STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

CENTRAL DADE MALPRACTICE ) TRUST FUND, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CASE NO. 94-5180RX

)

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, )

)

Respondent. )

)

FINAL ORDER

Pursuant to Notice, this cause was heard by Linda M. Rigot, the assigned Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings, on March 13, 1995, in Miami, Florida.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Curtis H. Sitterson, Esquire

Stearns, Weaver, Miller, et al. Museum Tower

150 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33130

For Respondent: Lisa M. Raleigh

Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General Tax Section, Capitol Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

The issue presented is whether the Department's Rule 12B-8.001(5), Florida Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The Department issued its Notice of Reconsideration sustaining its assessment against Petitioner for additional insurance premium tax, and Petitioner timely filed two Petitions: one challenging the validity of Rule 12B- 8.001(5), Florida Administrative Code, which is the subject of this proceeding, and one protesting the Department's assessment, which is the subject of DOAH Case number 94-5133. Those causes were consolidated for final hearing but are hereby severed since the former results in a final order issued by the Division of Administrative Hearings, and the latter results in a recommended order.

The Department presented the testimony of Joy B. Eldred. Additionally, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 1 and Joint Exhibits numbered 1-4 were admitted in evidence.

Both parties submitted post-hearing proposed findings of fact. A specific ruling on each proposed finding of fact can be found in the Appendix to this Final Order.

AGREED FACTS

1. At all times material hereto, Petitioner Central Dade Malpractice Trust Fund has been a medical malpractice self-insurance fund as defined in Section 627.357, Florida Statutes. Petitioner has been in existence and operation since 1979. Its sole purpose is to provide medical malpractice insurance to its members, approximately 100 doctors in Dade County.

   
   

2. Petitioner has no capital and is not operated for profit. It cannot, without permission from the Department of Insurance, pay dividends to its members. Rather, Petitioner is required by law to hold 100 percent of its premium and investment income to fund medical malpractice claims and pay its operating expenses, including taxes. Petitioner's members are individually liable or assessable for any shortfall in its trust funds.

   
   

3. The Department conducted an audit of Petitioner for insurance premium tax for the audit period of 12/31/89 through 12/31/90. After the conclusion of the audit and after administrative protest by Petitioner of the proposed assessment, the Department issued its assessment on July 20, 1994. Petitioner subsequently paid the entire assessment and is seeking a refund in the related proceeding.

   
   

4. Although Petitioner is a trust and not a corporation, as an insurer Petitioner is subject to corporate income tax and intangible tax. Beginning July 1, 1989, medical malpractice self-insurance funds also became subject to the insurance premium tax provided for in Section 624.509, Florida Statutes. That section further establishes a system of credits for taxes such as corporate income, intangible, and other specified taxes against the insurance premium tax assessed thereunder.

   
   

5. In computing the amount of tax due to the Department, Petitioner applied credit for a portion of the corporate income tax and intangible tax paid by it against its liability for the insurance premium tax for 1989 and 1990.

   
   

6. Petitioner has standing to initiate and maintain this action.

   
   

   CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

   
   

7. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties hereto and the subject matter hereof. Section 120.56, Florida Statutes.

   
   

8. Section 627.357, Florida Statutes, regulates the establishment of medical malpractice self-insurance funds, regulates the terms of their existence, and provides as follows:

   
   

   (9) Premiums, contributions, and assessments received by a fund are subject to s. 624.509(1) and (2) and s. 624.5092, except that the tax rate shall be 1.6 percent of the gross amount

   of such premiums, contributions, or assessments; provided, however, for the period July 1, 1989, through December 31, 1989, the tax rate shall

   be 0.8 percent and for calendar year 1990, the tax rate shall be 1.3 percent.

   
   

   By that subsection, originating in Chapter 88-206, Laws of Florida, medical malpractice self-insurance funds such as Petitioner became subject to the insurance premium tax effective July 1, 1989.

