STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
L. T., )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) CASE NO. 95-3630J
) DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, )
)
Respondent. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
The final hearing in the above-styled matter was heard pursuant to notice by Stephen F. Dean, assigned Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings, on October 11 and 25, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: Richard M. Summa, Esquire
Post Office Box 1677 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
For Respondent: Lynne T. Winston, Esquire
Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The Petitioner asserts that the issues are whether the Petitioner was wrongly discharged from his employment by Respondent and whether Respondent is disqualified from employment pursuant to Chapter 39, Florida Statutes, by virtue of his having plead guilty to a disqualifying offense.
There is no basis for Petitioner's claim that Respondent wrongly discharged Petitioner from his employment because Respondent did not employ Petitioner. Petitioner's discharge was the result of determination by Respondent that Petitioner did not meet the statutory criteria for employment by Disc Village, Inc. as a counselor pursuant to statute. There is no jurisdiction in this forum pursuant to the provisions upon which this case is
brought for Petitioner to seek redress for his discharge from employment by Disc Village, Inc. The only issue considered is whether Petitioner is disqualified from employment as a youth counselor pursuant to Chapter 39, Florida Statutes, as a result of pleading guilty to criminal charges in South Carolina. There are two issues to be considered in that regard:
Whether the Petitioner was convicted of a disqualifying offense, and
If so, whether he has rehabilitated himself and is no longer a danger to children?
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The Petitioner was employed by Disc Village, Inc. at Greenville Hills Academy in Madison County in December, 1994. At that time, the administration of juvenile detention facilities was transitioning pursuant to law from the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services to the Department of Juvenile Justice. Petitioner had revealed in his application for employment his plea of guilty and sentencing to probation for a criminal offense when he applied for employment with Disc Village, Inc. As part of the employment process, Petitioner provided fingerprints to permit a criminal records check. This check confirmed Petitioner's sentencing for a criminal offense, and the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, which was at that time conducting the screening of individuals in sensitive positions, requested records from the South Carolina court. These records, together with the rest of the file, were turned over to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) as part of the shift in administration during January, 1995.
DJJ requested additional information from the Petitioner in early 1995 regarding this offense, and advised the Petitioner that it was his responsibility to demonstrate he was qualified for the position which he was occupying. The Petitioner made the information requested available to DJJ. Thereafter, the Respondent determined that the Petitioner was not qualified, advised Disc Village that he was not qualified to work as a youth counsel, and advised Petitioner of his right to a hearing on the matter. The Petitioner requested a formal hearing, and the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings on July 22, 1995. An Order to Show Cause was entered August 25, 1995, requiring to parties to clarify their positions with appropriate pleadings, and on September 6, 1995, a preliminary hearing was held to consider who carried the burden of proof of specific factual issues. It was held that DJJ had the burden to show the Petitioner was disqualified under the statutes, and that the Petitioner had the burden to show he had rehabilitated his
good character upon a showing that he was statutorily disqualified. The case was noticed for hearing on October 6, 1995, and heard as noticed, with the conclusion of the hearing being conducted on October 25, 1995.
At the hearing, both parties presented the testimony of several witnesses, both sides introduced several documentary exhibits, and the Petitioner testified in his own behalf. The parties both submitted post-hearing briefs including proposed findings of fact which were read and considered. The Appendix attached hereto states which of those proposed findings were adopted, and which were rejected and why.
FINDINGS OF FACT
O.L.T., the Petitioner, was hired by Disc Village, Inc., as a youth counselor at Greenville Hills Academy in December, 1995. Because of the nature of the employment, the Petitioner provided Disc Village, Inc. a fingerprint card for the purpose of conducting the statutorily required criminal records check. The Petitioner reported his prior arrest and subsequent plea of guilty to criminal charges in South Carolina to his employer at the time of his application for employment.
The criminal records check reveal the Petitioner's arrest and the investigator at the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (DHRS), which was administering this part of the program at the time, requested the Petitioner to provide them information regarding his criminal record in South Carolina in order to determine if the offense involved was disqualifying under the Florida law.
The records from South Carolina were provided to DHRS by the Petitioner, and revealed he had plead guilty to "conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute," in Horry County, South Carolina on December 7, 1987.
