STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
FLORIDA ADOPTION AND )
CHILDREN'S CENTER, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 96-0572
)
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN )
AND FAMILIES, )
)
Respondent. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Pursuant to notice, a formal hearing was held in this case on May 8, 9, and 10, 1996, and on June 25 and 26, 1996, in Miami, Florida, before Patricia Hart Malono, a duly-designated Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: Maria Consuegra, Esquire
155 South Miami Avenue Miami, Florida 33130
Vivian Figueras, Esquire
2810 Ponce De Leon Boulevard, Suite 1170 Coral Gables, Florida 33134
For Respondent: Colleen Farnsworth, Esquire
Department of Children and Family Services
401 Northwest 2nd Avenue, N-1014 Miami, Florida 33128
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Whether the Petitioner's license as a child-placing agency should have been renewed for the period from March 1, 1996, through February 28, 1997.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In a letter dated December 8, 1995, the District 11 legal office of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, now known as the Department of Children and Families ("Department"), notified Florida Adoption and Children's Center ("FACC") that its license as a child-placing agency would not be renewed for the period from March 1, 1996, to February 28, 1997. The Department stated in the letter that "[u]pon review of the adoption practices of Florida Adoption and Children's Center, the Department has determined that the minimum licensing requirements of F.A.C. 10M-24 have not been met." The Department further asserted:
The Department's concerns about the agency's adoption practices include the following:
Billing prospective adoptive parents for services that were never rendered
Overbilling prospective adoptive parents for services that were inaccurately and/or partially performed
Misrepresenting and/or making fraudulent statements orally and/or in writing to prospective adoptive parents about the status of their adoption cases
Breaching contractual obligations
FACC timely requested a formal hearing, and the Department transmitted the file to the Division of Administrative Hearings for assignment of an administrative law judge. The hearing was scheduled for May 8, 9, and 10, 1996, and, since it was not possible to complete the hearing within the time scheduled, a continuation of the hearing was scheduled for June 25 and 26, 1996.
At the hearing, FACC presented the testimony of the following witnesses: Lucy Perez; Lilliam More; Lucille Newsome; Renu Mody; Charlene Watts; Kenneth Russell Drake; Janet Esther Fryeman; Magaly C. Abrahante; Robert Deltorre; Esther Larubia; Rebecca Gaye Dornoff; Mrs. Nwadike; and Juan Nwadike.
Petitioner's Exhibits 1 through 23 were offered and received into evidence.
The Department presented the testimony of the following witnesses: Elizabeth Wolverton; Donna Romero; Rene Gonzalez- Llorens; Zoila Sala; Axia Torres Ramirez; Samuel G. Ashdown; Charles R. Householder; Linda C. Householder; Brenda Rogerson; Isabel Afanador; Ana Marie Negron; Luis Farah; Graciela Farah; Esther Blynn; Elizabeth Annon; Donna Silverman; and Alan Mishael. On rebuttal, the Department presented the testimony of Linda Scott. Respondent's Exhibits 1 through 9, 9A, 10, 11, 11A, 12,
13, 15, 17 through 22, 24 through 45, 47 through 54, 57 through
59, and 61 were offered and received into evidence. Respondent's Exhibits 60 and 63 were offered into evidence but rejected.
Official recognition was taken of Chapter 10M-24, Florida Administrative Code; Sections 409.175 and .401, Florida Statutes; and Chapters 39 and 63, Florida Statutes.
There was substantial delay on the part of the court reporter in filing the transcript of these proceedings. The final volume of the transcript was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on August 1, 1997. Proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed by the parties, and these proposals have been duly considered.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made:
The Department of Children and Families is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating child-placing agencies. Section 409.175, Florida Statutes.
At all times material to this case, Florida Adoption and Children's Center was a non-profit corporation licensed as a child-placing agency. The agency was first licensed in September 1991, and the agency's annual applications for license renewal were approved; the last license issued to FACC was a standard license for the period March 1, 1995, through
February 29, 1996.
Lilliam More was the executive director of FACC until it ceased operations as a result of the Department's decision to deny its application for license renewal for the period from March 1, 1996, through February 28, 1997. Before opening FACC, Ms. More worked for seventeen years with Catholic Community Services as a social worker. From 1974 until 1985, she worked at the maternity clinic run by that organization, where she was involved with mothers who wished to give their newborn children up for adoption. From 1985 until 1991, she worked in the adoption department of the organization handling both domestic and international adoptions.
The Department issued FACC's March 1, 1995, license as a result of a Joint Stipulation and Settlement Agreement entered into by the Department and FACC in early March 1995 in DOAH Case No. 94-7242. That administrative proceeding arose out of the Department's decision not to renew FACC's child-placing agency license for the period extending from March 1995 through February 1996. In the stipulation and agreement, the parties agreed in pertinent part:
2. That HRS had received complaints against FACC. As a result, HRS issued FACC a notice that their license would not be renewed.
* * *
That Respondent drafted new contracts which will be signed by all prospective adoptive parents as of this date.
* * *
That the complaints against FACC have being [sic] resolved.
That HRS is issuing a standard one year license to FACC.
That the matter has been settled by agreement between Petitioner and Respondent in that all issues of material fact have been resolved.
* * *
10. That HRS hereby fully waives, releases, renounces, discharges, and relinquishes any and all claims, demands, and causes of action it may have with reference to HRS CASE
NO. 94-7242 against Respondent FACC, relating to the failure of Respondent to fully comply with HRS licensing regulations.
On the basis of the stipulation and agreement, the file of the Division of Administrative Hearings in DOAH Case No. 94-7242 was closed, and the case was transferred back to the Department for issuance of the license.
The complaints referred to in the Joint Stipulation and Settlement Agreement were those made by Juan and Graciela Farah, Angel and Ana Negron, Julio and Esperanza Perez, and Elizabeth Wolverton. In its review of FACC's application for license renewal for the period beginning March 1, 1996, the Department considered the entire complaint history of FACC to determine if there was a pattern of bad professional practice by the agency. Among the complaints considered were those of Ms. Wolverton, the Negrons, and the Farahs. It also considered two other complaints, one from the Department's District 9 office questioning the sufficiency of a home study prepared by Ms. More
and another relating to problems with the Texas and Arizona offices of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children.
The Department notified FACC of its decision not to renew its license in a letter dated December 8, 1995. This letter was sent to notify FACC of the specific reasons the license would not be renewed, including "every violation of the rules and regulations" it had committed. (Testimony of Isabel Afanador, transcript at 388.) FACC's response to the letter was deemed unsatisfactory, and the Department decided not to attempt corrective action or to issue an extended or provisional license to FACC.
