STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
JAMES J. WEAVER, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 00-0536
)
LEON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, )
)
Respondent. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
This case came before Larry J. Sartin, an Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, for consideration of Respondent's Second Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's Petition for Relief.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: James J. Weaver, pro se
1424 Jake Street
Tallahassee, Florida 32310
For Respondent: William R. Mabile, III, Esquire
William D. Horgan, Esquire Fuller, Johnson & Farrell, P.A.
111 North Calhoun Street Post Office Box 1739
Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1739
and
C. Graham Carothers, Esquire Ausley & McMullen
227 South Calhoun Street Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
The issue in this case is whether Petitioner's Petition for Relief should be dismissed pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(i),
Florida Statutes.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
On or about December 28, 1999, Petitioner, James J. Weaver, filed a Petition for Relief with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. The Petition for Relief was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on February 1, 2000. The Petition for Relief was designated DOAH Case No. 00-0536 and was assigned to the undersigned.
Following the filing of the Petition for Relief with the Florida Commission on Human Relations and the Division of Administrative Hearings, a number of motions were filed. Among the motions was Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's Petition for Relief.
On June 20, 2000, an Order on Motions was entered disposing of all outstanding motions. With regard to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's Petition for Relief, the parties were informed that the grounds raised in support of the Motion had merit. The parties were also informed that a recommended order of dismissal would be entered after giving the parties an opportunity to file proposed recommended orders. Neither party filed a proposed recommended order.
On July 25, 2000, a Recommended Order of Dismissal was entered recommending that this case be dismissed. The Recommended Order recommended dismissal of:
Those portions of the Petition dealing with events that occurred more than 365 days before Petitioner filed his complaint;
The entire Petition for failure to comply with Section 760.11, Florida Statutes; and
The entire Petition based upon the doctrine of res judicata.
On November 1, 2001, an Order Remanding Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice was entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations. In entering the Order, the Florida Commission on Human Relations rejected the second and third reasons for recommending that the Petition for Relief be dismissed and returned the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings. The first reason for dismissing the Petition for Relief was not addressed. The Order Remanding Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on
November 30, 2001.
On December 24, 2001, Respondent filed Respondent's Second Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's Petition for Relief. At the time the Motion was filed, the Division of Administrative Hearings
did not have jurisdiction over this matter because the Order of Remand had not yet been accepted.
The Order of Remand was subsequently accepted, and the file of the Division of Administrative Hearings was reopened by an Order Reopening File entered on February 13, 2002. Following the filing of a flurry of largely frivolous motions by Petitioner, all of which have been ruled on, the case was placed in abeyance until July 23, 2002, when a motion hearing was conducted to consider Respondent's Second Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's Petition for Relief.
Immediately prior to the commencement of the July 23, 2002, motion hearing, Petitioner filed three motions, where were also addressed at the motion hearing:
Petitioner's Emergency Motion to Strike Respondent's Exhibits in Support of its Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 1.140(F), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure;
Petitioner's Emergency Motion to Deny Respondent's Motion [sic] Dismiss for Lack of Standing; and
Petitioner's Second Motion for Summary Final Order Pursuant to Chapter 28-106.204(4), Florida Administrative Code Based on Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel.
At the conclusion of the July 23, 2002, motion hearing, it was announced that Petitioner's three Motions were denied. It was also announced that Respondent's Second Motion to Dismiss
Petitioner's Petition for Relief was granted, that a recommended order would be entered recommending dismissal of this matter, and that the parties could file proposed recommended orders within 20 days of the motion hearing.
On August 14, 2002, an Order was entered memorializing the rulings on Petitioner's three Motions. With regard to Respondent's Second Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's Petition for Relief, the Order provided the following:
As to Respondent's Second Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's Petition for Relief, it was indicated at the conclusion of the motion hearing that the Motion would be granted. Technically, the Motion is not clear in the relief that this forum is being requested to grant. The Motion simply argues that the petition filed in this matter should be dismissed, relief that the undersigned cannot grant. Therefore, the ruling on the record during the July 23, 2002, motion hearing that Respondent's Second Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's Petition for Relief [was granted] is hereby rescinded.
