STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

MARGARET MOORE, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CASE NO. 93-6655

) SMITHKLINE BEECHAM CLINICAL ) LABORATORIES, INC., )

)

Respondent. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Pursuant to notice, final hearing in the above-styled case was held in Tallahassee, Florida, on November 29-30, 1994, and March 27, 1995, before Robert

E. Meale, Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings.

APPEARANCES

The parties were represented at the hearing as follows: For Petitioner: Marie A. Mattox

Marie A. Mattox, P.A.

1333 North Adams Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303

For Respondent: John P. McAdams

Carlton Fields

Post Office Box 3239 Tampa, Florida 33601

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

The issues in this case are whether Respondent terminated Petitioner due to race or handicap and, if so, the nature of the relief that she should be awarded. The parties agreed to reserve the issue of attorneys' fees for a later hearing, if necessary.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Following the filing on May 24, 1993, of a complaint alleging employment discrimination by Respondent based on race and handicap, the Florida Commission on Human Relations entered on October 15, 1993, a Notice of Determination: No Cause. On November 18, 1993, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief alleging employment discrimination by Respondent based on race and handicap.

At the hearing, Petitioner called eight witnesses and offered into evidence

25 exhibits. Respondent called seven witnesses and offered into evidence 16 exhibits. All exhibits were admitted except Respondent Exhibit 39. Joint Exhibits 1-8 were also admitted.

The transcript was filed April 13, 1995. Rulings on timely filed proposed recommended orders are in the appendix.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The parties have stipulated that Respondent is an "employer" and Petitioner is a "person," within the meaning of Section 760.02. Respondent is an African American female.

   
   

2. Respondent employed Petitioner as a phlebotomist. She was hired on December 28, 1987, as a phlebotomist for International Clinical Laboratories, which was acquired by Respondent in 1988. While employed for Respondent and its predecessor, Petitioner worked at the main facility adjacent to Tallahassee Community Hospital.

   
   

3. A phlebotomist collects blood and urine, supervises

   specimen collection, provides off-site service when needed, and completes associated paperwork. The job requires bending and stooping when collecting specimens and sometimes requires physically subduing combative patients.

   
   

4. Petitioner took short-term disability leave from September 16 to October 16, 1991. Three months later, Petitioner injured her knee on January 12, 1992, when she bumped it into a cabinet at work. She took a couple of days off for this injury.

   
   

5. On April 12, 1992, Petitioner injured her lower back while taking blood from an uncooperative patient. She sought treatment from Dr. Robbie G. Hansen, a chiropractic physician.

   
   

6. Dr. Hansen gave Petitioner no orders concerning work, which she continued to attend, even though she was in pain.

   
   

7. At the same time, Respondent was beginning to address some problems experienced by several phlebotomists, including Petitioner, in maintaining the chain of custody of specimens. Respondent's supervisors counselled several such employees, including Petitioner.

   
   

8. On May 5, 1992, Deborah Glee, an African American female, counselled Petitioner orally for a mistake in the collection of a urine sample taken as part of a drug screen.

   
   

9. On June 24, 1992, Dr. Harold Panzik, a white male who is the general manager of Respondent's facilities in northwest Florida, counselled three employees, including Petitioner, for mistakes in maintaining the chain of custody of urine samples. A week later, Ms. Glee counselled Petitioner for another chain-of- custody mistake.

   
   

10. On July 15, 1992, Petitioner refused to perform a specimen collection for Tallahassee Community Hospital, Respondent's most important client. She caused a disruption in front of patients and coworkers.

    
    

11. On the same day, Pete Lowhorne, a white male supervisor, issued Petitioner a written warning for an error in the collection of urine samples for drug screens.

12. On August 3, 1992, Dr. Hansen advised Petitioner to discontinue working for a week in order to obtain relief from the pain from which she had been suffering. He intended to reevaluate her in a week to determine if her condition had improved. He wrote her a doctor's excuse from work for one or two weeks.