Elizabeth Wolverton
Elizabeth Wolverton contracted with FACC in July 1992 to adopt a Guatemalan child. She specified that she wanted a healthy girl no more than six months old. In a letter from the agency dated July 20, 1992, she was told that she could expect to be on the waiting list to adopt a Guatemalan child for approximately two years.
The Guatemalan adoption process is slow and cumbersome, and the efficiency with which adoptions are processed varies with the political environment in the country. It is not unusual for an adoption to take months, and sometimes years, longer than expected. Ms. Wolverton was advised of some of the difficulties inherent in a Guatemalan adoption in a letter sent by FACC to prospective adoptive parents in the summer of 1993.
Ms. More noted on a fee adoption agreement, which was not executed, that it would cost approximately $8,000 for a Guatemalan adoption, and that Ms. Wolverton would be responsible for additional charges for the child's immigration visa, which had to be renewed annually, and for the cost of caring for the child after the child was identified for her but before the adoption was finalized. Ms. More explained to Ms. Wolverton that there were a number of factors that could affect the cost of the adoption.
In November 1994, Ms. More asked Ms. Wolverton if she would be interested in a baby girl named Linda who had just been born in Guatemala. Ms. Wolverton stated that she would be interested, and Ms. More told her that it usually took approximately three to six months to complete the Guatemalan adoption procedures.
Shortly after Ms. Wolverton expressed her interest in adopting Linda, FACC sent her pictures of the child and the child's birth records. At or around this time, the Immigrant Visa Unit of the United States Embassy in Guatemala sent her a packet of information in which the Embassy cautioned those who wished to adopt Guatemalan children of the pitfalls of dealing with the Guatemalan adoption system.
Subsequent to March 1995,1 Ms. More told Ms. Wolverton that the paperwork on Linda had been completed by FACC's Guatemalan attorneys and that she would be able to travel to
Guatemala to pick up the child in "about six weeks." Ms. More relied for this information on representations made to her by the Guatemalan attorneys retained by FACC to handle the adoption in Guatemala.
In early June 1995, Ms. Wolverton began making preparations to travel to Guatemala in July to finalize the adoption and bring the child home. Before her departure, however, she telephoned the United States Embassy in Guatemala to notify them of her travel plans. She was told by the Embassy that Linda did not appear in the Guatemalan birth records and that there was no Guatemalan child cleared for adoption in
Ms. Wolverton's name. As a result of the information received from the Embassy, Ms. Wolverton did not travel to Guatemala in July 1995 as planned.
A short time later, Ms. Wolverton was told by the Embassy that Linda did exist but that she had not been legally classified as an orphan available for adoption because her mother had not appeared at the Embassy for the interview which was necessary before the United States would recognize Linda as a legal orphan available for adoption.
On the basis of the information she had received from the Embassy, Ms. Wolverton wrote Ms. More a letter dated July 25, 1995, directing her to stop the adoption process and demanding the return of all monies she had paid FACC to date, which she specified as $7,038. Ms. Wolverton complained that she had
waited eight months since she was told that a child had been identified for her and that the child had not been released for adoption as of July 1995.
After she sent this letter, Ms. Wolverton was notified by the Embassy that, on August 7, 1995, the child's birth mother appeared at the Embassy for her "relinquishment interview."
Even though her interest in adopting Linda was renewed when she learned that the birth mother had appeared at the Embassy for her interview, Ms. Wolverton did not, at any time subsequent to July 25, 1995, rescind her instructions to FACC to stop the adoption process or her demand for a refund of the money she had paid the agency. In fact, she reiterated her complaints against the agency to Maria Consuegra, FACC's Miami attorney, in a letter dated August 10, 1995.
At the same time, however, Ms. Wolverton was pursuing Linda's adoption on her own. In September 1995, she traveled to Guatemala with a friend to find out if Linda existed and had really been identified for her, and to do some research for herself on the status of the adoption. She met with the Guatemalan attorney who had been working on the adoption for FACC and signed some additional documents. Ms. Wolverton also spent an hour with Linda. The child was then eleven months old, and Ms. Wolverton felt that the child was very attached to her foster mother and that the child took a long time to be comfortable with her.
When Ms. Wolverton returned from Guatemala, she retained an attorney in Miami who speaks fluent Spanish to assist her in finalizing Linda's adoption. This attorney contacted the Guatemalan attorneys who were handling the adoption, but, even though the paperwork was complete, the attorneys were not able to move the paperwork through the final step in the Guatemalan adoption process.
By late November or early December 1995, Ms. Wolverton had signed with another adoption agency to start a new adoption process. Her attorney in Miami retained an attorney in Guatemala on Ms. Wolverton's behalf to assist her in adopting a different Guatemalan child. Because Ms. Wolverton was not certain that FACC had stopped the adoption process for Linda, she sent a letter dated February 2, 1996, to the Guatemalan attorney who had originally worked on Linda's adoption telling him to stop the process. She followed this letter with a letter to Ms. More dated February 23, 1996, reiterating her complaints against the agency and demanding a refund in the amount of $8,878, that is, of the $7,038 she had paid to the agency, together with miscellaneous expenses totaling $1,840.
Of the $7,038 Ms. Wolverton paid to FACC, $2,463 was paid to the agency for its expenses, $1,000 was paid to FACC's Guatemalan attorney handling the adoption, and $3,500 was paid to a Dr. Kuroyos, a Guatemalan physician who delivered Linda, monitored her health, and arranged for her care pending
completion of the adoption process. Ms. More attempted to get a refund of the amounts she paid to the Guatemalan attorney and Dr. Kuroyos, but she was not successful. To date, Ms. Wolverton has not received a refund from FACC.
At the hearing, Ms. Wolverton summarized her complaints against FACC as follows:
I felt there was a lack of communication. I felt that my phone calls were not returned and I felt that the letters I wrote were not answered and I felt that the adoption was continuing longer than they promised me.
They originally said I should have the baby home within six months and when I filled out the original application I stated that I wanted an infant aged zero to six months and the time kept going on and on and the child was getting older and older and I did not think she was available for my adoption, so I decided I wanted to sever my ties with Florida Adoption, so I could start with a new agency.