Rescinding the ruling of Respondent's Second Motion to Dismiss does not, however, have any impact on the decision to enter a recommended order recommending dismissal of this matter. Section 120.57(1)(i), Florida Statutes, recognizes that any matter before this forum may be relinquished to the agency involved in the matter at any time that it is determined that "a dispute of material fact no longer exists . . . ." This provision authorizes the return of the matter to the agency by either order relinquishing jurisdiction or recommended order. Once the matter is relinquished to the agency, "the parties may not raise any
issues of disputed fact that could have been raised before the administrative law judge."
Based upon the provisions of Section 120.57(1)(i), Florida Statutes, Respondent's Second Motion is being treated as a motion to relinquish jurisdiction due to the lack of any issue of material fact as to whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel should be applied . . . . During the motion hearing, Petitioner was specifically asked more than once by the undersigned to explain any difference between this matter and a proceeding between these parties in the state courts which has previously been disposed [of] by a jury verdict. The only difference suggested, that the state court proceeding did not involve discrimination based upon sex, is refuted by the jury's specific verdict that sexual discrimination was not proved. There are, therefore, no issues of material fact necessary to determine whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel should be applied in this case and a recommended order recommending dismissal of this case based upon that doctrine will be entered.
This Recommended Order is being entered consistent with the Order of August 14, 2002.
On August 12, 2002, Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order, and a Recommended Order of Dismissal from Respondent were filed. These pleadings have been fully considered in rendering this Recommended Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Petitioner's First Case.
In 1985, Petitioner filed an administrative complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (hereinafter referred to as the "Commission") alleging that Respondent had discriminated against him on the basis of his race and his gender. In 1987, as a result of the 1985 complaint, a Recommended Order was entering recommending that the Commission enter a final order finding discrimination on the basis of race.
The 1987 recommendation was ultimately adopted in a Final Order issued by the Commission in 1988.
In January 1990, the First District Court of Appeal affirmed the Commission's decision. School Board of Leon County v. Weaver, 556 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
As a result of the foregoing, Respondent hired Petitioner as a full-time social studies teacher for the 1990- 1991 school year.
Petitioner's Second Case.
At the end of the 1990-1991 school year, Respondent determined that Petitioner's contract would not be renewed.
Petitioner subsequently filed a second complaint with the Commission alleging, among other things, retaliation. Petitioner simultaneously filed a complaint with the EEOC
alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and 42 U.S.C. ss 1981 and 1988.
In March 1992, the Commission issued a No Cause Determination finding that Petitioner had not shown a prima facie violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and that Respondent had "articulated and substantiated" a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its decision not to renew Petitioner's contract.
In October 1992, the EEOC issued a similar determination.
In January 1993 Petitioner filed a Complaint in the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Leon County, Florida. This Complaint was designated Case No. 93-200 (hereinafter referred to as the "State Court Case").
The State Court Case was brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and 42 U.S.C. ss 1981 and 1988. In particular, Petitioner alleged that Respondent had discriminated against him when it failed to renew his teaching contract following the 1990-1991 school year and that it had subsequently discriminated against him by failing to hire him for positions for which he had applied between 1991 and the filing of the Complaint in the State Court Case. Petitioner alleged that the Respondent had discriminated against him on the basis of his race and gender.
The State Court Case was initially assigned to Judge
E. Steinmeyer, III. Judge Steinmeyer initially ruled that the trial would be limited to a consideration of whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner between August 1990 and January 19, 1993. Judge Steinmeyer entered this order on or about September 27, 1996.
The State Court Case was subsequently transferred to Judge Charles D. McClure. While hearing pre-trial motions, Judge McClure amended Judge Steinmeyer's ruling concerning the limit of the scope of the trial. Judge McClure ruled that Petitioner would also be allowed to introduce evidence concerning alleged discrimination by Respondent for the period beginning January 1993 and ending at the date of the trial of State Court Case. Although Judge McClure did not enter a written order to this effect, he did nonetheless enter a valid order of the court. Transcript of Pre-Trial Hearing of January 6, 1997, Page 28.
The State Court Case was transferred five times before being assigned to Judge Terry P. Lewis. Judge Lewis issued a Pretrial Order on October 8, 1998, in which he explained some of the history of the case and reaffirmed Judge McClure's earlier order:
Judge Charles McClure was next assigned to this case. In pretrial motions, the parties sought to revisit issues with him. He
amended Judge Steinmeyer's Order and indicated the [Petitioner] would be allowed to introduce evidence of the failure to rehire subsequent to January of 1993, up to the date of trial.
. . . .
