STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

NASSAU COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD,

Petitioners,

vs.

BERNICE LAMAR MILES,

Respondent.

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) Case No. 01-0001

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FINAL ORDER

Pursuant to the mandate of the District Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District and the Administrative Law Judge's Order of October 10, 2002, this cause came on for formal proceeding on January 13, 2003, in Tallahassee, Florida, before

P. Michael Ruff, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings. The appearances were as follows:

APPEARANCES

For Petitioners: Brian T. Hayes, Esquire

Brian T. Hayes, P.A.

245 East Washington Street Monticello, Florida 32344

For Respondent: Mary F. Aspros, Esquire

Meyer and Brooks, P.A.

2544 Blairstone Pines Drive Post Office Box 1547 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern the

amount of reasonable attorney's fees and costs due to the Respondent in the underlying case, to which the attorney's fees issue relates.1/

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The proceeding was initiated pursuant to an order and mandate of the Court of Appeal for the First District, issued on August 12, 2002. The court had determined, upon reviewing the Final Order of the Nassau County School Board, that the appellant in the case on appeal, Bernice Lamar Miles (the Respondent below) was entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs.

On October 21, 2002, the parties responded to an Order of the Administrative Law Judge, indicating that they could not agree as to a reasonable attorney's fee and that the Petitioner desired an evidentiary hearing on the issue of reasonable fees and costs. The hearing was then scheduled for January 13, 2003.

The matter came on for hearing as noticed. The Petitioner, the Nassau County School Board, presented expert witness John Carlson, Esquire and five exhibits which were admitted into evidence. The Respondent, Bernice Lamar Miles, presented witness Mary Aspros, Esquire and Jerry Traynham, Esquire, its expert witness. The Respondent presented its exhibit one,

Ms. Aspros's time records.

Upon concluding the proceeding the parties had it transcribed and chose to submit Proposed Final Orders. They submitted these after one agreed-upon extension and the Proposed Final Orders have been considered in the rendition of this Final Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

It has been stipulated between the parties that the costs represented in the Respondent's Exhibit One in evidence, in the amount of $1,739.49 are accurately stated, reasonable and properly due to the Respondent. The hourly amount to be awarded to Ms. Aspros, the attorney for the Respondent in the underlying case is not in dispute. Both of the attorney's fee experts testifying agree that a reasonable rate of pay for Ms. Aspros's representation of Mr. Miles in this matter is $150.00 per hour. This rate was assessed through a comparison of rates charged by local law firms for work performed by less experienced associates who are somewhat similarly situated to Ms. Aspros in terms of practice experience. Moreover, Mr. Carlson, the attorney's fee expert for the Nassau County School Board, the Petitioner in the case below (NCSB), did not challenge the accuracy of the time billed by Ms. Aspros represented in her Exhibit One as time actually spent by Ms. Aspros in the representation of her client; rather, the NCSB and Mr. Carlson

as its expert witness, disputes whether that amount of time was reasonable for an attorney prosecuting that type of litigation.

In the administrative and appellate proceeding to which this case and order on remand relate, Ms. Mary F. Aspros, Esquire, represented the Respondent therein, Mr. Miles.

Ms. Aspros was admitted to the bar in the year 2000 after earning a juris doctorate degree from the Florida State University College of Law. She became employed as an attorney at the Law Firm of Myer and Brooks, P.A., in August of 2000 and has practiced continuously with that firm since that date and during the entire course of the litigation at issue.

Ms. Aspros submitted her exhibit one at hearing. That exhibit set forth a total of 495 hours spent on the proceeding from December 11, 2000 through September 16, 2002, as well as the remaining balance of the costs accrued for the litigation.

In compiling exhibit one Ms. Aspros voluntarily extracted some of the time she spent on the case by removing all time which she deemed excessive or not related directly to the issues in the case. She also ended the billing record represented by exhibit one as of September 16, 2002, when the court's mandate was issued in the appellate portion of the proceeding, thus voluntarily excluding some time she spent on a motion to enforce the mandate and to tax costs.