Based upon these records, which were provided to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) by DHRS when DJJ assumed full administration of the juvenile justice program, DJJ determined that the Petitioner was disqualified from employment as a youth counselor, and advised Disc Village, Inc., which discharged the Petitioner from the position in which he was employed.
The Petitioner's court records from South Carolina were introduced as Department's Exhibit 3. These records reveal that the Petitioner pleaded guilty to "conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute." These records do not reveal the statute to which the Petitioner pleaded guilty. The sentencing
document references only the indictment (87-GS-26-1796). Indictment 87-GS-26-1796 does not reference a specific statute, but recites the Petitioner did "knowingly, wilfully and intentionally, combine, conspire, confederate and agree between and among and have tacit understanding with a reliable informant working with the Myrtle Beach Police Department and with other evil disposed persons whose names are unknown to the Grand Jurors for the purpose of Possessing Cocaine with Intent to Distribute."
Joint Exhibit 1 is a copy of a portion of the South Carolina Code defining criminal offenses involving possession of drugs. There are two portions of the exhibit which address conspiracy, Section 44-53-370(e) and Section 44-53-420. Section 44-53-420 provides that any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense made unlawful by the statutes, shall be fined or imprisoned not more than half of the punishment prescribed for the offense which was attempted or which was the object of the conspiracy. Section 44-53-370(e) provides that any person who knowingly sells, manufactures, delivers, or brings into this state, or who provides financial assistance or otherwise aids, abets, or conspires to sell, manufacture, deliver, or bring into this state, or who is knowingly in actual or constructive possession of: (1) ten pounds of marijuana . . . ; (2) ten grams or more of cocaine or any mixtures containing cocaine is guilty of a felony which is known as trafficking in cocaine and upon conviction must be punished as follows if the quantity is: (a) ten grams or more, but less than twenty-eight grams, . . . not less than three years . . . ; (b) twenty-eight grams of more, but less than one hundred grams . . . not less than twenty-five years
. . . [.] These are mandatory minimum sentences.
The Petitioner was sentenced to one year in prison, and that sentence was suspended and he was placed on one years probation.
Although the Petitioner was arrested for conspiracy to possess more than 28 grams of cocaine, the indictment and sentencing documents do not reflect that he was charged with that offense, and his sentence is less than the minimum mandatory sentence for either of the offenses regarding possession or conspiracy to possess cocaine, even if the court reduced the sentence by a half pursuant to Section 44-53-420. None of the court records establish an amount of cocaine which Petitioner was charged with possessing, conspiring to possess, or to which the Petitioner plead guilty to conspiring to possess.
The Petitioner is a Black male who graduated from Florida A and M University, and was commissioned in the U.S. Air Force. He was employed by the Florida Probation and Parole Commission as a probation officer until going on active duty in
the Air Force where he was trained as an Air Policeman. He left the Air Force and was employed as by the Commission of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse in South Carolina where he established diversion programs for persons charged with driving under the influence.
He was subsequently employed in the low energy assistance program of the state, and then left state employment to work for C & S Bank, at which time he left South Carolina. Subsequently, he left C & S and returned to South Carolina where he started his own construction company. Because of financial hard times, he lost money and had to declare bankruptcy.
At the time of the events which gave rise to the charges against him, his wife was employed by the local prosecuting attorney, and he was well known to local law enforcement officers.
In 1987, he was working in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina; and it was his practice to eat lunch with a group of persons who were self employed, none of whom were involved in illegal dealings. This group of acquaintances also got together occasionally after work for a drink, and at one of these meetings one of the members of the group raised the possibility of investing in an enterprise which was not described, but which was represented to be very lucrative. From the way it was presented and very large return which was available, the Petitioner concluded it was an illegal activity, and was shocked that this person would make this representation. When he left the meeting, he was asked whether he wished to participate, he indicated that he would have get back to them about it. Upon leaving the meeting, Petitioner commented to one of the other attendees that the enterprise was undoubtedly illegal and something to be avoided.
Several days later, he received a telephone call after having been out with another group of friends drinking. The caller did not identify himself and was not a party to the earlier meeting; however, the caller referenced that meeting. The caller advised the Petitioner that the caller had $40,000,
and indicated indirectly he was calling about drugs and wanted to meet with Petitioner. The Petitioner said he did not know what the caller was talking about, but would meet him in a vacant parking lot, very close to Petitioner's house, to determine what the caller was calling about. The Petitioner did not acknowledge in the call what the caller was talking about or agree to do anything beyond meeting the caller.
