STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE )

AND TREASURER, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CASE NO. 92-2707

)

WILLIAM RICHARD DOBEIS, )

)

Respondent. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

On February 19, 1993, a formal administrative hearing was held in this case in Clearwater, Florida, before J. Lawrence Johnston, Hearing Officer, Division of Administrative Hearings.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: William C. Childers, Esquire

Department of Insurance 612 Larson Building

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300

For Respondent: William Richard Dobeis, pro se

10333 Seminole Boulevard, #8

Largo, Florida 34648 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

The issues in this case are framed by the Administrative Complaint filed by the Insurance Commissioner and Treasurer against the Respondent, William Richard Dobeis, on February 14, 1992, Department of Insurance Case No. 92-L-045WWC.

Factually, the Administrative Complaint alleges essentially: (1) that the Respondent, while acting as a health insurance agent soliciting business from Andreas Kyriazis, knew of Kyriazis' heart and kidney condition and told Kyriazis that the conditions did not have to be disclosed on any application for new insurance unless Kyriazis was on medication; (2) that policies the Respondent sold to Kyriazis refused to pay claims for failure to disclose the kidney and heart conditions; and (3) that, as a result, Kyriazis suffered financial losses of approximately $50,000.

Legally, the Administrative Complaint asserts that, under those facts, the Respondent is guilty of violating the following sections of the Florida Statutes: 626.561(1), providing that, since they are trust funds, licensees must account for and pay them to insureds or others entitled to them; 626.611(4), prohibiting the willful use of a license to circumvent the Insurance Code; 626.611(5), prohibiting willful misrepresentation of, or deception in regard to, an insurance policy; 626.611(7), requiring fitness and

trustworthiness; 626.611(8), requiring reasonably adequate knowledge and technical competence; 626.611(9), prohibiting fraudulent or dishonest practices; 626.611(13), prohibiting willful failure to comply with provisions of the Insurance Code; 626.9521, prohibiting unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices, as defined by 626.9561; 626.9541(1)(a)1, which prohibits, in pertinent part, knowingly making, issuing, circulating a statement, sales presentation, omission, or comparison which misrepresents the benefits, advantages, condtions, or terms of any insurance policy; 626.9541(1)(b), which prohibits, in pertinent part, knowingly making, publishing, disseminating, circulating, or placing before the public any advertisement, announcement, or statement containing any assertion, representation, or statement with respect to the business of insurance which is untrue, deceptive, or misleading; 626.9541(1)(e)1, which prohibits, in pertinent part, knowingly making, publishing, disseminating, circulating, or delivering any false material statement; 626.9541(k)1, which prohibits knowingly making a false or fraudulent written or oral statement or representation on, or relative to, an application or negotiation for an insurance policy for the purpose of obtaining a fee, commission, money or other benefit from any insurer or individual; and 626.9541(1)(l), which prohibits knowingly making any misleading representations or incomplete or fraudulent comparisons of any insurance policies or insurers for the purpose of inducing, or tending to induce, any person to lapse, forfeit, surrender, terminate, retain, or convert any insurance policy, or take out a policy of insurance in another insurer.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

After the Respondent requested formal administrative proceedings on the Administrative Complaint, the Department of Insurance referred the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings on May 4, 1992. Ten days later, a Notice of Hearing was issued scheduling the case for final hearing in Clearwater on July 15, 1992.

On July 9, 1992, the parties filed a Joint Motion to Hold Case in Abeyance based on what it was representated appeared to the parties to be an imminent settlement. On July 10, 1992, an Order for Continuance and Status Report was entered requiring the parties to report finalization of the settlement and, in any event, the progress of settlement negotiations and the status of the case in

30 days and every 30 days until further order.

The parties reported monthly that settlement negotiations were progressing satisfactorily until the Status Report filed on January 11, 1993, which reported that the parties had decided they could not finalize a settlement and that final hearing should be rescheduled. By Notice of Hearing issued on January 14, 1993, final hearing was rescheduled for February 19, 1993, in Clearwater.

