STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
HACK CORPORATION, d/b/a )
FLORIDA KEYS PAYFAIR )
SUPERMARKET, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) CASE NO. 92-4202
) DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, )
)
Respondent. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Pursuant to notice, a formal hearing was conducted in this case on February 17, 1993, in Key Largo, Florida, before Stuart M. Lerner, a duly designated Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: Gus H. Crowell, Esquire
Gus H. Crowell, P.A. Post Office Box 777 Tavernier, Florida 33070
For Respondent: Paul Sexton, Esquire
Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 605 Suwannee Street
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
The parties have stipulated that the ultimate issue to be resolved in the instant case is "[w]hether the Respondent should provide a median cut or paved [non-restrictive] median [o]n U.S. Highway 1, State Road 5 ("US-1"), to allow Northbound traffic to turn left onto Petitioner's property on the West side of the Highway."
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
By letter dated September 11, 1991, the Department of Transportation (hereinafter referred to as the "Department") advised Petitioner of its intention to deny Petitioner's request for "a median cut on US-1 so as to provide [direct] access for Northbound traffic to [Petitioner's] property" abutting U.S. Highway 1 (hereinafter referred to as "U.S. 1"). The letter further informed Petitioner of its right to request an administrative hearing on the matter within 30 days of Petitioner's receipt of the letter. The Department subsequently extended the deadline for requesting such a hearing.
On May 5, 1992, Petitioner filed a petition challenging the Department's preliminary determination to deny its request for a median cut or opening.
Inasmuch as the petition did not indicate whether Petitioner was seeking a formal or informal proceeding, the Department sought clarification from Petitioner. In response to this request, Petitioner filed a written request for a formal hearing. Paragraphs 4 through 6 of this written request provided as follows:
The reason provided by the Department of Transportation personnel for disallowing a median cut was:
That the proposed cut was too close to an intersection. This is incorrect because the property owned by the Florida Keys Payfair has so much highway frontage that an adequate median cut could have been provided at an appropriate distance from the intersection and still serve the property.
The second reason given was that the median was not wide enough and DOT personnel claimed that DOT did not own enough
right-of-way to widen the road. This is incorrect because the right-of-way maps show more than enough right-of-way in that area to widen the road the extra couple of feet claimed to be needed. Another alternative would be a paved median strip as is done in many cases throughout the Keys.
In any event, median cuts exist throughout this area of the Upper Keys much closer together than would be provided for the Florida Keys Payfair, despite the fact that our median cut was denied based on proximity of other median cuts.
Florida Keys Payfair has been operating at this location for many many years and has had continuous access from the northbound lanes of
U.S. One until this project. The loss of the access from the northbound lanes has caused severe economic damages, loss of business and related problems to the Florida Keys Payfair.
On July 8, 1992, the Department referred the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the assignment of a Hearing Officer to conduct the formal hearing Petitioner had requested. The hearing was originally scheduled for November 18, 1992, but was twice continued. The hearing was ultimately held on February 17, 1993.
At the outset of the hearing, the parties presented the Hearing Officer with an amended prehearing stipulation. Thereafter, following a discussion of certain preliminary matters, the evidentiary portion of the hearing began.
Petitioner presented the testimony of Ernie Hack, its president, Ralph Aronberg, a traffic engineer, and Craig Belcher, the owner of a restaurant that is adjacent to Petitioner's business. Two witnesses, Gary Donn, a traffic engineer who works for the Department, and Andy Garganta, a traffic engineering consultant, testified on behalf of the Department. In addition to the testimony
of these witnesses, a total of ten exhibits (Petitioner's Exhibits 1 and 2 and Respondent's Exhibits 1 through 8) were offered and received into evidence. At the request of Petitioner, the Hearing Officer conducted a view of the area surrounding Petitioner's business following the conclusion of the evidentiary portion of the hearing.
At the hearing, the Hearing Officer, on the record, advised the parties of their right to file post-hearing submittals and established a deadline for the filing of such submittals. On April 12, 1993, the parties each filed a proposed recommended order.
The parties' proposed recommended orders contain what are labelled as "findings of fact." These proposed "findings of fact" have been carefully considered and are specifically addressed in the Appendix to this Recommended Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Based upon the parties' stipulations of fact, the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made:
For the past 31 years, Petitioner has owned and operated a small grocery store (hereinafter referred to as the "store" or "Payfair") on the bay side of Plantation Key.
The store is open for business from 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. seven days a week.
Payfair is situated on a block that is bounded on the north by Palm Avenue, on the south by Royal Poinciana Boulevard, on the east by U.S. 1 (or State Road 5, as it is also known), and on the west by Gardenia Street.
On this same block, to the south of the store, are a restaurant and the office of an insurance agency. All three businesses face U.S. 1. A paved driveway running parallel to U.S. 1 passes in front of all three establishments.
The property on which Payfair is located consists of ten platted lots, six of which abut U.S. 1 (for a total distance of approximately 300 feet).
U.S. 1 is a north-south roadway that is part of the State Highway System. In this area of the Upper Keys, it serves not only as a through highway linking the Upper Keys with the Middle and Lower Keys to the south and with the rest of the State to the north, but it also must carry local traffic because of the absence of any other major through streets in the area.
The remaining four lots of Petitioner's property abut Gardenia Street.
On the other (western) side of Gardenia Street are residences.
There are no street lights on Gardenia Street.
Gardenia Street dead ends several blocks to the south of Petitioner's property at Wood Avenue, where an elementary school is located.
Plantation Key High School is also nearby.
School children living in the residential area behind Payfair walk or ride their bikes on Gardenia Street past the store on their way to and from school.
There are signs on the street that warn motorists that there are "children at play."
It is desirable to minimize the amount of traffic, particularly commercial traffic, on streets in residential areas where there are school-aged children.
Motorists can enter the Payfair parking lot from either U.S. 1 or Gardenia Street.
Until recently, both southbound and northbound motorists on U.S. 1 could turn directly from U.S. 1 onto the Payfair property anywhere along the 300 feet the property fronted the roadway. Likewise, upon leaving the property, from anywhere along the frontage of the property, they could turn right and head south on U.S. 1 or turn left and go north on U.S. 1.