Petitioner admitted that he had been drinking most of the evening, was drunk, and agreed to meet with the caller just to see if he really had the money. The Petitioner thought it could be a practical joke, and really did not give a great deal
of thought to the matter because he was so drunk. The Petitioner had picked the vacant parking lot in which to meet the caller because it was close to Petitioner's house and he would not have to drive far as drunk as he was. The area was also well lighted and he felt safe there.
Petitioner arrived at the parking lot, stopped his car, and was immediately surrounded by police officers who arrested him for conspiracy to traffic in cocaine.
A search of Petitioner revealed Petitioner was carrying twenty-seven cents. A search of his wife's car, which he had driven to the meeting, revealed his wife's pistol for which she had a permit and which she kept under the driver's seat. The Petitioner knew the gun was there. There were no drugs found in the car.
The caller was not present, and was never arrested or identified.
Petitioner was represented by the former solicitor (prosecutor) for the county. Petitioner and his attorney listened to the tape of the telephone conversation shortly after Petitioner's arrest. The tape was consistent with the Petitioner's testimony above; however, prior to trial, a copy of the tape was produced which was altered to be more damaging. Petitioner's attorney indicated that it would be very expensive to have the tape analyzed and to fight the charges, and that Petitioner could be sentenced up to twenty-five years for the offense. Petitioner's attorney advised Petitioner that the prosecutor was offering one year's probation if Petitioner plead guilty. On the advise of counsel, Petitioner accepted the plea bargain.
The Petitioner satisfactorily completed his probation, and has spent the intervening time supporting his children by working at various occupations to include installing cable TV and working on a electronic components assembly line after his return to Madison, Florida. He has attempted to rehabilitate his reputation by working regularly, avoiding disreputable persons, and attending church regularly. His employment with Disc Village, Inc. was his first attempt to reenter the criminal justice field since his probation. At the time of the hearing, Petitioner was volunteering as a facilitator in a life skills class, but was unemployed.
Petitioner's coworkers and supervisors testified in his behalf. They found him to be honest, truthful, and morally upright in his actions and dealings with them and the young people with whom he counseled. He spent many extra hours at the
facility, and respected by young people for whom he was an effective counselor. Petitioner would not be a danger to young people. No credible evidence was presented that the Petitioner did not possess good character or was a danger to children.
Since his probation, the Petitioner has had no further criminal involvement. He has been gainfully employed until discharged from Disc Village, and has been engaged in worthwhile volunteer work since then. He attends church regularly, sings in the choir, and lives with a minister. Petitioner has amended his life, and has a reputation of being honest and truthful. His work with the young people at Disc Village was exceptional, and he was held in high esteem by the staff and the young people.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties to this action in accordance with Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.
Section 39.001(2)(b), Florida Statutes, provides that persons guilty of specific offenses are disqualified from working in caretaker positions in Florida. One of the offenses enumerated is a felony violation of Chapter 893, Florida Statutes, relating to drug offenses or an offense committed in another jurisdiction which would be a felony violation of Chapter 893, supra., or involved children. The facts reveal that children were not involved in the offense. One of the issues is whether the offense to which Petitioner entered the plea in South Carolina is a felony in Florida.
Section 893.135, Florida Statutes, addressing trafficking in drugs establishes a minimum of 28 grams of cocaine. The facts do not support a finding that the Petitioner engaged in trafficking in 28 grams or more of cocaine. There is no citation to statute or any fact which indicates the Petitioner plead guilty to an offense involving 28 grams or more of cocaine.
The Respondent argues that Section 777.04(4)(e), Florida Statutes, makes conspiracy to commit an offense which is a third degree felony for sentencing purposes a second degree felony. This argument abandons proof that Petitioner conspired to possess 28 grams or more of cocaine, and is based upon violation of Section 777.04(4)(e), supra. The Department abandons proof of a certain amount of cocaine being involved; however, under this approach the Petitioner is not guilty of a violation of Chapter 893, Florida Statutes, but Section 777.04(4)(e), supra. The drug conspiracy statutes of both Florida and South Carolina require proof of a specific amount of the drug, which is lacking in this case.
