II-LG-O | OLE py STATE OF FLORIDA 02 FER Soa fy DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION “4 PY » ford 38 MARK HAIR, BRENDA AND JAMES ) elie BURNSED, and JERRY R. HOLLAND, ) ) Petitioners, ) OGC CASENOs. 00-2388 ) 00-2370 vs. ) 00-. ) DOAH CASE NOs¢ 01-1028 DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL ) 1-102 PROTECTION, and TIR-NA-N’OG, INC., ) 01-1030 ) Respondents. ) DEA -CLosek. ! FINAL ORDER An Administrative Law Judge with the Division of Administrative Hearings (‘DOAH”) submitted his Recommended Order to the Department of Environmental Protection (“Department”) in this formal administrative proceeding. A copy of the Recommended Order is attached hereto as Exhibit A. The Recommended Order indicates that copies thereof were served upon pro se Petitioners, Mark Hair and Jerry Holland, and upon counsel for the Petitioners, James and Brenda Burnsed (collectively referred to as the “Petitioners”). A copy of the Recommended Order was also served upon John Abel, the owner of Tir-na-n’og, Inc. (‘Applicant’). Exceptions to the Recommended Order were filed on behalf of the Department and by the pro se Applicant. Responses in opposition to these Exceptions were filed on behalf of the Petitioners, James and Brenda Burnsed. The matter is now before the Secretary of the Department for final agency action. BACKGROUND In November of 1995, the Department issued a permit to the Applicant for a Residuals Management Facility (‘RMF”).' The RMF is located on the Applicant's ranch in the northeastern portion of unincorporated Okeechobee County near the community _ of Fort Drum. In May of 2000, the Applicant filed a permit renewal application for the RMF. A Notice of Intent to Issue the renewal permit for the RMF was issued by the Department’s Southeast District Office on December 20, 2000. Petitions were filed by the various Petitioners opposing the proposed RMF permit renewal by the Department. The matter was then referred to DOAH for formal proceedings and Administrative Law Judge, Donald Alexander (“ALJ”), was assigned to preside over the related cases. The cases were consolidated by the ALJ, and a DOAH final hearing was held on September 25, 2001, in Ft. Pierce, Florida. The ALJ entered a Recommended Order in these consolidated cases on November 16, 2001. A Motion for Enlargement of Time to File Exceptions and Extend the Time for Entry of the Final Order (“Motion”) was then filed on behalf of the Department and the Applicant. An order was subsequently entered by the Department extending the time for filing Exceptions to the Recommended Order until December 31, 2001. This order ‘ The term “residual” is defined by Department rule as “solid, semisolid, or liquid residue generated during the treatment of domestic wastewater.” Rule 62-640.200(31), F.A.C. A RMF is a facility that treats residuals from other facilities before use or land application. A RMF may also treat domestic septage and combination of residuals, domestic septage, wastes removed from portable toilets, and wastes removed from holding tanks associated with boats, marinas, and onsite sewage treatment and disposal systems before use or land application. See Rule 62-640.200(32), F.A.C. also extended the time for entry of an agency final order in these consolidated cases until January 31, 2002, as agreed to by the Applicant. * RECOMMENDED ORDER The ALJ found in the Recommended Order that the Applicant failed to accurately _ report all incoming loads of untreated residuals on the monthly Discharge Monitoring Reports (‘DMRs”) as required by the 1995 permit. The ALJ concluded that such noncompliance with the 1995 permit constituted a serious violation of Rule 62- 620.335(5)(a), F.A.C. The ALJ also concluded that the Applicant violated an alleged requirement that “no residuals be applied within the setback area for adjoining property boundaries.” Based on these two purported violations, the ALJ recommended that the Department enter a final order denying the application of Tir-na-n’og, Inc. for renewal of its RMF operating permit. RULINGS ON THE APPLICANT'S EXCEPTIONS The pro se Applicant filed a letter containing Exceptions to various findings of fact and conclusions of law in the Recommended Order. These letter Exceptions are disposed of as follows: 14. The Applicant’s Exceptions to the ALw’s Findings of Fact 2, 6, 17, 19, 20, 27, and 31 and 29 are denied. These Exceptions rely in part on purported facts set forth in written documents that were not admitted into evidence in the DOAH proceeding and were thus not considered by the ALJ in the preparation of his Recommended Order. On administrative review of a DOAH recommended order, | am limited to a consideration of the competent substantial evidence of record in the DOAH