   
   

9. The premium tax had been previously established and given definition in Section 624.509, Florida Statutes. Portions of that statute pertinent to this proceeding are as follows:

   
   

   1. In addition to the license taxes provided for in this chapter, each insurer shall also annually, and on or before March 1 in each year,

      . . . pay to the Department of Revenue a tax on insurance premiums, risk premiums for title insurance, or assessments, including membership fees and policy fees and gross deposits received from subscribers to reciprocal or interinsurance agreements, and on annuity premiums or considera- tions, received during the preceding calendar year, the amounts thereof to be determined as set forth in this section, to wit:

      1. An amount equal to 1.75 percent of the gross amount of such receipts on account of life and health insurance policies covering persons resident in this state and on account of all other types of policies and contracts (except annuity policies or contracts taxable under paragraph (b)) covering property, subjects, or risks located, resident, or to be performed in this state . . .

      2. An amount equal to 1 percent of the gross receipts on annuity policies or contracts paid by holders thereof in this state.

   2. Payment by the insurer of the license taxes and premium receipts taxes provided for in this part of this chapter is a condition precedent to doing business within this state.

   3. Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the distribution of the premium tax and any penalties or interest collected thereunder shall be made to the General Revenue Fund in accordance with rules adopted by the Department of Revenue and approved by the Administration Commission.

   4. The intangible tax imposed under chapter 199, the income tax imposed under chapter 220,

      and the emergency excise tax imposed under chapter

      221 which are paid by any insurer shall be credited against, and to the extent thereof shall discharge, the liability for tax imposed by this section for the annual period in which such tax payments are made.

      * * *

      (9) As used in this section "insurer" includes any entity subject to the tax imposed by this section.

      
      

10. Effective March 25, 1990, the Department amended its Rule 12B-8.001, Florida Administrative Code, which substantially tracks Section 624.509, Florida Statutes, requiring the payment of a premium tax, and reciting the rate of taxation and the methodology for computing the amount of tax owed. One of the amendments to the Department's rule was the addition of Subsection 5, which provides as follows:

    
    

    (5) Any insurer paying assessments made under s. 440.51, F.S., shall be allowed as a deduction against the amount of any other tax levied by the state upon the premiums, assess- ments, or deposits for workers' compensation insurance on contracts or policies of said insurance carrier, self-insurer, or commercial self-insurance fund. Self-insurance funds are not eligible for the aforementioned credits described in Rule 12B-8.001(3), F.A.C., with the exception of assessments made under s. 440.51, F.S. Wet Marine and Transportation Insurers under s. 624.510, F.S., are eligible

    for a credit for the total income tax paid under Chapter 220, F.S., and the community contribution credit, if applicable.

    
    

11. Petitioner agrees that the Department has followed all applicable rulemaking procedures in promulgating Subsection (5) of Rule 12B-8.001. Petitioner has challenged the validity, however, of that subsection, particularly the first complete sentence, which reads as follows: "Self- insurance funds are not eligible for the aforementioned credits described in Rule 12B-8.001(3), F.A.C., with the exception of assessments made under s. 440.51, F.S." Petitioner argues that Subsection (5) is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because the subsection is contrary to Section 624.509(4) and (9) and/or because it is arbitrary or capricious. Section 120.52(8)(c) and (e), Florida Statutes. Petitioner has met its burden in this proceeding. Agrico Chemical Co. v. Dept. of Environmental Reg., 365 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1979).

    
    

12. Section 627.357(9), Florida Statutes, unambiguous-ly requires medical malpractice self-insurance funds to pay the insurance premium tax as a condition precedent to doing business in Florida, as required in Section 624.509 (1) and (2), Florida Statutes. The Legislature has clearly stated in Section 624.509(4) and (9) that any insurer subjected to payment of the insurance premium tax imposed in Subsection (1) shall be entitled to credit against that tax a portion of the payments made by it for intangible tax and corporate income tax. The Department, on the other hand, has recited in Subsection (3) of Rule 12B-8.001 the availability of credit against the insurance premium tax for corporate income tax and intangible tax payments, as provided in Section 624.509(4), Florida Statutes, and has then provided in Subsection (5) of that rule that medical malpractice self-insurance funds are not entitled to those credits. In so doing, the Department has promulgated a rule which contravenes the statute it purports to implement, and Subsection (5) is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.

