The Issue Whether Respondent violated the provisions of chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2016), by failing to secure the payment of workers' compensation coverage, as alleged in the Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment; and, if so, what penalty is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for enforcing the requirement of chapter 440 that employers in Florida secure the payment of workers' compensation coverage for their employees and corporate officers. § 440.107, Fla. Stat. Respondent owns and operates a gas station/convenience store in Miami, Florida. The Investigation. The Department received a public referral that Respondent was operating without workers' compensation coverage. The case was assigned by the Department to Compliance Investigator Julio Cabrera ("Cabrera"). Cabrera first checked the Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations, Sunbiz website to verify Respondent's status as an active corporation. Cabrera then checked the Department's Coverage and Compliance Automated System ("CCAS") to see whether Respondent had a workers' compensation policy or any exemptions. An exemption is a method in which a corporate officer can exempt himself from the requirements of chapter 440. See § 440.05, Fla. Stat. CCAS is the Department's internal database that contains workers' compensation insurance policy information and exemption information. Insurance providers are required to report coverage and cancellation information, which is then input into CCAS. Cabrera's CCAS search revealed that Respondent had no coverage or exemptions during the relevant period. On February 23, 2016, Cabrera visited Respondent's place of business and observed two women, Margarita Maya ("Maya"), and Nuri Penagos ("Penagos") serving customers. Cabrera asked to speak to the owner. Maya telephoned John Obando ("Obando"). After introducing himself, Cabrera asked how many employees worked for the business. Obando indicated he needed to check with his accountant. Shortly thereafter, Obando called Cabrera back and indicated that his employees included Maya; Carolina Santos ("Santos"); his wife, Marta Ayala ("Ayala"); and himself. Obando confirmed that the business did not currently have workers' compensation insurance coverage nor did any of the members of the LLC have an exemption. The LLC had three managing members: Obando; Maria Rios ("Rios"); and Carlos Franco ("Franco"). Obando explained that Rios lived out of the country and did not provide services to Respondent. According to Obando, Franco also resides outside of the United States, but he travels to Florida and periodically assists with the running of Respondent's business enterprise. Cabrera contacted his supervisor and relayed this information. With his supervisor's approval, Cabrera issued a SWO and served a Business Records Request. Respondent provided the requested business records to the Department. The evidence showed that during the two-year look-back period, Respondent did not have workers' compensation coverage for its employees during a substantial portion of the period in which it employed four or more employees, including managing members without exemptions. As such, Respondent violated chapter 440 and, therefore, is subject to penalty under that statute. Penalty Calculation. The Department assigned Penalty Auditor Matt Jackson ("Jackson") to calculate the penalty assessed against Respondent. Jackson used the classification code 8061 listed in the Scopes® Manual, which has been adopted by the Department through Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.021(1). Classification code 8061 applies to employees of gasoline stations with convenience stores. Classification codes are four-digit codes assigned to various occupations by the National Council on Compensation Insurance to assist in the calculation of workers' compensation insurance premiums. In the penalty assessment, Jackson applied the corresponding approved manual rate for classification code 8061 for the related periods of non-compliance. The corresponding approved manual rate was correctly utilized using the methodology specified in section 440.107(7)(d)1. and rule 69L-6.027 to determine the final penalties. Utilizing the business records provided by Respondent, the Department determined Respondent’s gross payroll pursuant to the procedures required by section 440.107(7)(d) and rule 69L- 6.027. The Department served an Amended OPA on March 29, 2016, imposing a total penalty of $29,084.62. On May 6, 2016, following receipt of additional records, the Department issued a Second Amended OPA, reducing the penalty to $25,670.88. Because Respondent had not previously been issued a SWO, pursuant to section 440.107(7)(d)1., the Department applied a credit toward the penalty in the amount of the initial premium Respondent paid for workers' compensation coverage. Here, the premium payment amount for which Respondent received credit was $1,718.00. This was subtracted from the calculated penalty of $25,670.88, yielding a total remaining penalty of $23,952.88. No records were provided regarding the compensation of Penagos, who was observed working on the date of the inspection. According to Respondent, Penagos was present and working on that date, not as an employee, but as an unpaid volunteer who was testing out the job to see if it was to her liking. The Department imputed gross payroll for Penagos for February 23, 2016, which resulted in a penalty in the amount of $16.26 and was included in the Second Amended OPA. Respondent's Defenses. At the final hearing, Obando testified that he and the other co-owners of Respondent always attempted to fully comply with every law applicable to Respondent's business and have never had compliance problems. He testified that the business carried workers' compensation coverage until 2013, when its insurance agent advised Respondent it could go without coverage due to the size of the business, if the managing members of the LLC were to apply for, and be granted, an exemption. Obando offered no explanation why Respondent failed to secure the exemptions before letting coverage lapse during the penalty period. Obando also argues that on the date of the investigation, Penagos was not an employee, but rather his sister-in-law, who was trying out the job for a day as a volunteer to determine if she would replace Obando's wife, Ayala, who no longer wanted to work in the store. Obando asserts that only two employees were actually working in the store that day, so Respondent should not have been considered out of compliance. Obando also testified that at most, no more than three employees work at the store on any particular day. Obando testified that Respondent has ample liability coverage and that each worker has health insurance, suggesting that workers' compensation insurance coverage is unnecessary. According to Obando, the $23,952.88 penalty is a substantial amount that Respondent, a small family-owned business, cannot afford to pay. Findings of Ultimate Fact. Excluding Penagos as a volunteer, and Rios as a managing member of the LLC with no active service to Respondent, Respondent was a covered employer with four or more employees at all times during the penalty period. The Department demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent violated chapter 440, as charged in the SWO, by failing to secure workers' compensation coverage for its employees.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, enter a final order determining that Respondent, S & S of Florida, LLC, violated the requirement in chapter 440 to secure workers' compensation coverage and imposing a total penalty of $23,936.62. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MARY LI CREASY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Joaquin Alvarez, Esquire Trevor Suter, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229 (eServed) John J. Obando S & S of Florida, LLC 8590 Southwest Eighth Street Miami, Florida 33144 Julie Jones, CP, FRP, Agency Clerk Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to a refund of state group life insurance premiums retroactive to the date she became disabled and continuing through the date of approval of a waiver of premium based on disability.
Findings Of Fact During her entire career with the State, Petitioner was employed by the Department of Corrections (DOC). At all times material, DOC, like all State governmental agencies, had its own personnel office. At all times material, the Division of Retirement (Retirement) handled all governmental agencies’ employees’ retirement issues. At all times material, the State has provided its employees, including Petitioner at DOC, with various types of insurance through Respondent Department of Management Services (DMS), Division of State Group Insurance (DSGI), the Respondent herein. For more than 20 years, ending January 1, 2007, the State of Florida provided state officials, employees and retirees basic life insurance coverage through Prudential Insurance Company of America (Prudential). Although Petitioner retired on full disability in mid- 2000, at all times relevant to these proceedings, Petitioner has continuously participated in the State Group Insurance Program’s (Program’s), life insurance plan (Plan). The Program is authorized by Section 110.123, Florida Statutes. Because of enhanced benefits, employees were required to complete a new life insurance enrollment form during “open enrollment,” conducted in 1999, for coverage beginning January 1, 2000. Petitioner completed the life insurance enrollment form and dated it "10/04/99." Directly below Petitioner's signature on this enrollment form, the following statement appears: Waiver of Premium for Disability If you are totally disabled for a continuous 9 months and are less than 60 years of age at the time disability begins, Prudential will continue your coverage with no premium due, provided you report your disability within 12 months of its start and submit any required proof to Prudential. The second page, last paragraph of the 1999, enrollment form provided an address and a toll-free telephone number for Prudential, and advised participants that the form was intended to provide a summary of benefits, as more completely set out in the certificate. Petitioner produced the enrollment form in response to Respondent's request for production of documents. She identified her signature thereon at hearing, and had the enrollment form admitted in evidence as Exhibit P-1. She also admits in her Proposed Recommended Order that she signed it. Although her testimony waffled in some respects, on the whole, she testified to the effect that she had retained a copy of this form where she had access to it at all times material. She is, therefore, found to have had knowledge of its contents since 1999. Petitioner testified that she never received either a life insurance policy nor a certificate of insurance, from Prudential or from any entity of Florida State Government, and that neither her DOC Personnel Office, Retirement, Florida First,1/ or DMS/DSGI advised her at the time of her retirement in mid-2000, that she could apply to Prudential for a life insurance premium waiver. However, Petitioner also had admitted in evidence as Exhibit P-2, a “Continuation/Termination Form” which she signed on “4-11-00,” stating a retirement date of “3- 10-00.” That form specifies that “. . . the amount of life insurance shall be $10,000 . . .” with a footnote reading, “This [referring to the $10,000, amount] would only apply if Waiver of Premium is not approved.” (Bracketed material supplied.) Also, the credible testimony of Respondent’s witnesses and of exhibits in evidence show that a complete certificate of life insurance was mailed to Petitioner in a timely manner. There is no proof that the insurance certificate varied the substance of the enrollment form as quoted in Finding of Fact 7. Indeed, the certificate provided, in pertinent part: The Policyholder will continue the full premium for continuance of insurance in accordance with item 8 above, [referring to “Total disability commencing before age 60— Unlimited for Employee Term Life Insurance”] provided the employee furnishes written proof of such total disability when and as required by the Policyholder. * * * Period of Extension Protection for a Disabled Employee— one year after receipt by Prudential’s Home Office of written proof that his total disability has existed continuously for at least nine months, provided the employee furnishes such proof no later than one year after the later of (1) the date premium payments for the employee’s insurance under the Group Policy are discontinued or (2) the cessation of any extended death benefit under the provisions for “Extended Death Benefit for Total Disability” above, and successive periods of one year each after the year of extension under (1), provided the employee furnishes written proof of the continuance of the employee’s total disability when and as required by Prudential once each year. Only employees disabled before retirement and under 60 years of age were eligible for the premium waiver. Employees who became disabled during retirement were not eligible for the waiver. By the terms of her enrollment form and certificate, if Petitioner did not notify Prudential before the twelfth month, she could not receive the waiver. When, precisely, Petitioner became “totally disabled” for purposes of her State life insurance certificate’s definition is debatable, because for some time prior to her actual retirement date, she was working off and on while pursuing a “permanent total disability” determination, pursuant to the definition of that term as expressed in Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, The Florida Workers’ Compensation Law. Petitioner ultimately received the workers’ compensation ruling she sought, possibly before March 10, 2000. Petitioner’s last day of work was March 10, 2000, when, she testified, a superior had her forcibly removed from DOC property. Despite her assertion that she was not approved for in-line-of-duty retirement until September 1, 2000, Petitioner also testified that the State granted her retirement upon disability, effective April 1, 2000, and April 1, 2000, is the date put forth by Respondent as Petitioner's disability retirement date, as well. Upon that concurrence, it is found that Petitioner qualified for total disability for State life insurance purposes before retirement and that she qualified for the waiver by age at retirement. When Petitioner retired on disability in 2000, employees of both DOC and of Retirement knew that she was retiring on disability. Retirement provided Petitioner with printed materials referring her to the insurance company and/or DMS/DSGI for insurance questions and stating that Retirement did not administer any insurance programs. There is no evidence Petitioner asked anyone about the waiver in 2000. From her retirement date in mid-2000, until Prudential ultimately granted her a premium waiver in 2007, Petitioner paid the full life insurance premiums to the State Life Trust, either via deduction from her retirement or directly by her own check. From the date of her retirement through December 2006, Petitioner