proceeding. Consequently, 2 Attached to the Motion was a letter signed by John G. Abel, owner of the RMF facility, agreeing to an extension of time until January 31, 2002, to file a final order in these consolidated cases. The Applicant's owner has thus waived the 45-day time period set forth in § 120.60(1), F.S. in the course of rendering this Final Order, | am not authorized to consider written documents that are not part of the official DOAH record. Furthermore, most of Applicant's Exceptions do not cite or refer to any testimony or exhibits in the DOAH record containing evidence which arguably supports the assertions contained in these _ Exceptions. In addition, | view the ALJ’s factual findings challenged in these Exceptions to be subordinate findings not crucial to the final disposition of these cases. 2. The Applicant’s Exception to the ALJ's Finding of Fact 21 is granted in part and denied in part. Upon reviewing the entire DOAH record, | find that there is no competent substantial evidence to support the ALJ's finding in the second sentence that the Petitioner, Jerry Holland, “lives across the street from the [Applicant's] ranch,” and this finding is rejected. Holland testified that he lives “down the main road” in the Indian Hammocks community, which encompasses 3,500 acres of land (Tr. Vol. Il, pages 206- 207).> There is no competent substantial evidence of record establishing where Holland's residential lot is located within this large 3,500-acre community or establishing the proximity between Holland's house and the boundary line of the Applicant's ranch. The remainder of the Applicant's Exception to Finding of Fact 21 is denied. 3. The Applicant's Exceptions to the ALJ's Findings of Fact 24, 25, and 28 and Conclusion of Law 37 are granted for the reasons set forth in detail in the subsequent rulings granting the Department's Exceptions. 4. The Applicant's Exception to the ALJ’s Conclusion of Law 34 is denied. The ALJ correctly concluded in this paragraph that the Applicant has the ultimate burden of 3 The testimony presented at the DOAH final hearing was not transcribed until December 3, 2001, over two weeks after the ALJ's Recommended Order was entered. | thus recognize that, in the course of preparing this Final Order, | had access to a resource not available to the ALJ, i.e., a complete transcript of the testimony of all the witnesses at the final hearing. 4 establishing, by a preponderance of evidence, that it is entitled to the requested RMF permit renewal. Nevertheless, for the reasons set forth in my subsequent rulings granting the Department's Exceptions, | reject the ALJ's related legal conclusions that the Applicant has violated two conditions of the existing RMF permit and the “two _ violations are sufficient to deny the application” for the requested permit renewal. RULINGS ON THE DEPARTMENT'S EXCEPTIONS Exception No. 4 The Department's first Exception objects to portions of the ALJ’s Finding of Fact 28 and his related Conclusion of Law 37. In his “Finding of Fact 28,” the ALJ asserts that the Petitioner, Jerry Holland, personally observed the spreading of residuals on the ground “no more than 8 feet from the property line” of Applicant's ranch. The ALJ thus concluded that this action constituted a violation of the Agricultural Use Plan, incorporated by reference into the Applicant's 1995 permit issued by the Department. This purported violation was cited by the ALJ as one of two purported violations warranting denial of the Applicant's RMF permit renewal request. In a formal administrative proceeding under §§ 120.569 and 420.57(1), Florida Statutes, the determination of whether an applicant for a permit renewal has violated the conditions of an existing permit issued by the Department is not a pure fact-finding process within the sole prerogative of an administrative law judge. This determination involves a combination of fact-finding and interpretation of written provisions of a Department permit and Department rules incorporated by reference therein. | conclude that the phase of this “violation” determination process where written provisions of a Department permit and related Department rules are being construed in light of the material facts in a particular case essentially involves matters of law within the “substantive jurisdiction” of the Department under § 120.57(1)(I), Florida Statutes. The Department correctly notes in its Exceptions that there are no provisions in the 1995 permit, the Agricultural Use Plan, or in the Department's rules establishing a _ setback line from the Applicant's “property boundaries” for spreading treated residuals on the ground. in fact, both the Agricultural Use Plan (Resp. Joint Ex. R3, page 2) incorporated by reference into the 