Donna Waters Romero
Donna Romero and her husband met Lilliam More in late December 1995 or early January 1996 when they attended a meeting at FACC's offices to learn about international adoptions, specifically adoptions in Russia. Ms. Romero and her husband signed a Fee Agreement/Foreign and a Service Agreement/Foreign with FACC on January 18, 1996. In the fee agreement, certain fees were identified as non-refundable, and in the preface to the fee schedule, a statement is included advising that persons signing the agreement attest that "[i]t is understood that there is no refund if: the work has been completed or the prospective
client withdraws." This provision is reiterated in the service agreement as follows: "FACC application fee, communications and shipping fees, home study and foreign program fees are NON REFUNDABLE if Parents withdraw for any reason."2
Shortly before contacting FACC, Ms. Romero and her husband had intended to go through a private attorney to adopt a Russian child. They contacted another agency, and a home study was completed by a person employed by that agency. Ms. Romero gave Ms. More a copy of this home study, but Ms. More told them she needed to do a new home study in the proper format for the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
Ms. More visited Ms. Romero's home one evening to initiate the home study, and she spent about fifteen minutes talking with Ms. Romero and her husband about the adoption process. At this time, Ms. More filled out the fee and service agreements, and Mr. and Ms. Romero signed them. Ms. More also asked the Romeros some questions, and she told Ms. Romero that she could get most of the necessary information from the home study which had been prepared by the previous agency. Ms. Romero had invited Ms. More for dinner, and she spent the next several hours telling the Romeros about her difficulties with the Department.
Ms. Romero immediately became suspicious of Ms. More because of what she considered the superficiality of the home visit, and she telephoned Kathleen McNeil of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service regarding the need for a new home study. Ms. McNeil told Ms. Romero that FACC was under investigation.
Ms. Romero then contacted either the Department or the State Attorney's office and confirmed that FACC was under investigation and that its license would not be renewed for the period after February 1996. Ms. More had not disclosed to Ms. Romero that the agency was under investigation or that the agency's license would expire at the end of February 1996.
Ms. Romero immediately called her bank to stop payment on the check she had written Ms. More on January 18, but the check had already been cashed. She then called Ms. More and left a message asking that she return her call; when she did not get a return call, Mr. Romero called Ms. More, but she did not return his calls either.
Ms. Romero sent Ms. More a letter dated January 24, 1996, stating that she had been advised that FACC was under investigation and that its license would expire at the end of February 1996. Ms. Romero directed Ms. More to stop all work on their adoption, including preparation of the home study.
Ms. Romero also demanded a refund of the money paid to the agency. A copy of this letter was sent to the Department's legal section.
On January 25 or 26, Mr. Romero went to FACC's office to tell Ms. More to stop working on anything related to their application. Ms. More told him that she had already finished the
home study, and Vivian Figueras, one of FACC's attorneys, sent the Romeros a letter in February 1996 confirming that the home study was complete. In the letter, Ms. Figueras transmitted FACC's offer to refund $1500 of the amount paid3 to FACC if they would sign a release. Ms. Figueras also reminded them that the home study prepared by Ms. More was good for one year.
Ms. Romero notified Ms. Figueras that she would not sign the release because she had not received a copy of the home study. The home study was approved by FACC's Adoption Review Committee on February 27, 1996, and Ms. Figueras sent a copy to Ms. Romero in a letter dated April 12, 1996. When Ms. Romero reviewed the home study prepared, she discovered that it contained information which she and her husband never discussed with Ms. More but which was included in the home study that had been prepared by the agency retained by Ms. Romero before she contacted FACC. In Ms. Romero's opinion, the original home study was sufficient, and it was not necessary for Ms. More to prepare a new one.
Ms. Romero paid a fee of $850 to FACC for the preparation of a home study. As of May 1996, she had not received a refund of this amount despite the demand for a refund contained in the January 24, 1996, letter.
Dr. Alexia Torres Ramirez
Alexia Torres Ramirez and her husband reside in Puerto Rico. Dr. Torres first contacted FACC on January 31, 1996, while
she was in Miami to attend a dental conference. She attended a presentation at FACC's offices to learn about international adoptions, specifically adoptions of Russian children, given by a Maryland agency named ATI. The ATI representative told
Dr. Torres that FACC would act as an intermediary in the foreign adoption process.
Dr. Torres met with Ms. More the day after the meeting, and Ms. More agreed to accept her and her husband as clients. Dr. Torres stated that the Puerto Rican equivalent of the Department could perform the home study required for the
adoption, and she and Ms. More agreed that she would mail all the other documents to Miami. Ms. More told her that FACC's fee as intermediary for ATI was usually $3,500 but that she would charge Dr. Torres $2,500 since FACC would not be doing the home study.
By March 7, 1996, Dr. Torres had obtained several of the necessary documents, and she telephoned Ms. More to arrange to mail them along with the application and the fee. Ms. More told her to mail the documents and $1,000 in partial payment of the adoption fee. Dr. Torres was not able to send $1,000, so she obtained a money order for $100, which she sent to FACC with the application and documents.
Dr. Torres heard nothing from Ms. More for about three weeks after she had sent the packet of documents and the money order. She telephoned the agency a number of times, but no one answered the telephone, so she left messages for Ms. More to
return her calls. None of Dr. Torres' calls were returned, and she telephoned the Department's Miami office and learned that FACC's license had expired February 29, 1996, and that the agency was under investigation.
Dr. Torres and her husband sent a letter to Ms. More on April 3, 1996, demanding return of the $100 they had paid FACC and of the documents they had sent to the agency. In a letter dated April 15, 1996, Ms. More enclosed the documents Dr. Torres had requested, but she noted that "all application fees are non- refundable." As of May 1996, Dr. Torres had not received a refund of the $100 she paid to FACC.
Charles and Linda Householder
Charles and Linda Householder first adopted a child through FACC in 1991. Shortly after the first adoption, they decided to adopt a second child through FACC. FACC placed a newborn baby with the Householders on April 11, 1995, pending completion of the adoption.
Ms. More telephoned the Householders before she took the child to their home and explained to them that there were two possible problems with the child. First, the child had a heart problem and, second, there were two men who could possibly be the child's father. The Householders told Ms. More that they wanted the child regardless of these potential problems.
When Ms. More delivered the child to the Householders, they signed an "At Risk Placement Form." By their signatures,
Mr. and Mrs. Householder acknowledged that they had been advised that the child had not been cleared for adoption, that termination of parental rights was pending, and that, if for any reason the court refused to terminate parental rights, the child would have to be returned to FACC within three days.
At the time they signed the "At Risk Placement Form," Ms. More told the Householders that the baby's mother was married at the time of her birth but that the father of the child was not her husband. Ms. More told Mr. and Mrs. Householder that it would probably be necessary to terminate the parental rights of both the natural father and the legal father but that she did not consider this a serious problem because neither man seemed interested in the child.
On May 18, 1995, FACC filed a Petition for Termination of Parental Rights regarding the child placed with the Householders. On May 31, 1995, a judge in the Juvenile Family Division of the Dade County circuit court entered an Order of Dependency and Temporary Custody, finding the child dependent and committing her to the temporary custody of FACC.4
When the child was approximately three months old, her legal father asked to see her, and the Householders took her to FACC's office, where the child spent about thirty minutes with this man. At this point, the Householders were very concerned that the legal father might contest the adoption, and they were not sure of the legal status of the case. They attempted to
contact FACC's attorney, Maria Consuegra, for information, but she did not return four or five telephone calls made during one week in July.