There is a value in consistency and, all things being equal, my preference is to abide by the prior rulings of the predecessor judges and to make my rulings as consistent as possible with theirs. . . .
Pursuant to Judge Lewis's Pretrial Order, Petitioner was allowed to present evidence in the State Court Case concerning alleged discrimination by Respondent against Petitioner on the basis of his race and gender during the period 1990 through October 1998.
The State Court Case trial commenced October 12, 1998, and ended in a jury verdict on or about October 15, 1998. The jury ruled in favor of Respondent on all counts, finding no retaliation and no discrimination on the basis of race or gender, and judgment was entered for Respondent. The judgment was subsequently affirmed per curiam. Weaver v. School Board of
Leon County, 757 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).
Petitioner's Third Case.
While the State Court Case was pending, Petitioner filed a complaint against Respondent in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The
complaint was designated case number 4:97cv272-RH (hereinafter referred to as the "First Federal Court Case").
Petitioner alleged that Respondent, in refusing to hire him for 32 positions which he had applied for from 1994 to 1995, had discriminated against him on the basis of his race and gender.
Summary Judgment was granted in March 1999 in the First Federal Court Case. In granting Summary Judgment, the court accepted two Reports and Recommendation issued by Magistrate William C. Sherrill, Jr. In one of those Reports Magistrate Sherrill concluded, among other things, that a non- discriminatory reason had been proven by Respondent for its refusal to hire Petitioner: that Petitioner's job performance during the 1990-1991 school year had been inadequate.
The decision to grant Summary Judgment in the First Federal Court Case was affirmed on appeal by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in an unpublished opinion. Weaver v. School Board of Leon County, (Case No. 99- 11045, March 29, 2000). In its decision, the Eleventh Circuit stated:
The district court correctly concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment for the Board because Weaver failed to show that the Board's articulated reason for not hiring him was a pretext for race or gender discrimination. The Board stated that it
did not hire Weaver during the 1994-1995 school year because of prior unsatisfactory and inadequate performance during the 1991- 1992 [sic] school year in which he was a full-time seventh grade Social Studies teacher at Leon County's Deerlake and Nims Schools. Weaver has wholly failed to bring forward sufficient evidence to demonstrate that these reasons for failing to hire him were a pretext for discrimination. See Grigsby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 821 F.2d 590, 597 (11th Cir. 1987).
Petitioner's Fourth Case.
In 2000, Petitioner filed a second complaint against Respondent in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The complaint was designated case number 4:00cv91-WS (hereinafter referred to as the "Second Federal Court Case").
Petitioner alleged that Respondent, in refusing to hire him for positions which he had applied from 1995 to 2000, had discriminated against him on the basis of his race, age, and gender, and in retaliation for previous filed complaints.
Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint in the Second Federal Court Case arguing, among other things, that two previous cases, the State Court Case and the First Federal Court Case, had determined that Respondent had not discriminated against Petitioner in refusing to hire him after the 1990-1991 school year and, therefore, Petitioner should not be allowed to
continually apply for jobs with Respondent and then file a suit if he is not hired.
In a Report and Recommendation issued in the Second Federal Court Case, Magistrate Sherrill wrote:
[Petitioner's] pleading demonstrates that there are no new facts, no significant changes, but simply that [Respondent] continues to refuse to hire [Petitioner]. This conduct was deemed nondiscriminatory in the prior litigation between the parties.
Four courts have now held that [Respondent's] actions were lawful and, thus, the issue may not be raised again in subsequent actions. See Kremer, 456 U.S. at 467 n. 6, 102 S.Ct. at 1890, n. 6. Unless there are material and significant changes in the facts underlying the dispute between these two parties, [Petitioner] may not continue to bring discrimination claims against [Respondent] every time he is denied employment.
Judge William Stafford adopted the Report and Recommendation and ordered that Petitioner was enjoined from filing any lawsuit in Federal court alleging discrimination against him by Respondent unless Petitioner pays attorney's fees of Respondent incurred in the Second Federal Court Case and attaches affidavits from persons other than Petitioner setting forth competent evidence of discrimination in any future complaint.
Petitioner's Current Complaint and Request for Hearing; Petitioner's Fifth Case.
Petitioner is an African-American male.