At the final hearing, the Petitioner, the Department of Insurance, called Andreas Kyriazis as a witness and had Petitioner's Exhibits 1 through 9 and 11 through 14 admitted in evidence. The Respondent testified in his own behalf and had Respondent's Exhibits 1 through 8 admitted in evidence.

Without objection from the Respondent, the Department chose to utilize a tape recorder to meet its statutory obligation to preserve the testimony at final hearing. Neither party ordered the preparation of a transcript of the tape recording.

The parties stiputated to request until March 10, 1993, in which to file proposed recommended orders. Explicit rulings on the proposed findings of fact contained in the parties' proposed recommended orders may be found in the attached Appendix to Recommended Order, Case No. 92-2707.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The Respondent, William Richard Dobeis, is a Florida licensed life insurance agent, life and health insurance agent, health insurance agent and dental health care contract salesman.

   
   

2. In approximately June, 1988, the Respondent was approached by Irene Kyriazis at her place of employment. The Respondent had sold her employer a group health insurance plan in which she participated. She told the Respondent that her husband, Andreas Kyriazis, was dissatisfied with his health insurance and was interested in obtaining coverage through the group policy. This was not possible under the policy terms, but the Respondent told her that the Respondent would be happy to talk to her husband about his insurance and suggested that she make an appointment for the Respondent to meet with her husband for this purpose if her husband so desired.

   
   

3. The Kyriazises discussed the matter, and Andreas agreed that his wife should arrange a meeting with the Respondent. The meeting took place on June 23, 1988.

   
   

4. At the meeting on June 23, 1988, Andreas stated that his current policy with American States Insurance had a $250,000 lifetime maximum benefit, a $90 maximum daily hospital benefit and a $250 deductible. He wanted a policy with better coverage in those respects.

   
   

5. The Respondent asked Andreas to show him the policy. Andreas looked for it but could not find it. Instead, he produced an insurance identification card. Based on what was on the card, and what Andreas had told the Respondent, the Respondent surmised that the policy was an obsolete major medical policy (it was issued in 1977) that probably should be replaced.

   
   

6. The Respondent then presented to Andreas a policy with Individual Assurance Company. It was a million dollar policy with only a $150 deductible. The daily hospital bed benefit was higher than the old American States policy. (The evidence was not clear exactly what the daily hospital bed benefit was.) In addition, the Kyriazises could get coverage for their college age son, Nicholas--something they also had under the American States policy and were interested in as well. Andreas was pleased with the policy and decided to submit an application.

   
   

7. As the Respondent does routinely, and did in the case of each application Andreas submitted through the Respondent, the Respondent went through the application with the applicant line by line and question by question. The application states, and the Respondent repeats verbally, and it is clear to the applicant, that it is the applicant's duty to answer all questions truthfully, or the policy could be rescinded and benefits not paid. The Respondent carries reference books with him to these meetings so that he can answer virtually any question the applicant might ask the Respondent about the policy or the application. The Respondent completes the application in accordance with the information provided by the applicant, and the applicant signs the application.

8. In the case of the Individual Assurance application, Andreas answered, "no," to the question whether, to his best knowledge, he had been treated for, had been diagnosed as having, or currently was being treated, for heart disease or any other condition related to the heart or circulatory system within the past five (5) years. According to the evidence, this answer was truthful, and there was no reason for the Respondent to have inquired further as to whether the answer would have been different had there not been the five-year qualification to the question.

   
   

9. Andreas also stated on his application that he had not been treated for, had not been diagnosed as having, and currently was not being treated for any disorder of the kidneys. According to the evidence, this answer was not truthful. See Finding 17. But there was no reason for the Respondent to have known that it was untrue or to have questioned the answer Andreas gave.

   
   

10. Andreas wanted the Respondent to immediately make and leave at the house a copy of the application. The Respondent replied that he could not comply with that request but would mail Andreas a copy as soon as the Respondent got back to the office. The Respondent kept his promise and continued to follow the same procedure in the case of each application Andreas submitted through the Respondent.