Such unrestricted, direct access to and from U.S. 1 is no longer available to Petitioner and its customers as a result of work that has been done as part of Department Project No. 90060-3557 (hereinafter referred to as the "project").
The project, which is nearly finished, has converted a portion of U.S.
1 from a two-lane roadway without curbs, gutters or a restricted median to a four-lane roadway with these features which, at its southern terminus, makes the transition to a two-lane roadway.
That portion of U.S. 1 on which work either has been or will be done in furtherance of the project extends from Station 379, on Key Largo, south to Station 298, on Plantation Key. 1/ (The project plans call for the restrictive median to run only as far south as Station 308, which is immediately north of Royal Poinciana Boulevard.)
Station 298, the southern terminus of the project, is north of Wood Avenue.
The issue of where the southern terminus of the project should be located was raised at a public meeting held by the Department at Plantation Key High School on March 14, 1991.
Stan Cann, the Department's District 6 Director of Operations, following the meeting, wrote a letter to the Monroe County Superintendent of Schools in which he provided the following sound and reasonable explanation as to why the Department, in designing the project, had selected Station 298, rather than some point to the south of Wood Avenue, as the southern terminus of the project:
A major concern of most of the meeting participants was where the final location of the southern transition from four lanes to two would be. Currently our plans call for that to occur prior to the signalized intersection
at Woods Avenue. It was the overall opinion, however, that the four laning should be continued through the intersection and transition somewhere farther south.
After considerable review, the Department feels strongly that the current design for the transition is the best alternative for pedestrian safety. We understand the tendency of some drivers to attempt passing as many vehicles as possible before entering a two lane section. This tendency makes it preferable for all opportunities for passing to be complete before coming to the pedestrian crossing. The current design accomplishes this. Extending the four-lane section farther south would result in these drivers continuing their passing movements through the intersection thereby increasing the likelihood of vehicles running a red light which, of course, is when pedestrians are told to cross. In addition, with the increased length of the crossing to traverse the four lanes, pedestrians would be in the roadway itself twice as long. We believe that placing the transition to the south where there is no signal indicating to drivers that they may have to stop ahead, will tend to increase vehicle speeds in order to make passing movements, thus endangering the elementary school students.
With due consideration of the parents' concerns and recommendation, the Department must pursue what it firmly believes provides the most pedestrian safety. Completing all passing opportunities prior to the approach to the intersection, as currently designed, is the safest alternative.
The focus of the instant case is on that portion of the project between Station 308 (at or near the intersection of U.S. 1 and Royal Poinciana Boulevard) and Station 315 (at or near the intersection of U.S. 1 and Palm Avenue).
This segment of U.S. 1 (hereinafter referred to as the "subject roadway segment") has a design speed of 45 miles an hour. As a result of the project, it now has four lanes instead of two. Its two southbound lanes are separated from its two northbound lanes by a raised concrete, restrictive median, which is six feet in width at its southern end just north of Royal Poinciana Boulevard. 2/ The project also added curbs along the right side of the outer lanes which separate the subject roadway segment from the abutting property. There are, however, on the western side of the subject roadway segment, four driveways (curb cuts) that provide access to and from the
southbound lanes. 3/ Two of these driveways lead to the Payfair parking lot. Another driveway is located between Payfair and the restaurant next door. The remaining driveway services the insurance agency's parking lot to the south of the restaurant. 4/
Accordingly, while the installation of the raised concrete median and curbing has restricted access to and from U.S. 1 in this area, it has not eliminated such access entirely.
Southbound motorists on U.S. 1 still have direct access to the Payfair parking lot from U.S. 1; however, they must use one of the driveways that have been installed as part of the project.
Similarly, motorists departing the Payfair parking lot can still turn right onto to U.S. 1 and go south; however, they can do so only from one of the aforementioned driveways.
Because of the restrictive median that divides the subject roadway segment, northbound motorists on U.S. 1 can no longer turn left and directly access the Payfair parking lot from U.S. 1, nor can motorists leaving the Payfair lot any longer turn left onto U.S. 1 and head north.
Reasonable, although somewhat more inconvenient, alternatives remain for these motorists, however.
The Department has constructed left turn lanes on U.S. 1 so that northbound traffic can turn left (west) onto either Royal Poinciana Boulevard
5/ or Palm Avenue. Since both Royal Poinciana Boulevard and Palm Avenue connect
U.S. 1 with Gardenia Street, vehicles travelling north on U.S. 1 can enter the Payfair parking lot through the rear entrance on Gardenia Street by turning left onto either Royal Poinciana Boulevard or Palm Avenue, travelling one block west, and then turning onto Gardenia Street. Alternatively, some northbound vehicles on U.S. 1 will be able to make a U-turn at Palm Avenue and then travel southbound on U.S. 1 to one of the store's front driveways. 6/
Motorists leaving Payfair and desiring to travel north on U.S. 1 can exit the parking lot via the store's rear driveway, get to U.S. 1 by taking Gardenia Street to either Royal Poinciana Boulevard or Palm Avenue, 7/ and then turning left onto U.S. 1. 8/ They can also exit the parking lot via the front driveways, turn right onto U.S. 1, travel southbound to Fontaine Drive, turn eastbound onto Fontaine Drive, 9/ travel a very short distance on Fontaine Drive before turning northbound onto S-905, travel northbound on S-905 to Sunshine Boulevard, make a left onto Sunshine Boulevard, and then, at the intersection of Sunshine Boulevard and U.S. 1, turn northbound onto U.S. 1. Another option they have available is to drive southbound on the paved driveway that runs parallel to U.S. 1 in front of the businesses on the block, exit via the driveway that connects the insurance agency's parking lot with Royal Poinciana Boulevard, make a left onto Royal Poinciana Boulevard, and then turn northbound onto U.S. 1.
From a traffic engineering and safety perspective, it was prudent to install a restrictive median on the subject roadway segment, notwithstanding that its existence may result in some inconvenience to the travelling public.
The subject roadway segment is south of where southbound motorists are first warned that the two southbound lanes of U.S. 1 will merge into one southbound lane (hereinafter referred to as the "warning point"). Therefore,
although the subject roadway segment is before the actual merger and it has two southbound lanes like that portion of the roadway to its north, 10/ it is in a transition area where motorists can be expected to begin jockeying for position in anticipation of the elimination of one of the two lanes of traffic.