1995 permit and Rule 62-640.700(4)(d), F.A.C., prohibit the application of residuals “within 300 feet of a building occupied by the general public.” The ALJ did not make a factual finding in the Recommended Order that residuals were spread within 300 feet of a building occupied by one of the Petitioners or by another member of the general public. In his Finding of Fact 21, the ALJ did find that the Petitioner Holland “lives across the street from the [Applicant's] ranch” in a retirement community known as Indian Hammocks. However, the ALJ did not make any finding in his Recommended Order that Holland’s house (or any other structure in Indian Hammocks) was located within 300 feet of the place on the Applicant’s 247-acre ranch where the residuals were purportedly spread “no more than 8 feet from the property line.” As discussed in my prior ruling on the Applicant's Exception to Finding of Fact 21, it is undisputed that Indian Hammocks is a large residential community covering a total of 3,500 acres of land. There is no competent substantial evidence of record establishing the distance from Holland’s residential structure in the Indian Hammocks community to the Applicant's property line. | have no authority to supplement the factual findings in the Recommended Order on review by adding a finding in this Final Order that residuals were applied within 300 feet of Holland’s residence or within 300 feet of any other structure occupied by the general public. See, e.g., North Port, Fla. v. Consolidated Minerals, 645 So.2d 485 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), Inverness Convalescent Center v. Dept. of H.R.S., 512 So.2d 1011, 1015 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). In view of the above, the Department's Exception No. 1 is granted. Accordingly, the ALJ's conclusion that the act of spreading residuals no more than eight feet from the Applicant’s property line constitutes a “violation of the existing permit” is rejected.“ Exception No. 2 The Department's second Exception objects to a portion of the first sentence of Finding of Fact 8 wherein the ALJ states that the adjoining Fox property is “of unknown size.” Based on a review of the entire record, | conclude that there is no competent substantial evidence to support this contested finding of the ALJ. To the contrary, Part Il on page 2 of Respondent's Joint Exhibit R3.b states that the total acreage of the adjoining Fox property is “265 acres.” Consequently, the Department's Exception No. 2 is granted. The first sentence of Finding of Fact 8 is modified by inserting “265-acre” before the word “property” and by eliminating the words “of unknown size.” Exception No. 3 The Department's third Exception objects to the ALJ’s Findings of Fact 24 and 25 and Conclusion of Law 37. In his Findings of Fact 24 and 25, the ALJ found that the ‘ Pursuant to § 120.57(1)(I), F.S., | find that this agency’s conclusion of law and rule interpretation set forth above is more reasonable than the ALU's legal conclusion and rule interpretation that was rejected. | also conclude that the ALJ's determination that the act of “spreading residuals no more than 8 feet from the [Applicant's] property line” constitutes a violation of the existing permit and a violation of the provisions of Department Rule 62-620.335(5)(a), F.AC., is essentially a conclusion of law and a rule interpretation, although this determination is set forth in both the ALJ's “Finding of Fact” 28 and his Conclusion of Law 37. Ifa finding of fact or conclusion of law is improperly labeled by an administrative law judge, the label is disregarded and the item is treated as though it were properly labeled. Battaglia Properties v. Fla. Land and Adj. Comm., 629 So.2d 161, 168 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). 7 Applicant failed to accurately report all incoming loads of untreated septage or residuals on his monthly DMRs during the years 2000 and 2001 as required by the 1995 permit. In his related Conclusion of Law 37, the ALJ concluded that, when this permit violation is viewed together with the purported violation of spreading treated residuals no more _than eight feet from the property line, “the two violations are sufficient to deny the application.” | reject these crucial factual findings and legal conclusions of the ALJ for the following reasons: 1. Astate agency has the primary responsibility of interpreting statutes and rules within its regulatory jurisdiction and expertise. See, e.g., Public Employees Relations Commission v. Dade County Police Benevolent Association, 467 So.2d 987, 989 (Fla. 1985); Florida Public Employee Council, 79 AFSCME v. Daniels, 646 So.2d 813, 816 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). The rules relating