    
    

11. As the Respondent does routinely, and did in the case of each policy he obtained on behalf of the Kyriazises, the Respondent personally delivered the Individual Assurance policy to the Kyriazises at their home and thoroughly went over the provisions of the policy with them. He told them to let him know if they noticed anything that they did not think was right. He had the same advice stamped on the policy itself.

    
    

12. Andreas was completely satisfied with the Individual Assurance policy until he received a letter from the insurance company, addressed to him and dated December 30, 1988, stating that premiums on the policy would be adjusted to reflect a 9.4 percent increase, effective with the February 1, 1989, billing statement. Andreas was irate about the premium increase and insisted that the Respondent find him another policy. The Respondent was reluctant but succumbed to Andreas' angry bluster and pressure. (It was and, as was evident from his demeanor at the final hearing, and apparently from his subsequent dealings with the Department of Insurance, still is Andreas' modus operandi to use angry bluster and pressure tactics to make others bend to his will.)

    
    

13. At a meeting on February 1, 1989, the Respondent showed Andreas a policy with Central States Health & Life Co. of Omaha. Like the Individual Assurance policy, the Central States policy had a million dollar maximum lifetime benefit. It paid for a semi-private hospital room with no dollar amount maximum. The deductible was just $100. The son, Nicholas, also could apply for coverage from Central States. It was a good policy and a suitable replacement for the Individual Assurance policy that Andreas no longer wanted. Andreas decided to apply for himself and for his son, Nicholas.

    
    

14. The Respondent completed the Central States application in his usual fashion. See Finding 7. One of the questions on the Central States policy was whether Andreas had ever had, among other things, a heart murmur or any disorder of the heart, blood or blood vessels. Andreas falsely answered this question, "no." In fact, Andreas had a heart murmur from the time of his birth.

    
    

15. Andreas claims that the Respondent knew of Andreas' history of having a heart murmur. Andreas claims that the Respondent knew this from seeing a copy

    of Andreas' application to American States which revealed that Andreas had "heart murmur since birth, no complications, no medication." But it has been found that Andreas did not show the Respondent a copy of the American States policy. He had lost it. See Finding 5. Andreas subsequently obtained a duplicate copy from American States that the Respondent saw for the first time at the final hearing.

    
    

16. It is found that, notwithstanding Andreas' testimony to the contrary, Andreas did not tell the Respondent about Andreas' heart murmur or any other heart disease or problems on February 1, 1989, or at any time previously.

    
    

17. Another question on the Central States application asked whether Andreas had ever had, among other things, sugar or albumin in the urine, kidney stones or any disorder of the kidneys, bladder, prostate, urinary sytem or reproductive organs. Andreas answered this question, "yes," underlining the words "kidney stones," and gave the following details: "Lithotripsy Treatment Performed, Date 10/87, Duration 1 day, Degree of Recovery 100 percent."

    
    

18. The coverage on Nicholas was processed as fast as usual, and the Respondent promptly delivered the policy on Nicholas in the Respondent's usual fashion. See Finding 11. But the coverage on Andreas was delayed by the insurance company's investigation of Andreas' medical information.

    
    

19. On or about May 17, 1989, Central States finally issued Andreas' policy, effective February 1, 1989, but with a special endorsement requiring Andreas to "waive any benefits for any loss or disability resulting directly or indirectly, in whole or in part from disease or disorder of the heart and/or circulatory system and/or intestinal tract and/or urinary tract."

    
    

20. The Respondent promptly delivered the policy on Andreas, with the special endorsement, in the Respondent's usual fashion. See Finding 11. When he explained the special endorsement, Andreas was furious. His anger seemed to be directed both at the insurance company and at his doctors, for whatever they had told the insurance company. In general terms, he adamantly denied that there was any valid reason for the special endorsement. The Respondent tried to calm Andreas down and explain to what Andreas' options were.

    
    

21. The Respondent did not know why the special endorsement had been required by the insurance company. The Respondent explained that Andreas could send the company a letter authorizing the company to tell his doctors the reasons for the waiver requirement. The Respondent explained that neither the Respondent, nor even Andreas himself, could get the reasons directly from the insurance company; it would have to go through Andreas' doctors. The Respondent agreed to prepare a letter for Andreas to use to authorize the company to tell his doctors the reasons for the special endorsement. Meanwhile, the Respondent suggested, the Respondent could try to find a temporary policy for Andreas to cover the areas excluded by the special endorsement until the problem was resolved.