It is more appropriate to have a restrictive median than a painted or non-restrictive median on a segment of a through highway which has a design speed of 45 miles per hour and serves as a transition area as does the subject roadway segment.
A restrictive median on such a roadway segment helps to channelize traffic that will soon have to merge. More importantly, it minimizes the conflicts and dangers that motorists in the transition area must face as they jockey for position in anticipation of the merger.
The fewer the openings a restrictive median has the more effective it will be in accomplishing these objectives.
Prior to the installation of the restrictive median on the subject roadway segment, Petitioner requested that the Department provide an opening in the median across from Payfair.
The Department's District 6 Director of Operations, Stan Cann, addressed this request as follows in his aforementioned letter to the Monroe County Superintendent of Schools:
We have investigated the request of a median opening between [Royal] Poinciana Boulevard and Palm Avenue and are unable to grant this for two reasons. First, the median width is inadequate to safely provide for the left turn storage lane. Secondly, the minimum distance between median openings is 660 feet
unless they serve publicly dedicated roadways. The distance between Poinciana and Palm is approximately 700 feet or just over the minimum. An intermediate opening would certainly introduce operational problems to
US-1. Truck traffic serving the commercial establishments on the bay side of US-1 will continue to use Poinciana or Palm to re-enter US-1 as they do today. We will recommend to Monroe County that they post No Trucks signs on those residential streets behind this area, particularly south of Poinciana.
The District 6 Secretary, Charles W. Baldwin, Jr., by letter dated September 11, 1991, formally advised Petitioner of the Department's intention to deny its request for a median opening. In his letter, Baldwin stated the following regarding the matter:
The second issue you raised concerns a median cut on US-1 so as to provide access for Northbound traffic to your client's property. The Department must deny this request because of safety factors which include but are not limited to 1) the physical infeasibility of
constructing a median opening because of the width of the median and 2) the placement of a median opening would violate the Department's minimum design criteria.
The Department proceeded to install a restrictive median, in accordance with the project plans, without the "intermediate opening" sought by Petitioner, or any other "intermediate opening," between the openings at Royal Poinciana Boulevard and at Palm Avenue. The work was completed in December, 1992.
The distance from the centerline of the median opening at Royal Poinciana Boulevard to the centerline of the median opening at Palm Avenue (approximately 700 or 800 feet) is such that it is not possible to have an "intermediate opening" with a centerline that is 660 or more feet from the centerlines of both the Royal Poinciana Boulevard and Palm Avenue openings.
Furthermore, as Cann also noted in his letter, any such "intermediate opening would certainly introduce operational problems to US-1."
While the Department's decision to install a restrictive median without any "intermediate openings" may have certain undesirable consequences, such as increasing the vehicular traffic on Gardenia Street, on balance, having such a restrictive median is safer than having one with an "intermediate opening" or having a non-restrictive median like the one proposed by Petitioner's expert witness, Ralph Aronberg.
The Department has provided median openings on other portions of U.S. 1, north of the subject roadway segment, which service intersecting public roadways, notwithstanding that the centerlines of these openings are less than 660 feet from the centerlines of other openings.
Other median openings provided by the Department on U.S. 1 include one that services an office building, the Turek Building, which is a block and a half north of Payfair, and another that services a shopping center in Tavernier.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
As the parties have stipulated, "[t]his proceeding is governed by the provisions of Sections 335.18, et seq, and Chapter 14-97, Florida Administrative Code."
Sections 335.18 through 335.188, Florida Statutes, constitute the "State Highway System Access Management Act" (hereinafter referred to as the "Act").
The Act defines the scope of the Department's authority to regulate access to the State Highway System and prescribes the manner in which that authority shall be exercised.
Section 335.181(2), Florida Statutes, addresses the extent to which the Department may exercise its regulatory authority where access to a roadway on the State Highway System is sought by an abutting property owner such as Petitioner. It provides as follows:
It is the policy of the Legislature that:
Every owner of property which abuts a road on the State Highway System has a right to reasonable access to the abutting state highway but does not have the right of unregulated access to such highway. The operational capabilities of an access connection 11/ may be restricted by the department. However, a means of reasonable access to an abutting state highway may not be denied by the department, except on the basis of safety or operational concerns as provided in s. 335.184.
The access rights of an owner of property abutting the State Highway System are subject to reasonable regulation to ensure the public's right and interest in a safe and efficient highway system. This paragraph does not authorize the department to deny a means of reasonable access to an abutting state highway, except on the basis of safety or operational concerns as provided in s.
335.184. Property owners are encouraged to implement the use of joint access where legally available.
Section 335.1825, Florida Statutes, provides that a property owner seeking a connection to or from a State roadway abutting his property must obtain an access permit from the Department before such a connection is constructed. 12/
In reviewing any access permit application submitted by an abutting property owner, the Department must act in accordance with the following legislative directives set forth in Section 335.184(3), Florida Statutes:
A property owner shall be granted a permit for an access connection to the abutting state highway, unless the permitting of such access would jeopardize the safety of the public or have a negative impact on the operational characteristics of the highway. Such access connection and permitted turning movements shall be based upon standards and criteria adopted, by rule, by the department.
Accordingly, in those cases where the denial of the property owners' access permit application would deprive the property owner of his "right to reasonable access to the abutting state highway," the Department may deny the application only if it is able to establish that the requested connection "would jeopardize the safety of the public or have a negative impact on the operational characteristics of the highway;" however, where the applicant already has "reasonable access to the abutting state highway" and he is merely seeking additional access to the highway, he bears the burden of proving his entitlement to the permit by demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that the requested connection and permitted turning movements meet the "standards and criteria adopted, by rule, by the department." See Pershing Industries, Inc.,
v. Department of Banking and Finance, 591 So.2d 991, 994 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991);
Cohen v. Department of Business Regulation, 584 So.2d 1083, 1086 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Young v. Department of Community Affairs, 567 So.2d 2, 3 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Florida Department of Transportation v. J.W.C., 396 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
The "standards and criteria adopted, by rule, by the department" are found in Chapter 14-97, Florida Administrative Code.
