STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND ) TREASURER, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CASE NO. 92-4575

)

JUDY LOUISE ROBINSON, )

)

Respondent. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Upon due notice, this cause came on for formal hearing on April 15, 1993, in Green Cove Springs, Florida, before Ella Jane P. Davis, a duly assigned hearing officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Daniel T. Gross, Esquire

Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300

For Respondent: Judy Louise Robinson pro se

4336 Shadowood Lane

Orange Park, Florida 32073-7726 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Whether or not Respondent is guilty as charged in the Second Amended Administrative Compliant of violating Sections 626.561(1); 626.611(4), (5), (7),

(9), (10), (13), and (14); 626.621(2), (6), and (8); 626.9521, and

626.9541(1)(o)1. F.S. and should be disciplined therefor.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On July 6, 1992, the Department of Insurance filed its Administrative Complaint against Respondent for acts allegedly committed while acting in her capacity as a licensed insurance agent. Respondent exercised her right to a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1) F.S., and the cause was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings on July 29, 1992.

Formal hearing was initially scheduled for December 11, 1992.

On September 21, 1992, Petitioner served its First Request for Admissions, among other discovery. On November 4, 1992, Petitioner filed a Motion for Finding of Fact and to Relinquish Jurisdiction based on Respondent's failure to timely respond to the First Request for Admissions. On November 25, 1992, an

order was entered granting Respondent additional time to respond to Petitioner's Request for Admissions and cancelling the scheduled formal hearing.

On November 30, 1992, Respondent filed a response to Petitioner's Request for Admissions. On January 6, 1993, Petitioner filed a Motion to Determine the Sufficiency of Answers to its First Request for Admissions and further requesting an order granting Petitioner's Motion for Finding of Fact and to Relinquish Jurisdiction.

On January 8, 1993, Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File First Amended Administrative Complaint.

On January 22, 1993, oral argument on all pending motions was heard by telephone. During the January 22, 1993 telephone conference, Respondent interposed her constitutional right against self-incrimination with regard to the Request for Admissions. On January 27, 1993, an order was entered granting Petitioner's Motion for Leave to file First Amended Administrative Complaint, striking Petitioner's Request for Admissions and Respondent's answers thereto, denying Petitioner's Motion to Determine the Sufficiency of Answers to Petitioner's First Request for Admissions and Motion for Finding of Fact and to Relinquish Jurisdiction, excusing the filing of any prehearing stipulation/statements, and rescheduling formal hearing for April 15, 1993.

On April 9, 1993, Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Administrative Complaint.

At the commencement of formal hearing on April 15, 1993, after considering oral argument, the undersigned granted Petitioner's motion, and the evidentiary hearing proceeded upon the integrated three count Second Amended Administrative Complaint as the sole charging document herein.

In the course of formal hearing, Petitioner presented the oral testimony of Linda Smith, Lewis T. Morrison, Mandy Gossett, Gloria Parsons, Betty Johanson, Judy Coolidge, and Bill Diddell and had ten exhibits admitted in evidence.

Respondent testified in her own behalf and her Exhibits 1, 2, and 4-16 were admitted in evidence. Exhibit R-3 was not admitted in evidence.

During formal hearing, Respondent elected to testify on her own behalf.

Petitioner orally moved to exclude Respondent's testimony based on her failure to answer its Request for Admissions and her subsequent assertion of her constitutional rights against self-incrimination. This motion was denied.

Petitioner then made an oral motion for a recess seeking additional time to put forth evidence to rebut Respondent's testimony. This motion was granted.

In the course of the recess, Petitioner advised in an April 16, 1993 telephone conference, with both parties and the undersigned present, that Petitioner waived rebuttal and rested. By order of April 16, 1993, the record was closed, and a post-hearing schedule was established.

No transcript was filed. The undersigned has had custody of, and opportunity to review, the audio and VHS video tapes used by the agency to fulfill its obligation to preserve the proceeding. See, Section 120.57(1)(b)7.

1. and Rule 60Q-2.023 F.A.C.

   All timely-filed proposed findings of fact have been ruled upon in the appendix to this recommended order, pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S.

   
   

   FINDINGS OF FACT

   
   

   1. Respondent Judy Louise Robinson is currently licensed by the Florida Department of Insurance as a general lines agent, a health agent, and a dental health agent and has been so licensed since November 21, 1984.