    
    

22. There was nothing wrong with the Central States policy on Nicholas, and no change was made in that policy. Nicholas' Central States policy remained in effect as of the date of the final hearing, and substantial claims have been paid under the policy due to a serious car accident Nicholas had after obtaining the policy. The Respondent assisted with the claims, and neither Nicholas nor Andreas nor anyone else has complained to the Respondent either about the policy or about the Respondent's service. (Andreas' complaints, voiced for the first time at the final hearing, that he is dissatisfied with the policy because

    $4,000 of claims were not paid, and Andreas hired an attorney to pursue them, were not proven to be reasonable.)

    
    

23. Andreas eventually agreed to the approach suggested by the Respondent and signed the special endorsement waiving the specified coverage. However, probably privately suspecting at least some of the reasons for the special endorsement, Andreas apparently never mailed to the insurance company the authorization letter the Respondent prepared for him. The Respondent never learned from the insurance company, or Andreas' doctors, or from Andreas himself, the reasons for the special endorsement.

    
    

24. On or about September 29, 1989, the Respondent met with Andreas for purposes of presenting a United American Insurance Company policy known as "the Golden Rule." This was not a true major medical policy but rather a surgical schedule policy. The purpose of it was not to provide major medical, but just to provide some coverage for the areas excluded by the Central States special endorsement for a few months, until that problem could be resolved.

    
    

25. The Respondent completed the "Golden Rule" application in his usual fashion. See Finding 7. One of the questions asked whether Andreas had or had been treated for, among other things, any heart or circulatory disorder in the past two years. This question prompted a discussion of "preexisting conditions," and the Respondent explained that, if Andreas had a medical condition at the time of application, as would be indicated by an affirmative answer to the question, he would not be covered under the policy for six months. When Andreas raised the question what is meant by "having" or "being treated for" a condition, the Respondent answered that if he did not see a physician for treatment, and was not on medication, within the past two years, Andreas could answer, "no." Andreas then answered the question, "no." He also denied any reproductive organ disorder or recurrent urinary tract disorder.

    
    

26. There was no reason for the Respondent to question Andreas' answers on the "Golden Rule" application. It was consistent with the way in which Andreas answered the similar questions on the Individual Assurance application. See Findings 8 and 9. The answer on the "Golden Rule" application also would not have been necessarily inconsistent with the special endorsement requirement imposed by Central States. The Respondent still did not know why Central States had required the special endorsement on Andreas' policy. In addition, the answers on the "Golden Rule" application would not have been necessarily inconsistent with an affirmative answer to the question on Andreas' Central States application whether Andreas had ever had, among other things, a heart murmur or any disorder of the heart, blood or blood vessels. Finally, the answers on the "Golden Rule" application were not inconsistent with Andreas' answer on the Central States application that he had had kidney stones but never had sugar or albumin in the urine, or any other disorder of the kidneys, bladder, prostate, urinary sytem or reproductive organs, and that he had lithotripsy treatment in October, 1987, from which he had recovered "100 percent." Cf. Findings 15 and 17.

    
    

27. On or about October 16, 1989, the Respondent delivered Andreas' "Golden Rule" policy in the Respondent's usual fashion. See Finding 11. Meanwhile, he continued to look for a major medical policy to replace Andreas' Central States policy.

    
    

28. On or about November 20, 1989, the Respondent wrote Andreas to give him "good news." The Respondent had found a major medical policy with United Olympic Life Insurance Company to replace Andreas' Central States policy. As

    the Respondent wrote, United Olympic policy was a true million dollar major medical policy, with a $150 a year deductible, that paid 80 percent of the next

    $5,000, after the deductible, and 100 percent of the rest up to the lifetime maximum of a million dollars. There also were other features which the Respondent explained. The Respondent also sent a brochure more fully describing the policy. In addition, the Respondent wrote to Andreas: "If you can answer questions 2 thru 6 no, you qualify."