The "interim standards" set forth in Rule 14-97.004, Florida Administrative, are applicable in the instant case because the subject roadway segment has not yet been formally classified by the Department.
These "interim standards" provide in pertinent part that, where the posted or design speed limit of the roadway segment in question is 45 miles per hour, the "minimum median opening spacing" is 0.25 miles for a "full median opening" and 660 feet for a "directional median opening."
"Minimum median opening spacing," as that term is used in the "interim standards," is defined in Rule 14-97.002(20), Florida Administrative Code, as follows:
[T]he minimum allowable distance between openings in a restrictive median 13/ to allow for crossing the opposing traffic lanes to access property or for crossing the median to travel in the opposite direction (U-turn).
The minimum spacing or distance is measured from centerline to centerline of the openings along the traveled way.
A "full median opening," as that term is used in the "interim standards," is defined in Rule 14-97.002(15), Florida Administrative Code, as follows:
[A]n opening in a restrictive median designed to allow all turning movements to take place from both the state highway and the adjacent connection.
A "directional median opening," as that term is used in the "interim standards," is defined in Rule 14-97.002(11), Florida Administrative Code, as follows:
[A]n opening in a restrictive median which provides for U-turn only, and/or left-turn
in movements. Directional median openings for two opposing left or "U-turn" movements along one segment of road are considered one directional median opening. 14/
In the instant case, the Department has already provided Petitioner with "reasonable access" to U.S. 1 by permitting the driveways that connect Petitioner's property with the southbound lanes of the highway. See Division of Administration, State Department of Transportation v. Capital Plaza, Inc., 397 So.2d 682, 683 (Fla. 1981)(construction of "a raised four-foot-wide median" on roadway preventing northbound drivers from "turn[ing] across traffic directly into Capital's service station" did not constitute a "deprivation of access"
inasmuch as there was "still free, unimpeded access to Capital's service station albeit only by southbound traffic"); Division of Administration, State Department of Transportation v. Palm Beach West, Inc., 409 So.2d 1130, 1131 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)(construction of a "median strip" did not amount to denial of access). The median opening Petitioner seeks therefore will merely provide it with additional access to the highway. Accordingly, the Department may grant a permit authorizing such a median opening only if the record establishes that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the opening meets the applicable standards and criteria set forth in Chapter 14-97, Florida Administrative Code. See Section 335.184(3), Fla. Stat.("Such access connection and permitted turning movements shall be based upon standards and criteria adopted, by rule, by the Department"); Gadsen State Bank v. Lewis, 348 So.2d 343, 345 n.2 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)("[A]gencies must honor their own substantive rules until . . . they are amended or abrogated").
An examination of the record reveals that Petitioner has not made such a showing. It has failed to demonstrate that the median opening it has requested meets the applicable spacing requirements of the "interim standards." Indeed, the preponderance of the evidence affirmatively establishes that the opening does not meet these requirements. Accordingly, the opening requested by Petitioner should not be provided.
Petitioner, alternatively, has suggested that the Department should remove entirely the restrictive median that now divides the subject roadway segment. It contends that a restrictive median "was not required nor desirable at this location," and it should be replaced by a non-restrictive median which would provide Petitioner with direct access to and from the northbound lanes of
U.S. 1. 15/
The greater weight of the evidence, however, establishes that, for the reasons cited in Finding of Fact 35 of this Recommended Order, it is desirable, from an operational and safety perspective, to have a restrictive median on the subject roadway segment given its location in a transition area of the highway where the design speed is 45 miles per hour. 16/
Even assuming arguendo that the presence of a restrictive median on the subject roadway segment results in an increased number of turning movements at other locations on U.S. 1 that are of "sub-standard design," as Petitioner claims, this is not a reason for the Department to replace the restrictive median with a non-restrictive median. If these alleged design flaws exist, the Department should correct them, not introduce an additional hazardous condition by removing the restrictive median and thereby allowing motorists to make the dangerous turning movements onto and from the northbound lanes of the highway that the median now prevents them from making.
Furthermore, while the installation of the restrictive median has the adverse consequence of generating additional traffic volume in the residential area behind Payfair, 17/ it nonetheless, on balance, promotes and protects, rather than endangers, the public health, safety and welfare.
Although Petitioner has alleged that it has been a victim of disparate treatment in its dealings with the Department, it has failed to show that it has been treated any differently by the Department than has any other property owner or business along the subject roadway segment or at any other comparable location.
In view of the foregoing, the restrictive median should remain as it presently exists on the subject roadway segment.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order
denying Petitioner's request that the Department either provide Petitioner an
opening in the restrictive median on the subject roadway segment across from Payfair or, alternatively, replace the restrictive median with a non-restrictive median which would provide Petitioner with direct access to and from the northbound lanes of U.S. 1.
DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 4th day of May, 1993.
STUART M. LERNER
Hearing Officer
Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
(904) 488-9675
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of May, 1993.
ENDNOTES
1/ There is a distance of 100 feet between each "station" on U.S. 1.
2/ While the median is less than 19 and a half feet in width at this point, it is wide enough to adequately serve its function as a traffic separator.
3/ There are no curb cuts on the eastern side of the subject roadway segment inasmuch as the abutting property on this side is undeveloped and likely will remain so.
4/ Motorists may also enter and exit the insurance agency's parking lot via Royal Poinciana Boulevard.
5/ The left turn lane onto Royal Poinciana Boulevard has a 100 foot taper and
40 or 50 feet of storage.
6/ Although there is no sign prohibiting a U-turn at this intersection, some motorists with larger vehicles may have difficulty safely making this maneuver.
7/ More likely than not, these motorists wanting to head north from Payfair will get on U.S. 1 at Palm Avenue rather than at Royal Poinciana Boulevard inasmuch as Palm Avenue is north of the store whereas Royal Poinciana Boulevard is to the store's south.
8/ When turning northbound onto U.S. 1 from Royal Poinciana Boulevard, motorists must be especially careful because the width of the median just north of this location may not allow them to pull into the intersection and safely wait there for the northbound lanes to clear before turning.