    
    

13. Respondent placed Petitioner on short-term disability leave. Under Respondent's policy, as expressed in the employee handbook given to Petitioner previously, an employee begins short-term disability leave after five days' absence due to injury or illness. Short-term disability leave may extend up to

    130 working days, at which time the employee becomes eligible for long-term disability leave. Long-term disability leave is then available.

    
    

14. While on short-term disability leave, Petitioner received rehabilitation services from Maria Halpin, who was the rehabilitation counsellor for Respondent's workers' compensation carrier. Ms. Halpin scheduled medical examinations for

    Petitioner with Dr. Antolic and Dr. Bellamy.

    
    

15. Dr. Hansen released Petitioner to return to work on August 19, 1992, with limited bending and stooping.

    
    

16. Instead of returning to work, Petitioner sought treatment from Dr. Pierce Jones, an orthopedist. Dr. Jones first saw Petitioner on August 24, 1992, and he dismissed her on September 9, 1992, after determining that he could do nothing more for her.

    
    

17. Petitioner then returned to Dr. Hansen, who referred her to Dr. Antolic, who, in November, advised Petitioner that she could return to work.

    
    

18. Petitioner also saw Drs. Willis and Hoffman at the Spinal Testing and Strength Center. They excused her from work, but released her to return to work on November 11, 1992, provided that she not lift more than 25 pounds, engage in any prolonged bending, or work more than four hours per day for the first week.

    
    

19. Ms. Halpin helped design a plan for Petitioner to return to work gradually. The schedule called for Petitioner to work two to four hours daily the first week, four hours daily the second week, six hours daily the third week, and, if able, eight hours daily the fourth week. For the first two weeks, Petitioner was to work in a less physically demanding position as a receptionist and then return to her job as a phlebotomist. Dr. Panzik created the receptionist job for Petitioner, who would thus have, during the first two weeks, only occasional phlebotomy duties.

    
    

20. Before Ms. Halpin's plan was implemented, Petitioner returned to work as a phlebotomist on November 11, 1992. She worked parts of a couple of days that week.

    
    

21. Petitioner returned to work under Ms. Halpin's plan on Monday, November 16. She found that she could not sit prolonged periods in the new position as receptionist. She worked a few days, but never more than two or three hours during a single day.

    
    

22. Feeling unable to work in any position, Petitioner last worked for Respondent on November 27, 1992. On that day, she visited Dr. Hansen, who felt she could return to work and referred her to Dr. Antolic.

23. On December 3, 1992, Petitioner returned to Dr. Antolic. Discovering Ms. Halpin with Dr. Antolic upon her arrival, Petitioner became angry, confronted both of them, and dismissed Ms. Halpin from her case.

    
    

24. On that day, Dr. Antolic concluded that Petitioner just does not have enough objective findings to limit return back to work. I feel she is able to go back to light-duty work 4 hours per day until 01/01/93. At that time she should be able to tolerate full duties with limitations of no lifting greater than 25 pounds. I explained to her that she should be able to go back to light- duty work, but she became extremely unhappy, stood up and walked out of examining room saying "this is not why I came from Quincy." Unfortunately, it appears that I have nothing more to offer this lady and I will give her maximal medical improvement as of 01/01/93 with a 3.5 percent impairment as a whole person based on her present physical findings. The patient was not given an appointment for re-evaluation.

    
    

25. At the same time, Petitioner was seeing her personal physician, Dr. Whiddon, for unrelated problems with her knee and blood pressure. Dr. Whiddon gave her an excuse from work for these problems for November 19 and 20, 1992, and January 1-11, 1993. This was the only doctor's order excusing Petitioner from significant periods of work that she possessed after her return to work in November.

    
    

26. At the request of her attorney, Petitioner sought another opinion from Dr. Bellamy. On January 22, 1993, Dr. Bellamy found "[n]o abnormality found other than obesity. My suggestion is that she lose a lot of weight and exercise vigorously on a regular basis. I would expect her to continue to complain of pain."