      
      

   2. At all times material, Respondent engaged in the business of insurance as Fleming Island Insurer.

      
      

   3. At all times material, Respondent maintained two business bank accounts in the name of Fleming Island Insurer: Account No. 1740043215 at Barnett Bank in Orange Park and Account No. 11630004614 at First Union Bank, Park Avenue Office. First Union Bank is currently First Performance Bank.

      
      

   4. All funds received by Respondent from or on behalf of consumers, representing premiums for insurance policies, were trust funds received in a fiduciary capacity and were to be accounted for and paid over to an insurer, insured, or other persons entitled thereto in the applicable regular course of business.

      
      

   5. Respondent solicited and procured an application for a workers' compensation insurance policy from Linda Smith on September 13, 1989, to be issued by CIGNA.

      
      

   6. Respondent quoted Ms. Smith an annual workers' compensation premium of two thousand six hundred four dollars and forty cents ($2,604.40).

      
      

   7. Linda Smith issued her check payable to Fleming Island Insurer in the amount quoted by Respondent on September 13, 1989, as premium payment for the CIGNA workers' compensation insurance coverage.

      
      

   8. On September 14, 1989, Respondent endorsed and deposited Linda Smith's

      $2,604.40 check into Fleming Island Insurer's business bank account No. 1740043215 at Barnett Bank, Orange Park, Florida.

      
      

   9. On September 17, 1989, Respondent forwarded her check in the amount of two thousand six hundred eighty nine dollars and forty cents ($2,689.40) to NCCI ATLANTIC for issuance of a workers' compensation policy with CIGNA for Linda Smith, Inc.

      
      

   10. The difference between the amount paid to Respondent by Linda Smith ($2,604.40) and the amount paid by Respondent to CIGNA via NCCI ATLANTIC ($2,689.40) amounts to $85.00 advanced by Respondent because she misquoted the premium amount to Linda Smith.

       
       

   11. On September 17, 1989, Respondent notified Linda Smith that another

       $85.00 was due. Linda Smith never paid this amount to Respondent.

       
       

   12. On September 19, 1989, CIGNA issued a workers' compensation policy for Linda Smith, Inc.

       
       

   13. Respondent's check was thereafter returned to CIGNA due to insufficient funds.

   14. On or about October 20, 1989, CIGNA notified Respondent that her agency check had been returned as unpayable and requested substitute payment within ten days to avoid interruption in Linda Smith, Inc.'s workers' compensation insurance coverage.

       
       

   15. Respondent asserted that she was injured in an automobile accident on October 1, 1989 and could not work through July of 1990 due to chronic dislocation of her right arm, but she also asserted that she never closed her insurance business and operated it out of her home. Respondent's home is the address at which CIGNA notified her on October 20, 1989 concerning Ms. Smith's policy.

       
       

   16. Respondent failed to timely submit substitute payment to CIGNA, and as a result, Linda Smith, Inc.'s policy was cancelled January 1, 1990.

       
       

   17. On January 4, 1990, Linda Smith forwarded her own check in the full amount of $2,689.40 directly to CIGNA and her policy was reinstated.

       
       

   18. Respondent did not begin to repay Linda Smith the $2,604.40 proceeds of Linda Smith's prior check paid to Respondent until May 1991. At formal hearing, Respondent maintained that she was never notified that Linda Smith paid for the policy a second time. Even if such a protestation were to be believed, it does not excuse Respondent's failure to account to either Linda Smith or CIGNA for the $2,604.40, which Respondent retained. Respondent also testified that Barnett Bank's failure to immediately make available to Respondent the funds from Linda Smith's check, which cleared, resulted in Barnett Bank reporting to CIGNA that there were insufficient funds to cover Respondent's check to CIGNA. From this testimony, it may be inferred that Respondent knew or should have known that she owed someone this money well before May 1991.

       
       

   19. On November 11, 1989, Lewis T. Morrison paid the Traveler's Insurance Company six thousand forty-three dollars ($6,043.00) as a renewal payment on a workers' compensation policy for Morrison's Concrete Finishers for the policy period December 30, 1988 through December 30, 1989.

