was terminated November 6, 1989.
Notwithstanding that Respondent changed his story to comport with the alleged results of the polygraph examinations of October 11 and 27,1989 that he was being untruthful concerning the matter set out above, the more credible evidence concerning the events of the night of September 29, 1989 which led up to the shooting of Miller is Respondent's testimony at the hearing which comports in almost every detail with the Offense Incident Report which was completed and filed by Respondent shortly after the incident occurred.
Respondent's reason for changing his story concerning Miller's action was that he was aggravated by the investigation, and thought that by giving the "changed answers" to the same questions on another polygraph examination would indicate that he was also being untruthful with the "changed answers" and hopefully, this would clear up those areas on the two previous polygraph examinations.
There was sufficient substantial competent evidence to establish that Respondent was in fear in his life, on both occasions, when he shot at Miller on September 29, 1989, and that Respondent's reasons for changing certain statements about the incident was done neither with the intent to mislead the investigation nor to accomplish some unlawful purpose.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties to and the subject matter of this proceeding pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.
Respondent is charged with failure to maintain "good moral character" as required by Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, in that he committed a battery 3/ upon a male person by shooting him with a pistol firearm, a deadly weapon, and unlawfully and knowingly made false statements, concerning material matters of this incident to the Osceola County Sheriff's investigators with intent to mislead such investigators in violation of Section 943.1395(5) and (6), Florida Statutes.
Section 943.1395(5), Florida Statutes, empowers the Commission to revoke the certification of any officer who is not in compliance with the provision of Section 943.13(1)-(10), Florida Statutes.
Section 943.1395(6), Florida Statutes, also empowers the Commission to revoke the certification of an officer upon a finding that the officer has not maintained good moral character, and additionally empowers the Commission to impose certain lesser penalties in lieu of revocation where the only noncompliance is failure to maintain good moral character.
Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, provides as follows:
(7) Have good moral character as determined by a background investigation under procedures established by the Commission.
The procedures established by the Commission are set out in Rule 11B- 27.0011(4), Florida Administrative Code, which in pertinent part provides:
For the purpose of the Commission's implementation of any of the penalties enumerated in Section 943.1395(5) or (6), a certified officer's failure to maintain a good moral character, as required by Section 943.13(7), is defined as:
The perpetration by the officer of an act which would constitute any felony offense whether criminally prosecuted or not, or
* * *
(c) The perpetration by the officer of an act or conduct which causes substantial doubts concerning the officer's honesty, fairness, or respect for the rights of others or for the laws of the state and nation, irrespective of whether such act or conduct constitutes a crime . . . .
* * *
In a disciplinary proceeding, the burden is upon the regulatory agency to establish facts upon which its allegations of misconduct are based by clear and convincing evidence. Ferris v. Turlington, 510 So.2d 392 (Fla. 1987).
While it has been clearly shown that Respondent did shoot Miller on September 29, 1989 with a deadly weapon, it is equally clear as established by the foregoing Findings of Fact that Respondent's action would not equate to Aggravated Assault as defined in Section 784.045, Florida Statutes but would be more clearly defined as the use of justifiable force by a law enforcement officer under Section 776.05, Florida Statutes. Likewise, the facts established that Respondent's actions did not violate the Osceola County Sheriff's Department's Rules and Regulations Manual that are material to this proceeding and identified as Petitioner's Exhibit 3.
Facts clearly establish that Respondent knowingly changed certain statements concerning the shooting incident of September 29, 1989; however, it is also equally clear that Respondent's actions in this regard were not done in an unlawful manner or with the intent to mislead the investigators. The facts do not demonstrate that Respondent has failed to maintain "good moral character" as required by Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes. See, McClung v. Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, 458 So.2d 887 (5 DCA Fla. 1984); Florida Board of Bar Examiners re: G.W.L., 364 So.2d 454 (Fla. 1978); Zemour Inc. v. State of Florida, Division of Beverage, 347 So.2d 1102 (1 DCA Fla. 1977); Rule 11B-27.0011(4), Florida Administrative Code. The Petitioner has failed to sustain its burden to show that Respondent has failed to maintain "good moral character". Ferris v. Turlington, 510 So.2d 392 (Fla. 1987).
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, accordingly recommended that the Administrative Complaint, as amended at the hearing, filed against the Respondent be dismissed in its entirety.
RECOMMENDED this 16th day of December, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida.
WILLIAM R. CAVE
Hearing Officer
Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550
(904) 488-9675
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December, 1991.
ENDNOTES
1/ The Administrative Complaint was amended at the beginning of the hearing to strike the word junvenile (sic) before the word male appearing in the second paragraph of the initial Administrative Complaint.
2/ The questions were: 1) Did Robert Miller do anything to make you believe your life was in danger? 2) Did you lie to me or Detective Ryan when you said you were in fear of your life when you shot Miller?
3/ This portion of the Administrative Complaint was clarified at the hearing to be "Aggravated Battery" as defined by Section 784.045, Florida Statutes.
APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 91-1000
The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120- 59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in the case.