It cannot be determined to which provision of South Carolina law Petitioner entered his plea and under which statute the court sentenced him. It cannot be determined from comparison of the states' statutes which provision of Florida law would have been violated under the facts of the case. It cannot be inferred that he was guilty of a disqualifying offense.
The burden is on the Respondent to prove that Petitioner is disqualified. Based upon the foregoing, it is not proven that Petitioner plead guilty to an offense which is disqualifying.
In a exercise of caution and to prevent any necessity for remand, the following discussion is included regarding the Petitioner's rehabilitation of his character.
Since his probation, the Petitioner has had no further criminal involvement. He has been gainfully employed until discharged from Disc Village, and has been engaged in worthwhile volunteer work since then. He attends church regularly, sings in the choir, and lives with a minister. Petitioner has amended his life, and has a reputation of being honest and truthful. His work with the young people at Disc Village was exceptional, and he was held in high esteem by the staff and the young people.
The Respondent presented no evidence that the Petitioner had not rehabilitated himself, and did not possess good character. It presented two witnesses one of whom felt Petitioner was not rehabilitated because he was not contrite about attempting to sell drugs, and took the view that until Petitioner admitted that was what he had done, the Petitioner was not rehabilitated. The "contriteness" standard is not required by the statute.
The other agency witness believed as a matter of policy that no person disqualified under Chapter 39, Florida Statutes, should be an employee of the Department or its contract agencies. While no one can question the witness' background or the conviction with which he holds this opinion, it is also inconsistent with the provisions of the law as it now stands.
The law provides that a person who is disqualified may prove rehabilitation and may prove that he is not a danger to society. The Petitioner has proved his rehabilitation and that he is not a danger to society. If the Petitioner were disqualified under Chapter 39, Florida Statutes, he has demonstrated his rehabilitation.
Based upon the consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is,
RECOMMENDED:
That Petitioner be qualified to work with youth in the Department's facilities and those of its contract agencies.
DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of December, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida.
STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
(904) 488-9675
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of December, 1995.
APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 95-3630J
The parties submitted proposed findings of fact which were read and considered. The following states which facts were adopted and which were rejected and why:
Petitioner's Recommended Order Findings
Paragraphs | 1,2 | Irrelevant. | |
Paragraph | 3 | Paragraph 1. | |
Paragraph | 4 | Paragraph 2. | |
Paragraph | 5 | Irrelevant. | |
Paragraph | 6 | Paragraph 3. | |
Paragraph | 7 | Subsumed by Paragraph | 4. |
Paragraph | 8 | Paragraphs 3,5. | |
Paragraph | 9 | Subsumed by Paragraph | 6. |
Paragraphs | 10-12 | Irrelevant. | |
Paragraphs | 13-16 | Subsumed in Paragraph | 18. |
Paragraphs | 17-20 | Irrelevant. | |
Paragraphs | 21-23 | Subsumed in Paragraph | 18. |
Paragraphs | 24-26 | Irrelevant. | |
Paragraphs | 27-31 | Subsumed in Paragraph | 18. |
Paragraphs 32-35 Discussed in the C/L and
rejected as credible witnesses regarding the Petitioner's character
Paragraphs 36-40 Unnecessary.
Paragraphs 41,42 Subsumed in Paragraph 17. Paragraphs 43,44 Conclusions of Law (C/L).
Respondent's Recommended Order Findings
Paragraphs 1-3 Subsumed in Paragraphs 1,2
Paragraph 4 Conclusion of Law.
Paragraphs 5,6 Subsumed in Paragraph 1.
Paragraphs 7-9 Subsumed in Paragraph 4.
Paragraphs 10,11 Subsumed in Paragraph 2.
Paragraph 12 Paragraph 3.
Paragraph 13 Paragraph 7.
Paragraphs 14,15 Subsumed in Paragraph 4.
Paragraphs 15-17 The discussion of the informal
hearing and its results is irrelevant.
Paragraph 18 Rejected as contrary to more credible evidence.
Paragraphs 19-21 Irrelevant.