13. The Department argues that Petitioner is not entitled to credit against its premium tax liability other taxes paid, as other insurers are entitled to do, because when medical malpractice self-insurance funds became liable for payment of the premium tax in Section 627.357(9), the Legislature stated that only Subsections (1) and (2) of Section 624.509 applied to medical malpractice self-insurance funds. The Department reasons, therefore, that the other subsections of Section 624.509 which grant to insurers credit against the premium tax do not apply to medical malpractice self-insurance funds. The error in the first part of the Department's argument is that Section 627.357(9) does not include the word "only"; it is the Department's interpretation which offers that word. The error in the second part of the Department's position is that Section 627.357(9) need not provide that medical malpractice self-insurance funds are entitled to take credit for other taxes against their liability for premium tax since Section 624.509 states that already. Section 624.509(4) specifically provides that the intangible tax and the corporate income tax paid by any insurer shall be credited against that insurer's liability for the premium tax imposed by Section 624.509, and Subsection (9) defines insurer as meaning any entity subject to the premium tax imposed by 624.509.

    
    

14. Similarly, Rule 12B-8.001(5), Florida Administra-tive Code, is arbitrary and capricious. The first sentence contained therein is not a complete sentence and has no real meaning. The second sentence in Subsection (5), the first complete sentence, provides that self-insurance funds are not eligible for the credits described in Subsection (3) of the rule. However, the source of the credit is not Department rule but rather the statute, Section 624.509(4), Florida Statutes. Forbidding to Petitioner a credit granted Petitioner by the Legislature is despotic and, therefore, arbitrary. Further, promulgating a rule which contains a sentence which is incomplete and without meaning is capricious. See, Agrico, at 763.

    
    

15. The Department argues that it is simply clarifying the legislative intent in Section 627.357 since the statute does not speak, one way or the other, as to Petitioner's entitlement to credit. The Department refers, therefore, to the legislative intent it finds in Chapter 88-206, Laws of Florida, in which the Legislature imposed liability for paying the premium tax on entities not previously liable. The Department argues that as to some of those entities, the Legislature specified that Section 624.509, Florida Statutes, was henceforth applicable; however, as to other entities, the Legislature specified that Subsections (1), (2), and (3) of Section 624.509, Florida Statutes, were applicable. The Department reasons, therefore, that because the Legislature used different language, it intended to give the credit claimed by Petitioner to some forms of insurers but not to others.

    
    

16. Unfortunately for the Department, the Legislature did not say that. The apparent difference between those entities being made subject to the premium tax for the first time by a reference to the entire Section 624.509 as opposed to those entities upon whom the premium tax was being imposed for the first time with the reference to Section 624.509(1) and (2) is that the former group was being subjected to a premium tax equal to whatever percentage was specified in Section 624.509 from time to time but the latter group was being subjected to a premium tax at a different rate than that set forth in Section 624.509(1). In other words, the difference in the choice of language by the Legislature appears related to the tax rate being set for each type of legal entity, and the difference bears no relationship to whether credit would be given to that legal entity since the availability of credit is not mentioned in Chapter 88-206. The Department is not in a position to clarify legislative intent where no ambiguity exists in the statute enacted. Had the Legislature intended to not grant credit

    to medical malpractice self-insurance funds, it could have so provided and thereby overcome the general grant in Section 624.509 (4) and (9).

    
    

17. Lastly, the Department argues that Subsection (5) of its rule is a permissible interpretation of the statutes implemented. Dept. of Professional Reg., Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1984). That argument is not persuasive since the statutes are clear, requiring no interpretation, and since the Department's interpretation is contrary to the statutory language.