That billing record set forth the time spent rendering services, the date services were rendered and the type of services provided. The billing record includes billing at the full hourly price for all travel time, which would primarily be travel between Tallahassee and Nassau County or the City of Fernandina Beach. That record was maintained in and extracted from a data entry computer system maintained in Ms. Aspros office, for attorney time-record keeping. Ms. Aspros followed a regular practice of entering all billing information into the computer on a daily or weekly basis after which the office bookkeeper would create a billing statement. The billing statement would be reviewed by Ms. Aspros for accuracy and then sent to the client for payment. The client paid all bills it received from Ms. Aspros for her representation of the client, Mr. Miles. The evidence does not reflect clearly what bills Mr. Miles actually received nor the amount of each of them.

That information is not really material to the issue in this proceeding since the reasonableness of attorney's fees for the services rendered at all stages of this litigation is at issue rather than simply reimbursement for the amounts paid by

Mr. Miles, the client.

In testimony and Exhibit One, Ms. Aspros maintains that she spent 182 and one-half hours from the date she began representing Mr. Miles on December 11, 2000, up to and including

the formal evidentiary hearing conducted on June 22, 2001. During that time she participated in extensive discovery, including preparing for and traveling to five depositions in Nassau County from Tallahassee. She also drafted interrogatories and document requests and reviewed many documents. It was crucial to spend a significant amount of time contacting numerous students who were present at the time of the alleged incidents and who may have seen the complained-of activity. Her efforts were successful and she produced a favorable witness who testified at hearing, which testimony was instrumental in absolving Mr. Miles of the charges against him.

Prior to hearing, Ms. Aspros had to prepare several pleadings including a motion for continuance, a motion to redact names of minor students from the records of the Division of Administrative Hearings, as well as a motion in limine. A significant amount of time was necessary in researching issues involved in the motion in limine. The motion was never filed for strategic reasons, but the issues contained within it were successfully argued at hearing. Through objections at hearing, based upon her research, Ms. Aspros was able to prevent the NCSB from introducing documentary evidence and eliciting testimony pertaining to prejudicial and unproven alleged, prior bad acts ("Williams Rule" issues). This successful legal position was

pivotal in securing a favorable result for her client, Mr. Miles.

Ms. Aspros prepared extensively for the evidentiary hearing which was obviously crucial to successful representation of her client. Her preparation included evidentiary research as well as the creation of special exhibits to be used during cross- examination of key NCSB witnesses. Because of this investigation into the allegations and a thorough preparation for trial, she secured a favorable result in the recommended order entered by the administrative law judge, to the effect that the charges had not been proven and that Mr. Miles should be reinstated as a teacher.

The NCSB's expert witness, Mr. Carlson, allotted in his analysis slightly more than 46 hours for the work required for this entire portion of the case. This portion of the case through the evidentiary hearing was obviously crucial because the evidence in support of the administrative law judge's findings of fact was brought forward, established and protected during the course of the proceeding, such that Ms. Aspros secured favorable findings of fact, conclusions of law and a recommendation from the administrative law judge, obviously a critical result to the future of Ms. Aspros's client's teaching career. The evidence does not reflect that Mr. Carlson

considered the quality of work and the importance to the client of the favorable result at this point in the case.

From June 25, 2001, after the formal evidentiary hearing, to November 15, 2001, before the filing of the appeal,

Ms. Aspros contends that she spent 107.3 hours representing her client's interests, as reflected in her exhibit one. During this time she prepared a proposed recommended order which comprehensively set forth all factual and legal arguments supporting her client's position. In preparing this document she was required to do extensive additional legal research concerning sexual harassment decisions due to that issue being raised by NCSB for the first time at the evidentiary hearing, in that the NCSB asserted for the first time at the hearing that her client's alleged conduct violated the school board's policy on sexual harassment.

Upon entry of the Recommended Order by the administrative law judge, had the NCSB accepted that recommended order in its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the case would have ended at that point. However, the NCSB chose to file exceptions to the Recommended Order and therefore Ms. Aspros was required to do additional research and draft a response to those exceptions. She spent a significant amount of time preparing the response to the exceptions and preparing for the hearing before the school board on those exceptions. That hearing was

held on December 15, 2001, before the NCSB. Obviously the NCSB's decision would be pivotal to the case and would have an enormous impact on Mr. Mile's career in the future. It did have such an impact on her client, delaying a final and just resolution of the matter an additional eight months. The record does not reflect clearly that the NCSB's expert witness,

Mr. Carlson, in testifying that no more than 14 hours should have been expended on this entire phase of the case, considered a number of pivotal factors contained in Rule 4-1.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct (and case law) concerning the significance of the subject matter of the representation, the responsibility involved in the representation, the results obtained and the importance of the representation and the result to the client's interests.