to the permitting and regulation of wastewater facilities which treat and/or apply residuals are set forth in Chapters 62-620 and 62-640, F.A.C. The administrative rules in Chapters 62-620 and 62-640 were adopted and are enforced by the Department. Thus, it is the primary responsibility of the Department to interpret these rule provisions. These interpretations by Department officials of this agency’s own administrative rules are entitled to great deference and should not be overturned unless they are “clearly erroneous.” See, e.g., Dept. of Environmental Regulation v. Goldring, 477 So.2d 532, 534 (Fla. 1985); and Reedy Creek Improvement Dist. v. Dept. of Environmental Regulation, 486 So.2d 642, 648 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). 2. Two Department officials, Francis Murphy and Todd Brown, testified at the DOAH final hearing in these cases. Francis Murphy is a Department wastewater engineer in the Department's Southeast District Office and Todd Brown is an environmental manager in the Southeast District Office's wastewater facility compliance and enforcement section. Neither Mr. Murphy nor Mr. Brown were of the opinion that the Applicant was in violation of the Department's wastewater facility rules in Chapters 62-620 and 62-640 (Tr. Vol. |, pages 69-83 and 96-101). | conclude that these rule _ interpretations of the two Department officials are not clearly erroneous and should be affirmed. 3. Inhis Findings of Fact 24 and 25, the ALJ correctly found that trucks entering the Applicant’s property carrying previously treated residuals for direct land application were not required to be reported on the monthly DMRs. The ALJ also correctly found that these deliveries of previously treated residuals for direct land application on the Applicant's property were only required to be shown on annual summary reports submitted to the Department. The ALJ's Finding of Fact 24 refers to testimony of John Abel, owner of the subject RMF, that he annually receives about 280 truckloads of treated residuals from the Hutchinson Utility Authority (“Authority”) which are not required to be reported on the monthly DMRs. The ALJ observed that “[t]his explanation would account for virtually all of the [alleged] unrecorded shipments in the year 2000, assuming that all of the Authority shipments occurred during the 9-month surveillance period.” 4. Nevertheless, the ALJ totally discounted this direct testimony of Mr. Abel for two reasons. First, the ALJ observed that “[m]ore than likely, however, these shipments were staggered throughout the year.” Based on a review of the entire record, | find no competent substantial evidence to support this speculation of the ALJ. A second reason given by the ALJ for discounting John Abel's testimony as to the 280 truckloads or treated residuals not required to be recorded on the monthly DMRs was that the Applicant did not introduce into evidence the annual summary reports for the years 2000 and 2001 “so that those figures could be compared to the number of trucks identified in the surveillance tapes” presented by the Petitioners. However, the _ Department official, Francis Murphy, and the owner of the RMF, John Abel, both testified at the DOAH final hearing that these deliveries by the Authority of previously treated residuals were duly reported by the Applicant on the annual summary reports submitted to the Department (Tr. Vol. Il, page 216-217, pages 225-226, and 242-246). 5. The actual written annual reports submitted to the Department may have been the “best evidence” of the number of truckloads of previously treated residuals that were delivered to Applicant's property for direct land application. However, no objections were made on behalf of any of the Petitioners to the testimony of Francis Murphy and John Abel concerning the fact that the deliveries of previously treated residuals from the Authority to the Applicant’s property were properly reflected on the annual summary reports submitted to the Department, rather than on the monthly DMRs. This testimony admitted without objection at the DOAH final hearing thus became a part of the record in this case and is entitled to be considered along with any other evidence in the record. See Tri-State Systems, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, 500 So.2d 212, 215 (Fla. ist DCA 1985), rev. denied, 506 So.2d 1041 (Fla. 1987) (concluding that evidence admitted without objection at a DOAH hearing becomes a part of the evidence in the case and is usable as proof just as any other evidence). See also BAPCO v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 654 So.2d 292, 297 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (concluding that it is unfair to a party whose evidence is received at a DOAH hearing without objection only 10 to discover that its evidence was later rejected). Therefore, the fact that the Applicant's annual summary reports, or copies thereof, were not introduced into evidence at the final hearing does not negate the probative value of this “unobjected-to” testimony of Francis Murphy and John Abel concerning the matters contained in these annual reports. Tri-State Systems, 500 So.2d at 215. 