    
    

18. Since the Legislature has given Petitioner credit against its premium tax liability but the Department has taken that credit away by rule, then Petitioner has met its burden of proving that Subsection (5) of Rule 12B-8.001 is in contravention of the statute it purports to implement and is arbitrary and capricious. It is, therefore,

ORDERED that Rule 12B-8.001(5), Florida Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.

DONE and ORDERED this 18th day of May, 1995, at Tallahassee, Florida.

LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

(904) 488-9675

Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of May, 1995.

APPENDIX TO FINAL ORDER

1. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 2, 4, and 5 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Final Order.

2. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 3, 6, and 8 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact.

3. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 7, and 9-11 have been rejected as being subordinate to the issues involved herein.

4. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 2, 4, and 5 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Final Order.

5. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 3, 6-10, and 13-20 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact.

6. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 11 and 12 have been rejected as being subordinate to the issues herein.

7. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 21 and 22 have been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues in this cause.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Curtis H. Sitterson, Esquire Stearns, Weaver, Miller, et al. Museum Tower

150 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33130

Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue

Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668

Lisa M. Raleigh, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Tax Section, The Capitol

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050

Carroll Webb, Executive Director Administrative Procedures Committee Holland Building, Room 120 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300

Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue

104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

A party who is adversely affected by this final order is entitled to judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68. Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing one copy of a notice of appeal with the Agency Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings and a second copy, accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal, First District, or with the District Court of Appeal in the appellate District where the party resides. The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed.

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DISTRICT COURT OPINION

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

STATE OF FLORIDA, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

Appellant,

V. CASE NO. 95-2159/3142

DOAH CASE NO. 94-5133, 94-5180RX

CENTRAL DADE MALPRACTICE TRUST FUND,

Appellee.

/ Opinion filed May 7, 1996.

An appeal from an order of the Division of Administrative Hearings. Cross Appeal from an order of the Department of Revenue.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; Jeffrey M. Dikman and C. Lynne Overton, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Bradford Swing and Curtis H. Sitterson of Stearns, Weaver, Miller, Weissler, Miami, for Appellee.

DAVIS, J.

In the first of these consolidated cases, the State of Florida appeals the final order of the Hearing Officer, invalidating Rule 12B-8.001(5), Florida Administrative Code, as an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. In the second, Central Dade Malpractice Trust Fund appeals 1/ the final order of the Department of Revenue, upholding an audit assessing additional insurance premium tax, a penalty and interest, and rejecting a separate recommended order by the same hearing officer. The Hearing Officer's recommended order concluded that Central Dade Malpractice Trust Fund was entitled to a tax refund because the Department of Revenue had erroneously computed its tax obligation without applying certain credits permitted by section 624.509 Florida Statutes (Supp.

1990). The sole issue in both cases is whether Central Dade is entitled to the credits enumerated in section 624.509 against its liability for insurance premium tax. We conclude that under a plain reading of the unambiguous language of this statute, read in conjunction with section 627.357(9), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990), the statute allows such credits; therefore, we affirm the final order of the Hearing Officer in case no. 95- 2159, and reverse the final order of the Department of Revenue in case no. 95-3142.

In computing its premium tax liability for 1989 and 1990, Central Dade applied against its liability a credit for a portion of the corporate income tax and intangible tax it had paid. The Department of Revenue conducted an audit, disallowed any credits, and issued an assessment against Central Dade Malpractice Trust Fund for additional insurance premium tax, a penalty and interest. Central Dade paid the assessment, and then filed two petitions with the Division of Administrative Hearings. In one petition, Central Dade protested the Department of Revenue's assessment and sought a refund. In the other, Central Dade challenged the validity of Rule 12B-8.001(5), Florida Administrative Code, and in particular the first complete sentence thereof, which states: "Self-insurance funds are not eligible for the aforementioned credits described in Rule 12B-8.0()i(3), F.A.C., with the exception of assessments made under s. 440.51, F.S." Central Dade contended that subsection