       
       

   20. At the conclusion of the 1988-1989 policy period, Traveler's Insurance Company conducted an audit of Morrison's Concrete Finishers' account. This is a standard auditing and premium adjustment procedure for workers' compensation insurance policies. It is based on the insured's payroll and is common practice in the industry. This audit revealed that Morrison's Concrete Finishers was due a return premium of two thousand one hundred fifty-three dollars and eighty- seven cents ($2,153.87) from the insurer.

       
       

   21. On March 30, 1990, Traveler's Insurance Company issued its check for

       $2,153.87 payable to Fleming Island Insurer. This check represented the return premium due Morrison's Concrete Finishers from Traveler's Insurance Company.

       
       

   22. On April 6, 1990, Respondent endorsed and deposited Traveler's Insurance Company's return premium check into the Fleming Island Insurer's business bank account No. 11630004614 at First Union Bank.

       
       

   23. The standard industry procedure thereafter would have been for Respondent to pay two thousand two hundred forty-eight dollars ($2,248.00) via a Fleming Island Insurer check to Morrison's Concrete Finishers as a total returned premium payment comprised of $2,153.87 return gross premium from Traveler's Insurance Company and $94.13 representing her own unearned agent's commission.

   24. When Respondent did not issue him a check, Lewis T. Morrison sought out Respondent at her home where he requested payment of his full refund. In response, Respondent stated that she would attempt to pay him as soon as she could, that she was having medical and financial problems, and that the delay was a normal business practice.

       
       

   25. Respondent testified that on or about April 19, 1990, in an attempt to induce Mr. Morrison to renew Morrison's Concrete Finishers' workers' compensation policy through Fleming Island Insurer, she offered him a "credit" of the full $2,248.00 owed him. Pursuant to this offer of credit, Respondent intended to pay Traveler's Insurance Company or another insurance company for Morrison's Concrete Finisher's next year's premium in installments from Fleming Island Insurer's account. This "credit" represented the return premium Respondent had already received from Traveler's Insurance Company on behalf of Morrison's Concrete Finishers for 1988-1989 which she had already deposited into Fleming Island Insurer's business account. Whether or not Mr. Morrison formally declined Respondent's credit proposal is not clear, but it is clear that he did not affirmatively accept the credit proposal and that he declined to re-insure for 1989-1990 through Respondent agent or Traveler's Insurance Company.

       
       

   26. Respondent still failed to pay the return premium and commission which she legitimately owed to Morrison's Concrete Finishers. On June 28, 1990, the Traveler's Insurance Company issued a check directly to Mr. Morrison for the full amount of $2,248.00.

       
       

   27. Respondent did not begin repaying Traveler's Insurance Company concerning Mr. Morrison's premium until after intervention by the Petitioner agency.

       
       

   28. At formal hearing, Respondent offered several reasons for her failure to refund the money legitimately due Mr. Morrison. Her first reason was that the district insurance commissioner's office told her to try to "work it out" using the credit method outlined above and by the time she realized this method was unacceptable to Mr. Morrison, he had already been paid by Traveler's Insurance Company. However, Respondent presented no evidence to substantiate the bold, self-serving assertion that agency personnel encouraged her to proceed as she did. Respondent also testified that she did not know immediately that Traveler's Insurance Company had reimbursed Mr. Morrison directly. However, it is clear she knew of this payment well before she began to pay back Traveler's, and since Mr. Morrison did not reinsure through her or Traveler's she should have immediately known the "credit" arrangement was unacceptable to him. Respondent further testified that she did not want to repay Mr. Morrison until a claim on his policy was resolved. However, there is competent credible record evidence that the Traveler's Insurance Company 1988-1989 workers' compensation policy premium refund was governed solely by an audit based on payroll. Mr. Morrison's policy premium or refund consequently was not governed by "loss experience rating", and the refund of premium would not be affected by a claim, open or closed. Thus, the foregoing reasons given by Respondent for not refunding Mr. Morrison's money are contradictory or not credible on their face. They also are not credible because Respondent admitted to Mr. Morrison in the conversation at her home (see Finding of Fact 24) that she was having trouble paying him because of medical and financial difficulties. Further, they are not credible because Respondent testified credibly at formal hearing that she would have paid Mr. Morrison but for her bank account being wiped out by a fraudulent check given her by an unnamed third party.