Ms. Aspros contends that she expended 205.2 hours on the appellate portion of the case, between the dates of

November 16, 2001, and September 17, 2002. Following the NCSB's reversal of the recommended order she filed a notice of appeal with the District Court of Appeals for the First District and handled all of the appellate work in the case. Prior to drafting the appellate brief Ms. Aspros acquired the tapes of the exceptions hearing before the NCSB and assisted in the accurate transcription of the hearing for the appellate record.

In preparing the initial appellate brief she thoroughly reviewed all the pleadings and transcripts related to the proceeding before the administrative law judge and the NCSB, including the NCSB final order. She was required to file a motion for extension of time to file the brief due to NCSB's late filing of the appellate index. She also prepared and won the motion for attorney's fees which resulted in the matter now before the administrative law judge in the instant proceeding.

In preparing the reply brief Ms. Aspros was required to further scrutinize all prior pleadings and conduct additional research because in its answer brief the NCSB had argued that one of the issues was one of first impression. In any event, the appellate court ruled in Mr. Miles' favor rejecting the arguments of NCSB.

Thereafter, NCSB filed a petition for clarification and re- hearing and Ms. Aspros was required to do additional work and research to respond to the petition for re-hearing.

Mr. Jerry Traynham testified as an expert witness on attorney's fees for the Respondent and Mr. John Carlson testified as an attorney's fee expert for the Petitioner. Both have practiced a substantial amount in the area of administrative law and procedure over the course of many years of law practice. Both of them, particularly Mr. Traynham, have prosecuted a substantial number of cases arising under

Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, and both, particularly

Mr. Traynham, have handled a substantial number of Chapter 120 administrative law cases on appeal.

Mr. Traynham thoroughly reviewed the files pertaining to this case, as well as the billing records contained in Respondent's Exhibit One and prepared by Ms. Aspros. He consulted with Ms. Aspros about her case on three or four occasions regarding her work and her billing records. A banker's box full of Ms. Aspros's files was delivered to

Mr. Traynham's office in early December 2002, at which time he reviewed the entire case file. The files were again produced to him just days before the hearing on the fees issue. At that time he again refreshed his memory concerning the case.

Mr. Carlson spent only approximately two hours reviewing the records in the case provided by Mr. Hayes and only an hour or so reviewing Ms. Aspros's files. He never consulted with

Ms. Aspros and did not review the billing records generated by Ms. Aspros until the day of the hearing, for unknown reasons.

Following a comprehensive, critical review of the files and billing records Mr. Traynham extracted approximately 35 hours from the hours claimed in the Respondent's Exhibit One. He decreased some of the hours in areas of billing that he believed to be excessive. He concluded that the remaining 452.5 hours Ms. Aspros spent working on this case were reasonable and

necessary and that she should be paid an attorney's fee therefor.

In reaching this determination concerning his reasonable opinion as to the number of hours reasonable and properly expended, Mr. Traynham considered the severity of the charges against the Respondent, the possible severe consequences to Mr. Miles and his career had he lost the case, the quality of the result produced and the quality of the work performed by Ms. Aspros.

Mr. Traynham opined that a high number of hours was justified due to the severity of the allegations to the client, which involved alleged inappropriate touching of three minor, female students. If the allegations had been sustained the Respondent's entire teaching career would have been destroyed and he would never have been able to find employment in that field again. Consequently, Mr. Traynham believed that, because of the severe, substantial ramifications of losing such a case, Ms. Aspros was justifiably very zealous in representing her client's interests. She thus expended a high number of hours of attorney time and he opined that she should be compensated for her successful efforts in that regard.

Mr. Traynham also described the very high quality of work in this case as having an effect on his opinion regarding a reasonable fee. He stated that Ms. Aspros had done very

competent work, far beyond what you normally expect from a lawyer with two years' experience. Concerning her appellate work in this case, and her brief, he opined that he had seen at least one hundred appeals and had rarely seen work that good.

The undersigned has considered the testimony of the experts for the Petitioner and the Respondent, Mr. Carlson and

Mr. Traynham. It is determined that both are qualified as expert witnesses, both having substantial experience in administrative law and procedure in the area of law involved in the subject litigation.