A friend had given the Householders the name of an attorney who handles adoptions. As a result of Ms. Consuegra's failure to return their telephone calls and of their feeling that the case was not progressing satisfactorily, they contacted Alan Mishael, the attorney recommended by their friend, and requested that he review the case and advise them if they needed legal assistance to protect their interest in the adoption process. In a letter dated July 30, 1995, Mr. and Mrs. Householder notified Ms. More that Mr. Mishael had agreed to review the case, and they requested that Ms. More provide copies of any documents she might have and to cooperate fully with Mr. Mishael.
In early August 1995, Ms. More made her third home visit to the Householders. At that time, she requested payment of the balance of the fee charged for the adoption. This was in accordance with the terms of the fee agreement the Householders had signed with FACC, but they refused to pay because they feared that they would lose whatever leverage they had over FACC; they felt that it would not be appropriate to pay the agency until the adoption had been finalized.
After reviewing the status of the adoption, Mr. Mishael advised the Householders that they needed independent legal representation in the adoption because, in his opinion, the
matter was not being handled properly by FACC. In early August 1995, the Householders formally retained Mr. Mishael to
represent them. He then contacted the Department, and at least two lawyers employed by District 11 expressed to him their "disenchantment" with FACC. Mr. Mishael kept the Department attorneys informed about the adoption proceeding, and the Department became involved in the proceeding to the extent that the judge requested a report on the complaints the agency had received relating to FACC. In a report dated September 25, 1995, the Department summarized for the judge the five specific complaints it had received about FACC, including the four complaints covered by the Joint Stipulation and Settlement Agreement executed in March 1995. The Department also referred to "complaints from other individuals and HRS licensing departments regarding unacceptable home studies and inappropriate placements by FACC."
Because Mr. Mishael disagreed with the way in which the agency was proceeding with the adoption and found what he considered to be defects in the pleadings filed by FACC, he filed a Motion to Intervene in the proceeding initiated by FACC to terminate parental rights; this motion was not opposed by FACC and was granted by order entered October 18, 1995. Mr. Mishael also filed a Verified Petition for Dependency and for Termination of Parental Rights on behalf of the Householders on November 6,
1995, and incorporated into the petition some of the documents prepared by FACC.
The adoption had not been finalized as of May 9, 1996, the date of the Householders' testimony at the hearing in this case. Mr. Householder is aware, however, that the parental rights of the mother and of the legal father have been terminated and that the Department is continuing the search for the putative natural father of the child.
As of May 1996, Mr. Mishael had submitted bills to the Householders for approximately $7,000 to $8,000 in legal fees and costs, which the Householders are paying at the rate of $100 per month. Mr. Mishael estimated that he had worked at least thirty hours on the case.
Mr. and Mrs. Householder did not file a complaint against FACC with the Department.
Ana Marie Negron5
In early 1993, Angel and Ana Marie Negron decided to go through FACC to adopt a Russian child. The adoption process was not completed, and Mr. and Mrs. Negron filed suit against FACC to recover money they had paid to the agency. The civil action was dismissed pursuant to an Order Approving Mediation Settlement entered by the county court in Dade County on January 12, 1995. Luis and Graciela Farah6
In early 1993, Luis and Graciela Farah filed an application to adopt a Russian child through FACC. The adoption process was not completed, and Mr. and Mrs. Farah filed suit in the Dade County Circuit Court to recover the money they had paid to the agency. A judgment was obtained against FACC on March 1, 1995, and the judgment was satisfied in September 1995.
Brenda Rogerson
Brenda Rogerson is a resident of Maine, and, in 1995, she was working with an adoption agency in Bangor, Maine, to adopt her fifth child. On December 15, 1995, Ms. Rogerson was contacted by FACC through a referral from her Maine agency. She was told that FACC had a baby girl ready for a pre-adoptive placement. FACC sent her a number of documents via facsimile transmittal, including medical information and background history on the child. After reviewing this information, Ms. Rogerson said she would like to adopt the child, who was free for adoption since parental rights had already been terminated.
Once Ms. Rogerson agreed to take the child, FACC asked her to pay a fee of $5,000 to cover the placement of the child. She sent FACC a check in the amount of $5,000 on December 16, 1995. She knew that it would take about ten days for the placement to be approved by the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children ("Interstate Compact"),7 and Ms. More confirmed that she should be able to come to Florida to pick up the child between Christmas and New Year.
Ms. More set about collecting the documents which needed to be sent to the Interstate Compact office, and, on December 15, 1995, she sent these documents to Linda Scott, who is the deputy administrator of Florida's Interstate Compact office.
In a transmittal memorandum dated December 19, 1995, Samuel G. Ashdown notified FACC that its placement request on the child promised to Ms. Rogerson was being returned because he had learned that the Department was not going to renew FACC's license. As a result, according to Mr. Ashdown, FACC could not carry out its responsibilities regarding the adoption of the child because its license would expire before the adoption could be finalized. When she learned this, Ms. More tried to find an agency that would accept a transfer of the child so the adoption could be finalized but was unable to do so.
A day or two after Christmas, Ms. Rogerson called her adoption agency in Maine and asked about the status of the
placement. The agency made some inquiries and told her that the placement had not been approved by Florida's Interstate Compact office. When she heard that the placement had not been approved, Ms. Rogerson telephoned FACC. Despite her repeated attempts to contact Ms. More, Ms. Rogerson was not able to speak with her until January 16, 1996. Ms. More confirmed that the placement was not approved because of some problems the agency was having with the Department.
Ms. Rogerson asked for a refund of the $5,000 she had paid for the placement. Ms. More asked her to submit her request in writing, which she did in a letter sent to Ms. More via facsimile transmittal on January 17, 1996. Before sending the letter, Ms. Rogerson contacted an attorney to assist her in obtaining the refund.
After trying to reach Ms. More by telephone several times, Ms. Rogerson spoke with her on January 22, 1996. During that conversation, Ms. More told her that FACC's board of directors was scheduled to meet on January 25 and that the refund would be discussed at the meeting. When Ms. Rogerson had not heard anything by January 30, she tried to contact Ms. More and received no answer. She wrote to Ms. More on January 30 and demanded an immediate refund of her money within ten days, advising Ms. More that, if she did not have her money within ten days, she would file a complaint with the Department.
Ms. Rogerson received a letter and a release from FACC's attorney, Vivian Figueras, on February 12, 1996.