    
    

27. By the time of the last visit with Dr. Bellamy, Drs. Jones and Antolic had also dismissed Petitioner as a patient.

    
    

28. After her unsuccessful return to work in November 1992, Petitioner's employment relationship with Respondent became attenuated. She did not supply her employer with doctors' excuses because most of the time she did not have any. She spoke to Dr. Panzik's assistant two times and possibly to Dr. Panzik, but neither of them assured Petitioner that she could return to her job.

    
    

29. In January, Petitioner called Mr. Lowhorne and promised him a doctor's excuse for her knee. He referred her to Dr. Panzik's assistant, with whom Petitioner discussed the possibility of more sick pay for the new year. When the

    assistant told Petitioner that she was ineligible for more sick pay, Petitioner asked about resigning in order to obtain the balance of a profit-sharing account. After thinking about the option, Petitioner told the assistant that she would not resign until she had spoken to her attorney.

    
    

30. In January, Brenda Oxley, Respondent's human resources supervisor located in Tampa, discovered that Petitioner had not returned to work after being released to do so. Unaware that Petitioner had not remained at work following her short-lived return in November, Ms. Oxley contacted Dr. Panzik and the workers' compensation carrier and learned of the upcoming January 22 appointment with Dr. Bellamy.

31. Following receipt of Dr. Bellamy's report, Ms. Oxley and Dr. Panzik decided to terminate Petitioner. The employee manual states:

    
    

    for employees who have medical limitations which prohibit them from performing their normal job, an attempt will be made to provide a temporary work assignment suitable to these medical restrictions [and i]f you decline a temporary work assignment, it will be considered a voluntary termination of employment.

    
    

    The manual elsewhere adds:

    
    

    refusal to cooperate in training, rehabilitation, temporary work assignment or placement efforts, when offered will result in disqualification for disability benefits and the employee will be considered to have voluntarily resigned employment effective the last day for which [short-term disability] benefits were approved.

    
    

32. By letter dated January 27, 1993, Ms. Oxley informed Petitioner that she was terminated effective February 1, 1993, unless she could produce more information from a doctor by February 1. Petitioner received the letter on February 1, but did not provide such information to Ms. Oxley, Dr. Panzik, or anyone else at Respondent's offices.

    
    

33. As of February 1, 1993, Petitioner remained unable or unwilling to return to work as a phlebotomist or any other available assignment. After that date, Dr. Panzik hired Petitioner's temporary replacement, a white female, as a permanent employee.

    
    

34. Doubtlessly, Ms. Oxley was not always aware of developments concerning Petitioner after her unsuccessful return to work in November. It is unclear exactly when Petitioner came off short-term disability leave, and it is likely that Ms. Oxley and Dr. Panzik did not come to a common understanding on this point until they spoke after receiving Dr. Bellamy's final report.

    
    

35. It is clear, however, that several doctors saw Petitioner, and they all dismissed her and released her to return to work. It is also clear that Petitioner did not return to work, except for a short time in November. These factors, coupled with repeated performance counselling of Petitioner by an African American female supervisor, tend to preclude a finding of discrimination based on race or handicap, even if Petitioner's termination were deemed involuntary. The time had come for Petitioner to return to work or, if unable, pursue other legal remedies available to all other employees claiming to be injured on the job or wrongfully deprived of contractual disability benefits.

    
    

36. Petitioner cites two factors as evidence of discrimination. The first is the handling of another employee, Deborah Tinter, a white female, who was allowed to take short term disability.

    
    

37. Petitioner used Ms. Tinter for a dual purpose. In addition to being offered as an additional victim of discrimination due to disability, Ms. Tinter was offered as the beneficiary of racial discrimination.

38. Counsel chose not to disclose the nature of Ms. Tinter's afflictions or injuries, except for a minor injury. This appeared to be a commendable attempt to spare the witness embarrassment. However, as the hearing officer warned during the hearing, it is difficult to compare the treatment given Petitioner and Ms. Tinter by Respondent without understanding the natures of their disabilities.