    
    

29. The Respondent completed the United Olympic application in his usual fashion. See Finding 7. Question 2 asked whether Andreas had or had been treated for heart attack, heart disease or disorder, chest pain, stroke, arteriosclerosis, high blood pressure or any other condition related to the heart or cardio-vascular system within the past five years. The Respondent repeated the explanations about the meaning of "preexisting conditions," and the meaning of "having" or "being treated for" a condition, that he had given for the "Golden Rule" application. See Finding 25. After these explanations, Andreas answered the question, "no."

    
    

30. Just as with Andreas' answer to the similar question on the "Golden Rule" policy, there was no reason for the Respondent to question Andreas' answer to Question 2 on the United Olympic policy. See Finding 26.

    
    

31. Question 1 on the United Olympic application asked whether Andreas had been recommended to receive or was receiving at that time "treatment or medication for any medical condition, including pregnancy." (Emphasis added.) Andreas answered this question, "no."

    
    

32. There was no reason for the Respondent to question Andreas' answer to Question 1 on the United Olympic application. It was consistent with the way in which Andreas answered the questions on previous applications submitted through the Respondent.

    
    

33. Question 6 on the United Olympic application asked whether Andreas had been diagnosed or treated for disease or injury of the kidney, bladder, or genito-urinary or reproductive systems. Andreas also answered this question, "no."

    
    

34. Both Andreas and the Respondent should have known that Andreas' answer to Question 6 on the United Olympic application was false. On the Central States application, Andreas had disclosed that he had kidney stones and received lithotripsy treatment in October, 1987. (Andreas stated on the Central States application that he had recovered "100 percent.")

    
    

35. On or about January 31, 1990, the Respondent delivered Andreas' United Olympic policy in the Respondent's usual fashion. See Finding 11.

    
    

36. The Respondent had no knowledge of any problem with the United Olympic policy until 1991, when Andreas made claims for a kidney condition and for hospitalization and medical services for a heart condition. The Respondent processed the claims in a prompt and appropriate manner, but payment was slow and some claims were not paid. As a result, Andreas began having problems with creditors and was unable effectively to continue his business of buying and selling of property.

    
    

37. In July, 1991, the Respondent prepared a State of Florida Insurance Consumer Service Request for Andreas' signature to send to the Florida Insurance Commissioner to get assistance in procuring prompter payment of the claims. The

    Respondent also prepared a letter for Andreas' signature asking Andreas' creditors for patience in view of the insurance company's slow processing of claims.

    
    

38. On or about August 12, 1991, the administrator for United Olympic sent Andreas a letter, with a copy to the Respondent, notifying them that the company was rescinding Andreas' policy. The letter stated that, contrary to the answers Andreas gave on United Olympic application, the company's investigation had obtained information: (1) that Andreas was taking medication for impotency at the time of the application; (2) that he was diagnosed with mitral valve prolapse in July, 1989; and (3) that he also had continuing problems with kidney stones and urinary tract infections since 1987.

    
    

39. When Andreas received the rescission letter, he telephoned the Respondent. The Respondent was in the midst of a previously scheduled appointment at the time but offered to accompany Andreas to the Florida Insurance Commissioner's local offices as soon as he finished with the appointment. But, before the Respondent could finish the appointment and call back, Andreas when to the Insurance Commissioner's office himself and registered a complaint against the Respondent for advising Andreas "that it was not necessary to include this medical information on the application to United Olympic Life."

    
    

40. As reflected in these Findings of Fact, Andreas' complaint was not true. The only medical information that the Respondent should have known was incorrect was the answer to Question 6 on the United Olympic application. See Finding 33. But Andreas also knew or should have known this. The Respondent had no special duty, greater than Andreas', to realize that the answer was false. At worst, the Respondent may have been guilty of negligent oversight in this respect. It was not proved that the Respondent knew the answer was false, or that he advised Andreas that Andreas did not have to disclose the kidney stones and lithotripsy on the United Olympic application. Finally, United Olympic rescinded Andreas' policy not because of the kidney stones and lithotripsy, but because Andreas allegedly has had "continuing problems with kidney stones and urinary tract infections since 1987." See Finding 38. There is no evidence that the Respondent knew, or that Andreas ever told him, that Andreas was having "continuing problems with kidney stones and urinary tract infections since 1987."