9/ The centerlines of Fontaine Drive and Royal Poinciana Boulevard, measured from where they each intersect U.S. 1, are less than 660 feet apart. The median on U.S. 1 between these two roadways is a non-restrictive one.
10/ While the subject roadway segment has the same number of southbound lanes as that portion of U.S. 1 to north of the warning point, its lanes are slightly narrower.
11/ A "connection," as that term is used in the Act, "means driveways, streets, turnouts, or other means of providing for the right of reasonable access to or from the State Highway System."
12/ With certain exceptions, it is the property owner who must bear the costs involved in constructing the connection.
13/ A "restrictive median," as that term is used in Rule 14-97.002(20), Florida Administrative Code, is "the portion of a divided highway or divided driveway physically separating vehicular traffic traveling in opposite directions." The term includes "physical barriers that prohibit movement of traffic across the median such as a concrete barrier, a raised concrete curb and/or island, and a grassed or swaled median." Rule 14-97.002(26), Fla. Admin. Code. A "non- restrictive median," on the other hand, is "a median or painted centerline which does not provide a physical barrier between center traffic turning lanes or traffic lanes traveling in opposite directions." Rule 14-97.002(23), Fla.
Admin. Code.
14/ It is apparent from a reading of the language of Rule 14-97.002(11), Florida Administrative Code, that an opening need not allow for opposing left turn movements in order to be a "directional median opening" subject to the spacing requirements of the "interim standards."
15/ The "minimum median opening spacing" requirements of Rule 14-97.004, Florida Administrative Code, apply only to "full median openings" and "directional median openings," which are defined in Rule 14-97.002, Florida Administrative Code, as "opening[s] in a restrictive median."
16/ Including the subject roadway segment in the transition area has not been shown to have been anything other than the sound exercise of the Department's discretion to plan and design State roadways. See Department of Transportation
Lopez-Torres, 526 So.2d 674, 676 (Fla. 1988)(Department has "plenary power to plan and construct state roads and bridges;" the Department's power, however, "is not absolute and is limited to the lawful exercise of its discretion").
17/ There are measures that can be taken to minimize the negative impact of this additional traffic volume. These measures include the construction of sidewalks, the addition of street lights, the use of school crossing guards, and the strict enforcement of traffic regulations during times of peak pedestrian activity in the area combined with the posting of appropriate warning signs and the visible presence of law enforcement personnel.
APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-4202
The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on the "findings of fact" set forth in the parties' proposed recommended orders:
Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact
First sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance, although not necessarily repeated verbatim, in this Recommended Order; Second sentence: Rejected because it is contrary to the parties' stipulation that Petitioner has operated the store at this particular location "for 31 years."
2-4. Accepted and incorporated in substance.
Rejected because it constitutes a summary of evidence rather than a finding of fact.
Accepted and incorporated in substance.
Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer.
Accepted and incorporated in substance.
First sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Second and third sentences: Rejected because, even if the alternative routes in question are not "readily observable," the outcome of the instant case would be the same.
10-12. Rejected because they constitute summaries of testimony rather than findings of fact.
First and second sentences: Rejected because they are not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence; Third sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Fourth and fifth sentences: To the extent that these proposed findings assert that "the intersection of U.S. 1 and Royal Poinciana is substandard" because the intersection's left turn lane does not meet taper and storage capacity requirements, they have been rejected because, even if true, the outcome of the instant case would be the same. To the extent that these proposed findings state that the intersection of U.S. 1 and Royal Poinciana Boulevard is "[t]he intersection that is nearest [to Payfair] to the south" and that the left turn lane at the intersection has "a 100 feet taper" and "40 feet of storage," they have been accepted and incorporated in substance; Sixth sentence: Rejected because it constitutes unpersuasive argument; Seventh sentence: To the extent that this proposed finding asserts that the restrictive median is "too narrow," it has been rejected because it is not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. To the extent that it states that the restrictive median deprives Petitioner of direct access to and from the northbound lanes of U.S. 1, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance.
First sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Second sentence: To the extent that this proposed finding asserts that the width of the restrictive median "is below minimum criteria," it has been rejected because it is not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. To the extent that this proposed finding states that the median, at its southern terminus, "is much narrower than 19-1/2 feet," it has been accepted and incorporated in substance.
Rejected because it is not supported by the greater weight of the evidence.
Accepted and incorporated in substance.
First sentence: Rejected because it constitutes unpersuasive legal argument; Second sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance.
First and second sentences: To the extent that these proposed findings assert that northbound motorists on U.S. 1 are "forced" to make a left turn at Royal Poinciana Boulevard in order to get to the Payfair parking lot, it has been rejected because the greater weight of the evidence establishes that there are other options available. To the extent that these proposed findings state that the left turn lane is "undesirable" and its use "should be discouraged instead of encouraged," they have been rejected because, even if true, the outcome of the instant case would be the same. To the extent that these proposed findings state that the left turn lane has "storage of only 40 feet and a taper of only 100 feet," they have been accepted and incorporated in substance; Third sentence: To the extent that this proposed finding asserts that the restrictive median is of "sub-standard width," it has been rejected because it is not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Otherwise, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance.
To the extent that this proposed finding suggests that the "mixing of vehicle traffic with children [in the residential area behind Payfair]. . . can [reasonably] be prevented," it has been rejected because it is not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Otherwise, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance.
Rejected because it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence.
First sentence: Rejected because it constitutes legal argument rather than a finding of fact; Second and third sentences: To the extent that these proposed findings assert that the restrictive median plays no role whatsoever in the merger of traffic, they have been rejected because they are not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Otherwise, they have been accepted and incorporated in substance.
Rejected because it is more in the nature of argument regarding the sufficiency of the Department's evidentiary presentation than a finding of fact.
First sentence: Rejected because it constitutes a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact; Second sentence: Rejected because, even if true, the outcome of the instant case would be the same.
First sentence: Rejected because it is not supported by the greater weight of the evidence; Second sentence: To the extent that this proposed finding asserts that the referenced streets were not designed to accommodate any commercial traffic, it has been rejected because it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Otherwise, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance.
Before comma: Accepted and incorporated in substance; After comma: Rejected because it constitutes legal argument rather than a finding of fact.