On September 25, 1995, Petitioner filed a Charge of Discrimination (hereinafter referred to as the "FCHR Complaint") with the Commission. Petitioner alleged that Respondent had discriminated against him on the basis of race, gender, and retaliation. In particular, Petitioner alleged that Respondent had discriminated against him "[i]n February of 1991 and continuing through September 19, 1995 "
Some of the allegations of the FCHR Complaint relate to alleged acts of discrimination which occurred more than
365 days before the FCHR Complaint was filed. By filing the FCHR Complaint on September 25, 1995, the allegations contained therein should have been limited to alleged acts of discrimination which occurred between September 26, 1994, and September 25, 1995.
On November 24, 1999, more than three years after Petitioner filed the FCHR Complaint, the Commission issued a "Notice of Determination: No Jurisdiction," and a "Determination: No Jurisdiction." The Commission gave the following explanation, in relevant part, of why it had concluded it had no jurisdiction over the FCHR Complaint:
In his Complaint of Discrimination, Complainant asserted that between February, 1991, and September, 1995, he was not considered by Respondent for teaching positions for which he made application. Counsel for Respondent argues that Complainant's charges must be dismissed as a matter of law. Counsel
states, "[M]r. Weaver's claims of discrimination against the School Board of Leon County, including but not limited to the 1994-
95 school year, and continuing to October 1988 [sic] have been litigated in both state and federal courts in favor of the school board."
Information provided to the Commission indicates that in January, 1993, Complainant filed a civil suit in the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit. Case number "93-200" was assigned to the case. The complaint states, inter alia, that following the 1990-91 school year, Complainant applied for positions with Respondent and was not considered.
Judge McClure of the Second Judicial Circuit held that Complainant would be permitted to introduce evidence of Respondent's failure to rehire subsequent to January, 1993, up to the date of the trial.
Case number 93-200 was litigated before a jury of the Second Judicial Circuit. A Verdict Form provided to the Commission and dated October 15, 1998, indicates that Complainant was not retaliated against and that Complainant was not discriminated against because of his race or sex in Respondent's 'decisions not to hire him (Complainant) following the 1990-91 school year.'
Therefore, the Commission's jurisdiction over the Complaint of Discrimination was terminated as a result of the issues being litigated in the Second Judicial Circuit. Inasmuch as the Commission lacks jurisdiction over the Complaint, the Determination will not address the merits of the allegations of discrimination contained in the Complaint.
On December 25, 1999, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief with the Commission. The Petition for Relief was filed
three years and three months after Petitioner filed the FCHR Complaint.
In the Petition for Relief, Petitioner relates a long history between himself and Respondent. That history for purposes of this proceeding goes back to at least 1979 when Petitioner was employed as a substitute and temporary teacher by Respondent. Petitioner goes on to contend that Respondent has discriminated against him from at least 1985 through the date of the Petition for Relief. The relevant allegations which may be considered, however, are limited by the dates alleged in the FCHR Complaint, February 1991 to September 19, 1995, since those were the only dates the Commission had an opportunity to consider before referring the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings.
On February 1, 2000, the Commission filed the Petition for Relief with the Division of Administrative Hearings and requested that an administrative law judge be assigned to conduct all necessary proceedings.
On February 4, 2000, Respondent filed Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's Petition for Relief. Respondent argued that the Petition for Relief should be dismissed for two reasons: (a) the Petition for Relief is barred by the statute of limitations of Section 760.11, Florida Statutes; and (b) the
allegations of the Petition for Relief are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
An Order on Motions was entered on June 20, 2000, disposing of numerous motions filed in this matter, and disposing of Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's Petition for Relief as follows:
Respondent has filed a Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's Petition for Relief in which two grounds have been raised for the dismissal of the Petition for Relief in this case.
Petitioner has filed a response to the Motion. Both grounds for the dismissal of this case have merit. Therefore, a recommended order of dismissal will be entered in this case within thirty-five days of the entry of this Order: July 24, 2000. The parties will be given an opportunity to file proposed recommended orders within fifteen days of the date of this Order: July 5, 2000.
On July 25, 2000, a Recommended Order of Dismissal was entered recommending that this case be dismissed. The Recommended Order recommended dismissal of:
Those portions of the Petition for Relief dealing with events that occurred more than 365 days before Petitioner filed the FCHR Complaint;
The entire Petition for Relief due to the failure to comply with Section 760.11, Florida Statutes; and
3. The entire Petition for Relief based upon the doctrine of res judicata.
On November 1, 2001, an Order Remanding Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice (hereinafter referred to as the "Order of Remand") was entered by the Commission. In entering the Order of Remand, the Commission rejected the second and third reasons for recommending that the Petition for Relief be dismissed and returned the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings. The Commission failed to address the first reason. The Order of Remand was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on November 30, 2001.