Mr. Traynham made a more detailed review of the documents amassed in this case at all levels of the proceeding. Moreover, he consulted with Ms. Aspros on several occasions. He also reviewed the documents a second time shortly before the hearing on this attorney's fee issue. Mr. Traynham also considered a number of factors typically used in assessing reasonable attorney's fees and delineated in the conclusions of law below. He, for instance, considered the typical fees for an attorney with Ms. Aspros's experience level, the severity of the allegations against her client and the possible ramifications to the career of her client if she lost the case. He also considered the quality of the result achieved and the high quality of the work that was produced by Ms. Aspros in achieving the successful result. He considered all these factors while

looking at the file and the billing records in a critical fashion. He ultimately determined that 452.5 hours was a reasonable amount of time to be expended by Ms. Aspros and that she should be reimbursed with an attorney's fee representing that many hours.

Mr. Carlson did not spend as much time reviewing the documents in the file and did not consult with Ms. Aspros at all. Additionally, the record does not reflect that Mr. Carlson considered all of the various factors delineated above and in the authority cited in the conclusions of law below, including the factors contained in Rule 4-1.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, cited below, in assessing a reasonable fee, under the circumstances presented by this case and these parties. Rather, Mr. Carlson more relied on his own approximate 30 years experience as a lawyer in determining what he considered would be a reasonable amount of time (83.58 hours) that he might expend in handling this case, from Ms. Aspros's and her client's standpoint. Both Mr. Carlson and Mr. Traynham are certainly well-qualified in the field of administrative law to render opinions on the issues presented in this case, but

Mr. Traynham's somewhat more detailed delving into the facts and circumstances supportive of a reasonable fee determination is accorded somewhat more weight.

That being said, however, the opinion of Mr. Carlson that

83.58 hours would be a reasonable amount of time to attribute to Ms. Aspros's representation in this case and Mr. Traynham's determination that 452.5 hours would be a reasonable amount of attorney time to be reimbursed in this case are both rejected as not being reasonable under all of the relevant facts and circumstances attendant to determining a reasonable fee.

Accordingly, in addition to weighing the testimony of the two expert witnesses concerning reasonable attorney's fees, the undersigned has conducted an exhaustive review and consideration of the billing record contained in Ms. Aspros's Exhibit One and has considered the various factors depicted in the above findings of fact and the conclusions of law below, as well as in court decisions and court rules cited herein concerning how a reasonable fee should be assessed; considering also the undersigned's own substantial experience in administrative law and practice. The undersigned has thus considered such factors as the nature of the services rendered and responsibility placed upon counsel for Mr. Miles, the skills required in successful prosecution of the litigation at all stages of the proceedings, the circumstances in which it was rendered, the value and beneficial results of Ms. Aspros's services to her client and the consequences of those results to her client (i.e. the effective saving of his career as an educator). Also considered

are the time and labor involved, the novelty, complexity and difficulty of the questions involved, or the relative lack thereof, the experience, reputation, diligence, and ability of the lawyer performing the service, the efficiency of effort reflected in the actual providing of the services. All of these factors have been considered in justification of the reasonable fee found by the undersigned, in addition to consideration of only the time and rate factors.

There is no question and indeed it is undisputed that

Ms. Aspros expended the hours she depicted herself as expending in furtherance of her client's claim at all stages of the proceedings. Not all of those hours are determined to be reasonable and necessary, however, although a substantial number of them are. In fact, through the course of the representation, particularly in the appellate phase of the proceeding, a significant number of hours seemed to exceed that which is reasonable and necessary. The instances of travel time between Tallahassee and Nassau County at $150.00 per hour have been deleted. Under the circumstances of this case, while travel expense might be reimbursable, attorney time spent in vehicle travel is not reasonably compensable at six hours per round trip. There were extensive client conferences after the evidentiary hearing, for instance, and a seemingly excessive amount of time devoted to revision of the brief and reply brief,

as well as a significant amount of time expended in consulting with other persons during Ms. Aspros's preparation of the brief, reply brief, response to petition for rehearing, etc. which were not shown to be necessary. In fact, there is no real detailed testimony or evidence to justify why some of these time billings were reasonable and necessary. Accordingly, upon conducting an extensive review of the billing records and in considering the factors enumerated above, the undersigned determines that a reasonable compensable time for all stages of this proceeding, in accordance with the court mandate and decision, is 293.54 hours. This results in a reasonable attorney's fee, given the undisputed rate of $150.00 an hour, of $44,031.00.