6. The Petitioners did introduce into evidence documentary evidence consisting of a compilation and comparison of information gleaned from surveillance videotapes purporting to show the number of truckloads of residuals that were delivered to the Applicant's property during the period from April 6, 2000, to May 9, 2001 (‘Plaintiff's Ex. B1"). Based primarily ona comparison of these figures compiled by the Petitioners with the number of truckloads of untreated residuals shown on the Applicant's monthly DMR reports, the ALJ made critical factual findings that the Applicant “failed to report on his DMRs around 25 percent of the incoming loads of untreated septage or residual during the year 2000” and that “a significant underreporting would be occurring during the year 2001.” Upon review of the entire DOAH record, however, | find that there is no competent substantial evidence to support these crucial factual findings of the ALJ. 7. The Petitioners’ Exhibit B1 does not specify whether or not the various trucks listed therein contained treated residuals for direct land application on the Applicant's ranch or untreated residuals to be processed through the Applicant's RMF facility. Furthermore, no other competent substantial evidence was presented by the Petitioners at the final hearing specifying which of the trucks listed on their “Exhibit B1” contained treated residuals and which of the trucks contained untreated residuals. As discussed above, the record in these cases contains the uncontroverted testimony of a 1 Department official, Francis Murphy, that the truck loads of previously treated residuals from the Authority for direct land application on the Applicant’s property were not required to be reported on the monthly DMR reports (Tr. Vol. ll, page 216). 8. Consequently, a comparison of the number of truckloads of unspecified _ residuals listed on the Petitioners’ Exhibit B1 with the number of truckloads of untreated residuals shown on the monthly DMR reports could not support valid factual findings by the ALJ of “significant underreporting” on the Applicant's DMRs during the years 2000 and 2001. In order for such findings to be appropriate in this case, the ALJ would need to have before him competent substantial evidence of record that all or substantially all of the trucks identified in the Petitioners’ Exhibit B1 carried untreated residuals which were required to be reported on the Applicant's monthly DMRs. No such evidence was presented by the Petitioners in this case. The fact that the Applicant's property is being used for both treating residuals in its RMF and also for direct land application of residuals previously treated at other RMFs seems to have been a major source of confusion on the part of the Petitioners with regard to their claims of purported “underreporting” by the Applicant on the monthly DMRs. 9. Even assuming that the 1995 permit had been violated due to the Applicant's failure to comply with monthly DMR reporting requirements, there is no factual or legal basis in these cases to support the ALJ’s ultimate determination in Conclusion of Law 37 that “the two violations are sufficient to deny the application.” As discussed above, | have previously rejected the ALJ's legal conclusion that spreading residuals within eight feet of the Applicant's property line constitutes a violation of the Applicant’s 1995 permit. Consequently, the ALJ's conclusions that the Applicant has committed two separate 12 violations of the existing permit and that the cumulative effects of the two violations are sufficient to deny the subject permit renewal application are fatally defective. Based on the above rulings, the Department’s Exception No. 3 is granted. Accordingly, the portions of the ALJ’s Findings of Fact 24 and 25 stating that the Applicant “significantly underreported” and “failed to accurately report” incoming loads of residuals on the monthly DMRs are rejected for lack of competent substantial evidence. In addition, the ALJ's legal conclusions in Conclusion of Law 37 that the Applicant committed two violations of the existing permit and that “the two violations are sufficient to deny the application” for the subject RMF permit renewal are rejected.