paid $4.20, per month for life insurance, and beginning January 1, 2007, through November 2007, she paid $35.79, per month. According to Petitioner, she only became aware of the availability of the potential waiver of premiums when she received a booklet during open enrollment in October 2007, advising her that beginning January 1, 2008, the State life insurance coverage would be provided through Minnesota Life Insurance. The specific language that caught her eye was: No premium to pay if you become disabled --- If you become totally disabled or as defined in your policy, premiums are waived. Petitioner conceded that there is no substantive difference between the foregoing instruction and the statement on her 1999, enrollment form for Prudential. (See Finding of Fact 7.) Petitioner applied for the Minnesota life insurance, with premium waiver, triggering a series of bureaucratic decisions that maintained her continuous life insurance coverage by Prudential and permitted Petitioner to apply to Prudential for waiver of the life insurance premium as described in her 1999, enrollment form. Although bureaucratic delays occurred through DOC’s personnel office, Prudential accepted Petitioner’s proof of age, disability, etc., and granted the waiver of premiums based on disability. The monthly premiums of $35.79, that Petitioner paid in October and November 2007, were retroactively reimbursed to her by the State, based upon Prudential's receipt of Petitioner's waiver package on October 3, 2007. Beginning in December 2007, Prudential activated the waiver of premium, so that Petitioner has not had to pay any premium since. Adrienne Bowen, a DSGI manager of Prudential contracts for twenty years, testified that, in 1999-2000, Prudential’s waiver did not apply until after nine months of continuous disability and after the participant had reported the disability to Prudential, and after Prudential had approved the waiver of premiums. She further testified that she believed that there was no provision for the waiver to apply retroactively. For this testimony, Ms. Bowen relied upon Exhibit R-11, a “Group Life Administration Manual,” which had been devised so that the State life insurance plan would be consistently administered. On the foregoing issues, The Group Life Administration Manual states, in pertinent part: WAIVER OF PREMIUM When an employee becomes disabled and is unable to work because of a disability, the employee may be eligible to extend the group life coverage without premium payments. In order to extend coverage, the employee must submit proof of disability within the period shown on the Group Contract (generally at least 9 months but less than 12 months after the total disability starts). If the proof is accepted, you may stop the premium on behalf of the employee’s group coverage. We recommend that premium payments continue for that employee until a decision is made regarding the claim. (Emphasis in original.) However, Ms. Bowen also testified that DSGI and Prudential now allow an insured to request the waiver at any time after nine months of continuous disability, without automatic denial if the employee’s first request is not made within 12 months after she first becomes disabled. This was done in Petitioner's situation in 2007. Prudential did not refuse to waive premiums because Petitioner’s application was not made within 12 months of total disability. However, the premiums refunded related back only to the first day of the month in which she made application for waiver. Petitioner seeks a reimbursement for overpayment of premiums from April 1, 2000, to September 30, 2007. Her first request to Respondent for an administrative hearing appears to have been made on or about May 12, 2008. After several levels of internal agency “appeals,” the cause was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings on or about August 28, 2008.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of State Group Insurance, enter a final order which calculates the State group life insurance premiums Petitioner paid between May 12, 2006, and October 1, 2007, and orders payment to Petitioner of that amount within 30 days of the final order. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of December, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of December, 2008.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent complied with Sections and 440.38, Florida Statutes, with regard to workers' compensation insurance for his subcontractors, and if not, the appropriate amount of penalty that should be assessed.
Findings Of Fact Hernandez, Inc., is a contractor based in the Jacksonville, Florida area, and is in the business of installing dry wall, among other construction related activities. The Department of Financial Services is the state agency responsible for enforcing the Workers' Compensation Law. This duty is delegated to the Division of Workers' Compensation. On February 5, 2004, Hernandez, Inc., was engaged in installing drywall in the Bennett Federal Building in Jacksonville, Florida. Hernandez, Inc., was a subcontractor for Skanska, Inc., who was the general contractor for the building. Hernandez, Inc., was accomplishing the installation of drywall by using two subcontractors, GIO & Sons (GIO), of Norfolk, Virginia, and U&M Contractors, Inc., (U&M), of Charlotte, North Carolina. Hernandez, Inc., was also using its own personnel, who were leased from Matrix, Inc., an employee leasing company. Prior to contracting with GIO and U&M, Hernandez, Inc., asked for and received ACORD certificates of insurance, which on their face indicated that the subcontractors had both liability coverage and workers' compensation coverage. It is the practice of Hernandez, Inc., to ensure that certificates of insurance are provided by subcontractors and the office staff of Hernandez, Inc., tracks the certificates so that they are kept current. Since the beginning of 2001, Hernandez, Inc., has received approximately 310 certificates of insurance from subcontractors. These certificates listed Hernandez, Inc., as the certificate holder. Though most of the producers and insureds on these certificates are from Florida, a substantial number are from other states. Hernandez, Inc., relied on the certificates as evidence that the subcontractor's workers were covered by workers' compensation insurance. Hernandez, Inc., has relied on certificates of insurance for more than twenty years and, with the exception of this case, has never known an instance where the underlying policy was invalid. On February 5, 2004, Katina Johnson, an investigator with the Division, made a routine visit to the Bennett Federal Building with another investigator. She observed personnel from Hernandez, Inc., and its subcontractors, installing dry wall. On February 5, 2004, Ms. Johnson determined that Hernandez, Inc., also had a contract to install dry wall as a subcontractor participating in the construction of the Mayport BEQ. L. C. Gaskins Company was the general contractor engaged in the construction of the Mayport BEQ. U&M worked at both the Bennett Federal Building site and the Mayport BEQ site as a subcontractor of Hernandez, Inc. Ms. Johnson issued a Stop Work Order on February 26, 2004, to Hernandez, Inc., GIO, and U&M. By the Stop Work Order, Hernandez, Inc., was charged with failure to ensure that workers' compensation meeting the requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, and the Florida Insurance Code, was in place for GIO and U&M. The Stop Work Order indicated that the penalty amount assessed against Respondent would be subject to amendment based on further information provided by Hernandez, Inc., including the provision of business records. An Amended Order of Penalty Assessment dated March 19, 2004, was served on Hernandez, Inc., which referenced the Stop Work Order of February 26, 2004. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was in the amount of $157,794.49. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment reached back to September 29, 2003. An Amended Order of Penalty Assessment dated March 22, 2004, was served on GIO. This Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was in the amount of $107,885.71. An Amended Order of Penalty Assessment with a March 2004 date (the day is obscured on the document by a "filed" stamp), was served on U&M. This Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was in the amount of $51,779.50. The sum of these numbers is $159,665.21. However, the parties agreed at the hearing that the amount being sought by the Division was $157,794.49, which represented the total for GIO and U&M. Hernandez, Inc.'s, employees leased from Matrix were covered by workers' compensation insurance through a policy held by Matrix. The Matrix policy did not cover the employees of GIO and U&M. Although Skanska, Inc., and L. C. Gaskins Company had workers' compensation insurance in force, their policies did not cover the workers used by Hernandez, Inc., or the employees of GIO or U&M. GIO and U&M employees were considered by the Division to be "statutory employees" of Hernandez, Inc., for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Law. This meant, according to the Division, that Hernandez, Inc., was required to ensure that the employees of GIO and U&M would receive benefits under the Workers' Compensation Law if a qualifying event occurred, unless the subcontractors had workers' compensation insurance policies in force that satisfied the Division. GIO had a policy of workers' compensation insurance evidenced by an ACORD certificate of liability insurance for the period December 3, 2002, until December 3, 2003. The policy was produced by Salzberg Insurance Agency in Norfolk, Virginia. It listed Hernandez as the certificate holder. The policy was issued by Maryland Casualty Company, a subsidiary of the Zurich American Insurance Company. These companies are admitted carriers in Florida. The Classification of Operations page of this policy indicated class code 5022, masonry work. GIO employers were installing drywall during times pertinent. Rates for drywall installation are substantially higher than for masonry work. In the policy section titled "Other States Insurance," Florida is not mentioned. William D. Hager, an expert witness, reviewed the certificate of insurance and the policy supporting the certificate. Mr. Hager is a highly qualified expert in insurance and workers' compensation coverage. Among other qualifications, he is an attorney and a former member of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners by virtue of his position as Insurance Commissioner for the State of Iowa. He concluded that this policy did not conform to the requirements of Chapter 440 because the policy was Virginia based and did not apply Florida rates, rules, and class codes. Mr. Sapourn, testified as an expert witness. Mr. Sapourn has a degree from the University of Virginia in economics with high distinction and a juris doctorate from Georgetown. He is a certified insurance counselor and owned an insurance agency in the District of Columbia area. As an insurance agent he has issued tens of thousands certificates of insurance and written hundreds of workers' compensation policies. Mr. Sapourn, opined that this certificate represented workers' compensation coverage that complied with Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. Upon consideration of the testimony of the experts, and upon an examination of the documents, it is concluded that the policy represented by the certificate of insurance for the period December 3, 2002, to December 3, 2003, did not comply with the requirements of Chapter 440. Subsequently, someone forged an ACORD certificate of liability insurance, which indicated that it was produced by Salzberg Insurance Agency, and that indicated that GIO was covered from December 4, 2003, until December 4, 2004. The forged certificate was presented to Hernandez, Inc., upon the expiration of the policy addressed above. It was accepted by Hernandez, Inc., and considered to be a valid certificate. Both of the experts pointed out that with their practiced eye they could easily determine that the certificate was a forgery. However, there was no evidence that Mr. Hernandez, or his employees, had training in forgery detection. Accordingly, it was reasonable for them to accept the certificate as valid. U&M presented Hernandez, Inc., with an ACORD certificate which indicated insurance coverage from October 24, 2003, until October 24, 2004. The producer was Insur-A-Car Commercial Division of Charlotte, North Carolina. The insurer was The St. Paul, an admitted carrier in Florida. The insured was U &M. The certificate holder was Hernandez Enterprises, Inc. William D. Hager reviewed the certificate of insurance and the policy supporting the certificate. He noted that The St. Paul policy upon which the certificate was based did not apply in Florida because U&M was not working temporarily in Florida and because it included a policy endorsement that stated: "The policy does not cover work conducted at or from 3952 Atlantic BLVD #D-12 Jacksonville, FL 32207." U&M's mailing address in Jacksonville was 3952 Atlantic Boulevard, Suite D-12. The information page of the policy, at Part 3.A. states that Part One applies to North Carolina. Part 3.C., Other States Insurance states that Part 3 of the policy applies to the states listed, and then refers to the "residual market limited other states insurance." Mr. Hager testified that the policy did not indicate compliance with Chapter 440, because the policy is North Carolina based, applies only North Carolina rates, and does not provide Florida coverage. Mr. Sapourn, on the other hand, opined that the policy provided workers' compensation that complied with Chapter 440. Although it is possible that a worker who was injured during times pertinent may have received benefits, it is clear that the policy did not comply with the requirements of Chapter 440. The Division instituted a Stop Work Order against U&M and sought to impose penalties upon it for failure to comply with Chapter 440 for offenses committed at the exact times and places alleged in this case. U&M demanded a hearing and was provided one. In a Recommended Order entered April 7, 2005, an Administrative Law Judge recommended that the Division enter a final order affirming the Stop Work Order and assessing a penalty in the amount of $51,779.50. See Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation vs. U and M Contractors, Inc., Case No. 04-3041 (DOAH April 7, 2005). The recommendation was adopted in toto by the Department of Financial Services on April 27, 2005. See In the Matter of: U and M Contractors, Inc., Case No. 75537-05 WC (DFS April 27, 2005). The evidence taken as a whole demonstrates that U&M did not have workers' compensation coverage in Florida that complied with the requirements of Chapter 440, during times pertinent. Mr. Sapourn testified that the theory behind ACORD certificates of insurance is that they provide a uniform document upon which business people may rely. This testimony is accepted as credible. In order to continue working on a project not addressed by the Stop Work Order, Hernandez, Inc., entered into and agreement with the Division which provided for partial payments of the penalty in the amount of $46,694.03. This payment was made with the understanding of both parties that payment was not an admission of liability.