    
    

41. To date, no determination has been made as to whether United Olympic properly rescinded Andreas' policy. Andreas contends that the Respondent knew all along that Andreas had a heart murmur since birth. Andreas equates this knowledge with knowledge of mitral valve prolapse, but the evidence did not prove that the two are the same. In addition, knowledge of a heart murmur since birth is not the same as knowledge of a diagnosis of mitral valve prolapse in July, 1989. Andreas did not admit, and the evidence did not establish, that Andreas was diagnosed with mitral valve prolapse in July, 1989. Moreover, it is found that Andreas did not tell the Respondent about a diagnosis for mitral valve prolapse in July, 1989.

    
    

42. As reflected in these Findings of Fact, it was not proven that the Respondent ever misrepresented to Andreas, or misled or deceived him, as to the coverage of any of the policies he sold to Andreas.

    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

    
    

43. The Administrative Complaint asserts that the Respondent is guilty of violating the following sections of the Florida Statutes: 626.561(1), providing that, since they are trust funds, licensees must account for and pay them to insureds or others entitled to them; 626.611(4), prohibiting the willful use of a license to circumvent the Insurance Code; 626.611(5), prohibiting willful misrepresentation of, or deception in regard to, an insurance policy; 626.611(7), requiring fitness and trustworthiness; 626.611(8), requiring reasonably adequate knowledge and technical competence; 626.611(9), prohibiting fraudulent or dishonest practices; 626.611(13), prohibiting willful failure to comply with provisions of the Insurance Code; 626.9521, prohibiting unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices, as defined by 626.9561; 626.9541(1)(a)1, which prohibits, in pertinent part, knowingly making, issuing, circulating a statement, sales presentation, omission, or comparison which misrepresents the benefits, advantages, condtions, or terms of any insurance policy; 626.9541(1)(b), which prohibits, in pertinent part, knowingly making, publishing, disseminating, circulating, or placing before the public any advertisement, announcement, or statement containing any assertion, representation, or statement with respect to the business of insurance which is untrue, deceptive, or misleading; 626.9541(1)(e)1, which prohibits, in pertinent part, knowingly making, publishing, disseminating, circulating, or delivering any false material statement; 626.9541(k)1, which prohibits knowingly making a false or fraudulent written or oral statement or representation on, or relative to, an application or negotiation for an insurance policy for the purpose of obtaining a fee, commission, money or other benefit from any insurer or individual; and 626.9541(1)(l), which prohibits knowingly making any misleading representations or incomplete or fraudulent comparisons of any insurance policies or insurers for the purpose of inducing, or tending to induce, any person to lapse, forfeit, surrender, terminate, retain, or convert any insurance policy, or take out a policy of insurance in another insurer.

    
    

44. Although it is cited in the Administrative Complaint, Section 626.561(1) has nothing to do with the facts of this case, and the Department does not press the issue in its Proposed Recommended Order.

    
    

45. Although there is much in the cited statutes that has nothing to do with the facts of this case, the Department contends in its Proposed Recommended Order that the Respondent violated all of those statutes essentially by: (1) willfully misrepresenting to Kyriazis that he need not disclose his heart condition to insurers as long as he was not on medication; (2) willfully misrepresenting to Kyriazis that his health insurance policies would "cover everything"; and (3) willfully repeatedly failing to disclose to insurers the fact that Kyriazis had a heart condition.

    
    

46. Under Ferris v. Turlington, 510 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1987), the Department had the burden of proving the allegations in this case by clear and convincing evidence. As reflected by the Findings of Fact, the Department did not meet this burden of proof.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Insurance Commissioner enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint in this case.

RECOMMENDED this 19th day of April, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida.

J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer

Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

(904) 488-9675

Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 1993.

APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-2707

To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1991), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact:

Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact.