   29. On August 10, 1992, Respondent was charged by Information with two counts of grand theft. See, Section 812.014(2)(c) F.S. The allegations in the Information charged Respondent with theft of insurance premiums from Linda Smith and Lewis T. Morrison, and arose out of the same facts as found herein.

       
       

   30. On December 17, 1992, Respondent entered a nolo contendere plea to only the first count of grand theft as to matters involving Linda Smith and the other count was "null prossed." Respondent secured a negotiated sentence on the first count. "Grand theft" is a felony punishable by imprisonment by one year or more. Adjudication was withheld pending satisfactory completion of probation, including community service and payment of restitution and court costs.

       
       

   31. Respondent has been complying with her probation, including restitution payments.

       
       

       CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

       
       

   32. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this cause pursuant to Section 120.57(1), F.S.

       
       

   33. Count I of the Second Amended Administrative Complaint alleges, with regard to the matter involving Linda Smith, violations of Sections 626.561(1), (4), (5), (7), (9), (10), and (13); 626.621(2) and (6), 626.9561, 627.381 and 626.9521 F.S., and 626.9541(1)(o)1. F.S.

       
       

   34. Count II of the Second Amended Administrative Complaint alleges, with regard to the matter involving Lewis T. Morrison, violations of Sections 626.561(1), 626.611(4), (5), (7), (9), (10) and (13); 626.621(2) and (6); 626.9521, and 626.9541(1)(o)1. F.S.

       
       

   35. Count III of the Second Amended Administrative Complaint alleges, with regard to Respondent's nolo contendere plea, violations of Sections 626.611(4) and 626.621(8) F.S.

       
       

   36. The events herein span September 1989 through December 1992. At all times material, the applicable statutes have provided, in pertinent part, as follows:

       
       

       626.561 Reporting and accounting for funds.

       (1) All premiums, return premiums, or other funds belonging to insurers or others received by an agent, solicitor, or adjuster in transactions under his license shall be trust funds so received by the licensee in a fiduciary capacity . . . the licensee in the applicable regular course of business shall account for and pay the same to the insurer, insured, or other person entitled thereto.

       
       

       626.611 Grounds for compulsory refusal, suspension, or revocation of agent's, . . . license . . .

       The department shall deny, suspend, revoke, or refuse to renew or continue the license

       . . . of any agent, . . . and it shall suspend or revoke the eligibility to hold a

       license . . . of any such person, if it finds that as to the licensee, . . . any one or more of the following grounds exist:

       * * *

       1. If the license . . . is willfully used, or to be used, to circumvent any of the requirements or prohibitions of the code.

       2. Willful misrepresentation of any insurance policy or annuity contract or willful deception with regard to any such policy or contract, done either in person or by any form of dissemination of information or advertising.

       (7) Demonstrated lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance.

       1. Fraudulent or dishonest practices in the conduct of business under the license . . .

       2. Misappropriation, conversion, or unlawful withholding of moneys belonging to insurers or insureds or beneficiaries or to others and received in conduct of business under the license.

       1. Willful failure to comply with, or willful violation of, any proper order or rule of the department or willful violation of any provision of this code.

       2. Having been found guilty of, or having pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to a felony or a crime punishable by imprisonment of 1 year or more under the law of the United States of America or of any state thereof or under the law of any other country which involves moral turpitude, without regard to whether a judgment of conviction has been entered by the court having jurisdiction of such cases.

       * * *

       626.621 Grounds for discretionary refusal, suspension, or revocation of agent's, . . . license . . .

       The department may, in its discretion, deny, suspend, revoke, or refuse to renew or continue the license . . . of any agent . . . and it may suspend or revoke the eligibility to hold a license . . . of any such person if it finds that as to the licensee . . . any one or more of the following applicable grounds exist under circumstances for which such denial, suspension, revocation, or refusal is not mandatory under s.626.611;

       (2) Violation of any provision of this code or of any other law applicable to the business of insurance in the course of dealing under the license . . .

       (6) In the conduct of business under the license . . . engaging in unfair methods of

       competition or in unfair or deceptive acts or practices, as prohibited under part X of this chapter, or having otherwise shown himself to be a source of injury or loss to the public or detrimental to the public interest.

       (8) Having been found guilty of or having pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to a felony or a crime punishable by imprisonment of 1 year or more under the law of the United States of America or of any state thereof or under the law of any other country, without regard to whether a judgment of conviction has been entered by the court having jurisdiction of such cases.