Ms. Figueras requested that she sign the release and return it to her, at which time she would sent the $5,000 check. Ms. Rogerson refused to sign the release before she got the check, and a plan was worked out whereby Ms. Rogerson's attorney would hold the check until she signed the release. On February 23, 1996,
Ms. Rogerson received a $5,000 check from FACC dated February 12, 1996.
Michael and Rebecca Dornoff
Rebecca Dornoff first heard of a Haitian child named Florine in December 1994 from Charlene Watts, a person who has adopted a number of special needs children and who acts as a representative for the Gabriel Foundation in Florida. The Gabriel Foundation is affiliated with the World Harvest Missions. In December, Florine had just been transported to Florida from Haiti and was ready for placement.
Mr. and Ms. Dornoff reside in Michigan, and they have seventeen children, two natural children and fifteen adopted children ranging in age from two years to eighteen years.
In February 1995, Ms. Dornoff contacted the Gabriel Foundation and told the director that she and her husband wished to adopt Florine. Ms. Dornoff then contacted FACC and asked
Ms. More to do the paperwork necessary to complete the adoption.
In March 1995, Ms. More sent a packet of documents to Linda Scott of Florida's Interstate Compact office, together with the ICPC-100A form that initiated the request for approval of Florine's placement to the Michigan and Florida Interstate Compact offices. On March 15, 1995, Ms. Scott sent a transmittal memorandum to Michigan's Interstate Compact office to notify it that the approval process had been initiated and to request that a psychological evaluation be done in the adoptive home.
At the same time, Ms. Scott contacted Ms. More and told her that she needed to advise the Michigan Interstate Compact Office how FACC intended to finalize the adoption. According to Ms. Scott, when a child is to be placed in Michigan, a decision regarding the state in which the adoption will be finalized must be made before placement because, again according to Ms. Scott, the laws of Michigan require that a Michigan court approve the adoption of an out-of-state child before the child's placement in Michigan. According to Ms. Scott, in Florida, the courts can generally finalize adoptions only for children who are placed with parents who reside and are employed in Florida, except when the child is committed to a Florida licensed child-placing agency for adoption. As far as Ms. Scott knew, the Gabriel Foundation was Florine's guardian and the child had not been committed to FACC for adoption so that the adoption could not, in Ms. Scott's opinion, be finalized in Florida.8
In June 1995, Ms. More contacted Ms. Dornoff and told her that the Interstate Compact office had approved the placement. In July 1995, Ms. Dornoff traveled to Florida and returned to Michigan with Florine.
Ms. Scott did not receive a response from Ms. More to the request of March 15, and Ms. Scott heard nothing more from Ms. More on the Dornoff placement until she received a letter from Ms. More dated December 15, 1995. In the letter, Ms. More transmitted to Ms. Scott the First Supervisory Report on Florine, which had been prepared in September 1995 by an adoption agency in Michigan. It was through this letter that Ms. Scott first learned that Florine had been placed in Michigan on July 22, 1995. Ms. Scott called her counterpart in the Michigan Interstate Compact office and learned that Michigan was still waiting for information about the plans for finalizing the adoption and had not approved the placement. According to
Ms. Scott, because of this premature placement, the adoption could not be finalized in Michigan and the placement was made in violation of the Interstate Compact.
In January 1996, Ms. Dornoff learned from the Interstate Compact office in Michigan that there was a problem with Florine's placement because there was, in fact, no Interstate Compact approval to place the child with the Dornoff family. Ms. Dornoff then called Linda Scott. Ms. Scott confirmed that FACC had not received approval to place the child
in Michigan, but she told Ms. Dornoff that she and her husband could try to finalize the adoption in Florida, although, in
Ms. Scott's opinion, it would always be open to attack because of the violation of the Interstate Compact.
In memoranda to the Department's legal section dated January 2, 3, and 8, 1996, Ms. Scott advised her of the Dornoff situation and of her opinion that there was an illegal placement, that FACC had violated the Interstate Compact, and that FACC's license should be suspended or revoked.
On January 18, 1996, Ms. Scott sent a transmittal memorandum notifying Ms. More for the first time of her concern about the Dornoff placement and requesting that Ms. More advise her on how she intended to finalize the adoption.
In accordance with Ms. Scott's advice, Ms. Dornoff decided to finalize the adoption in Florida. She contacted an attorney in Dade County, Florida, who was recommended to her by FACC. The attorney filed a petition to finalize the adoption, and a Final Judgment of Adoption was entered in Dade County on May 28, 1996. In the judgment, the court noted that World Harvest Missions, to which the child had been committed for adoption, had consented to the adoption and that the adoption was recommended by FACC, which was identified as a "duly licensed child-placing agency under the laws of Florida."
Complaints regarding the sufficiency of home studies
In addition to the complaints against FACC regarding its handling of adoption proceedings, the Department received two in-house complaints regarding home studies prepared by FACC. One complaint was made in a memorandum dated July 31, 1995, by the district administrator for the Department's District 9, which encompasses Broward County. According to the complaint, Ms. More did a home study in which she found suitable as an adoptive parent a single, divorced, forty-year-old male who expressed an interest in adopting one particular seventeen-year-old girl with special needs or in adopting any female child or youth ten years old or older with special needs. The district administrator returned the home study to Ms. More with a letter in which she raised a number of questions regarding the suitability of the applicant as an adoptive parent and the omission from the home study of information critical to evaluating his suitability.
Ms. More was in contact with District 9 and agreed to resolve the problem.
In another case, an employee of the Department who specializes in adoption subsidies had a concern about a home study prepared for Russell and Charlene Watts, who, at the time, had at least thirteen children in the home, nine of whom were adopted, special needs children. A home study update done by FACC on October 29, 1994, and signed by Ms. More was submitted to the Department with a request for an adoption subsidy for a special needs child named Jonathan. In the home study, however,
references were made to the suitability of the family to adopt a child named Lidia. The Department requested that Ms. More provide a current home study, and it also questioned the ability of the Watts to care for an additional special needs child.
Ms. More responded to the request for a current home study in January or February 1996, and the adoption subsidy was ultimately approved by the Department.
Complaints relating to Interstate Compact placements
Russell and Charlene Watts were also the subject of inquiries to Florida's Interstate Compact office from the Texas and Arizona Interstate Compact offices. Both of these states had requested updated information from FACC on the Watts' home, but the information had not been timely submitted.
Texas had placed a child in the Watts home in October 1994 and, although it had received reports from FACC regarding three supervisory visits, there had been no report forthcoming of the fourth supervisory visit required under the placement agreement. The Texas Department of Protective Services notified the Florida Interstate Compact office of FACC's failure to provide the report or to otherwise respond to its requests.