In assessing this fee the undersigned is mindful of the fact that the District Court of Appeal for the First District decided the attorney's fee entitlement based upon

Section 120.595(5), Florida Statutes, which provides that "upon review of agency action that precipitates an appeal, if the court finds that the agency improperly rejected or modified findings of fact in a recommended order, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fee and reasonable costs to a prevailing appellant for the administrative proceeding and the appellate proceeding." In that regard, the court implicitly found that the agency has participated in the appellate portion for an improper purpose for purposes of Section 120.595, Florida

Statutes, because it improperly rejected or modified findings of fact, substituted findings of fact which were not supported by the substantial, competent evidence of record and improperly substituted its determination of the credibility of witnesses for that of the administrative law judge. The court ironically cited the case of MacMillan v. Nassau County School Board, 629 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), in support of its opinion; a case involving essentially the same issues concerning improper rejection or modification of findings of fact and substituting findings of fact based upon a re-weighing of evidence; in which the same counsel and/or law firms were involved, with the same party school board. It is readily apparent that a substantial number of the hours of attorney time expended in litigating this case and for which fees are to be assessed by order of the court, could have been obviated if due regard had been made to the well-settled principles of law with regard to an administrative law judge's findings, conclusions, and judgment as to witness credibility enunciated in the MacMillan decision. See also McPherson v. School Board of Monroe County, 505 So. 2d 682, 683 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1987); Forehand v. School Board of Washington County, 481 So. 2d 953, 955 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Heifetz v. Department of Business Regulation, 475 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) and Holmes v. Turlington, 480 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The order of the District Court of Appeal for the First District entered in Case No. 1D01-4793, pursuant to Section 120.595, Florida Statutes, remanded this matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings and the undersigned administrative law judge for a reasonable attorney fee to be established, the court having already determined that the Respondent was entitled to an award of attorney's fees. Accordingly, the Division of Administrative Hearings and the undersigned administrative law judge has jurisdiction of the parties to and the subject matter of this proceeding.

The Respondent seeks to establish an amount of reasonable attorney's fees to be awarded and thus bears the burden to demonstrate by preponderant evidence what the amount of reasonable attorney's fees should be. See Department of Transportation v. JWC Company, 396 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Balino v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 348 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).

It is well-settled that factors which may be considered in assessing the amount of a reasonable attorney fee include:

Services rendered, responsibility incurred, the nature of the services, the skill required, the circumstances under which it was rendered, the ability of the litigant to respond, the value of the services to the client and the beneficial results, if any, of the services.

Pfohl v. Pfohl, 345 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1977); Donner v. Donner, 281 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1973). It is also well- settled that the quality of the work produced is a factor to be considered in the calculation of fees. ID.

Additional factors, and to some extent the same factors, have also been enumerated in Rule 4-1.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct which states as follows:

(b) Factors to Be Considered in Determining

Reasonable Fees. Factors to be considered as guides in determining a reasonable fee include:

1. The time and labor required, the novelty, complexity, and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;

   
   

2. The likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;

   
   

3. The fee, or rate of fee, customarily charged in the locality for legal services of a comparable or similar nature;

   
   

4. The significance of, or amount involved in, the subject matter of the representation, the responsibility involved in the representation, and the results obtained;

   
   

5. The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances and, as between attorney and client, any additional or special time demands or requests of the attorney by the client;

   
   

6. The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;

   
   

7. The experience, reputation, diligence, and ability of the lawyers performing the service and the skill, expertise, or efficiency of effort reflected in the actual providing of such services; and

   
   

8. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent, and, if fixed as to amount or rate, then whether the client's ability to pay rested to any significant degree on the outcome of the representation.

In the manner described in the above findings of fact, the preponderant evidence shows that 293.54 hours at $150.00 dollars an hour results in a reasonable fee for Ms. Aspros's representation of Mr. Miles in the administrative and appellate cases. The NCSB is therefore responsible for reimbursement of

$44,031.00 for attorney's fees plus the $1,739.49 amount agreed to for costs which are due.