(5) was an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because it was contrary to subsections 624.509(4) through (9) 2/

Chapter 88-206, Laws of Florida, made medical malpractice self-insurance funds such as Central Dade, as well as other enumerated insurers, / 3 subject to the premium tax. In promulgating except that the tax rate shall be 1.6 percent of the gross amount Rule 12B-8.001(5), Florida Administrative Code, the Department of Revenue erroneously interpreted section 627.357(9) to disallow any credits to Central Dade otherwise permitted by section 624.509, because of the belief that the specific enumeration of subsections (1) and y(2) in section 627.357(9) precluded the application of other subsections of the premium tax statute. We-reject that construction based upon the plain language of the statutes. "While legislative intent controls construction of statutes in Florida, that intent is determined primarily from the language of the statute.

The plain meaning of the statutory language is the first consideration." St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co. v. Hamm, 414 So.2d 1071, 1073 (Fla. 1982)(citations omitted)

Section 627.357(9), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990), provides that: "Premiums, contributions, and assessments received by a fund are subject to s. 624.509(1) and (2) and s. 624.5092, except that the tax rate shall be 1.6 percent of the gross amount of such premiums, contributions or assessments; provided, however, for the period July 1, 1989, through December 31, 1989, the tax rate shall be 0.8 percent and for calendar year 1990, the tax rate shall be

1.3 percent." Subsections (1) and (2) of section 624.509 set the amount of the tax. It is obvious from a plain reading of section 627.357(9), that the Legislature specifically cross-referenced those particular subsections because those subsections alone are being modified by the lower rate contained in the dependent clause "except that the tax rate shall be 1.6 percent..."

More importantly, the enumeration in section 627.357(9) of subsections (1) and (2) of section 624.509 does not preclude the applicability of the credits governed by subsections (4) through (8) because subsection (1) of section

624.509 itself expressly incorporates the disputed credits into the final computation of the premium tax. Subsection (1) provides that the amount of the tax is "to be determined as set forth in this section..." The words "this section" plainly refer to section 624.509 in its entirety, including the subsections which permit the credits which the Department disallowed in this case.

There can be no doubt that the Legislature, by using the term "this section," meant the whole of section 624.509. The Preface contained in The Florida Statutes, which explains the usage of the terms chapter, section and subsection, states that chapters are arranged by subject matter, and identified

by a whole number; sections within a chapter are identified by a "whole decimal number consisting of the chapter number followed by digits appearing to the right of the decimal point;" and subsections are identified "by whole Arabic numbers enclosed by parentheses." Reference to "this section" within subsection 624.509(1) mandates the Department of Revenue to permit medical malpractice self-insurance funds the credits for corporate and intangible taxes in subsection 624.509(4), when calculating the premium taxes due and owing under section 624.509.

Our conclusion is supported by the fact that legislative intent may be discerned from the Legislature's election to use different words to convey different meanings within a statute. [Dep't of Professional Regulation. Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Durrani], 455 So.2d 515, 518 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).

Throughout section 624.509 the Legislature referred to the entire premium tax statute, including credits, by using the word "section," and made specific reference to particular subsections within section 624.509 by using the word "subsection." [See, e.g.], subsection 624.509(4), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990) ("As to any insurer issuing policies insuring against loss or damage from the risks of fire, tornado, and certain casualty lines, the tax imposed by this section, as intended and contemplated by this [subsection], shall be construed to mean the net amount of such tax remaining after there has been, credited thereon such gross premium receipts tax as may be payable by such insurer in pursuance of the imposition of such tax by any incorporated cities or towns...") [Emphasis added]; subsection 624.509(5)("There shall be allowed a credit against the net tax imposed by' this section equal to 15 percent of the amount paid by the insurer in salaries to employees located or based within this state and who are covered by the provisions of chapter 443. For purposes of this subsection:... (c) The term "net tax" means the tax imposed by this [section] after applying the calculations and credits set forth in subsection (4).") [Emphasis added]; subsection 624.509(6)("The Total of the credit granted for the taxes paid by the insurer under chapters 220 and 221 and the credit granted by subsection (5) shall not exceed 65 percent of the tax due under subsection (1) after deducting therefrom the taxes paid by the insurer...") [Emphasis added]; subsection 624.509(7) ("Credits and deductions against the tax imposed by this section shall be taken in the following order:...") [Emphasis added].