On December 24, 2001, Respondent filed Respondent's Second Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's Petition for Relief. At the time the Motion was filed, the Division of Administrative Hearings did not have jurisdiction over this matter, because the Order of Remand had not yet been accepted.
The Order of Remand was subsequently accepted and the file of the Division of Administrative Hearings was reopened by an Order Reopening File entered on February 13, 2002.
The Respondent's Second Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's Petition for Relief was filed more than 20 days after the Commission's Order of Remand was entered. It was filed, however, before jurisdiction over this matter was accepted by the Division of Administrative Hearings. The Second Motion to Dismiss was, therefore, filed within less than 20 days after the file in this case was reopened.
A motion hearing was scheduled for July 23, 2002, to consider the Second Motion to Dismiss. During the hearing, Petitioner was asked on more than one occasion to explain any differences in the allegations of this matter and the State Court Case. Other than suggesting that this case involves allegations of gender discrimination and the State Court Case did not, a suggestion refuted by the jury verdict in the State Court Case, Petitioner was unable to state any difference. Indeed, the material allegations of this matter and the State Court Case, the First Federal Court Case, and the Second Court Case are no different.
At the conclusion of the July 23, 2002, motion hearing, it was announced that Respondent's Second Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's Petition for Relief was granted, that a recommended order would be entered recommending dismissal of this matter, and that the parties could file proposed recommended orders within 20 days of the motion hearing.
On August 14, 2002, an Order was entered memorializing the rulings entered at the July 23, 2002, motion hearing.
Petitioner has alleged in three previous court proceedings that Respondent's failure to hire him since 1991, was based upon race and gender. In one of those cases the issue was tried before a jury, and it was determined that Respondent had articulated a reasonable reason for refusing to hire
Respondent-his unsatisfactory and inadequate performance as a teacher during the 1990-1991 school year-and that Petitioner had failed to prove that the reason for Respondent's refusal was a pretext. Two subsequent cases recognized this verdict.
Petitioner continues to disagree with those judicial determinations and is attempting for a fourth time to litigate the same issue. Should he fail here, no doubt he will continue to file future proceedings. There is, however, no new issue to be tried.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel should be applied to dismiss this matter. This case involves the same Petitioner bringing the same action against the Respondent that has been fully litigated and determined through a final decision of a court of competent jurisdiction in the State Court Case, the First Federal Case, and the Second Federal Case.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction of the parties to, and the subject matter of, this proceeding. Section 120.57, Florida Statutes (1999).
Statute of Limitations.
Section 760.11(1), Florida Statutes, provides, in pertinent part, the following:
Any person aggrieved by a violation of ss. 760.01-760.10 may file a complaint with the commission within 365 days of the
alleged violation . . . . The commission, within 5 days of the complaint first being filed, shall by registered mail send a copy of the complaint to the person who allegedly committed the violation (Emphasis
added).
Some of the violations alleged by Petitioner in the FCHR Complaint occurred more than 365 days before the FCHR Complaint was filed. Those allegations are, therefore, barred by Section 760.11(1), Florida Statutes, and should be dismissed.
The Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel.
Collateral estoppel is a judicial doctrine which prevents identical parties from relitigating issues which have already been decided. City of Oldsmar v. State, 790 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 2001); Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. B.J.M., 656 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 1995); and Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So. 2d 372, 374 (Fla. 1977). The elements of collateral estoppel are:
The parties must be identical; and
The particular matter must be fully litigated and determined through a final decision of a court of competent jurisdiction. Id.
The doctrine is available in administrative proceedings and may be applied in the same manner as a judicial proceeding. See, e.g., Hays v. State of Florida, Department of
Business Regulation, 418 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
Of particular relevance to this case is the case of Munsey v. General Telephone Co., 538 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). In Munsey, Donna Munsey, a former employee of General Telephone Company of Florida (hereinafter referred to as "General Telephone"), sued General Telephone in Federal court under Title VII alleging that she had been denied promotions because of her gender. Failing to present sufficient evidence to prove that she had performed the same or substantially the same work as those males who were promoted in her stead,
Ms. Munsey failed to prevail in the Federal case. Munsey, 538 So. 2d at 1330. Ms. Munsey then sued General Telephone in Florida state court under Section 725.07, Florida Statutes (1983), "which renders sex discrimination actionable." Id. at 1329. In the state court proceeding, Ms. Munsey claimed that she had performed services equal to those of her male coworkers. Summary judgement was entered by the trail court grounded upon the principle of estoppel by judgment, or collateral estoppel.