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is entitled to receive Health Insurance Subsidy payments retroactive to July 1995, the month she began to receive retirement benefits from the Respondent as the surviving spouse of a member of the Florida Retirement System.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Division is, and was at the times material to this case, the state agency charged with the responsibility of administering the Florida retirement and pension systems. Section 121.025, Florida Statutes (1995). The Division is, and was at the times material to this case, also responsible for administering the Retiree Health Insurance Subsidy. Section 112.363(7), Florida Statutes (1995). Harold Mosser, the former husband of Mrs. Kirkley, retired from his job as a school principal in August 1979, and he was a member of the Florida Retirement System. Mr. Mosser received a monthly state retirement benefit, and, as a supplement to the retirement benefit, he received a monthly Health Insurance Subsidy. Mrs. Kirkley retired from her job as a schoolteacher in 1989, and she is a member of the Florida Retirement System. Since her retirement, Mrs. Kirkley has received a monthly state retirement benefit and a monthly Health Insurance Subsidy. Mr. Mosser died on April 28, 1995. Mrs. Kirkley did not advise the Division of Mr. Mosser's death. Rather, the Division learned of his death in July 1995, when conducting a routine check of the Bureau of Vital Statistics "death tape." As Mr. Mosser's surviving spouse and the person he named as his joint annuitant, Mrs. Kirkley was entitled to receive an "Option 3" monthly retirement benefit for the remainder of her lifetime, pursuant to Section 121.09, Florida Statutes (1995). Mrs. Kirkley was also eligible to receive a monthly Health Insurance Subsidy upon filing an application for the subsidy with the Division, and this benefit included payment of the subsidy from the date of Mr. Mosser's death or for the six months prior to the date the application was filed.1 In a Statement of Retirement Benefit Payments dated 1/31/95, the components of Mr. Mossers's monthly retirement benefit payments were identified. At the time of his death, Mr. Mosser received a gross monthly retirement benefit of $1,730.60, plus a Health Insurance Subsidy of $90.00, minus $250.00 withholding tax, for total net monthly benefits of $1,570.60. Because the Division did not learn of Mr. Mosser's death until July 1995, his monthly benefit check was issued in May and June 1995 and electronically deposited in NationsBank. When the Division learned of Mr. Mosser's death, a Division representative tried to reach Mrs. Kirkley by telephone but could not obtain her unlisted telephone number. The representative then sent Mrs. Kirkley a letter dated July 20, 1995, in which the representative advised Mrs. Kirkley that Mr. Mosser's estate was entitled to receive his benefits for the month of April 1995 in the net amount of $1,570.60 and that she must apply for a continuing monthly benefit as Mr. Mosser's designated beneficiary. The representative also advised Mrs. Kirkley to complete the Division Form FST-11b that was enclosed with the letter and to return it to the Division together with Mr. Mosser's death certificate. Mrs. Kirkley completed the form enclosed with the letter and mailed it to the Division as directed. The Division changed Mr. Mosser's account over to Mrs. Kirkley, and she began receiving a monthly retirement benefit check in October 1995.2 Mr. Mosser's Health Insurance Subsidy was terminated effective July 1995, and the net monthly benefit received by Mrs. Kirkley as Mr. Mosser's beneficiary did not include a Health Insurance Subsidy payment. It is the Division's practice to send each retiree added to the system a "retiree packet" that includes, among other things, an application for the Health Insurance Subsidy and an explanation of the subsidy, as well as a booklet containing an explanation of all of the benefits available to retirees and beneficiaries under the Florida Retirement System. The process of sending out the retiree packets is automated, so that a packet is sent to every retiree and beneficiary when they are first entered into the system. Pursuant to the Division's regular practice, Mrs. Kirkley would have been sent the retiree packet in October 1995, when she was added to the system as Mr. Mosser's beneficiary. The Division also sends retirees and beneficiaries an annual newsletter, and the Health Insurance Subsidy was discussed in the 1995 and 1996 newsletters. Mrs. Kirkley received a Statement of Retirement Benefit Payments, as Mr. Mosser's beneficiary, each July, December, and January. This statement includes a separate entry for the Health Insurance Subsidy, with the amount of the subsidy noted; Mrs. Kirkley would have been aware of this entry because the Statement of Retirement Benefit Payments that she had been receiving on her own account would have shown an amount paid as her Health Insurance Subsidy. Mrs. Kirkley received her first statement in December 1995, and it would have been apparent from the statement that no amount was included for the Health Insurance Subsidy. Mrs. Kirkley does not recall having any direct contact with the Division between the time she submitted her application for the retirement benefit as Mr. Mosser's beneficiary and late September 1997, when she called the Division to request that the monthly check be electronically deposited in her bank account. During the conversation in September 1997, the Division's representative advised Mrs. Kirkley that she was entitled to receive a monthly Health Insurance Subsidy as Mr. Mosser's surviving spouse, in addition to the monthly retirement benefit she received as Mr. Mosser's beneficiary. The representative told Mrs. Kirkley that she would send her an application for the Health Insurance Subsidy, which the representative did in September 1997. Mrs. Kirkley completed the application she received from the Division and sent it to the Division with a cover letter dated October 17, 1997. The application required certification of health insurance coverage, which Mrs. Kirkley satisfied by attaching a copy of her Medicare Health Insurance card. Mrs. Kirkley did not hear anything from the Division for quite a long time. She contacted the Division and was told that they had not received her application for the Health Insurance Subsidy. The Division sent her another application form, which she completed and sent to the Division in January 1998, and she began receiving a monthly Health Insurance Subsidy as Mr. Mosser's surviving spouse; she also received retroactive benefits effective July 1997 through December 1997, a period of six months prior to January 1998. The Division eventually located Mrs. Kirkley's October 1997 application, and it advised her in a letter dated April 6, 1998, that she would receive retroactive Health Insurance Subsidy payments for an additional three months, moving the effective date of her entitlement to the benefits back to April 1997. Including the retroactive benefits she received, Mrs. Kirkley has been receiving a Health Insurance Subsidy as Mr. Mosser's surviving spouse since April 1997. She also had the benefit of Mr. Mosser's May and June 1995 Health Insurance Subsidy, which were paid by the Division because it was not aware that Mr. Mosser was deceased. Mrs. Kirkley seeks to recover an additional $1890.00 in retroactive Health Insurance Subsidy payments as Mr. Mosser's surviving spouse, which is the difference between the total Health Insurance Subsidy payments she has received and the total Health Insurance Subsidy payments she would have received had the benefits been paid to her retroactive to Mr. Mosser's death (21 months x $90.00 per month = $1890.00). Summary The evidence presented by Mrs. Kirkley is insufficient to establish her entitlement to retroactive Health Insurance Subsidy payments from July 1995 to March 1997. It is uncontroverted that she submitted her application for the Health Insurance Subsidy with her certification of health insurance coverage in October 1997 and that the Division paid retroactive Health Insurance Subsidy payments for the six months prior to the date it received the application. In addition, Mrs. Kirkley has not presented sufficient evidence to establish that the Division should be required to pay her the additional retroactive Health Insurance Subsidy payments because it failed to send her an application until September 1997. The Division did not make any specific representations to her regarding her entitlement to the Health Insurance Subsidy payments until September 1997, and she failed to establish by the greater weight of the credible evidence that she did not receive any general information from the Division that included information regarding the Health Insurance Subsidy. In addition, Mrs. Kirkley knew or should have known in December 1995 that she was not receiving a Health Insurance Subsidy as Mr. Mosser's surviving spouse, when she received her first statement detailing the components of her gross monthly benefit as Mr. Mosser's beneficiary, and she could have made inquiry of the Division at that time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Review of Final Agency Action filed by Mary J. Mosser, now known as Mary J. Kirkley. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of November, 2001.
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether the Agency for Health Care Administration's denial of Petitioners', Brookwood- Walton County Convalescent Center and Brookwood-Washington County Convalescent Center (Brookwood), interim rate request for general and professional liability insurance was proper and in keeping with state and federal laws and the rules and regulations governing Florida's Medicaid program.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners, Brookwood-Washington County Convalescent Center and Walton County Convalescent Center (Brookwood) are licensed nursing homes in the State of Florida. The Brookwood facilities have historically been high Medicaid providers. Both participate in the Florida Medicaid program. Washington County Convalescent Center is currently 90 percent Medicaid and Walton County Convalescent Center is 85 percent Medicaid. The statewide average for all nursing homes in Florida is 50-55 percent Medicaid. Such high Medicaid participation makes Brookwood extremely sensitive to changes in its allowable costs and its ability to recover those costs. Florida's Medicaid program is needs-based, providing nursing home care to persons eligible for such care who fall below a certain level of income and assets. Medicaid is a "prospective" reimbursement program in that reimbursement to a nursing home is based on the facility's cost history adjusted or inflated to approximate future costs. Adjustments are made and reimbursement rates are set based on a nursing home's cost report for allowable costs it has incurred in the past year. In determining allowable reimbursable costs, AHCA utilizes the Florida Title XIX Long-Term Care Reimbursement Plan, Version XIX, dated November 27, 1995 (Reimbursement Plan), the reimbursement principles of the Federal Medicare Program's Health Insurance Manual (also known as the Provider Reimbursement Manual, PRM, or HIM-15), and Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) or accepted industry practice. In making determinations as to allowable reimbursable costs, one first looks to the Plan, then HIM-15 and finally, GAAP. With certain exceptions not relevant here, The Florida Medicaid program reimburses all allowable costs, as those costs are defined in the Reimbursement Plan and HIM-15. Premiums paid by a nursing home for liability insurance are an allowable cost under the Reimbursement Plan. Allowable costs are broken out in the categories of property, patient care, and operating expenses. As indicated, in determining the prospective rate, AHCA inflates the reported allowable costs in each category forward subject to various class ceiling limitations and target limitations. A class ceiling is an upper limit on the cost that will be reimbursed. A target limitation is a limit on the rate of increase of costs from year to year. In short, a nursing home provider may be under its class ceilings; however, any increase in its costs that exceeds a certain percentage amount will not be recognized for reimbursement purposes. After applying the inflation factor, the class ceilings and the target limitations to allowable costs, AHCA arrives at a per-patient, per-day rate that the nursing home will be paid during the next year. Because nursing home reimbursement is prospective and subject to target limits, a nursing facility might be unable to recover its allowable costs of providing services if it experiences unanticipated expenses that cause its allowable costs to unexpectedly rise. In such cases, the Plan has provisions that allow, under very limited circumstances, an interim rate adjustment for an unexpected increase in costs. Such interim rate increases are covered in Section IV.J. of the Plan. In 1999, Brookwood's liability insurance premium cost was $400,000 for its six Florida facilities and one North Carolina facility. In the year 2000, Brookwood's liability insurance premium cost increased to $4,000,000. Of that amount, the premium cost for Walton County Convalescent Center increased from $56,000 to $546,000 and the premium cost for Washington County Convalescent Center increased from $84,000 to $819,000. The premium increase occurred after Brookwood's rates had been set based on its 1999 insurance costs. Additionally, in September of 2000, Brookwood's liability insurer left the state. Brookwood has since been unable to obtain liability insurance for its Florida facilities. It was possible for Brookwood to self-insure, but it did not. Self-insurance is generally only feasible for facilities larger than Brookwood. However, the evidence did not demonstrate that Brookwood could not self-insure. On May 30, 2000, faced with this unforeseen increase in liability insurance premiums, Brookwood applied to AHCA for an interim rate effective retroactively to January 1, 2000. This was necessary because the large increase in costs would not be covered by the normal rate of inflation allowed by the department and the cost of the increase would not be recoverable through the normal prospective reimbursement methodology due to the lag time between the cost increase and the filing of the cost report. In addition, without an interim rate Brookwood would not receive an adjustment to its target rate, thereby, limiting reimbursement for any increased costs it did report on its cost reports. Brookwood only requested interim rates for these two facilities because its other four facilities were at or above the cost ceilings and could get no relief from an interim rate. In other words, for those four facilities, Medicaid will not participate in payment for the extra costs incurred by the increased liability insurance premiums. Even for the two facilities