Rejected because it constitutes a summary of evidence rather than a finding of fact.
Third sentence: Rejected because it constitutes a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact; Remaining sentences: Rejected because they would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer.
First and second sentences: Rejected because they are not supported by the greater weight of the evidence; Third sentence: To the extent that this proposed finding asserts that one of "[t]he reason[s] given for denial of the left turn into Petitioner's property by [the Department] was the . . . application of the minimum spacing requirement of 660 feet," it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. To the extent that it states that the Department's application of this "requirement" was "improper," it has been rejected because it constitutes unpersuasive legal argument.
Rejected because it constitutes unpersuasive legal argument.
First and second sentences: Rejected because they constitute summaries of testimony rather than findings of fact; Third sentence: To the extent that this proposed finding suggests that safety and operational considerations played no role in the Department's decision to install a restrictive median on the subject roadway segment, it has been rejected because it is not supported by the greater weight of the evidence.
Second sentence: Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer; Remaining sentences: Rejected because they constitute summaries of testimony rather than findings of fact.
First and second sentences: Rejected because they constitute summaries of testimony rather than findings of fact; Third sentence: Rejected because, even if true, the outcome of the instant case would be the same.
First sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Second sentence: Rejected because it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence.
34-37. Rejected because they constitute summaries of testimony rather than findings of fact.
38. Accepted and incorporated in substance.
The Department's Proposed Findings of Fact
1-3. Accepted and incorporated in substance.
First sentence: Rejected because it is a statement of the ultimate legal issue in the instant case rather than a finding fact; Remaining sentences: Rejected because they are statements of the parties' respective positions rather than findings of fact.
Rejected because it constitutes a summary of evidence rather than a finding of fact.
Accepted and incorporated in substance.
Rejected because it is a statement of the factual issues in the instant case rather than a finding of fact.
First, second, third, fourth and sixth sentences: Rejected because they constitute argument regarding the sufficiency of proof submitted at hearing rather than a finding of fact; Fifth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance.
Rejected because it constitutes legal argument rather than a finding of fact.
First and second sentences: Rejected because they constitute legal argument rather than findings of fact; Remaining sentences: Rejected because they constitute argument regarding the sufficiency of proof submitted at hearing rather than findings of fact.
11-12. Accepted and incorporated in substance.
First sentence: Rejected because it constitutes argument regarding what matters are at issue in the instant case rather than a finding of fact; Second and third sentences: Rejected because they constitute summaries of testimony rather than findings of fact.
Accepted and incorporated in substance.
Rejected because it constitutes a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact.
Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer.
First and second sentences: Rejected because they constitute summaries of testimony rather than findings of fact; Third sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance.
Fourth sentence: Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer; Remaining sentences: Accepted and incorporated in substance.
19-21. Accepted and incorporated in substance.
Rejected because it constitutes argument regarding the sufficiency of proof submitted at hearing rather than a finding of fact.
First, second and fourth sentences: Rejected because they constitute summaries of testimony rather than findings of fact; Third sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Fifth sentence: Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer.
First sentence: Rejected because it constitutes a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact; Remaining sentences: Accepted and incorporated in substance.
First sentence: Rejected because it constitutes legal argument rather than a finding of fact; Second sentence: Rejected because it constitutes argument regarding the state of the evidentiary record rather than a finding of
fact; Third and fourth sentences: Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer; Remaining sentences: Rejected because they constitute summaries of testimony rather than findings of fact.
First sentence: Rejected because it constitutes legal argument rather than a finding of fact; Second sentence: Rejected because it constitutes a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact; Third sentence, before "and:" Rejected because it constitutes legal argument rather than a finding of fact; Third sentence, after "and:" Rejected because it constitutes a summary of testimony rather than a finding of fact.
First and second sentences: Rejected because it constitutes argument regarding the nature and relevancy of testimony rather than a finding of fact; Third and fourth sentences: Rejected because they constitute summaries of testimony rather than findings of fact; Fifth sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Sixth sentence: Rejected because it is a summary of evidence submitted at hearing rather than a finding of fact; Seventh sentence: Rejected because it constitutes argument regarding the sufficiency of proof submitted at hearing rather than a finding of fact.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Gus H. Crowell, Esquire Gus H. Crowell, P.A. Post Office Box 777 Tavernier, Florida 33070
Paul Sexton, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation
Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 605 Suwannee Street
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation ATTN: Eleanor F. Turner
Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 605 Suwannee Street
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
Thornton J. Williams, Esquire General Counsel
Department of Transportation
562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
All parties have the right to submit written exceptions to this recommended order. All agencies allow each party at least 10 days in which to submit written exceptions. Some agencies allow a larger period of time within which to submit written exceptions. You should contact the agency that will issue the
final order in this case concerning agency rules on the deadline for filing exceptions to this recommended order. Any exceptions to this recommended order should be filed with the agency that will issue the final order in this case.
=================================================================
AGENCY FINAL ORDER
=================================================================
STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORATION
HACK CORPORATION, d/b/a/
FLORIDA KEYS PAYFAIR SUPERMARKET,
Petitioner,
vs. DOAH CASE NO. 92-4202
DOT CASE NO. 92O225
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Respondent.
/
FINAL ORDER
On July 8, 1992, Petitioner, HACK CORPORATION, d/b/a/ FLORIDA KEYS PAYFAIR
SUPERMARKET (hereinafter HACK CORPORATION), filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing with the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (hereinafter DEPARTMENT) seeking review of the DEPARTMENT's intent to deny HACK CORPORATION's application for a median cut on U.S. Highway 1 to provide access for Northbound traffic to its property on U.S. Highway 1 in Plantation Key, Florida. The matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings (hereinafter DOAH) for formal administrative proceedings.
A formal hearing was held in the matter on February 17, 1993, in Key Largo, Florida, before Stuart M. Lerner, a duly designated Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings. The Final Order rules on the exceptions and adopts the Hearing Officer's recommendation, attached hereto and incorporated herein.
EXCEPTIONS
Petitioner filed exceptions to the Hearing Officer's Recommended Order.
Those exceptions are addressed below:
1.- 4. These exceptions are in the nature of legal argument and do not go to specific factual findings made by the hearing officer and are therefore rejected. The Department's view of the law applicable to this case is contained in the Conclusions of law below.