On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal found that Ms. Munsey was collaterally estopped from re-litigating the issue of whether she performed the same or substantially the same work as the promoted males. The court stated, in part, the following:
We have no difficulty in finding, as did our trial court, that Munsey's equal pay claim was fully and fairly litigated in the
federal court. Although the federal claim and the state causes of action were different, the central issue was the same in each instance.
Collateral estoppel, or estoppel by judgment, is a judicial doctrine which in general terms prevents identical parties from relitigating issues that have previously been decided between them. The essential elements of the doctrine are that the parties and issues be identical, and that the particular matter be fully litigated and determined in a contest which results in a final decision of a court of competent jurisdiction. (Emphasis added).
Id. at 1330.
This Case, Petitioner's Fifth Case, is Barred by the Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel.
The material facts necessary to determine whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel should be applied in this case are not in dispute. Although given an opportunity to do so, Petitioner has not suggested any material difference in the allegations of this matter and the State Court Case.
Because no dispute of material fact necessary to determine whether the doctrine applies exists, jurisdiction over this matter should be relinquished to the Commission for entry of a final order dismissing this matter pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(i), Florida Statutes.
Obviously, the first element for the application of collateral estoppel has been shown to exist: Petitioner and Respondent are the same parties as the parties in the State
Court Case, the First Federal Court Case, and the Second Federal Court Case.
Secondly, the second element of the doctrine, that the material issues in this case must be identical to the material issues which have been previously fully litigated and decided in a contest which resulted in a final decision of a court of competent jurisdiction, has been shown to exist.
Petitioner has previously alleged in the State Court Case the identical factual issues alleged in this case. From a practical standpoint, Petitioner has also previously alleged the identical essential issues raised in this case in the First and Second Federal Court Cases. All three courts are courts of competent jurisdiction.
The State Court Case resulted in a jury verdict, which, when considered in light of the Reports and Recommendations issued in the First and Second Federal Court Cases, can only be reasonably interpreted to have found that Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent's rationale for refusing to hire him was based on a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason which Petitioner failed to prove was a pretext. That decision is now final.
The First Federal Court Case also concluded that Petitioner had failed to prove in the State Court Case that Respondent's rational for refusing to hire Petitioner was based
upon a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason and, therefore, dismissed the proceeding. That decision is also now final.
Finally, although the Second Federal Court Case decision was not final at the time of the July 23, 2002, motion hearing, that case resulted in the same finding as the previous First Federal Court Case and even went so far as to enjoin Petitioner from filing any future claims in the Federal court absent some change in circumstance.
If Petitioner is allowed to purse this action, there is nothing that would prevent Petitioner from applying for every future job opening with Respondent and, assuming that he is not hired because of his poor performance during the 1990-1991 school year, then filing a separate cause of action for each such refusal. This would force Respondent to prove in each case, at great expense to Respondent, the Commission, and this forum, that he had not been hired, not because of his race or gender, but because he is not competent to teach based upon his prior performance. It is just this type of situation that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is intended to prevent.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the complaint of discrimination filed in this case by James J. Weaver.
DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of August, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
LARRY J. SARTIN
Administrative Law Judge
Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060
(850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675
Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of August, 2002.
COPIES FURNISHED:
James J. Weaver 1424 Jake Street
Tallahassee, Florida 32310
William R. Mabile, III, Esquire William D. Horgan, Esquire Fuller, Johnson & Farrell, P.A.
111 North Calhoun Street Post Office Box 1739
Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1739
C. Graham Carothers, Esquire Ausley & McMullen
227 South Calhoun Street Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within
15 days from the date of this recommended order. Any exceptions to this recommended order should be filed with the agency that will issue the final order in this case.
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Jan. 13, 2003 | Agency Final Order | |
| Aug. 21, 2002 | Recommended Order | Collateral estoppel applies; Petitioner already tried same issues in state and federal court. |