Texas also expressed concern that, as of June 1995, Mr. and Mrs. Watts had not initiated the adoption process. This
complaint against FACC was resolved when it agreed to provide the requested information, and the adoption was finalized in November or December 1995.
In or about September 1995, the Arizona Interstate Compact office sent to the Florida Interstate Compact office a request for approval to place another child with the Watts family. The home study provided by FACC was out-dated, and Arizona had not received a response to its request that FACC provide an updated home study of the Watts family as of October 5, 1995. In November 1995, when FACC still had not
provided the updated home study, the Florida Interstate Compact office denied the Arizona request to place a child with Mr. and Mrs. Watts. The bases for the denial were Ms. Scott's concerns regarding FACC's late response to the Texas requests and her conclusion that it was not appropriate to place a child with the Watts family with FACC as the supervisory agency. A new agency became involved with the Arizona child in January 1996, and the Florida Interstate Compact office approved the request to place the child in the Watts home.
On December 8, 1995, the Florida Interstate Compact office sent a transmittal memorandum to FACC pointing out three deficiencies in a request for approval to place a Florida child in Michigan. Two of the deficiencies were minor, but the third involved an out-dated, unsigned home study update. Mr. Ashdown felt that the out-dated home study was a serious deficiency, and he decided that it was necessary to return the request to FACC with instructions to correct the deficiencies and resubmit the request. Although FACC did not respond to this request, it is
the prerogative of the child-placing agency to decide not to resubmit a request for approval to place a child out-of-state.
FACC presented the testimony of a number of persons who had very good experiences with both domestic and international adoptions handled by FACC and would adopt through that agency again if it were licensed.
Summary
The evidence presented by the Department was not sufficient to establish that FACC engaged in the adoption practices which the Department identified as the basis for its decision to deny FACC's application for renewal of its license as a child-placing agency. The Department did not identify a single contractual provision which was breached by FACC; it did not establish a reasonable fee for the services rendered by a child- placing agency against which the fees charged by FACC could be judged; it did not establish an objective standard by which the adequacy of and necessity for the services performed by FACC could be evaluated; and, except as noted below, it did not establish that Ms. More made any statement to prospective adoptive parents that she knew or should have known was false.
The evidence presented by the Department is sufficient to establish that Ms. More placed a child who resided in Florida with a family which resided in Michigan without having received approval under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children and that, in doing so, Ms. More told the prospective
adoptive parents that the placement had been approved when she knew or should have known that approval had not been given.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this proceeding and of the parties thereto pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (1997).
Section 409.175(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1995)9 provides:
A person or agency, other than a parent or legal guardian of the child or an intermediary as defined in s. 63.032, shall not place or arrange for the placement of a child in a family foster home, residential child-caring agency, or adoptive home unless such person or agency has first procured a license from the department to do so.
Sections 409.175(5)(h) and (i) provide in pertinent part:
Upon determination that the applicant meets the state minimum licensing requirements, the department shall issue a license without charge to a specific person or agency at a specific location. The
license is valid for 1 year from the date of issuance, unless the license is suspended or revoked by the department or is voluntarily surrendered by the licensee. The license is the property of the department.
A license issued for the operation of a family foster home or agency, unless sooner suspended, revoked, or voluntarily returned, will expire automatically 1 year from the date of issuance. Ninety days prior to the expiration date, an application for renewal shall be submitted to the department by a licensee who wishes to have the license renewed. A license shall be renewed upon the
filing of an application on forms furnished by the department if the applicant has first met the requirements established under this section and the rules promulgated hereunder.
Section 409.175(8) provides:
(8)(a) The department may deny, suspend, or revoke a license.
(b) Any of the following actions by a home or agency or its personnel is a ground for denial, suspension, or revocation of a license:
An intentional or negligent act materially affecting the health or safety of children in the home or agency.
A violation of the provisions of this section or of licensing rules promulgated pursuant to this section.
Noncompliance with the requirements for good moral character as specified in paragraph (4)(a).
Failure to dismiss personnel found in noncompliance with requirements for good moral character.
Section 409.175(4)(a) directs the Department to adopt rules setting forth the licensing requirements for child-placing agencies. The Department adopted Chapter 10M-24, Florida Administrative Code, to carry out this mandate.10
Because this case involves the renewal of FACC's license to operate as a child-placing agency, it is FACC's burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it meets the minimum requirements for licensure. See Florida Department of Transportation v. J.W.C. Co., Inc., 396 So. 2d 778, 788 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)("[T]he party asserting the affirmative of an issue before the administrative tribunal carries the burden of proof."). The Department, however, must prove that FACC
committed the acts upon which it bases its decision to deny the application for license renewal. Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Securities and Investor Protection v.
Osborne Stern and Co., 670 So. 2d 932, 933-34 (Fla. 1996).
In this case, the Department did not identify in its December 8, 1995, letter any specific statutory sections or rules upon which it based its decision to deny FACC's application to renew its child-placing agency license. Rather, the Department advised FACC only that "the Department has determined that the minimum licensing requirements of F.A.C. 10M-24 have not been met" and that it had four "concerns" regarding FACC's "adoption practices": that FACC billed prospective adoptive parents for services they did not receive; that FACC over-billed prospective adoptive parents for services "inaccurately and/or partially performed;" that FACC made misrepresentations or fraudulent statements to prospective adoptive parents regarding the status of their adoptions; and that FACC breached contractual obligations.
On the basis of the findings of fact herein, the Department has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that FACC engaged in the "adoption practices" specified in the December 8, 1995, notification letter.11 For the most part, the Department elicited from its complaining witnesses a chronicle of their experiences with FACC and Ms. More, in which they expressed their subjective perceptions regarding the quality and adequacy
of the services provided and their equally subjective perceptions regarding their entitlement to refunds of the monies paid to FACC for its services.
An issue that was raised by the Department at the hearing and tried without objection involved FACC's dealings with the Interstate Compact offices in Florida and Michigan with regard to the placement of the Haitian child named Florine in the home of Rebecca Dornoff. The Department presented the testimony of Samuel Ashdown and Linda Scott on this issue, and FACC presented the testimony of Rebecca Dornoff regarding Florine's placement in her home and her experience with FACC.
Article III of the Interstate Compact provides:
(a) No sending agency shall send, bring, or cause to be sent or brought into any other party state any child for placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption unless the sending agency shall comply with each and every requirement set forth in this article and with the applicable laws of the receiving state governing the placement of children therein.
* * *
(d) The child shall not be sent, brought, or caused to be sent or brought into the receiving state until the appropriate public authorities in the receiving state shall notify the sending agency, in writing, to the effect that the proposed placement does not appear contrary to the interests of the child.