The definition of reasonable access is controlled by section 335.181, et seq and the Department's construction of that term through its rule
promulgation activities. Petitioner's expert's characterization of access cannot be construed as affecting such definition outside of the context of a Chapter 120 rule challenge. The reasonableness of the Department's regulations as to access may only be challenged in the context of a 120.56 rule challenge.
Hack also misapprehends the law of access as articulated in both the cases cited by the hearing officer and the access management statute. The act specifically notes that the Access Management Act does not create any additional property rights which do not exist absent the act. Section 335.181(6), Florida Statutes. This exception is rejected as legal argument. The Department's view of the law applicable to this case is contained in the Conclusions of law below.
Rejected for the same reasons as set out in 5 above. Where rule criteria clearly demonstrates that Hack is not eligible for the type access sought, Hack bears the burden of demonstrating compliance with the rule criteria.
Rejected. See 6 above.
Rejected as argument.
9.-11. The hearing officer did in fact note that the record must establish Hack's compliance with the rule criteria in order for the Department to grant a permit allowing turning movements through a median opening. By also noting that the site does not meet the spacing requirements found in the interim standards contained in Rule 14-97, the hearing officer's finding demonstrates compellingly that Hack is not entitled to such permit. There is no Chapter 120 right of review by a property owner seeking a particular form of access to administratively challenge the Department's road design decision. Advance Leasing and Development. Inc. v. Department of Transportation, DOT Case No. 92- 0261, DOAH Case No. 92-1644 (September 29, 1992), affirmed. Advance Leasing and Development, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, Case No. 924)3835 (Fla.2d DCA, 1993). These exceptions are rejected in that Hack has no standing to seek review of the Department's design decision.
12. Rejected. The hearing officer's finding that use of a restrictive median on the disputed roadway segment is desirable is supported by competent substantial evidence. Further, Hack has no standing to challenge the Department's roadway design decisions. Advance Leasing Company.
13.- 14. Rejected. Hack's citation in its Proposed Recommended Order regarding the safety of the median width was to page 82 of the transcript. There is no discussion of that issue on page 82, hence the hearing officer's rejection of Hack's proposed finding was correct on its face. Hack's citation to page 84 in its exception does not address anything other than roadway design and Department specifications. While Department specifications may be challenged by a bidder on a state project on a project by project basis, the
Department's design standards and specifications are not reviewable in this type of proceeding. Therefore this exception is rejected. Advance Leasing Company Blackhawk Quarry Company v. Department of Transportation. 528 So.2d 447 (Fla.
5th DCA 1988).
Rejected. The Standard Index contains Department design guidelines which are not subject to Chapter 120 review. See 14 above. Hack's failure to demonstrate its entitlement to a certain type of turning movement at its connection point to the State Highway System involves a failure to comply with the access rule standards for the particular roadway design.
Rejected. Hack cites to page 124 of the Transcript for support for the suggestion that no standards or criteria adjust for driver behavior in vying for position at the end of a taper. The record is silent at page 124 of the transcript on this matter. The witness testified he based his opinion on his personal experience and not on AASHTO standards as he was not sure whether there were AASHTO standards regarding vehicle movement prior to median tapers.
Rejected. The only testimony on the pages cited by Hack concerning the existence of standards, criteria or studies was that the witness was not familiar with or aware of such studies. That does not result in the conclusion that none exists or that the Hearing Officer's order was not well founded.
Rejected. The Hearing Officer's conclusion was based on competent substantial evidence. The purported lack of national standards on which to base such a conclusion should not obviate the Hearing Officer's finding. The Department did in fact offer expert witness testimony to support its decisions regarding the median on the disputed highway section. (Tr. p. 149 through p. 151, line 7).
Rejected. The Hearing Officer's finding is supported by competent substantial evidence.
Rejected. The Hearing Officer's finding was some larger vehicles could not make the u-turn. Hack's expert testified that some compact cars could make the u-turn. (Tr. p.53).
Rejected. The Hearing Officer's finding is supported by competent substantial evidence. (Tr. p.151, line 8-9).
Rejected. There is no basis for overturning the Hearing Officer's language in describing the roadway around or near the Payfair as a "transition area."
Rejected. The Hearing Officer's finding is supported by competent substantial evidence.
Rejected. A paved median is not appropriate here. The Department's witness testified that the disputed road's main purpose was to provide through access for the entire Keys and a secondary purpose was local access. Tr. p.162, line 1-3).
Rejected. The appropriateness of the Department's action is clearly supported by the Access Management Act and the administrative rules promulgated pursuant thereto.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Hearing Officer's findings of fact are deemed to be correct alter a review of the record in its entirety.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and a review of the record in its entirety, the Hearing Officer's conclusions of law are adopted and incorporated herein.
The Hearing Officer's recommended order having been adopted in its entirety, it is hereby determined that HACK CORPORATION's request for a median opening for the Payfair Supermarket is hereby DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED this 27th day of July, 1993.
BEN G. WATTS, P.E.
Secretary
Florida Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building
605 Suwannee Street
Tallahassee, Florida 32399
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
THIS ORDER CONSTITUTES FINAL AGENCY ACTION AND MAY BE APPEALED BY PETITIONER PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES, AND RULE 9.110, FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, BY FILING A NOTICE OF APPEAL CONFORMING TO THE REQUIRED OF RULE 9.110(D), FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, BOTH WITH THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, ACCOMPANIED BY THE APPROPRIATE FILING FEE, AND WITH THE DEPARTMENT'S CLERK OF AGENCY PROCEEDINGS, HAYDON BURNS BUILDING, 605 SUWANNEE STREET, M.S. 58, TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0458, WITHIN THIRTY (30)DAYS OF RENDON OF THIS ORDER.
COPIES FURNISHED
Stuart M. Lerner Hearing Officer
Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
Gus H. Crowell, Esquire Gus H. Crowell, P.A. Post Office Box 777
Tavernier, Florida 33070
Paul Sexton
Assistant General Counsel
Florida Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building
605 Suwannee Street
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
================================================================= DISTRICT COURT OPINION
=================================================================
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA, THIRD DISTRICT JANUARY TERM, A.D. 1994
HACK CORPORATION, d/b/a FLORIDA NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES KEYS PAYFAIR SUPERMARKET, TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DISPOSED OF.