1.-4. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary.

1. Rejected that the Respondent's purpose was to "solicit health insurance," except as described in the Findings of Fact. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated.

2. Rejected as not proven and as contrary to facts found.

3. Accepted and incorporated. However, as reflected in the Findings of Fact, he did not give the Respondent the complete information, or at least the information alleged by United Olympic in rescinding Andreas' policy.

4. Rejected as not proven and as contrary to facts found.

5. Rejected as not proven and as contrary to facts found that the application was completed "as a result of the representations of the Respondent." Otherwise, accepted and incorporated.

6. Accepted and incorporated.

7. See 5., above.

8. Rejected as not proven and as contrary to facts found.

9. See 9., above.

14.-15. Accepted and incorporated.

16. Rejected as not proven and as contrary to facts found.

Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-4. Accepted and incorporated.

5.-6. Accepted. Subordinate to facts found, and unnecessary.

1. Accepted and incorporated.

2. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary.

COPIES FURNISHED:

William C. Childers, Esquire Department of Insurance

612 Larson Building

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300

William Richard Dobeis Post Office Box 3387 Seminole, Florida 34642

Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and

Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300

Bill O'Neil, Esquire General Counsel Department of Insurance

and Treasurer The Capitol, PL-11

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit to the Department of Insurance written exceptions to this Recommended Order. All agencies allow each party at least ten days in which to submit written exceptions. Some agencies allow a larger period within which to submit written exceptions. You should consult with the Department of Insurance concerning its rules on the deadline for filing exceptions to this Recommended Order.

=================================================================

AGENCY FINAL ORDER

=================================================================

OFFICE OF THE TREASURER DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE

IN THE MATTER OF:

CASE NO. 92-L-045WCC

WILLIAM RICHARD DOBEIS DOAH CASE NO. 92-2707

/

FINAL ORDER

THIS CAUSE came on before the undersigned Treasurer of the State of Florida, acting in his capacity as Insurance Commissioner, for consideration and final agency action. On February 14, 1992, an Administrative Complaint was filed charging Respondent with various violations of the Insurance Code.

Respondent timely filed a request for a formal proceeding pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Pursuant to notice, the matter was heard before J. Lawrence Johnston, Hearing Officer, Division of Administrative Hearings, on February 19, 1993.

After consideration of the evidence, argument and testimony presented at hearing, and subsequent written submissions by the parties the hearing officer issued his Recommended Order (attached as Exhibit A). The hearing officer recommended that the Insurance Commissioner enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint in this case. Neither party filed exceptions to the Recommended Order. Upon careful consideration of the record, and being otherwise advised in the premises, it is

ORDERED:

1. The Findings of Fact of the hearing officer are adopted in full as the Department's Findings of Fact.

   
   

2. The Conclusions of Law of the hearing officer are adopted in full as the Department's Conclusions of Law except for the hearing officer's statement in paragraph 45 "Although there is much in the cited statutes that has nothing to do with the facts of the case." All of the statutes cited, except for Section 626.561(1), Florida Statutes, as addressed by the hearing officer in paragraph 44, are clearly applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case.

   
   

3. That the hearing officer's recommendation regarding dismissal of the Administrative Complaint is approved and accepted as being the appropriate disposition of this matter.

ACCORDINGLY, the Administrative Complaint issued against Respondent in this matter is hereby DISMISSED.

Any party to these proceedings adversely affected by this Order is entitled to seek review of this Order pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes, and Rule 9.1101, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Review proceedings must be instituted by filing a Notice of Appeal with the General Counsel, acting as the agency clerk, at 612 Larson Building, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300, and a copy of the same and the filing fee with the appropriate District Court of Appeal within thirty (30) days of the rendition of this Order.

DONE and ORDERED this 18th day of May, 1993.

TOM GALLAGHER

Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner

COPIES FURNISHED TO:

Honorable J. Lawrence Johnston Hearing Officer

Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

William Richard Dobeis Post Office Box 3387 Seminole, Florida 34642

William C. Childers, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300

Docket for Case No: 92-002707

Orders for Case No: 92-002707