at issue here, if an interim rate is granted, AHCA will not reimburse for any costs that exceed the cost ceilings. The increase of premiums and subsequent pull out by several insurance companies were part of a reaction to increased loss in the area of nursing home liability. The crisis was, in part, due to an increase in civil litigation against nursing homes being brought under Sections 400.022 and 400.023, Florida Statutes. Indeed, Florida's rate of nursing home liability litigation is significantly above the national average. However, Florida's nursing home population is also significantly larger than the national average. However, the crisis was also due to many other factors which impact liability and rates in Florida. While there may be some debate about the causes of the increased litigation, there is no debate that the cost of liability insurance increased significantly over a short period of time with some insurance companies ceasing to write liability insurance for nursing homes in Florida. The Agency denied Brookwood's request because no new interpretation of law by the state or federal government pertaining to liability insurance had occurred which caused Brookwood's costs to increase. As indicated earlier, the Plan contains provisions that allow a nursing home participating in the Medicaid program to request an interim change in its reimbursement rate when it incurs costs resulting from patient care or operating changes made to comply with existing state regulations and such costs are at least $5,000 or one percent of its per diem. The language of Section IV.J.2 of the Estate's Long- Term Care Reimbursement Plan states that: J. The following provisions apply to interim changes in component reimbursement rates, other than through the routine semi- annual rate setting process. * * * 2. Interim rate changes reflecting increased costs occurring as a result of patient care or operating changes shall be considered only if such changes were made to comply with existing State or Federal rules, laws, or standards, and if the change in cost to the provider is at least $5000 and would cause a change of 1 percent or more in the provider's current total per diem rate. Other subsections of Section J of the Reimbursement Plan deal with new requirements or new interpretation of old requirements. Those subsections do not apply in this case. The term standards as used in Section J refers to standards in the Reimbursement Plan, Section IV titled "Standards," the standards of care and operation detailed by the Medicaid program in its provider handbooks and such standards as are detailed in the Code of Federal Regulations, and HCFA/HHS guidelines, as well as state statutes and rules. These standards are the usual or customary method or practice used by the nursing home industry to gain reimbursement from Medicaid. The term standards include reimbursement standards, methods or principles for medicaid providers. In essence, a nursing home would have to incur additional or new costs to receive an interim rate adjustment. Brookwood's increase in insurance premiums was such an increase in costs, which would be allowable subject to ceiling and target limitations. At the time of Brookwood's request, there was no specific requirement in the state Reimbursement Plan, state or federal law requiring that liability insurance be carried by a nursing home. Additionally, there was no change to the Reimbursement Plan, state, or federal law or regulation requiring that liability insurance be carried by a nursing home. On the other hand, the reimbursement standards or requirements set forth in HIM-15 make it clear that a prudent Medicaid provider is expected to carry liability insurance or self-insurance in order to be reimbursed for any uninsured losses. Specifically, Section 2160.2 of the Provider Reimbursement Manual states: Liability damages paid by the provider, either imposed by law or assumed by contract, which should reasonably have been covered by liability insurance, are not allowable. Section 2161 of HIM-15 states that the reasonable costs of such insurance are allowable. Section 2162.1 of HIM-15 states that losses in excess of the deductible or co-insurance are allowable costs so long as the amount of insurance was consistent with sound management practices. Section 2162.5 of HIM-15 recognizes the allowability of deductibles, so long as they do not exceed 10 percent of the entity's net worth or $100,000 per provider. It also states that if you set a deductible higher than those amounts (or assume all the risk), any losses exceeding the 10 percent or $100,000 will not be allowable as recognized costs. The general implication of these and other related sections of HIM-15 is that a prudent provider is expected to carry liability insurance or be self-insured. Thus, a provider will be reimbursed for the reasonable costs of liability insurance, any reasonable deductible, and any losses in excess of reasonable insurance coverage. These limitations on loss recovery or reimbursement are standards for purposes of determining whether a interim rate increase is allowable. These standards were in effect at the time Brookwood's premiums increased. Thus, in order to comply with Medicaid's reimbursement standards, Brookwood had to remain insured or self-insured. The choice of which type of insurance to utilize to meet the reimbursement standard is left to the provider. Brookwood reasonably chose to insure through an insurance company. Since Brookwood was required to make such a choice in order to comply or conform to Medicaid's reimbursement standards, Brookwood is entitled to an interim rate increase. However, the interim rate provisions of the Plan only recognize such rates submitted within 60 days prior to the date of the interim rate request. Based on this limitation, Petitioners' rate increase is limited to the increase in premium incurred 60 days prior to its interim rate request around May 30, 2000.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that A final order be entered granting Brookwood's interim rate request limited to the 60 days prior to the initial rate request. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of September, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of September, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven A. Grigas, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Theodore E. Mack, Esquire Powell & Mack 803 North Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Diane Grubbs, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Julie Gallagher, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent is guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against him, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him, if any.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has been licensed in Florida as a life and variable annuity contracts salesman and as a life and health insurance agent. In 1994 twin sisters Edith Ellis and Gertrude Franklin attended a luncheon at which Respondent made a presentation. The sisters were then 79 years old, and both were the owners of single-premium insurance policies issued by Merrill Lynch. They decided to cash in their existing policies and purchase new policies through Respondent. Both Ellis and Franklin executed 1035 exchange forms whereby the monies obtained from cashing in their Merrill Lynch policies were transferred to the insurance companies issuing their new policies. Both were charged a substantial penalty by Merrill Lynch. On August 11, 1994, Security Connecticut Insurance Company issued to Edith Ellis a flexible premium adjustable life insurance policy with a face value of $150,000. The cover page of the policy recites in bold print that it is a flexible premium adjustable life insurance policy, directs the insured to read the policy, and provides a 20-day period for canceling the policy with a full refund. It also contains a statement that provides: This Policy provides flexible premium, adjustable life insurance to the Maturity Date. Coverage will end prior to the Maturity Date if premiums paid and interest credited are insufficient to continue coverage to that date. Dividends are not payable. Flexible premiums are payable to the end of the period shown, if any, or until the Insured's death, whichever comes first. The cover page also recites that the first premium is $75,000 and that the monthly premium is $805.75. After deductions, Merrill Lynch only transferred $44,928.81, and Ellis never paid any additional premiums. Therefore, the policy was not funded to maturity since the company only received a partial payment. The insurance company did not set up this policy to receive periodic premium payments because it was originally anticipated that the company would receive $75,000 which would carry the expense, based upon the then interest rate. The policy was dependent upon interest rates. The company sent annual statements, however, to both Ellis and to the agency where Respondent worked. These statements clearly showed a declining accumulated value for the policy and specified how much it had declined from the previous year. When Ellis surrendered the policy on July 3, 2002, its value was $4,849. First Colony Life Insurance issued a flexible premium adjustable life insurance policy to Gertrude Franklin on October 18, 1994, with a face value of $600,000. The cover page provides for a 20-day cancellation period with a full refund of premiums paid. In bold type, the cover page further advises as follows: "Flexible Premium Adjustable Life Insurance Policy", "Adjustable Death Benefit Payable at Death", "Flexible Premiums Payable During Insured's Lifetime", and "Benefits Vary with Current Cost of Insurance Rates and Current Interest Rates." It also advises that the initial premium is $56,796. The insurance company received an initial premium payment of $203,993.75 on December 19, 1994, and an additional premium payment in February 1996, for a total of premiums paid of approximately $266,000. The total premiums received, however, were insufficient to fund the policy to maturity since that would have required in excess of $400,000 in premiums. Annual statements sent by the insurance company reflected that the policy value was declining. On August 26, 1996, the insurance company received a letter over the name of Nancy Franklin, the trustee of the trust which owned the policy, advising the company to send billing and annual statements to the address of the agency where Respondent was employed. Respondent sent that letter as a courtesy because Gertrude Franklin asked him to keep her papers for her because she had no place to keep them. Gertrude Franklin, not her daughter, signed that letter. Respondent left that agency in October 1997 and was not permitted to take any records with him. In 2002 Edith Ellis showed her policy to someone at a senior center. Based upon that person's statements she called her sister and told her that their policies were no good. They contacted Respondent who came to their homes and reviewed their policies. He advised Gertrude Franklin that her only options at that point were to pay an additional premium or to reduce the face value of the policy to $400,000 in order to keep it in effect longer. She chose the latter course. Respondent gave Franklin a letter for Nancy Franklin's signature directing the insurance company to reduce the face value of the policy. Franklin, not her daughter, signed the letter and forwarded it to the company. The company reduced the face value based upon that letter which it received on April 1, 2002. That directive allowed the policy to stay in force another two months.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent in this cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of December, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Bossart, Esquire Department of Financial Services 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Nancy Wright, Esquire 7274 Michigan Isle Road Lake Worth, Florida 33467 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Pete Dunbar, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a licensed insurance agent licensed in the State of Florida as a general lines agent. He was the primary agent of Emerald Coast Insurance Agencies, Inc. (Agency) for Pensacola, Florida. The agency at all times pertinent to the events and times treated in the Amended Administrative Complaint was a general lines insurance agency incorporated under the laws of the State of Florida. The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with regulating and licensing the entry of insurance agents into the profession of insurance and regulating the practice of agents and other insurance professionals already licensed by the State of Florida, including the imposition of disciplinary measures. The Respondent had been an insurance agent, as of the time of the hearing, for approximately four years. During that time, he has typically written 50-60 applications for automobile insurance and related coverage per week. The owner of the Agency would not allow the Respondent to issue checks from the Respondent's own office. All processing of insurance application files was completed at the Tallahassee, Florida office. The files with client information for insurance applicants, whose business was initiated by the Respondent, was sent by UPS to the Tallahassee, Florida office on the morning following the taking of the applications. The forms, which the Respondent was required to have completed and asked customers to sign, were pre-printed and issued from the Tallahassee, Florida office. The Respondent had no part in the creation of these forms as to content, format, and the disclosures depicted on their face. The Respondent inquired of the Department's local office as to whether the forms comported with pertinent statutes and regulations, and the Department expressed no objection to them. Indeed, the forms in question do make disclosures of the coverage or products which the customer is purchasing and contain an acknowledgment, which the customer is required to sign, indicating that the coverage has been explained to the customer. In particular, the motor club product is depicted on the relevant form as being an optional product and that it has been explained to the customer, with a blank after that pertinent statement for the customer to sign an acknowledgment of that fact. The issue in this case does not involve whether the customer paid for such a product without executing any consent but, rather, whether the customer was misled or whether the products sold were actually, in fact, explained fully to them; whether they were misled in making a decision to buy such coverage in the belief that it was required in order to obtain the insurance they knew they needed. THE TRANSACTIONS AT ISSUE No evidence was submitted as to Count I, concerning Cheryl Ginsterblum nor Count VIII, concerning Joseph Shelton. Therefore, no findings of fact can be made and these counts should be dismissed. Pam Shivers of Gulf Breeze, Florida, required insurance coverage for her 1988 Dodge Caravan. Because the van was still financed with a lender, "full coverage" was required, that is, she needed personal injury protection (PIP), property damage (PD) coverage, comprehensive risk coverage, and collision damage coverage. On March 8, 1993, she went to the Respondent's Agency, and the Respondent handled the requested insurance transaction. She requested "full coverage", and the transaction was handled while she was standing at the counter, in just a few minutes. PIP and PD insurance was placed with Security Insurance Company of Hartford (Security). Comprehensive and collision coverage was placed with Florida International Indemnity Company (FIIC). The premium for Security was $350.00, and the premium for FIIC was $399.00. The purchase of this coverage was financed so that Ms. Shivers would not have to pay the entire $749.00 premium for all of the coverage at one time. In return for the premium financing arrangement, a $187.00 down payment was required for the insurance coverage. During the transaction, Ms. Shivers was quickly presented with approximately six documents to sign. Included in those documents was a document containing a disclosure that the motor club product which she purchased was optional, that is, not required by law; that she had been offered to purchase automobile insurance by the Agency without an optional motor club and chose to purchase that optional coverage of her own free will at an additional cost of $150.00; that she examined the benefits being offered, and that it was her decision to request enrollment as a member of the motor club association. It is true that Ms. Shivers signed these acknowledgments and disclosures, which on their face, would indicate that she had been informed about the nature of the motor club product or coverage and its cost, including the fact that it was not required by law and was optional. In fact, however, her apparent consent was not an actual, knowing and informed consent. She was presented with the six documents to sign hurriedly, with the places to sign simply marked for her to make quick signatures. She did not, in the course of the transaction, have significant time to read the documents or reflect on what she was signing, what her signatures obligated her for, and what specific products she was purchasing. She was not, in actual fact, informed that she was purchasing a motor club membership. She did not request that product, and the Respondent did not give her any actual explanation about it. She was not informed that she had any choice in whether or not to take that product. She later discovered that the product was optional and that it was, therefore, not an integral, unseverable part of the insurance coverage she did want to purchase. Moreover, Ms. Shivers was confused about the $749.00 premium quote and the amount she was actually required to pay. Her confusion involved the $749.00 premium for insurance quoted to her because of the fact that she was actually required to pay an $899.00 purported "premium". The receipt issued at the end of the purchase transaction indicated a total "premium" of $899.00. In fact, however, the actual cost of the insurance was $749.00. The additional $150.00 was for a motor club membership which was hidden in the receipt amount and what was represented on the receipt as a "total premium". The down payment of $337.00 quoted to her was also deceptive because actually, only $187.00 of that was the down payment on the actual insurance coverage premium. This is shown by the premium finance agreement in evidence. The Respondent had concealed the cost of the motor club membership within what was purported to be the total insurance premium amount reflected on the receipt and included the entire $150.00 charge for that membership within the down payment, simply and misleadingly calling the down payment of $337.00 as the down payment on insurance coverage. Thereafter, on March 21, 1993, Ms. Shivers went back to the Agency to cancel her insurance, related to the fact that her vehicle had been involved in an accident. Upon doing that, she left thinking that her insurance had been effectively cancelled. Later, she received notices from the premium finance company but was told by the Respondent to ignore them. On May 7, 1993, however, the Respondent informed her that she had to come back to the Agency and fill out a cancellation request. Thus, 47 days after she had attempted to cancel her coverage, her request was finally processed by the Agency. In the meantime, she was apparently being charged for premiums on the coverage she thought she had cancelled. Thus, from January 21, 1994, the premium finance company turned an amount it claimed was due of $43.26 over to its attorney for collection purposes, which impinged on Ms. Shivers' credit standing. She had already paid the Respondent $190.00 in premiums under the premium financing agreement, with her down payment, but did not receive any returned unearned premium representing the period after she thought she had cancelled her policy but, instead, was billed the additional $43.26 directly due to the Respondent's 47-day delay in processing her cancellation request. Count III In June, 1993, Laura O'Donohue of Pensacola, Florida, purchased her first vehicle, a 1993 Chevrolet Cavalier. The automobile dealership, where she purchased the vehicle, gave her a card for the Respondent's insurance agency. Therefore, never having established a relationship with an insurance agency, she went to that Agency to purchase insurance. Her mother, Lynn O'Donohue, accompanied her to the Agency. Before coming to the Agency while at the automobile dealership, she had received a quote for the insurance she wanted from the Agency. When she arrived at the Agency, she informed Donald Grubb, an employee of the Agency and the Respondent, that she just wanted "basic coverage". This was the first time she had purchased insurance, and she relied entirely for her decisions regarding that upon the representations of the Respondent and his colleague. Therefore, in a transaction, which took approximately 20 minutes, the Respondent and/or Mr. Grubb assisted her in filling out the paperwork required to place the insurance coverage she requested. During the course of the brief insurance purchase transaction, Ms. O'Donohue learned that she would be required to pay a higher premium amount than the quote she had received from the Agency while she was at the automobile dealership earlier that day. This is consistent with the Agency's custom and practice, established by former agent, James Self's, testimony to the effect that motor club coverage was typically added to the normal insurance coverage requested by customers, which resulted in higher purported "premium" quotes and charges than had initially been quoted to the customer, typically by telephone, before a customer came to the Agency office. When Ms. O'Donohue and her mother arrived at the Agency after having received the lower quote earlier, they were thus not prepared to pay the higher amount of the so-called premium. Ms. O'Donohue did not need a motor club because, through her mother, she was covered by AAA Motor Club for towing and other benefits. She had no knowledge that she had purchased a motor club product from the Respondent. All of the documents were presented to her, in response to her request for just basic insurance coverage, in the context that this was what the law required her to have and what she needed. She totally relied, as did her mother, upon the representations of the Respondent and his agent or employee, Mr. Grubb, concerning what the law required and what she needed in the way of insurance coverage. The testimony of Ms. O'Donohue's mother, Lynn O'Donohue, confirms the fact that they had no intent to purchase towing coverage or "auto club" because they already had a membership with AAA and wanted to pay nothing extra other than the basic insurance coverage. The Respondent or his agent or employee, Mr. Grubb, indicated, as shown on page 91 of the transcript, that "towing was all part of it", that is, they meant that the basic insurance package sought by Ms. O'Donohue included towing as part of its coverage. In fact, that was not the case, and the motor club product was clearly optional, at extra cost, and not legally required. Ms. O'Donohue purchased it unknowingly, based upon the representations and business practice used by the Respondent in connection with her transaction, in spite of the presence of her signatures on the disclosure portion of the application documents for the reasons referenced with regard to the Shivers transaction. The insurance requested was placed with two insurance companies. The PIP and PD were issued by Security at a premium of $223.00. The comprehensive and collision coverage was placed with General Insurance Company (General) at a premium of $411.00. Thus, the premiums for actual insurance coverage, which is all Ms. O'Donohue wanted, totaled $634.00. That was financed by the ETI Premium Finance Company (ETI) on periodic installment payments, with a required down payment of $127.00. The Respondent, however, required Ms. O'Donohue to make a down payment of $277.00 on a purported total premium due of $784.00. This amount, unbeknownst to Ms. O'Donohue, happened to include a motor club purchase (Atlantic Travel Association), which cost $150.00, thus, the difference between the $634.00 actual insurance premium and the $784.00 purported premium due. The $150.00 fee for motor club benefits was concealed in the "total premium" amount falsely represented to the customer by the Respondent. The deceptive and misleading nature of this transaction is further pointed out by the form of the receipt issued to Ms. O'Donohue upon consummating the transaction. That receipt indicates that the "total premium" is $784.00. Actually, the cost of the insurance was only $634.00, as referenced above, and the additional $150.00 of that purported total premium amount was the motor club fee. Likewise, the down payment quoted to her of $277.00 was deceptive because only $127.00 of that was applied to the actual insurance coverage. The remaining amount was the motor club fee which the agent collected in its entirety at the beginning of the transaction, as part of the down payment, while the insurance premiums, in excess of the $127.00 actual down payment for insurance, were financed through ETI. The Respondent did this because, by collecting all of the motor club fee in a lump sum at the outset of the transaction, he could get his entire commission immediately. His motor club sales commission was at a considerably higher rate than the commission he earned on the sale of insurance itself. In fact, his commission was 90 percent of the $150.00 motor club fee. Since Ms. O'Donohue did not have the entire $277.00 at the time of the transaction, because she had been relying on the lower quote for the insurance given to her over the telephone, she only paid $200.00 down payment at the time of the transaction, with a balance owed of $79.00, as reflected on her receipt. Her mother had reservations concerning the purchase of this insurance from the Respondent and told her daughter that she thought that because the insurance she purchased involved financing the premium, she could save money by going to GEICO insurance company. Therefore, the following day, she went to GEICO and secured new coverage at a lower premium rate and then called the Respondent's Agency to confirm that she could cancel her policy, with no penalty. They replied that she could cancel her policy just so long as she brought them proof that she had secured new insurance, since the law presently does not allow them to cancel the coverage until they are shown proof that the insured has obtained other coverage. Ms. O'Donohue, therefore, went to GEICO, purchased new insurance for her vehicle, and then brought proof to the Agency and requested that the Respondent cancel her insurance. This request was made on June 19, 1993. At that time, she requested a refund of the $200.00 down payment which she had made two days before and was assured that she would receive it within 60 days. In fact, she never received a refund and continued to receive past-due and delinquency notices from ETI, the premium finance company. She notified the Agency of this problem on numerous occasions to no satisfaction. Due to ETI's belief that her coverage was still in force and that they were still owed the premium payments, her credit was endangered. This was all directly related to the Respondent's failure to properly and timely process her cancellation request. On June 20, 1993, Terre Thompson of Pensacola, Florida, also went to the Respondent's Agency to purchase insurance for her 1993 GEO Metro automobile. The Respondent met her at the automobile dealership, where she purchased the vehicle. He had already prepared documents for the purchase of insurance to be underwritten by Security and General, along with a premium financing agreement and other documents. He had marked X's where Ms. Thompson was supposed to sign all contracts and disclosure forms. The Respondent filled out all of the information on the documents and merely told her, in effect, to "sign here, here and here". The transaction was conducted very quickly and with little or no explanation of coverage or benefits. Although Ms. Thompson needed full coverage for her vehicle, because it was financed, she did not want towing and rental benefits. The Respondent, however, gave her to understand that it was required in the coverage package she purchased. Accordingly, on June 20, 1993, she made a down payment of $100.00, with an additional amount due of $51.00 by June 27, 1993. Although the receipt was dated June 20, 1993, Ms. Thompson did not actually receive it until June 27, 1993, when she returned to the Respondent's Agency to pay the $51.00 owed. The receipt falsely depicts that the "total premium" was $834.00. Actually, the cost of the insurance was only $754.00. The additional $80.00 was for a motor club product, although the $80.00 was buried in and represented to be part of the total insurance premium for the transaction. The down payment of $231.00 quoted, likewise, was deceptive because only $151.00 of that was actually applied to insurance coverage, which was all of the coverage that Ms. Thompson had requested. The Respondent collected the $100.00 on June 20, 1993 and entered into a financing arrangement with the customer, Ms. Thompson, for the $51.00 to be paid on June 27, 1993. In fact, this was only enough to cover the down payment for the actual insurance coverage because the Respondent forgot to include the fee for the motor club coverage on the "front end" or in the down payment, as was his normal practice. This is why Ms. Thompson became upset when she learned she owed an additional $71.00 when she returned on June 27, 1993, when she thought she had only owed approximately $60.00. In any event, the receipt finally received by her reflected payments of $100.00, $60.00, and $71.00, which totals $231.00. This amount includes the $151.00 down payment for actual insurance coverage and the remaining $80.00 for motor club membership, which Ms. Thompson did not know she had purchased at the time and did not desire to purchase. Indeed, Ms. Thompson, and the other customers referenced in the Amended Administrative Complaint, who testified, signed the disclosure in the standard