Paragraph 22 Conclusion of Law.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Richard M. Summa, Esquire Post Office Box 1677 Tallahassee, FL 32302
Lynne T. Winston, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive
Tallahassee, FL 32399-3100
Calvin Ross, Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive
Tallahassee, FL 32399-3100
Janet Ferris, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive
Tallahassee, FL 32399-3100
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
All parties have the right to submit written exceptions to this Recommended Order. All agencies allow each party at least 10 days in which to submit written exceptions. Some agencies allow a larger period within which to submit written exceptions. You should contact the agency that will issue the final order in this case concerning agency rules on the deadline for filing exceptions to this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the final order in this case.
================================================================= PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF RECOMMENDED ORDER
=================================================================
STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
L. T., )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) CASE NO. 95-3630J
) DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, )
)
Respondent. )
)
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF RECOMMENDED ORDER
COMES NOW, Petitioner, O.L.T., and requests a clarification of the recommended order issued on this cause December 8, 1995, and as grounds therefor would state:
Petitioner, in his proposed recommended order and in his trial brief filed November 9, 1995, addressed the question of Petitioner's entitlement to an award of a reasonable attorney fee pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(b)5., Florida Statutes.
The question of Petitioner's entitlement to an attorney fee award was raised by Petitioner's motion for attorney fees filed October 9, 1995, and again by Petitioner's amended motion for attorney fees filed October 27, 1995.
At hearing, the Honorable Hearing Officer Steve F. Dean, requested that the parties address the question of Petitioner's entitlement to an attorney fee award.
Hearing Officer Dean's Recommended Order issued December 8, 1995, makes no mention of the question of Petitioner's entitlement to an attorney fee award.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests the issuance of an amended or supplemental order determining the question of Petitioner's entitlement to an attorney fee award.
Respectfully submitted,
Richard M. Summa Post Office Box 1677 Tallahassee, Florida FBN 890588
Ph. (904) 877-4546
Attorney for Petitioner
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been sent by U.S. Mail to: Lynne T. Winston, Esquire, Chief of Investigations, Department of Juvenile Justice, 2737 Centerview Drive, Tallahassee, FL 32399-3100, this 11th day of December, 1995.
Richard M. Summa
================================================================= SUPPLEMENTAL RECOMMENDED ORDER
=================================================================
STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
O. L. T., )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) CASE NO. 95-3630J
) DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, )
)
Respondent. )
)
SUPPLEMENTAL RECOMMENDED ORDER
A Recommended Order in the above-styled cause was entered on December 8, 1995. By oversight, the Hearing Officer did not rule on the Petitioner's pending Motion for Attorney's Fees. The Petitioner requested clarification of the Recommended Order on
December 11, 1995, requesting a ruling on the pending motion for attorney's fees pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(b)5., Florida Statutes.
The Petitioner makes his request for attorney's fees pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(b)5., Florida Statutes, which provides that a party is entitled to attorney's fees if the opposing party filed a pleading or other paper which was frivolous, or for an improper purpose, or for the purpose of needlessly increasing the cost of litigation. The Petitioner argues that the decision to disapprove the Petitioner's application for approval to work in an area governed by Chapter 39, Florida Statutes, was frivolous, or for an improper purpose, or for the purpose of needlessly increasing the cost of litigation. This argument is embellished with arguments that the Department was required to adopt rules to carry into effect the statutes under which it considered the Petitioner's application.
The only issue in considering the awarding of attorney's fees in this case is whether the Department had a reasonable basis for denying the Petitioner approval to work with young people. The Department denied the Petitioner on the basis of his conviction in South Carolina of a crime involving conspiracy to distribute cocaine. This is facially a very serious charge and potentially disqualifying under the provisions of Chapters 39 and 893, Florida Statutes.
It was only after a full exposition of the facts, including testimony by the Petitioner, that it was determined that the offense to which he pled guilty was not a violation of Chapter 893, Florida Statutes, and that determination is sufficiently dependent upon interpretation of the law, that the Hearing Officer felt it necessary to include a factual discussion of the Petitioner's rehabilitation as an alternative basis for consideration of his application.
The Petitioner's rehabilitation was also informally considered by the Department prior to its determination that the Petitioner was not rehabilitated. The informal hearing which preceded the determination that the Petitioner was not qualified was an informal "predetermination" hearing, and is permissible under the circumstances, although not required. This informal process prior to the notification of the agency's decision and notice of the right to a formal hearing does not warrant the award of attorney's fees. The facts show that there were facts which facially supported the agency's decision to require the Petitioner to show that he has rehabilitated his character and would not be a danger to children.