Rulings on Proposed Finding of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner
Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the Petitioner's proposed Finding of Fact: 1(1); 2(2); 3(1); 4-5(4); 6(5); 7-8(6); 9(5,7); 10(7); 11(8); 12(9); 13(10); 14-15(11); 17(11); 18(7,8); 19(12); 20(13); 21(14); 22(15,16); 23(22); 24(21); 25(24,31); 26(24,25); 27(26); 28-30(28); 32-37(29); 38(30); 39(31); 40(33); 41(19); 42(37); and 59(15,25,41).
Proposed findings of fact 16 and 31 are not material or relevant to the conclusion reached in the Recommended Order.
Proposed findings of fact 43 and 44 deal with the results of the experiment conducted by Ryan, and those results are not relied upon by the undersigned. See Finding of Fact 37.
Proposed findings of fact 45-47 are rejected in that they are stated as an opinion and not as a finding of fact but in any event I do not give Stuart's testimony in this regard any credence in that none of this was noted in his investigation.
Proposed findings of fact 48-58 are more appropriately dealt with in the Conclusions of Law. Also note that Section 776.07, Florida Statutes does not have a subsection (3) as indicated in the Osceola Sheriff's Department's Directive and Petitioner's proposed findings of fact. Additionally, proposed findings of fact 56-58 are not stated as a finding but more as an opinion but in any event would not be relevant or material.
Proposed findings of fact 60-69 deal with the various versions of Respondent's testimony which are covered in Findings of Fact 40, 41, 42, and 44. Proposed finding of fact 69 is rejected. See proposed finding of fact 45.
Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent
1. Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the finding of fact which so adopts the Respondent's proposed finding of fact: 1(1); 2(1); 3(2); 4(3); 5(4); 6(5); 7(6,7); 8(7,8); 9(11); 10(12); 11(12,13); 12(14); 13- 14(15); 15(16); 16(17); 17(18); 18(19); 19(20); 20(21); 21(22); 22(23); 23(24); 24(24,25); 25(26); 26-27(27); 28(29); 29(28,29); 30-31(29); 32(30); 33(35,36); 34(38); 35(39); 36(40); 37(41); 38(42); and 39(43).
COPIES FURNISHED:
Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards
Training Commission
P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302
James T. Moore, Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement
P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302
Michael R. Ramage, Esquire
Florida Department of Law Enforcement
P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302
Joan Stewart, Esquire Florida Police Benevolent
Association, Inc.
P.O. Box 11239 Tallahassee, FL 32302
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS:
ALL PARTIES HAVE THE RIGHT TO SUBMIT WRITTEN EXCEPTIONS TO THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER. ALL AGENCIES ALLOW EACH PARTY AT LEAST 10 DAYS IN WHICH TO SUBMIT WRITTEN EXCEPTIONS. SOME AGENCIES ALLOW A LARGER PERIOD WITHIN WHICH TO SUBMIT WRITTEN EXCEPTIONS. YOU SHOULD CONTACT THE AGENCY THAT WILL ISSUE THE FINAL ORDER IN THIS CASE CONCERNING AGENCY RULES ON THE DEADLINE FOR FILING EXCEPTIONS TO THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER. ANY EXCEPTIONS TO THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER SHOULD BE FILED WITH THE AGENCY THAT WILL ISSUE THE FINAL ORDER IN THIS CASE.
Issue Date | Proceedings |
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Aug. 12, 1992 | Final Order filed. |
Dec. 16, 1991 | Recommended Order sent out. CASE CLOSED. Hearing held 9/25/91. |
Nov. 25, 1991 | Order Granting Stipulated Motion for Extension of Time sent out. |
Nov. 20, 1991 | Transcript filed. |
Nov. 07, 1991 | Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact and Analysis filed. |
Nov. 05, 1991 | Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed. |
Nov. 04, 1991 | (Respondent) Stipulated Motion For Extension of Time filed. |
Oct. 18, 1991 | Transcript (Vols 1-3) filed. |
Sep. 25, 1991 | CASE STATUS: Hearing Held. |
Jul. 09, 1991 | Order Granting Continuance sent out. (hearing rescheduled for Sept. 25, 1991; 9:00am; Lakeland). |
Jul. 08, 1991 | (Respondent) Stipulated Motion for Continuance filed. (From Joan Stewart) |
Jun. 18, 1991 | Order Continuing Hearing and Amended Notice sent out. (hearing rescheduled for July 10, 1991: 3:00 PM: Lakeland) |
Jun. 17, 1991 | Notice of Appearance; Motion for Continuance filed. (From Michael R. Ramage) |
Mar. 08, 1991 | Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for 6/27/91; at 9:00am; in Haines City) |
Feb. 26, 1991 | Letter to Judge Cave from S. Larson (Response to Initial Order) filed. |
Feb. 19, 1991 | Initial Order issued. |
Feb. 13, 1991 | Agency referral letter; Administrative Complaint; Election of Rights filed. |
Issue Date | Document | Summary |
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May 07, 1992 | Agency Final Order | |
Dec. 16, 1991 | Recommended Order | Use of deadly weapon by officer was use of justifiable force and not aggravated assault. |