package of documents presented to them by the Respondent. It indicated that they acknowledged that the motor club benefit or the "nations safe driver" medical benefit was an optional coverage, not required by law and that, after explanation of it, they had elected to purchase it. In fact, they signed those documents, albeit imprudently, without actual knowledge that they were obtaining that coverage and without explanation that it was not legally required. No disclosure was made to them that the purported "total premium" amount actually included payment for the motor club benefit, which was not actually part of the insurance premium and which, at least in the case of those customers with AAA memberships, was totally unnecessary. Timothy Malden of Jacksonville, Florida, purchased a vehicle on or about August 31, 1993. He needed full coverage because the vehicle was financed, that is, he needed PIP, PD, comprehensive coverage, and collision coverage. He went to the Respondent's Agency on that date to purchase coverage on his 1986 Pontiac Fiero. During the course of the transaction, handled by the Respondent, Mr. Malden was asked if he had motor club coverage or benefits and he told the Respondent that he had AAA membership and showed the Respondent his AAA card. The Respondent and Mr. Malden entered into a transaction to sell Mr. Malden insurance. The transaction involved approximately seven different documents and took a total of about 15 to 20 minutes. Mr. Malden merely signed the documents. The Respondent told him that he just needed his signature on the documents and the Respondent did not explain the coverage. The procedure seemed rushed or hurried to Mr. Malden. Although Mr. Malden signed the disclosure (inadvertently, because apparently he did not read it) stating, in effect, that the motor club coverage was optional, not required and that after having it explained to him, he had decided to purchase it, he, in fact, did not know at the time that he had purchased the motor club coverage and it had not been explained to him. Moreover, as stated above, he had explained to the Respondent that he did not need it because he already had AAA motor club coverage. Nevertheless, the Respondent, knowing that Mr. Malden had AAA, still sold him the motor club coverage with the Atlantic Travel Association for an additional fee of $150.00. Mr. Malden made no informed consent to purchase that benefit. The PIP and PD coverage was placed with Security at a premium of $395.00. The comprehensive and collision coverage was placed with Continental American Insurance Company (Continental) for a premium of $525.00. The total premium for "insurance" was $920.00, with a $230.00 down payment. The premiums were financed by ETI. Mr. Malden, however, was required to pay a "down payment" of $380.00. The receipt issued to him reveals a "total premium" of $1,070.00. The actual cost of insurance was only $920.00. The additional $150.00 was for motor club coverage, and the charge for that was hidden in what was represented on the receipt as "total premium". Likewise, the down payment of $380.00 was deceptive in nature because only $230.00 of it was actually a down payment for insurance coverage. The remainder of it, as explained above with regard to the other customers, was actually full payment for the unnecessary, unwanted motor club benefit. On March 8, 1994, Karen Sigler of Pensacola, Florida, went to the Agency to purchase automobile insurance for a 1990 Plymough Voyager. She stated to the Respondent that she only wanted the minimum automobile insurance required by Florida law. She told the Respondent that she needed new insurance because her previous insurance company had gone out of business. The Respondent handled the transaction for her and she specified that she wanted only that coverage which the State of Florida required. Ms. Sigler had been originally quoted a $324.00 premium amount. When she actually entered into the insurance transaction, however, an additional $65.00 was added on to that amount because the Respondent sold her an additional "Nations Safe Drivers, Inc." enrollment. This is not an insurance product but, rather, is a form of supplemental medical benefit. Ms. Sigler had not requested this and did not understand the nature of it, believing that it was unnecessary because she was already qualified as a "safe driver" based upon her driver's record. She was given no explanation as to what that enrollment form, and benefit was nor that there was an extra charge for it. Even as reflected on the enrollment form, Ms. Sigler merely thought that the Nations Safe Drivers membership was a part of the required insurance purchase package. This is not true, in fact, since only PIP and PD coverages are required by law. Ms. Sigler was thus sold a product she did not request, which was not required by law and which was not explained to her. The entire transaction took approximately one- half hour. The receipt issued to Ms. Sigler shows that the "total premium" was $324.00. In fact, however, the actual cost of insurance was a $259.00 premium. The additional $65.00 of the $324.00 amount was the fee for the Nations Safe Drivers membership, which was hidden in what was represented as a "total premium". Moreover, the down payment she paid of $98.00 was deceptive because only a part of it was applied to automobile insurance coverage and the remainder was the fee for the Nations Safe Drivers membership. The Respondent's business practice in this regard resultingly misled Ms. Sigler into believing that Nations Safe Drivers, Inc. was required by State law and that it was an insurance product, which it was not. Here, again, in spite of the disclosure she signed and the documents that she was hurriedly urged to execute by the Respondent, the clear and convincing evidence shows that she did not actually, knowingly consent to purchase the extra non-insurance product referenced above. The Respondent's business practice, the way he represented the nature of her insurance coverage and in the manner in which he conducted the transaction did not involve an actual explanation of the non-insurance product he misled her into purchasing. Thus, there was no informed consent to purchase that product. Rosa Johnson went to the Respondent's Agency on March 21, 1994. She wanted to purchase the "minimum" automobile insurance required by State law for her 1971 Plymouth. She dealt with the Respondent and another gentleman who worked under the Respondent's direction and control. She told them she only wanted the basic, legally-required coverage. PIP and PD coverage was issued through Security. Ms. Johnson was also sold the Nations Safe Drivers product. This product was not actually explained to her, in spite of the fact that she may have signed a written disclosure that it had been, including the fact that it was an optional benefit and not part of the legally-required insurance coverage. She did not request this product nor was it explained to her so that its meaning and coverage was understood by her. Upon conclusion of the transaction, Ms. Johnson had purchased PIP and PD coverage from Security for a premium of $248.00, plus an unrequested enrollment in Nations Safe Drivers, Inc. for a fee of $35.00. All of this amount was financed by ETI. Here, again, as with the other customers, the receipt furnished to Ms. Johnson indicates a total "premium" of $283.00. The actual cost of insurance or true premium was $248.00. The additional $35.00 of the $283.00 amount was the cost of the Nations Safe Drivers, Inc. product, which was hidden in what was represented to her on the receipt as the "total premium". Likewise, the purported down payment of $85.00 was deceptive in the manner in which it was presented and required of Ms. Johnson, because only part of it was applied to insurance coverage, the remainder being the $35.00 fee for the added non- insurance product referenced above. The Respondent's authority to bind coverage with Security Insurance Company had been terminated on March 14, 1994 due to excessive late submissions of insurance applications to the carrier. The problem was later alleviated and his authority to bind insurance for Security was restored by that company. However, during the period of time his binding authority had been terminated, the Respondent kept taking applications and binding policies. This caused the insureds to believe that they had coverage when, in fact, they did not, because the carrier, Security, through its managing agent, U.S. Underwriters, did not, for a period of time, allow the Respondent to obligate that company for coverage. Accordingly, in due course, Ms. Johnson was notified by U.S. Underwriters, on behalf of Security, that she had no coverage. She became upset and filed a complaint with the Insurance Commissioner because she had understood that as soon as the transaction with the Respondent was completed, her coverage had been bound and timely filed and processed with the underwriting insurance carrier. Charles Meadows of Gulf Breeze, Florida, required insurance on his 1986 Chrysler LeBaron. He wanted to purchase the minimum amount of legally- required coverage and went to the Respondent's Agency for that purpose on May 17, 1994. He needed the minimum amount of legally-required insurance so that he could obtain a tag for his automobile from the county tag office. He was in a hurry because he had taken leave from work and needed to get his insurance transaction consummated, as well as to obtain his automobile tag before 4:30 p.m. He conferred with a lady who was employed by the Respondent at the Agency who handled his transaction. She completed all of the documents, spread them across the counter, and marked and told him the places to sign to effect the binder of the coverage that day. The transaction occurred quickly, lasting only approximately 15 minutes. He received no effective explanation of any of the coverages. Rather, he relied on her representations that he was getting what he had asked for, that is, the minimum legally-required Florida insurance coverage. The coverage he obtained was placed with Security as to the PIP and PD coverage. The premium for that coverage was $321.00. The total premium quoted to him was $421.00, which included a $100.00 membership in the Gulf Coast Travel Association, a motor or travel club. Mr. Meadows was not aware that he had this extra amount of coverage or membership until he conferred with Mr. Spencer of the Department at a later time, who informed him of such. If he had known that the agreements he was signing during the hurried, unexplained transaction with the Respondent's employee included the motor club coverage, he would have declined it because his wife already had coverage with AAA for towing and related benefits. Mr. Meadows made a down payment of $190.00 on May 17, 1994. The receipt issued to him revealed a "total premium" of $421.00. The actual cost of insurance was $321.00, with the additional $100.00 being for the motor club, although the total amount was represented as "total premium". Additionally, the down payment of $190.00, which he paid, was deceptive in that only $90.00 was actually applied to insurance coverage and the remaining $100.00 was the total up-front fee for the motor club coverage, although it was represented to Mr. Meadows as being the $190.00 down payment on the insurance premium itself. Later, Mr. Meadows learned that he had the motor club benefits which he did not want or need and so he demanded a refund of his money from the Respondent. He spoke to the Respondent personally about this but did not receive immediate satisfaction. There was a substantial delay in receiving his refund after the Respondent told him that he would receive one. The Respondent justified this by stating to him that it had to come from "another office" and that it would not come from his Agency itself. Dorothy Weber of Pensacola, Florida, required automobile insurance for her 1986 Chevrolet Blazer and a 1978 Chevrolet Caprice. She went to the Respondent's Agency on June 15, 1994 and indicated to one of his employees that she was interested in the cheapest coverage available. She wanted nothing extra, except that required by law. She received very little explanation of the coverages and benefits, other than in response to questions she asked. The transaction of insurance was conducted in a similar manner to those referenced earlier in these Findings of Fact. The PIP and PD coverage was placed with the Florida Joint Underwriting Association. It carried a premium of $787.00. Despite Ms. Weber's request for only the minimum, legally-required insurance, she was also sold a motor club (Gulf Coast Travel Association) unbeknownst to her at the time at an additional fee of $150.00. In spite of the fact that Ms. Weber signed the disclosure concerning the optional nature of the motor club and related fee and so forth, as described in further detail in the above Findings of Fact, in actual fact, it was not explained to her. The fact that the fee for it was separate from the insurance premium for the insurance coverage was not explained to her and she effectively was not informed that she was purchasing that product. During the transaction, she was informed that if her vehicle broke down, she could obtain wrecker service. Nothing was mentioned to her, however, about Gulf Coast Travel Association or that the $150.00 was an extra fee. She merely had all of the forms presented to her in rapid fashion and was asked to sign them. The explanation simply was that the "total policy" cost $937.00, and there was a down payment of $318.00 supposedly for premium only. The entire transaction took approximately one-half hour. Later, Ms. Weber discovered that she had been misinformed and complained to the Department and the Respondent's Agency, specifically indicating that she had not been informed that the $150.00 for the motor club was separate nor that she had purchased motor club coverage. The receipt furnished to Ms. Weber concerning the amounts she paid to secure her coverage is misleading. It indicates a total premium of $937.00, when the actual cost of the insurance was $787.00. The additional $150.00 was for the undisclosed motor club coverage hidden in what was represented on the receipt as a "total premium". The down payment of $308.00 was deceptive or misleading in that only $158.00 of it was actually a down payment on insurance coverage. Barry and Deeana Walker of Pensacola, Florida, needed automobile insurance for a 1990 Plymouth Laser. They wanted the cheapest coverage legally required and available to them. The Respondent dealt with the Walkers and was their agent of record. Mr. Walker remembers nothing being mentioned about a motor club, but Mrs. Walker remembers that the agent mentioned "Nations Safe Drivers, Inc."; however, she specifically informed him that she did not want it. In fact, Nations Safe Drivers is a non-insurance membership plan which includes a medical supplement coverage benefit. It is not a motor club. The PIP and PD and bodily injury coverages were placed with Underwriters Guaranty Insurance Company (UGIC) for a premium of $641.00. The premium was originally financed by Underwriters Financial. Also executed on May 4, 1994 was another premium