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the Petitioner's request for attorney's fees is denied.
DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of January, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida.
STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
(904) 488-9675
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of January, 1996.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Richard M. Summa, Esquire Post Office Box 1677 Tallahassee, FL 32302
Lynne T. Winston, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive
Tallahassee, FL 32399-3100
Calvin Ross, Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive
Tallahassee, FL 32399-3100
Janet Ferris, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive
Tallahassee, FL 32399-3100
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
All parties have the right to submit written exceptions to this Recommended Order. All agencies allow each party at least 10 days in which to submit written exceptions. Some agencies allow a larger period within which to submit written exceptions. You should contact the agency that will issue the final order in this case concerning agency rules on the deadline for filing exceptions to this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the final order in this case.
| Issue Date | Proceedings |
|---|---|
| May 23, 1997 | Opinion and Mandate filed. |
| Apr. 07, 1997 | First DCA Opinion (Affirmed) filed. |
| Jun. 20, 1996 | Supplemental Index, Supplemental Record, Certificate of Record sent out. |
| Jun. 17, 1996 | BY ORDER of THE COURT (motion to supplement the record is granted) filed. |
| Jun. 17, 1996 | BY ORDER of THE COURT (Motion to supplement the record is granted) filed. |
| Jun. 17, 1996 | Motion for Preparation of Supplemental Record (Richard Summa) filed. |
| May 28, 1996 | Index, Record, Certificate of Record sent out. |
| May 20, 1996 | Amended Index sent out. |
| May 17, 1996 | Notice of Filing (Transcripts) filed. |
| Apr. 22, 1996 | Index & Statement of Service sent out. |
| Apr. 17, 1996 | Certificate of Notice of Administrative Appeal sent out. |
| Apr. 17, 1996 | Reporter's Acknowledgment (from Richard Summa) filed. |
| Apr. 17, 1996 | Designation (court reporter to transcribe the transcript) filed. |
| Mar. 11, 1996 | Final Order filed. |
| Feb. 06, 1996 | Order Certifying Indigency sent out. |
| Jan. 31, 1996 | Notice of Administrative Appeal(Richard Summa) filed. |
| Jan. 31, 1996 | (Petitioner) Motion for Certificate of Indigency filed. |
| Dec. 11, 1995 | Petitioner`s Motion for Clarification of Recommended Order filed. |
| Dec. 08, 1995 | Recommended Order sent out. CASE CLOSED. Hearing held 10/11 & 25/95. |
| Nov. 13, 1995 | Respondent`s Proposed Recommended Order filed. |
| Nov. 09, 1995 | Petitioner`s Trial Brief filed. |
| Nov. 09, 1995 | Petitioner`s O.L.T.`s Proposed Recommended Order filed. |
| Oct. 27, 1995 | Petitioner`s Amended Motion for Attorney Fees filed. |
| Oct. 18, 1995 | Order Scheduling Hearing sent out. (hearing set for 10/25/95; 1:00pm; Tallahassee) |
| Oct. 11, 1995 | CASE STATUS: Hearing Held. |
| Oct. 11, 1995 | Department`s Response to Petitioner`s Motion for Attorney`s Fees filed. |
| Oct. 09, 1995 | Petitioner`s Motion for Attorney Fees filed. |
| Sep. 13, 1995 | Order and Notice sent out. (hearing set for 10/11/95; 10:00am; Tallahassee) |
| Aug. 24, 1995 | (Petitioner) Motion to Stay Order to Show Cause and Motion for Hearing to Determine Procedural Status filed. |
| Aug. 22, 1995 | Order to Show Cause sent out. (parties to show cause why this case should not be closed, the department will have 15 days to file a pleading setting forth the factual information and Petitioner will have 10 days) |
| Jul. 20, 1995 | Notice of Appearance and Motion for Continuance filed. |
| Jul. 18, 1995 | Notice; Request for Administrative Hearing, Letter Form; Agency Action ltr. filed. |
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| May 22, 1997 | Mandate | |
| Apr. 03, 1997 | Opinion | |
| Mar. 07, 1996 | Agency Final Order | |
| Dec. 08, 1995 | Recommended Order | Agency failed to show out of state conviction was disqualifying and petitioner showed rehabilitation and lack of danger to children. |