    
    

39. But, regardless of the nature of Ms. Tinter's disability, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that the disabilities and impairments arising from Ms. Tinter's afflictions or injuries were in dispute. In this important respect, Ms. Tinter's situation differed from Petitioner's situation and merited different treatment by Respondent.

    
    

40. Petitioner also attempted to show that other African American employees were subjected to racial discrimination by Respondent. Several such employees testified that they were victims of racial discrimination.

    
    

41. Necessarily, the evidence of discrimination concerning several other employees was summary. It is possible that one or more of these persons in fact have been victims of racial discrimination. However, based on the abbreviated records presented on each such person, Petitioner did not prove that these persons were victims of race discrimination by Respondent. Sometimes, the alleged facts did not establish prima facie racial discrimination. In each case, based on the testimony of the alleged victim, it is at least as likely as not that legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons existed for the complained-of acts or omissions.

    
    

    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

    
    

42. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. (All references to Sections are to Florida Statutes.)

    
    

43. Section 760.10 provides that it is an unlawful employment practice "[t]o discharge or to fail or refuse to hire any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . race [or] handicap. "

    
    

44. Petitioner has failed to prove that Respondent terminated Petitioner due to her race or disability.

RECOMMENDATION

It is

RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief.

ENTERED on May 24, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida.

ROBERT E. MEALE

Hearing Officer

Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

(904) 488-9675

Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on May 24, 1995.

APPENDIX

Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings

1-3: adopted or adopted in substance. 4: rejected as subordinate.

5: adopted or adopted in substance, except for last sentence, which is rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence.

6-7: rejected as subordinate.

8-9: adopted or adopted in substance.

10-12: rejected as subordinate, except that Dr. Jones saw Petitioner and later dismissed her.

13: adopted or adopted in substance. 14: rejected as subordinate.

15-17: adopted or adopted in substance. 18: rejected as subordinate.

19-21: adopted or adopted in substance.

22: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 23: adopted or adopted in substance.

24-25: rejected as recitation of evidence.

26: adopted or adopted in substance, but not for the continuous period in question.

27 (first sentence): rejected as irrelevant.

27 (remainder): rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence.

28: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence, except for last sentence, which is adopted or adopted in substance.

29-30: adopted or adopted in substance.

31 (first sentence): adopted or adopted in substance.

31 (second sentence): rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence.

32: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 33: adopted or adopted in substance.

34: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence, except for learning that her short term disability did not recommence in the new year.

35-36: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 37: rejected as subordinate.

38: rejected as irrelevant.

39: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence.

40-46 (first two sentences): rejected as irrelevant.

1. (remainder): rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence.

2. (first sentence): adopted or adopted in substance.

47 (second sentence): rejected as irrelevant. 48: adopted or adopted in substance.

49-53: rejected as irrelevant.

54: adopted or adopted in substance. 55-57: rejected as irrelevant.

58: rejected as repetitious.

59-60: rejected as subordinate.

61-62: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 63-64: rejected as unnecessary.

65-66: rejected as irrelevant.

67-70: adopted or adopted in substance. 71-82: rejected as irrelevant.

83: rejected as subordinate.

84: adopted or adopted in substance. 85-92: rejected as irrelevant.

93: adopted or adopted in substance. 94: rejected as subordinate.

95-110: rejected as subordinate, unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence, and recitation of testimony.

111 (first sentence): rejected as irrelevant.

111 (second sentence): rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence.

112: rejected as recitation of evidence.

Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings

1-25: adopted or adopted in substance. 26: rejected as subordinate.

27-31: adopted or adopted in substance. 32: rejected as recitation of evidence. 33: rejected as subordinate.

34-35: adopted or adopted in substance. 36: rejected as irrelevant.

37-43: adopted or adopted in substance. 44-45: rejected as irrelevant.

46: adopted or adopted in substance. 47-50: rejected as irrelevant.

51: adopted or adopted in substance.