finance agreement with ETI. It provided for an insurance premium of $441.00 for a policy issued by UGIC and the financing of a Nations Safe Drivers enrollment for $100.00. This document was not signed by the Walkers. On May 4, 1994, the Walkers paid $150.00 by check and were required to pay an additional $143.00 by May 20, 1994. The $143.00 was paid; and subsequently, the Walkers received a notice of additional premium of $190.00 due and they paid an additional down payment of $76.00. The Walkers made payments on the ETI premium financing agreement up until October, 1994, even though it had never actually been signed. They made down payments of $369.00 and monthly payments totaling $333.63, for a total of $702.63. Sometime in October of 1994, they received a letter from the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Division of Drivers Licenses in Tallahassee, Florida, stating that Mr. Walker's driver's license was suspended because his insurance had been cancelled, effective July 16, 1994. The Walkers had received a notice from the insurance company of cancellation (because apparently that company would not insure co-owned vehicles) and had gone to the Respondent to see what to do about that problem. The Respondent told them to fill out a form which he gave them and that everything would be taken care of. They filled out the form at his behest so as to indicate that Mr. Walker's father, the co-owner, would not be a driver of the vehicle. Accepting the Respondent's representation, they believed that that would take care of the cancellation of coverage problem, and they continued to make their monthly payments on their premium financing agreement until October of 1994 based upon what the Respondent told them. In fact, the coverage was cancelled effective July 16, 1994; and soon thereafter, Mr. Walker's driver's license was suspended due to failure to carry valid insurance on his automobile. If the Respondent had acted with promptness in correcting the underwriting error, upon being apprised of the situation by the Walkers, the lapse in coverage and suspension of the driver's license need not have occurred and the payments on the original coverage need not have been made until October 11, 1994, when new coverage was finally obtained by the Respondent at the Walkers' behest. Although, on November 11, 1994, ETI credited the Respondent and the Walkers for $169.41 of unearned premium, the damage had already been done by that point in terms of the lapse of coverage and the suspension of Mr. Walker's driver's license, with attendant financial risk and inconvenience to Mr. Walker. Moreover, the receipt issued to the Walkers in the original insurance transaction indicates a total premium of $741.00. As in the other situations, the actual insurance cost was $641.00, and the additional $100.00 was for the Nations Safe Drivers non-insurance medical payment product, wrapped up in what was represented as "total premium". The down payment of $293.00 was similarly misleading because only $193.00 of that applied to actual insurance coverage. The Respondent received his fee of $100.00 for the added-on product mentioned above entirely out of the up-front, down payment amount. Thus, the Respondent received the entire fee for the Nations Safe Drivers product within a purported "premium receipt" amount described to the customer as an insurance down payment. On January 26, 1995, Ms. Betty Cook of Walnut Hill, Florida, needed to purchase insurance for her 1994 Thunderbird and her 1993 Chevrolet C1500 pickup truck. She went to the Respondent's Agency to accomplish her insurance renewal transaction. A lady by the name of Sonya handled the transaction for her that day. The Cooks' insurance was placed with UGIC for a premium of $1,123.00. The premium was financed through Underwriters Financial of Florida, Inc. The transaction was initiated on January 26, 1995 but ultimately concluded on January 28, 1995, after Mrs. Cook had received and signed all of the paperwork. Mrs. Cook made a premium down payment of $339.00 and mailed her first payment when it was due. She thereupon was sent a notice stating that no policy existed. She called the Agency to see what was wrong and someone at the Agency indicated to her that it would taken care of immediately. A lienholder on the pickup truck sent a notice to her that they had not been notified that the insurance had been renewed. Mrs. Cook became very concerned and the Respondent offered to refund her premium; however, three months had evidently elapsed since she first renewed her insurance or thought she had. Thus, Mrs. Cook, without knowing at the time, was driving her automobiles without insurance coverage for approximately a three-month period. Mrs. Cook contacted the Department and got her insurance reinstated and placed with another servicing agent. The policy was issued by UGIC, without requiring the payment of a premium down payment by the Respondent. The Respondent had still not forwarded the $339.00 down payment originally received from Mrs. Cook as of April 19, 1995. This lapse or failure to forward the insurance down payment obviously resulted in the coverage never being bound with the company. Therefore, the company had not issued and had no record of coverage for Mrs. Cook's vehicles. The agent for this company was required to account for and promptly forward insurance premium down payments, such as this, to the insurer he represented and on behalf of the insured he also represented in the transaction. Christopher Camus of Pensacola, Florida, went to the Respondent's Agency to purchase insurance for a 1983 Oldsmobile Cutlass. He went to the agency on August 25, 1993, and the Respondent placed his coverage with Security. The total premium was quoted as $274.00. Mr. Camus signed an application on that date and paid the full amount to the Respondent. The Respondent failed to forward the application and premium to the insurance carrier, and the policy of insurance was not actually issued until November 30, 1993. Mr. Camus was thus left without coverage for approximately two months. He made repeated telephone calls to the Agency to no avail. Agency personnel maintained that the problem was occurring with the insurance company itself and was not the fault of the Respondent's Agency. The Respondent deposited Mr. Camus' check in August of 1993, but the application for his insurance was never received by Security until December 23, 1993. The Respondent thus did not promptly and appropriately handle the insurance premium funds in question and forward the application so as to promptly bind the coverage for the customer. Indeed, it is noteworthy that this company revoked the Respondent's authority to bind coverage for customers on March 14, 1994 due to an excessive amount of such late submissions of insurance applications and premiums. In 1993, of the 1,299 applications taken by the Respondent and his Agency, only 58 percent reached the insurer's office within the required time period. In summary, the evidence presented in this case indicates that the Respondent engaged in the general business practice of selling ancillary products to insureds without truly obtaining "informed consent" of those insureds. The pattern running through the testimony of the above-described witnesses, none of whom were shown to have any motive to falsify their testimony, was that, although they signed the various disclosures on the insurance underwriting or binding documents, indicating that they understood that the ancillary products were optional, were not insurance, and were not required to be purchased. They did not receive any significant explanation of the optional nature of those products concerning the advisability of their purchase (particularly as to those customers who had AAA coverage), nor the extra cost attributable to those products. Each insured witness consistently maintained that he or she had not read the numerous documents presented to them. Certainly, they should have, in an abundance of caution, read the documents and attempted to understand them. Their failure to do so, however, does not absolve the Respondent of his duty to specifically explain to each customer the exact nature of the coverage being offered, whether or not it was legally optional, particularly, as to those customers who stated definitely that they only wanted the bare minimum coverage required by law, and the fact that it was optional at an extra cost, and was not included in the basic insurance coverage being sold. It is clear from these witnesses' testimony that none had requested motor club benefits or any other ancillary product and yet, in effect, these were automatically added to the policies involved in this proceeding in each transaction and were clearly not explained to the customers. The general business practice of the Respondent involved in the sale of the motor club and ancillary products belies the existence of "informed consent" on the part of the customers. Mr. James Self is a former agent for the Respondent, who testified regarding the Respondent's business practices. He was trained by the Respondent and worked for the Agency from August, 1993 to June, 1994. The Agency had a policy of giving telephone quotes for insurance premiums, without including the amount represented by motor club or other add-on optional products. The Agency would then add such products to the insurance package when the customer came in to purchase insurance. According to Mr. Self, any sort of explanation or disclosure of these add-on products to the customer would be merely to the effect that the insurance "quote" included towing or rental. There was little else explained about it. In many of the situations with witnesses in this case, the insureds only requested the minimum coverage and, therefore, no optional or ancillary products were justified without full explanation to the customer. Mr. Self described how the Respondent specifically trained him in "clubbing", which meant adding motor club coverage to the insurance coverage requested by customers. The Respondent's own testimony shows the economic necessity for the pervasive sale of such motor club benefits to as many customers as possible, when he stated: It's really the only way to exist . . . Q: So you're telling me that the only way for you to exist is to sell motor clubs? A: Financially, it's -- really for most businesses in this market it's the only way to be able to survive. Transcript, page 175. The Respondent further acknowledged the pecuniary interest he had in selling travel or motor clubs since he described his average commission as being 90 percent of the fee for writing that coverage, which is higher than the commission on insurance products. Moreover, he recovered all of that money from the down payment the customers were making, supposedly for their insurance coverages. Therefore, his incentive was multiplied because he was getting the high commission percentage rate, plus he was getting all of it in cash on the initial portion of the transaction, the down payment. Mr. Self also explained that salesmen would never tell the insured exactly how much the motor club cost. On occasions, when Mr. Self would try to partially disclose the motor club, the Respondent would tell him to "hurry up", that he was taking too much time in effecting the transaction. It was Mr. Self's experience that approximately 99 percent of the customers coming into the Agency for insurance left having purchased motor club benefits. Eventually, Mr. Self was terminated because he did not sell enough motor club products. The overall gravamen of his testimony shows that he attempted to make some disclosure or explanation of the motor club and other ancillary products but was discouraged from doing so by the Respondent, with the implication being that this ultimately resulted in his termination from employment with the Respondent's Agency. The evidence thus establishes that, for the most part, the insureds in question did not really know what "minimum coverage" or "full coverage" really consisted of when they came in to purchase such insurance. In making this lay description of the coverage they desired, they then relied on the agent, the Respondent or his employees, to sell them coverage which comported with their wishes and needs, since they were not schooled in the insurance business and related laws themselves. Since they were not so schooled, they almost totally relied on any explanation given to them by the Respondent or his agents or employees. In spite of the signing of the disclosure documents referenced in the above Findings of Fact, the reality of the situation, as a continuing, consistent pattern throughout the testimony adduced from these insureds, and from Mr. Self, reveals that no regular business practice of obtaining an informed consent from customers, such as these, was carried out by the Respondent.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent, Daniel Lee Alison, be found guilty of the violations set forth and discussed above, that his license as an insurance agent in the State of Florida be revoked for a period of two years and that he be ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $9,000.00, within a time to be set by the Department. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of October, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 95-2690 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-35. Accepted, except to the extent that they do not comport with the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact on these subject matters to which they are subordinate. Rejected, as being subordinate to the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as being subordinate to the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact on this subject matter and because of the editorial comment. Accepted, in part, but subordinate to the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact on this subject matter and rejected, as to the editorial comment. 39-40. Rejected, as being subordinate to the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact on this subject matter. 41-44. Accepted, in part, but rejected, as subordinate to the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact on this subject matter. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-13. Accepted, but not as materially dispositive of the issues presented for resolution. Accepted, in part, but rejected, as subordinate and somewhat contrary to the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted, but not itself materially dispositive to the issues presented for resolution in this case. 16-17. Accepted. 18. Rejected, as subordinate to the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact on this subject matter. 19-25. Accepted, but not themselves materially dispositive to the resolution of the issues presented to the Administrative Law Judge. 26. Accepted. 27-29. Rejected, as subordinate to the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact on this subject matter. 30-32. Accepted. 33-36. Accepted, in part, but rejected, as to the overall material import and as subordinate to the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact on this subject matter. 