       * * *

       626.9521 Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices prohibited--

       No person shall engage in this state in any trade practice which is defined in this part as, or determined pursuant to s. 626.9561 to be, an unfair method of competition or an unfair or deceptive act or practice involving the business of insurance. Any person who violates any provision of this part shall be subject to the penalties provided in

       s. 627.381.

       626.9541 Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices defined.

       (1) The following are defined as unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices:

       * * *

       (o) Illegal dealings in premiums; excess or reduced charges for insurance

       1. Knowingly collecting any sum as a premium or charge for insurance, which is not then provided, or is not in due course to be provided, subject to acceptance of the risk by the insurer, by an insurance policy issued by an insurer as permitted by this code.

       
       

   37. With regard to Count I, the Linda Smith matter, it has been clearly and convincingly proven by the test established in Ferris v. Turlington, 510 So.2d 292 (Fla. 1987), that Respondent is guilty of violating Sections 626.561(1) [failure of the licensee to account for and pay trust funds to the person entitled]; 626.611(7) [demonstrated lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance], (9) [fraudulent or dishonest practices in the conduct of insurance business], (10) [misappropriation, conversion or unlawful withholding of moneys belonging to insurers or insureds received in the conduct of the insurance business], and (13) [willful violation of the Insurance Code]; 626.621(2) [violation of any provision of the Insurance Code or any other law applicable to the business of insurance in the course of insurance dealing] and (6) [showing herself to be a source of injury or loss to the public detrimental to the public interest] F.S. The other charges of this count were not adequately proven.

   38. Respondent defended against Count I upon the grounds that because Ms. Smith paid the premium amount quoted by Respondent and that quoted amount turned out to be low by $85.00, Respondent should never have submitted the correct total premium amount to CIGNA in the first place, and therefore Respondent was neither incompetent nor dishonest in her dealings with Ms. Smith or the insurance company. For this concept, Respondent relies upon Larson v. Bankers Life and Casualty, 64 So.2d 322 (Fla. 1953). That case does not stand for the proposition cited, nor does Respondent's argument or the case holding alter the fact that Respondent kept $2,604.40 of someone else's money for at least nineteen months and did not begin to pay it back to anyone until after the policy had lapsed and been reinstated. Regardless of some delays in notifying her of exactly what was occurring, Respondent was aware during the period of time she kept the premium that she owed the money to either CIGNA or Ms. Smith. Respondent apparently used this money for some other purpose either due to commingling or poor accounting of trust funds, since her bank account was depleted. This constitutes conversion and misuse of trust funds.

       
       

   39. With regard to Count II, the Lewis T. Morrison matter, it has been clearly and convincingly demonstrated that Respondent is guilty of violating Sections 626.561(1) [failure of the licensee to account for and pay trust funds to the person entitled]; 626.611(7) [demonstrated lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance]; 626.611, (9) [fraudulent or dishonest practices in the conduct of insurance business], (10) [misappropriation, conversion, or unlawful withholding of moneys belonging to insurers or insureds received in conduct of the insurance business], and (13) [willful violation of the Insurance Code], and 626.621(2) [violation of any provision of the Insurance Code or any other law applicable to the business of insurance in the course of insurance dealing]; and (6) [showing herself to be a source of injury or loss to the public or detrimental to the public interest]

       F.S. The remaining charges of this count have not been adequately proven.

       
       

   40. Respondent's defense on Count II also misconstrues the Larson case, supra, which she has cited. Despite Respondent's argument that the amounts submitted were incorrect, there is no evidence to that effect with regard to Mr. Morrison's situation. Respondent desired to "work it out" by paying a new workers' compensation premium for Mr. Morrison in increments in order to ease her burden of reimbursing the full amount of money she owed him but which full amount she did not have. Mr. Morrison never affirmatively agreed to such an arrangement. Respondent's assertion that she withheld Mr. Morrison's refund of premium in order to induce his purchasing more insurance from her, if believed, would subject her to a conclusion of unfair practices. Her assertion that she withheld the refund on the basis of an unresolved claim, if believed, would subject her to a conclusion that she lacks reasonably adequate knowledge and technical competence to engage in the business of insurance. However, Respondent's assertions on those grounds were not credible, and the undersigned declines to address the agency's arguments with regard to statutory violations not formally charged against Respondent in the Second Amended Administrative Complaint. Respondent simply did not have the money to pay Mr. Morrison, and therefore she could not pay him. This constitutes conversion and misuse of trust funds.