It is stipulated and established through the testimony at the hearing that a reasonable hourly rate to be awarded

Ms. Aspros is $150.00 per hour. Both experts agreed that this is a reasonable hourly rate given to attorney's comparable with Ms. Aspros's level of experience. A lower rate is customarily awarded to an attorney with less experience to compensate for the increased amount of time necessary to complete the same or equivalent work as a more experienced attorney. More experienced attorneys might be awarded increased hourly rates, even as high as $300.00 per hour, because of their ability to

reach the same result in less time. Therefore the lower rate agreed upon herein does justify some of the additional time expended by Ms. Aspros necessary to adequately prosecute her client's interests. In addition to Ms. Aspros's level of experience, such factors as were treated and found in the above findings of fact and delineated in the above-cited court rule and decisional authority must be considered, such as the seriousness of the charges against Mr. Miles and the possible ramifications of an adverse ruling after the hearing, after the filing of exceptions and the board's final order or by the appellate court. One must also consider the additional time expended in the extensive search for and location of an exculpatory witness, which should be credited and reimbursed to the Respondent and Ms. Aspros.

Furthermore, Ms. Aspros's competent appellate work rescued her client from a disastrous consequence to his career. He had been terminated for allegedly touching three young female students in a sexual manner but, as a direct result of the quality of her legal representation, including the time expended, the court ultimately upheld the administrative law judge and ordered Mr. Miles reinstatement and that he be made whole by the NCSB. This ultimate result took a significant amount of time expended by Ms. Aspros in mounting a successful defense and a great deal of the amount of time she expended,

reflected by the time shown in her billing records, is directly proportional to the importance Ms. Aspros attributed to the case and to her client's circumstances.

The Pfohl court recognizes, in addition to the criteria discussed above, that the quality of the work produced is a factor in assessing the reasonableness of an attorney's fee. The preponderant evidence shows, as Mr. Traynham testified, that Ms. Aspros displayed a high level of competency in performing the work necessary to a successful conclusion for her client in this case. This is one of the considerations he used in computing a reasonable fee, in his opinion, and has been considered by the administrative law judge in arriving at a reasonable fee.

In summary, the undersigned has considered and weighed the testimony of record and has considered the factors enumerated in the above findings of fact and the conclusions and legal authority referenced above; See also Patients Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985). It is thus determined that preponderant evidence and the above analysis establishes that a reasonable fee is based upon reasonable and necessary time expended of 293.54 hours which, when multiplied by the accepted and reasonable rate of $150.00 per hour results in a reasonable attorney's fee to be awarded of $44,031.00.

Accordingly, having considered the preponderant evidence of record, the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore,

ORDERED:

That a reasonable attorney's fee of $44,031.00 is hereby awarded to the Respondent, together with costs of $1,739.49, which amount shall be paid by the Nassau County School Board to Respondent's counsel, Ms. Aspros.

DONE AND ORDERED this 13th day of May, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060

(850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675

Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of May, 2003.

ENDNOTE

1/ At the hearing, the parties erroneously identified the Respondent as the Petitioner and vice versa. The style of this case accurately reflects Mr. Miles as the Respondent represented by Mr. Meyer and Ms. Aspros, and the Nassau County School Board as the Petitioner, represented by Mr. Hayes. Throughout this order the School Board will be referred to as the Petitioner and

Mr. Miles as the Respondent, to be consistent with their status in the underlying case when it was before the undersigned.

Consequently, the identification of exhibits is hereby changed so that the Petitioner's exhibits shall be entitled Respondent's exhibits and the Respondent's exhibits shall be entitled the Petitioner's exhibits with the present respective numbering remaining unchanged.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Brian T. Hayes, Esquire Brian T. Hayes, P.A.

245 East Washington Street Monticello, Florida 32344

Mary F. Aspros, Esquire Meyer and Brooks, P.A.

2544 Blairstone Pines Drive Post Office Box 1547 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

John L. Ruis, Ed.D Superintendent of Schools Nassau County School District 1201 Atlantic Avenue

Fernandina Beach, Florida 32034

Honorable Jim Horne Commission of Education The Capitol, Level 08

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing the original notice of appeal with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings and a copy, accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal, First District, or with the District Court of Appeal in the Appellate District where the party resides. The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed.

Docket for Case No: 01-000001

Orders for Case No: 01-000001