52-67: rejected as recitation of evidence and subordinate 68: adopted or adopted in substance.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission

325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149

Dana Baird, General Counsel Human Relations Commission

325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149

Marie A. Mattox

Marie A. Mattox, P.A. 1333 North Adams Street Tallahassee, FL 32303

John P. McAdams Carlton Fields

P.O. Box 3239 Tampa, FL 33601

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions to this Recommended Order. All agencies allow each party at least 10 days in which to submit written exceptions. Some agencies allow a larger period within which to submit written exceptions. You should contact the agency that will issue the final order in this case concerning agency rules on the deadline for filing exceptions to this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the final order in this case.

================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER

=================================================================

STATE OF FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS

MARGARET MOORE,

Petitioner,

EEOC Case No. 15D930457

v. FCHR Case No. 93-5831

DOAH Case No. 93-6655 SMITHKLINE BEECHAM CLINICAL FCHR Order No. 96-006 LABORATORIES, INC.,

Respondent.

/

FINAL ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM AN UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE

Preliminary Matters

Petitioner Margaret Moore filed a complaint of discrimination pursuant to the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Sections 760.01 - 760.11, Florida Statutes (1992 Supp.), alleging that Respondent Smithkline Beecham Clinical Laboratories, Inc., committed an unlawful employment practice by terminating her from her position on the basis of her race (black) and handicap (back injury).

The allegations set forth in the complaint were investigated and, on October 15, 1993, the Executive Director issued his determination, finding that no reasonable cause existed to believe that an unlawful employment practice had occurred.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice, received by the Commission on November 15, 1993, and the matter was transferred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the conduct of a formal proceeding.

A formal administrative hearing was held in Tallahassee, Florida, on November 29 and 30, 1994, and March 27, 1995, before Hearing Officer Robert E. Meale.

Hearing Officer Meale issued a Recommended Order of dismissal, dated May 24, 1995.

Pursuant to notice, public deliberations were held on March 19, 1996, in Pensacola Beach, Florida, before this panel of Commissioners, at which deliberations the panel determined the action to be taken upon the Petition for Relief.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The Hearing Officer's findings of fact contain one apparent scrivener's error. Recommended Order, s 1, indicates that, " Respondent is an African American female. " This should clearly read, "Petitioner is an African American female," and we correct the findings of fact accordingly.

Otherwise, we find the Hearing Officer's findings of fact to be supported by competent substantial evidence.

With the above-indicated correction, we adopt the Hearing Officer's findings of fact.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Hearing Officer's overall application of the law to the facts is a correct disposition of the case.

With the modifications noted in the "Exceptions" section of this Order, infra, we adopt the Hearing Officer's conclusions of law.

Exceptions

Petitioner filed four numbered exceptions to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact. All these appear to take issue with the Hearing Officer's view of the evidence presented.

It has been stated that, "it is the Hearing Officer's function to consider all of the evidence presented and reach ultimate conclusions of fact based on competent substantial evidence by resolving conflicts, judging the credibility of witnesses and drawing permissible inferences therefrom. If the evidence presented supports two inconsistent findings, it is the Hearing Officer's role to decide between them." Maggio v. Martin Marietta Aerospace, 9 F.A.L.R. 2168, at 2171 (FCHR 1 986).

Having adopted the Hearing Officer's findings of fact (see "Findings of Fact" section of this Order, supra), we reject Petitioner's exceptions to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact.

Petitioner filed 15 numbered paragraphs of exceptions to the Hearing Officer's conclusions of law.

Paragraph 2 of the exceptions to the conclusions of law indicates that Petitioner established prima facie cases of race discrimination and handicap discrimination.

To establish a prima facie case of race discrimination in a "termination" case, Petitioner must show, "(1) that [s]he belongs to a group protected by the statute; (2) that [s]he was qualified for the job; (3) that [s]he was terminated; and (4) that after [her] termination, the employer hired a person not in [P]etitioner's protected class or retained those having comparable or lessor qualifications, not in the protected class." Arnold v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 16 F.A.L.R. 576, at 582 (FCHR 1993).