       
       

   41. With regard to Count III, Respondent's nolo contendere plea to the grand theft felony charge arising our of Respondent's dealings with Ms. Smith constitutes a plea of nolo contendere to a felony of moral turpitude punishable by one year or more in prison. Clear and convincing proof of violations of Sections 626.611(14) and 626.621(8) F.S. have been established. A violation of Section 626.611(14) is cause for compulsory suspension or revocation of

Respondent's license, regardless of adjudication being withheld and regardless of how excellently she may have fulfilled her probation.

RECOMMENDATION

Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Insurance enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violations of Sections 626.561(1), 626.611(7), (9), (10), and (13); 626.621(2) and (6) F.S. under Count I, violations of Sections 626.561(1), 626.611(7), (9), (10), and (13), and 626.621(2) and (6) under Count

II, and violations of Sections 626.611(14) and 626.621(8) F.S. under Count III, finding Respondent not guilty of all other charges under each count, and revoking Respondent's several insurance licenses.

RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of June, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida.

ELLA JANE P. DAVIS

Hearing Officer

Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

(904) 488-9675

Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of June, 1993.

APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER 92-2060

The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to S120.59(2), F.S., upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF).

Petitioner's PFOF:

As modified to more correctly reflect the whole of the record evidence and avoid unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative material, all of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted.

Respondent's PFOF:

1. Sentence 1 is accepted as a paraphrased allegation of the Second Amended Administrative Complaint.

   
   

   Sentence 2 is covered in Findings of Fact 4-18.

   
   

   Sentence 3 is accepted but subordinate and to dispositive.

   
   

   Sentence 4 is apparently Respondent's admission that she owed $2,604.40 to Linda Smith and paid her $500.00 of it. Accepted to that extent but not dispositive in that full payment was not made timely.

2. Sentence 1 is accepted as a paraphrased allegation of the Second Amended Administrative Complaint but not dispositive.

Sentence 2 is accepted but immaterial.

Sentence 3 is rejected as argument and not dispositive. As stated, the proposal also is not supported by the

record.

Sentence 4 It is accepted that Mr. Morrison admitted he had a claim. However, the record does not support a finding that he requested Respondent to contact Traveler's Ins.

Co. about it. Even if he had, that is subordinate and not dispositive of the ultimate material issues.

Sentence 5 is rejected as not supported by the credible record evidence. Covered in Findings of Fact 23-28.

Sentence 6 is rejected as not supported by the record and as argument.

Sentence 7 Accepted.

Sentence 8 Accepted.

The "Descriptive Narrative" is accepted through page 4, but not dispositive. Beginning with the words "In summary" on page 5, the remainder of the proposal is not supported by the record in this cause which closed April 16. 1993.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Daniel T. Gross, Esquire Division of Legal Services

Department of Insurance and Treasurer

412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300

Judy Louise Robinson 4336 Shadowood Lane

Orange Park, FL 32073-7726

Tom Gallagher

State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner

Department of Insurance and Treasurer

The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300

Bill O'Neil General Counsel

Department of Insurance and Treasurer

The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions to this Recommended Order. All agencies allow each party at least 10 days in which to submit written exceptions. Some agencies allow a larger period within which to submit written exceptions. You should contact the agency that will issue the final order in this case concerning agency rules on the deadline for filing exceptions to this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the final order in this case.

=================================================================

DISTRICT COURT OPINION

=================================================================

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

JUDY LOUISE ROBINSON, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

Appellant, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED.

v. CASE NO. 94-1237

DOAH CASE NO. 92-4575

DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER,

Appellee.

/ Opinion filed May 17, 1995.

An appeal from an order of the Division of Administrative Hearings. Judy L. Robinson, Orange Park, for Appellant.

Daniel Gross and Lisa S. Santucci, Division of Legal Services, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

ZEHMER, C. J. and BARFIELD, J., and SHIVERS, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCUR

Docket for Case No: 92-004575

Orders for Case No: 92-004575