Reading subsection 624.509(1) with reference to the entirety of section 624.509, in conjunction with section 627.357, based upon the plain meaning of the words contained within those sections, we conclude that the Legislature intended medical malpractice self insurers to pay the tax imposed in section 624.509, using the lower rate specified in section 627.357, and then applying the credits, as provided in subsections (4) through (8) of section 624.509.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the Hearing Officer's final order in case no. 95- 2159 invalidating Fla. Admin. Code Rule 12B-8.001(5), as an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, because the rule improperly denied the applicability of the credits granted by the Legislature. We REVERSE the final order of the Department of Revenue in case no. 95-3142 which upheld the assessment of additional tax, a penalty and interest, and denied Central Dade Malpractice Trust Fund's application for a tax refund, because the additional tax was erroneously imposed by denying the credits to which Central Dade Malpractice Trust Fund was entitled.

ZEHMER, C.J., and BARFIELD, J., CONCUR.

ENDNOTES

1/ These appeals were consolidated and case no. 95-3142 became a cross-appeal.

2/ Subsections 624.509(4) through (8) govern credits against the insurance premium tax; subsection (9) provides that, "as used in this section insurer includes any entity subject to the tax imposed by this section."

3/ The Legislature did not use uniform language throughout the act, however. With respect to reciprocal insurers, for example, section 7 of chapter 88-206, Laws of Florida, provided for the creation of section 629.5011, Florida Statutes, stating that "[p]remiums and assessments received by reciprocal insurers are subject to any premium tax provided for in s. 624.509." See also 12, 13, chapter 88-206, Laws of Florida, (premiums, contributions, and assessments received by dental service plans, and entrance fees received by a provider in payment for a continuing care contract, are "subject to the tax imposed by s. 624.509"). In contrast, 6, chapter 88-206, Laws of Florida, amended section 627.357, Florida, Statutes, by adding subsection (9), providing: "[p]remiums, contributions, and assessments received by a fund are subject to s. 624.509(1), (2), and (3), of such premiums, contributions and assessments." See also 3, 4, 5, 17, Chapter 88-206, Laws of Florida (using similar language to impose lower premium tax rate on premiums, contributions and assessments received by an arrangement under section 624.4425, as well as those received by commercial self-insurance funds regulated by section 624.475, and those received by professional liability self-insurance funds under section 627.356, and the premiums, contributions and assessments received by worker's compensation group self-insurer's funds under section 440.57).

MANDATE

From

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA FIRST DISTRICT

To the Honorable Linda M. Rifot, Hearing Officer

Division of Administrative Hearings WHEREAS, in that certain cause filed in this Court styled:

CENTRAL DATE MALPRACTICE TRUST FUND

v. Case No. 95-2159

Your Case No. 94-5180RX

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE

The attached opinion was rendered on May 7, 1996.

YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED that further proceedings be had in accordance with said opinion, the rules of this Court and the laws of the State of Florida.

WITNESS the Honorable Richard W. Ervin, III, Acting

Chief Judge of the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District and the Seal of said court at Tallahassee, the Capitol, on this 23rd day of May, 1996.

(Seal) Karen Robert

Deputy Clerk, District Court of Appeal of Florida,

First District

Docket for Case No: 94-005180RX

Orders for Case No: 94-005180RX