Appellant,
CASE NO. 93-1989
vs. DOAH CASE NO. 92-4202
STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Appellee.
/ Opinion filed May 10, 1994.
An appeal from the Department of Transportation. Gus H. Crowell (Tavernier), for appellant. Thornton J. Williams and Gregory G. Costas (Tallahassee), for appellee.
Before HUBBART and GERSTEN and GODERICH, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Affirmed. s. 335.181(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991); Palm Beach County v.
Tessler, 538 So. 2d 846, 848-49 (Fla. 1989); Division of Admin., State Dep't of Trans. v. Capital Plaza, Inc., 397 So. 2d 682, 683 (Fla. 1981); State Dep't of Trans. v. Stubbs, 285 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973); Smith v. Department of H.R.S., 555 So. 2d 1254, 1255-56 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).
M A N D A T E
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA THIRD DISTRICT
HACK CORPORATION, etc.
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
DCA CASE NO. 93-1989
This cause having been brought to this Court by appeal, and after due consideration the Court having issued its opinion;
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED that such further proceedings be had in said cause in accordance with the opinion of this Court attached hereto and incorporated as part of this order, and with the rules of procedure and laws of the State of Florida.
DOT NO. 92-0225 CASE NO. DOAH NO. 92-4202
WITNESS, The Honorable ALAN R. SCHWARTZ
Chief Judge of said Court at Miami, this 30th day of June, 1994.
Clerk District Court of Appeal of Florida Third District
| Issue Date | Proceedings |
|---|---|
| Jul. 05, 1994 | Opinion and Mandate from the First DCA filed. |
| Aug. 24, 1993 | AGENCY APPEAL, ONCE THE RETENTION SCHEDULE OF -KEEP ONE YEAR AFTER CLOSURE- IS MET, CASE FILE IS RETURNED TO AGENCY GENERAL COUNSEL. -ac |
| Jul. 28, 1993 | Final Order filed. |
| May 04, 1993 | Recommended Order sent out. CASE CLOSED. Hearing held 2/17/93. |
| Apr. 12, 1993 | Agency's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law w/Agency's Proposed Recommended Order filed. |
| Apr. 12, 1993 | Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Final Order filed. |
| Mar. 22, 1993 | Transcript w/(2) cover Letter filed. |
| Mar. 17, 1993 | Supplemental Prehearing Stipulation filed. |
| Mar. 04, 1993 | Letter to SML from Paul Sexton (re: Exhibits filed. |
| Mar. 04, 1993 | Petitioners' Exhibits filed. |
| Mar. 02, 1993 | (Respondent) Exhibits 1-8 filed. |
| Feb. 16, 1993 | CASE STATUS: Hearing Held. |
| Feb. 15, 1993 | CC (joint) Supplemental Prehearing Stipulation filed. |
| Feb. 05, 1993 | Petitioner's Supplemental Witness List filed. |
| Feb. 03, 1993 | (4 unsigned - Subpoena for Hearing) Request for Subpoenas filed. (From Gus H. Crowell) |
| Jan. 27, 1993 | (Respondent) Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum filed. |
| Jan. 25, 1993 | (Respondent) Notice of Taking Telephonic Deposition Duces Tecum filed. |
| Nov. 25, 1992 | (Respondent) Response to Request for Production filed. |
| Nov. 18, 1992 | Amended Order Rescheduling Hearing sent out. (hearing rescheduled for 2-17-93; 12:30pm; Key Largo) |
| Nov. 17, 1992 | Order Rescheduling Hearing sent out. (hearing rescheduled for 2-16-93; 12:30pm; Key Largo) |
| Nov. 16, 1992 | Renewed Joint Motion for Continuance of Final Hearing; Request for Telephonic Motion Hearing filed. |
| Nov. 12, 1992 | Order sent out. (motion to view is denied; motion to continue is denied) |
| Nov. 09, 1992 | Joint Motion for Continuance of Final Hearing filed. |
| Nov. 06, 1992 | (joint) Prehearing Stipulation filed. |
| Nov. 05, 1992 | Letter to KNA from Paul Sexton (re: parties working to finalize a prehearing stipulation) filed. |
| Oct. 26, 1992 | Petitioner`s Motion for View of Property and Sites filed. |
| Oct. 23, 1992 | Petitioner's Request for Production of Documents filed. |
| Oct. 19, 1992 | Notice of Serving Petitioner's Answers to Interrogatories w/Interrogatories filed. |
| Oct. 09, 1992 | Order Rescheduling Hearing sent out. (hearing rescheduled for 11-25-92; 8:30am; Key Largo) |
| Sep. 25, 1992 | Petitioner's Motion to Change Date and Location of Hearing filed. |
| Sep. 24, 1992 | (Respondent) Response to Motion to Change Date And Location of Hearing filed. |
| Sep. 15, 1992 | Order sent out. (respondent's motion regarding prehearing procedure is granted) |
| Aug. 28, 1992 | (Respondent) Certificate of Service filed. |
| Aug. 28, 1992 | (Respondent) Motion Regarding Prehearing Procedure filed. |
| Aug. 20, 1992 | Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for 11-18-92; 8:30am; Homestead) |
| Jul. 31, 1992 | Petitioner's Motion for Venue in Monroe County filed. |
| Jul. 28, 1992 | (joint) Response to Initial Order filed. |
| Jul. 16, 1992 | Initial Order issued. |
| Jul. 08, 1992 | Agency referral letter; Agency Action letter; Petition to Review A Decision Effecting Substantial Interests Of Petitioner; Request for Formal Hearing filed. |
| May 16, 1990 | (Respondent) Notice of Taking Telephonic Depositions Duces Tecum; Amended Notice of Taking Telephonic depositions Duces Tecum filed. |
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| May 10, 1994 | Opinion | |
| Jul. 27, 1993 | Agency Final Order | |
| May 04, 1993 | Recommended Order | Requested median opening did not meet DOT spacing requirements, plus it presented safety hazard; denial of request recommended. |