Article IV of the Interstate Compact provides:
The sending, bringing, or causing to be sent or brought into any receiving state of a child in violation of the terms of this
compact shall constitute a violation of the laws respecting the placement of children of both the state in which the sending agency is located or from which it sends or brings the child and of the receiving state. Such violation may be punished or subjected to penalty in either jurisdiction in accordance with its laws. In addition to liability for any such punishment or penalty, any such violation shall constitute full and sufficient grounds for the suspension or revocation of any license, permit, or other legal authorization held by the sending agency which empowers or allows it to place, or care for children.
On the basis of the findings of fact herein, the Department has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that FACC acted as the sending agency with regard to the placement of Florine in Michigan with the Dornoff family and that it violated the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, Section 409.401, Florida Statutes, because it placed the child without having received approval for the placement from the Michigan Interstate Compact office.
The Department also presented evidence, without objection, which was sufficient to establish that Ms. More accepted an application from Dr. Torres, together with a $100 application fee, after FACC's license had expired on February 29, 1996. This conduct cannot be a basis for denying FACC's application for license renewal for the period March 1, 1996, through February 28, 1997, because it occurred after FACC's license had expired.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order finding that Florida Adoption and Children's Center violated Section 409.401, Florida Statutes (1995), and denying its application for renewal of its license as a child-placing agency for the period from March 1, 1996, through February 28, 1997.
DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of May, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
PATRICIA HART MALONO
Administrative Law Judge
Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060
(850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675
Fax Filing (850) 921-6847
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of May, 1998.
ENDNOTES
1/ Ms. Wolverton is one of the complainants whose complaint had purportedly been resolved when the Joint Stipulation and Settlement Agreement was executed in March 1995. For the reasons stated in endnote 11, infra, except for certain background information, only that testimony relating to Ms. Wolverton's experiences with FACC after March 1995 is relevant to this proceeding.
2/ The contract used by FACC subsequent to March 1995 was prepared with the Department's guidance and approval.
3/ No evidence was submitted as to the total amount paid to FACC by the Romeros.
4/ Esther Blynn, an attorney for the Department who handles most of the termination of parental rights proceedings involving the Department and all adoption proceedings in which the Department's consent is required, testified that, in her opinion, the Petition for Termination of Parental Rights and the supporting documents filed by FACC with regard to the child placed with the Householders were not legally sufficient to support either the termination of the rights of the legal father and the putative natural father or the Order of Dependency and Temporary Custody requested in the petition's prayer for relief and entered by the court on May 31, 1995. This testimony is rejected, first, because no representation was made in FACC's petition that it requested the termination of the rights of the legal or putative natural father and, second, because the court determined that the pleadings were legally sufficient when it entered the Order of Dependency and Temporary Custody.
5/ Mr. and Mrs. Negron are complainants whose complaint had purportedly been resolved when the Joint Stipulation and Settlement Agreement was executed in March 1995. For the reasons stated in endnote 11, infra, no dealings between FACC and Mr. and Mrs. Negron prior to the end of March 1995 will be considered in this proceeding.
6/ Mr. and Mrs. Farah are complainants whose complaint had purportedly been resolved when the Joint Stipulation and Settlement Agreement was executed. For the reasons stated in endnote 11, infra, no dealings between FACC and Mr. and
Mrs. Farah prior to the end of March 1995 will be considered in this proceeding.
7/ The Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children is enacted as a law of Florida in Section 409.401, Florida Statutes. The responsibilities of Florida's Interstate Compact office are to facilitate requests for approval to place Florida children for adoption in other states and to approve requests to place out-of- state children for adoption in Florida. The office reviews packets of documents from licensed child-placing agencies seeking to place children out-of-state to determine that all the necessary information is included and that the request complies with the adoption law in Chapter 63, Florida Statutes. If everything is in order, the Interstate Compact office attests that the placement complies with Florida law and sends the packet to the state in which the prospective adoptive parents reside.
If Florida is the "receiving" state, that is, the state in which
the prospective adoptive parents reside, the Interstate Compact office approves the placement of the out-of-state child in
Florida and works with the licensed child-placing agency or attorney by forwarding any documents it might receive from the "sending" state.
8/ The fact that Ms. Scott held these opinions is relevant to this action. However, the substance of her opinions is given no weight because nothing in her testimony establishes that she is an expert on the adoption laws of Michigan and of Florida.
9/ This is the version of the statute that is applicable in this proceeding since the decision not to renew FACC's license was made in December 1995.
10/ At hearing, the Department requested that official recognition be taken of Chapter 10M-24. The request was granted, and the Department provided copies of the chapter. It should be noted, however, that Chapter 10M-24 was substantially rewritten in 1996. A number of the rules were repealed effective March 6, 1996, several were transferred to Rule Chapter 65C-15, Florida Administrative Code, and the rules relating to the licensure of child-placing agencies were substantially re-written. For purposes of this proceeding, however, reference is made to Chapter 10M-24.
11/ Pursuant to paragraph 10 of the Joint Stipulation and Settlement Agreement executed by the Department and FACC in DOAH Case No. 94-7242, the Department waived all rights to use the complaints of Ms. Wolverton, the Negrons, and the Farahs against FACC for any purpose relating to licensing. This waiver is absolute, and no evidence related to the experiences of these individuals prior to March 1995 was considered in these proceedings.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Maria Consuegra, Esquire Penthouse
155 South Miami Avenue Miami, Florida 33130
Colleen Farnsworth, Esquire Department of Children and
Family Services
111 South Sapodilla Avenue, Suite 201 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
Eileen Parsons, Esquire Department of Children and
Family Services
401 Northwest 2nd Avenue, Suite N-1014 Miami, Florida 33128
Vivian Figueras, Esquire 2801 Ponce De Leon Boulevard Suite 1170
Coral Gables, Florida 33134
Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and
Family Services
1317 Winewood Boulevard
Building 2, Room 204
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
John S. Slye, General Counsel Department of Children and
Family Services
1317 Winewood Boulevard
Building 2, Room 204
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Edward A. Feaver, Secretary Department of Children and
Family Services
1317 Winewood Boulevard
Building 2, Room 204
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within 15 days from the date of this recommended order. Any exceptions to this recommended order should be filed with the agency that will issue the final order in this case.
1 Ms. Wolverton is one of the complainants whose complaint had purportedly been resolved when the Joint Stipulation and Settlement Agreement was executed in March 1995. For the reasons stated in endnote 11, infra, except for certain background information, only that testimony relating to Ms. Wolverton's experiences with FACC after March 1995 is relevant to this proceeding.