37-43. Rejected, as subordinate to the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact on this subject matter and to some extent, as immaterial. 44. Accepted, as technically correct, but witness Self, a former employee and a witness who purchased insurance, did establish in his testimony that purchase of an ancillary product was a pre-condition to premium financing by Agency policy. 45-47. Accepted, in part, but otherwise rejected, as subordinate to the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact on this subject matter. 48. Accepted. 49-52. Accepted, but not in and of themselves dispositive of the material issues presented concerning this witness' transaction(s). Rejected, as immaterial. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael K. McCormick, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Charles J. Grimsley, Esquire Charles J. Grimsley & Associates, P.A. 1880 Brickell Avenue Miami, Florida 33129 Bill Nelson Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dan Sumner, Acting General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Frank Alvin Lashman (Lashman), was at all times material hereto a licensed insurance agent in the State of Florida. Lashman is qualified for licensure and/or licensed as an Ordinary Life, including Health Agent, Dental Health Care Service Contract Salesman, and Legal Expense Insurance Agent. At all times material hereto, all funds received by Lashman from consumers or on behalf of consumers representing premiums or monies for insurance policies were trust funds received in a fiduciary capacity. Such funds were to be paid over to the insurer, insured, or other persons entitled thereto, in the regular course of business. On or about July 1, 1985, Lashman, as a general agent for American Integrity Insurance Company (American), solicited Martha Lunsford to purchase a medicare supplement insurance policy. On July 31 1985, Lashman secured an application for the subject insurance policy from Ms. Lunsford, and delivered to her a "certification" document which provided: That, I am a licensed agent of this insurance company and have given a company receipt for an initial premium in the amount of $189.20 which has been paid to me by ( ) check (x) cash ( ) money order. The proof establishes that Lashman did not receive the initial quarterly premium of $189.20 from Ms. Lunsford, or give a company receipt for any monies. Rather, Lashman collected $25.00 on July 3, 1985 with the intention of submitting the application to American once he had collected the entire initial premium. Over the ensuing months Lashman visited Ms. Lunsford on a number of occasions to collect the balance due on the initial premium. While the proof is uncontroverted that the full premium of $189.20 was never paid, there is disagreement as to the total amount Ms. Lunsford paid to Lashman. The premium installments Ms. Lunsford paid to Lashman were in cash. Lashman kept no record of the amount or date of payment, and gave no company receipt for the monies collected. The only evidence of payment Lashman provided to Ms. Lunsford was a brief note on the back of his business cards stating the amount received. The last business card he gave to Ms. Lunsford reflects a payment of $60.00, and a balance due of $9.00. On balance, the proof establishes that Ms. Lunsford paid to Lashman $180.20 toward the initial premium of $189.20. Under the terms of Lashman's general agent's contract with American, he was: . . . authorized to solicit applications for insurance for (American), to forward these applications to (American) for approval or rejection, and to collect only the initial premium payment due on such applications. While American averred that Lashman's contract did not permit him to collect the initial premium payment in installments, there is no such prohibition contained in the agreement or proof that Lashman was otherwise noticed of such a prohibition. Accordingly, there is no proof that Lashman committed any offense by collecting the premium in installments, by failing to remit any monies to American until he was in receipt of the full initial premium, or by failing to submit the application to American until the initial premium was paid in full. Although Lashman is free of wrongdoing in the manner in which he strove to collect the initial premium and his delay in submitting the application to American, the proof does establish that Lashman breached a fiduciary relationship by failing to safeguard and account for the monies collected. On November 22, 1985, Ms. Lunsford filed a criminal complaint against Lashman for his failure to secure the subject insurance policy. Incident to that complaint, Lashman was interviewed by a criminal investigator with the State Attorney's Office and served with a subpoena duces tecum which required the production of: ANY AND ALL RECORDS PERTAINING TO THE INSURANCE POLICY SOLD TO . . . MARTHA D. LUNSFORD ON JULY 3, 1985 BY FRANK LASHMAN, ACTING AS AGENT FOR AMERICAN INTEGRITY INSURANCE COMPANY. During the course of his interview, Lashman told the investigator that he had not procured the policy because the initial premium had not yet been paid in full. Lashman further stated that although he kept no records of the payments made, all funds received from Ms. Lunsford had been deposited in his account with Florida National Bank. As of December 20, 1985, Lashman's account with Florida National Bank carried a balance of $5.81. At hearing Lashman averred that he had erred when he advised the investigator that he had deposited the monies he received from Ms. Lunsford in his account with Florida National Bank. According to Lashman, he put the money, as he collected it, into an envelope, which he kept in the file with Ms. Lunsford's insurance papers. Lashman's explanation for not exhibiting the envelope and money to the investigator when questioned was ". . . he didn't ask me for that." Lashman's explanation is inherently improbable and unworthy of belief. On January 12, 1986, the investigator advised Lashman's attorney that a warrant had been issued for Lashman's arrest on the complaint filed by Ms. Lunsford. On his counsel's advice, Lashman sent Ms. Lunsford a cashier's check in the sum of $149.00, as a refund of premiums paid. Ms. Lunsford did not negotiate the check, nor was it of a sufficient sum to represent a return of all premiums paid by Ms. Lunsford.
The Issue The issues presented are (1) whether Respondent properly secured the payment of workers’ compensation insurance coverage and, if not, what penalty is warranted for such failure; and (2) whether Respondent conducted business operations in violation of a stop-work order and, if so, what penalty is warranted for such violation.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a corporation domiciled in Georgia and engaged in the business of electrical work, which is a construction activity. On July 2, 2004, Petitioner's investigator Katina Johnson visited 6347 Collins Road, Jacksonville, Florida, on a random job site visit. Investigator Johnson inquired of Respondent's superintendent at the job site whether Respondent had secured the payment of workers’ compensation coverage. She was informed that Respondent had done so and was subsequently provided with a Certificate of Liability Insurance from Respondent’s agent in Georgia, the Cowart Insurance Agency, Inc. Investigator Johnson also obtained a copy of Respondent’s workers’ compensation insurance policy which had a policy period of September 23, 2003, to September 23, 2004. The policy and the information contained in the Certificate of Liability Insurance were not consistent. Keith Cowart, Respondent’s insurance underwriter in Georgia, testified in deposition that the certificate of insurance is not correct because it conflicts with Respondent’s workers’ compensation policy, 01-WC-975384-20, which does not have a Florida endorsement. Subsequent to the site visit, Investigator Johnson continued the investigation of Respondent utilizing the Department’s Coverage and Compliance Automated System (“CCAS”) database that contains information to show proof of coverage. She determined that Respondent did not have a Florida workers' compensation insurance policy. Johnson also checked the National Council for Compensation Insurance (“NCCI”) database and further confirmed that Respondent did not have a workers’ compensation insurance policy for the State of Florida. Petitioner also maintains a database of all workers’ compensation exemptions in the State of Florida. In consulting that database, Johnson did not find any current, valid exemptions for Respondent. Florida law requires that an employer who has employees engaged in work in Florida must obtain a Florida workers’ compensation policy or endorsement for such employees utilizing Florida class codes, rates, rules, and manuals to be in compliance. Further, any policy or endorsement used by an employer to prove the fact of workers' compensation coverage for employees engaged in Florida work must be issued by an insurer that holds a valid certificate of authority in the State of Florida. The insurance policy held by Respondent did not satisfy these standards. First, Respondent's policy was written by Cowart Insurance Agency, a Georgia agency which was not authorized to write insurance in Florida. Second, the premium was based on a rate that was less than the Florida premium rate; the policy schedule of operations page shows that Safeco Business Insurance insured Respondent for operations under class codes utilizing Georgia premium rates. On July 6, 2004, Investigator Johnson received a copy of another insurance policy declaration page from the Cowart Insurance Agency for Respondent that still did not have Florida listed as a covered state under Section 3A. In fact, none of Respondent’s workers’ compensation policies had a Florida endorsement with Florida listed in Section 3A. On July 7, 2004, after consulting with her supervisor, Investigator Johnson issued and served on Respondent a stop-work order and order of penalty assessment for failure to comply with the requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, specifically for failure to secure the payment of workers’ compensation based on Florida class codes, rates, rules and manuals. After the issuance of the stop-work order, Respondent produced a certificate of insurance with a Florida endorsement that would allegedly confer workers’ compensation coverage retroactively for Respondent. Such retroactive coverage does not satisfy Respondent’s obligation. Employers on job sites in Florida are required to maintain business records that enable Petitioner to determine whether the employer is in compliance with the workers' compensation law. Investigator Johnson issued to Respondent a request for the production of business records on July 7, 2004. The request asked the employer to produce, for the preceding three years, documents that reflected payroll and proof of insurance. Respondent produced payroll records for a number of employees. On August 2, 2004, Investigator Johnson issued a second business records request to Respondent because she noticed that the names of the workers that she interviewed during her site visit were not the same as the list of employees submitted by Respondent. Respondent failed to produce the requested records. When an employer fails to provide requested business records which the statute requires it to maintain and to make available to the Department, effective October 1, 2003, the Department is authorized by Section 440.107(7)(e), Florida Statutes, to impute that employer's payroll using the statewide average weekly wage multiplied by l.5. Petitioner therefore imputed Respondent's payroll for the entire period for which the requested business records were not produced. From the payroll records provided by Respondent, and through imputation of payroll from October 1, 2003, the Department calculated a penalty for the time period of July 7, 2001, through July 7, 2004, by assigning a class code to the type of work utilizing the SCOPES Manual. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment which assessed a penalty of $115,456.14 was served on Respondent through its attorney on September 27, 2004. The Department issued and served on Respondent a second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment on November 10, 2004, with the penalty imputed back three years to July 7, 2001. The Department assessed a penalty of $100 per day for each day prior to October 1, 2003, for a total of $216,794.50. On April 28, 2005, the Department issued to Respondent a third Amended Order of Penalty Assessment with an assessed penalty of $63,871.02. The reduction in the amount of penalty was due to the Department’s determination that it did not have the authority at the time to impute the $100 per day penalty prior to October 1, 2003. On July 7, 2005, Respondent entered into a Payment Agreement Schedule for Periodic Payment of Penalty and was issued an Order of Conditional Release from Stop-Work Order by the Department. Respondent made a down payment of ten percent of the assessed penalty; provided proof of compliance with Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, by obtaining a Florida endorsement on its workers’ compensation insurance policy; and agreed to pay the remaining penalty in sixty equal monthly payment installments. Respondent has since defaulted on those payments. Section 440.107(7)(c), Florida Statutes, requires the Department to assess a penalty of $1,000 per day for each day that the employer conducts business operations in violation of a stop-work order. Several months after issuing the stop-work order, Investigator Johnson was informed that Respondent was conducting business operations in Miami in violation thereof. She obtained documentation that showed Respondent was performing electrical work as part of a contract it entered into with KVC Constructors, Inc., on August 4, 2004. Investigator Johnson obtained the daily sign-in sheets of KVC Constructors, Inc., that indicated the names of each entity that performed work on the job site for each particular day. She determined from the records that Respondent had worked 187 days in violation of the stop-work order prior to entering into the Payment Agreement Schedule and obtaining the Order of Conditional Release from the Department. On October 7, 2005, the Department issued to Respondent a fourth Amended Order of Penalty Assessment which assessed a penalty of $250,871.02. That amount was comprised of the $63,871.02 from the third Amended Order plus $187,000 for the 187 days of violation of the stop-work order.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order imposing a penalty against Respondent in the amount of $250,871.02 minus the amount of payments previously made by Respondent to the Department. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of June, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of June, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Colin M. Roopnarine, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229 H.R. Electric, Inc. c/o Mr. Jeremy Hershberger 5512 Main Street Flowery Branch, Georgia 30542 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Carlos Muñiz, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