Facts established by the Hearing Officer indicate that, (1) Petitioner is an African American (Recommended Order, 1); (2) that she was qualified for the position from which she was terminated by virtue of having worked in the position since she was hired in 1987 (Recommended Order, 2); (3) that she was

terminated from her position, effective February 1, 1993 (Recommended Order, [

32 and [ 33); and (4) that she was replaced by a person not in her protected class, a white female (Recommended Order, t 33).

Consequently, we partially accept Petitioner's exceptions to the Hearing Officer's conclusions of law to the extent we find Petitioner established a prima facie case of race discrimination.

Since Petitioner failed in its ultimate burden of proving intentional handicap discrimination (assuming a prima facie case of handicap discrimination was established), we find it unnecessary to decide the somewhat less clear issue of whether a prima facie case of handicap discrimination was actually established.

We have found the Hearing Officer's overall application of the law to the facts to be a correct disposition of the case. See Conclusions of Law section of this Order, supra.

We consequently reject Petitioner's remaining exceptions to the Hearing Officer's conclusions of law.

Dismissal

The Petition for Relief and Complaint of Discrimination are DISMISSED with prejudice.

The parties have the right to seek judicial review of this Order. The Commission and the appropriate District Court of Appeal must receive a notice of appeal within 30 days of the date this Order is filed with the Clerk of the Commission. Explanation of the right to appeal is found in Section 120.68, Florida Statutes, and in the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.110.

DONE AND ORDERED this 17th day of April, 1996. FOR THE FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS:

Whitfield Jenkins

Commissioner Whitfield Jenkins Panel Chairperson; and Commissioner Clarethea Brooks

Commissioner Ronald Townsend, Specially Concurring:

While I concur with the above-indicated outcome of this case, I am compelled to call attention to an inference drawn by the Hearing Officer which I feel inappropriate.

In Recommended Order, [ 35, the Hearing Officer indicates that repeated performance counselling of Petitioner, an African American, by an African American supervisor, tends to preclude a finding of race discrimination in this case.

In so doing, the Hearing Officer implies that the fact that a Petitioner is disciplined by a supervisor of the same race raises the inference that discrimination did not occur in the administration of the discipline.

This, in my view, is contrary to the case law developed by this Commission and the courts, in general.

In disparate treatment cases, such as this, the inference of discrimination is based on whether those similarly situated to the Petitioner who are not members of the Petitioner's protected class are treated differently than the Petitioner. It is not based on the race of the employer's supervisor implementing the complained of treatment.

Indeed, in determining whether a prima facie case of discrimination has occurred, the fourth prong of the test as cited in the Exceptions section of this Order, supra, is a showing that after Petitioner's termination, the employer hired a person not in Petitioner's protected class or retained those having comparable or lessor qualifications, not in the protected class. See Arnold v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 16 F.A.L.R. 576, at 582 (FCHR 1993).

To suggest that the race of the supervisor who conducts the alleged discriminatory conduct is a factor in determining whether discrimination has occurred is, in my view, inconsistent with the above-cited case law.

Clearly, supervisors can unlawfully discriminate against those of their own race.

Filed this 17th day of April, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida.

Sharon Moultry

Clerk of the Commission

NOTICE TO COMPLAINANT/PETITIONER

As your complaint was filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which is enforced by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), you have the right to request EEOC to review this Commission's final agency action. To secure a "substantial weight review" by EEOC, you must request it in writing within 15 days of your receipt of this Order. Send your request to Miami District Office (EEOC), One Biscayne Tower, 2 South Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2700, 27th Floor, Miami, FL 33131.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Marie A. Mattox, Esquire John P. McAdams, Esquire 1333 North Adams Street Carlton, Fields, et al. Tallahassee, Florida 32303 One Harbour Place

P. O. Box 3239

James Mallue, Legal Advisor Tampa, Florida 33601 for Commission Panel

Robert E. Meale, DOAH Hearing Officer

Docket for Case No: 93-006655

Orders for Case No: 93-006655