2 The contract used by FACC subsequent to March 1995 was prepared with the Department's guidance and approval.
3 No evidence was submitted as to the total amount paid to FACC by the Romeros.
4 Esther Blynn, an attorney for the Department who handles most of the termination of parental rights proceedings involving the Department and all adoption proceedings in which the Department's consent is required that, testified that, in her opinion, the Petition for Termination of Parental Rights and the supporting documents filed by FACC with regard to the child placed with the Householders were not legally sufficient to support either the termination of the rights of the legal father and the putative natural father or the Order of Dependency and Temporary Custody requested in the petition's prayer for relief and entered by the court on May 31, 1995. This testimony is rejected, first, because no representation was made in FACC's petition that it requested the termination of the rights of the legal or putative natural father and, second, because the court determined that the pleadings were legally sufficient when it entered the Order of Dependency and Temporary Custody.
5 Mr. and Mrs. Negron are complainants whose complaint had purportedly been resolved when the Joint Stipulation and Settlement Agreement was executed in March 1995. For the reasons stated in endnote 11, infra, no dealings between FACC and Mr. and Mrs. Negron prior to the end of March 1995 will be considered in this proceeding.
6 Mr. and Mrs. Farah are complainants whose complaint had purportedly been resolved when the Joint Stipulation and Settlement Agreement was executed. For the reasons stated in endnote 11, infra, no dealings between FACC and Mr. and Mrs.
Farah prior to the end of March 1995 will be considered in this proceeding.
7 The Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children is enacted as a law of Florida in Section 409.401, Florida Statutes. The responsibilities of Florida's Interstate Compact office are to facilitate requests for approval to place Florida children for adoption in other states and to approve requests to place out-of- state children for adoption in Florida. The office reviews packets of documents from licensed child-placing agencies seeking to place children out-of-state to determine that all the necessary information is included and that the request complies with the adoption law in Chapter 63, Florida Statutes. If everything is in order, the Interstate Compact office attests that the placement complies with Florida law and sends the packet to the state in which the prospective adoptive parents reside.
If Florida is the "receiving" state, that is, the state in which
the prospective adoptive parents reside, the Interstate Compact office approves the placement of the out-of-state child in Florida and works with the licensed child-placing agency or attorney by forwarding any documents it might receive from the "sending" state.
8 The fact that Ms. Scott held these opinions is relevant to this action. However, the substance of her opinions is given no weight because nothing in her testimony establishes that she is an expert on the adoption laws of Michigan and of Florida.
9 This is the version of the statute that is applicable in this proceeding since the decision not to renew FACC's license was made in December 1995.
10 At hearing, the Department requested that official recognition be taken of Rule Chapter 10M-24. The request was granted, and the Department provided copies of the rule chapter. It should be noted, however, that Rule Chapter 10M-24 was substantially rewritten in 1996. A number of the rules were repealed effective March 6, 1996, several were transferred to Rule Chapter 65C-15, Florida Administrative Code, and the rules relating to the licensure of child-placing agencies were substantially re-written. For purposes of this proceeding, however, reference is made to Rule Chapter 10M-24.
11 Pursuant to paragraph 10 of the Joint Stipulation and Settlement Agreement executed by the Department and FACC in DOAH Case No. 94-7242, the Department waived all rights to use the complaints of Ms. Wolverton, the Negrons, and the Farahs against FACC for any purpose relating to licensing. This waiver is absolute, and no evidence related to the experiences of these
individuals prior to March 1995 was considered in these proceedings.
Issue Date | Proceedings |
---|---|
Aug. 12, 1998 | Final Order filed. |
Jun. 05, 1998 | Petitioner`s Exceptions to Recommended Order (filed via facsimile). |
May 21, 1998 | Recommended Order sent out. CASE CLOSED. Hearing held 05/08-10/96 & 06/25-26/96. |
Mar. 26, 1998 | Letter to PHM from Vivian Figueras (RE: Request for ruling) filed. |
Sep. 24, 1997 | Petitioner`s Proposed Recommended Order (filed via facsimile). |
Aug. 18, 1997 | Order Extending Time for Filing Proposed Recommended Order sent out. (Petitioner PRO due by 8/21/97) |
Aug. 14, 1997 | Petitioner`s Motion for Extension of Time to File Proposed Recommended Order (filed via facsimile). |
Aug. 01, 1997 | Transcript filed. |
Aug. 01, 1997 | Transcript filed. |
May 07, 1997 | Respondent`s Proposed Recommended Order; Cover Sheet (filed via facsimile). |
Mar. 12, 1997 | Transcript (Hearing Date 06/25/96) filed. |
Feb. 18, 1997 | Letter to D. Giannilivigni from C. Farnsworth Re: Completion of Transcript filed. |
Nov. 14, 1996 | (4 Volumes) Transcript filed. |
Oct. 09, 1996 | Letter to PHM from Colleen Farnsworth (RE: Request for transcript) (filed via facsimile). |
Oct. 02, 1996 | Letter to Parties of Record from P. Malono (re: filing of transcript) sent out. |
Jun. 28, 1996 | Post-Hearing Order sent out. |
Jun. 25, 1996 | CASE STATUS: Hearing Held. |
Jun. 18, 1996 | Petitioner`s Prehearing Statement; Petitioner`s Motion to Allow Telephonic Testimony filed. |
May 20, 1996 | (Respondent) Exhibit List; Exhibits #49 through 54 filed. |
May 14, 1996 | Order Scheduling Continuation of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for June 25-26, 1996; 10:00am; Miami) |
May 08, 1996 | CASE STATUS: Hearing Partially Held, continued to June 25-26, 1996; 10:00am; Miami) |
May 03, 1996 | (Respondent) Amended Motion for Telephonic Testimony filed. |
Apr. 30, 1996 | (Respondent) Motion for Telephonic Testimony filed. |
Apr. 26, 1996 | Respondent`s Pre-Hearing Statement filed. |
Mar. 06, 1996 | Prehearing Order sent out. |
Mar. 06, 1996 | Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for May 8-10, 1996; 9:30am; Miami) |
Mar. 01, 1996 | Agreed Response to Order filed. |
Feb. 22, 1996 | (Respondent) Agreed Response to Order filed. |
Feb. 08, 1996 | Initial Order issued. |
Jan. 30, 1996 | Notice; Request for Formal Administrative Hearing, Letter Form; Agency Action ltr. filed. |
Issue Date | Document | Summary |
---|---|---|
Aug. 11, 1998 | Agency Final Order | |
May 21, 1998 | Recommended Order | Adoption agency violated interstate compact on placement of children and license should not be renewed.. |
ADOPTION ADVISORY ASSOCIATES, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 96-000572 (1996)
LARRY RICHARDS AND LINDA RICHARDS vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 96-000572 (1996)
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES vs ADOPTION BY SHEPHERD CARE, INC., 96-000572 (1996)
ROSA WISE AND EDWIN WISE vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 96-000572 (1996)