® Exception No. 4 The Department's fourth and final Exception again objects to the ALU’s Conclusion of Law 37. This Exception also objects to the ALJ's recommendation that a final order be entered denying the subject application for the permit renewal. Exception No. 4 is granted for the reasons set forth in detail in the preceding ruling. Moreover, for the reasons stated above and in the following conclusion, the ALJ’s recommendation that a final order be entered denying the Applicant’s RMF permit renewal is rejected. CONCLUSION In the landmark case of Florida Dept. of Transportation v. J.W.C. Co., Inc., 396 So.2d 778 (Fla.1st DCA 1981), the court ruled that a permit applicant in a contested permit proceeding has the initial burden of going forward and presenting a prima facie case that it is entitled to the requested permit. The J.W.C. Co. court further ruled that, once a permit applicant has made a preliminary showing that applicable environmental 5 Pursuant to § 120.57(1)(I), F.S., | find that this agency's conclusion of law and rule interpretation set forth above are more reasonable than the ALJ’s conclusion of law and rule interpretation that were rejected. 13 standards will not be violated, then the burden shifts to the permit challenger to go forward and present “contrary evidence of equivalent quality” that the applicant is not entitled to the permit. Id. at 396 So.2d 789. In these cases, the Department called three expert witnesses in domestic wastewater facilities (James Macon, Francis Murphy, and Todd Brown) to testify at the final hearing.® All three experts rendered opinions supporting the issuance of the RMF renewal permit to the Applicant (Tr. Vol. |, pages 20-38, 69-83, 96-101). Based on this expert testimony, the ALJ properly found in his Finding of Fact 7 that: All physical components of the facility are in good working condition, are not leaking, and operate as intended. The engineering review concluded that there are no corrective actions required, no outstanding compliance issues, and the facility has no noted problems or deficiencies. The Department's review concluded that there are no outstanding compliance issues or enforcement actions involving the facility. The ALJ also found in his Finding of Fact 29 that “no concrete evidence” was presented at the final hearing to establish that several illnesses in the general neighborhood were due to the Applicant’s operation of the RMF. The ALJ further found in his Finding of Fact 30 that the RMF “is not in violation” of the Department rule prohibiting the discharge of air pollutants which cause or contribute to an objectionable odor. The Petitioners did not present opposing expert testimony that the subject application would violate any Department wastewater facility rules or standards relating to renewal of RMF permits. Instead, the Petitioners’ evidence consisted primarily of lay testimony and related documents prepared by themselves purporting to show that the Applicant had violated certain conditions of the existing RMF permit. In my above 8 The preliminary action of the Department staff resulted in a proposed issuance of the RMF permit renewal to the Applicant. Therefore, the interests of the Department permitting staff and the Applicant were compatible in the DOAH proceeding below. 14 rulings, | have found that this evidence of the Petitioners is not competent substantial evidence supporting a finding that the Applicant violated the terms of the 1995 permit issued by the Department. Accordingly, the Petitioners did not satisfy the J.W.C. Co. requirement of presenting “contrary evidence of equivalent quality” to that presented by the Department and the Applicant in these cases. The denial or issuance of a permit by the Department must be based solely on an applicant’s compliance or noncompliance with applicable environmental standards set forth in the governing statutes and rules implementing the Department's regulatory jurisdiction. Consequently, issues relating to whether the Applicant’s RMF facility complies with Okeechobee County zoning and land use ordinances or other local laws are legal matters beyond the jurisdiction of this administrative permit proceeding. See, e.g., Taylor v. Cedar Key Special Water & Sewerage District, 590 So.2d 480 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Council of the Lower Keys v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 429 So.2d 67 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). However, the Florida courts have observed that other “remedies apart from the permitting scheme” are available to the Petitioners if the Applicant's RMF facility violates any mandatory zoning or land use ordinances or other local laws. Taylor, 590 So.2d at 482. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: A. The Recommended Order is modified as indicated in the above rulings. B. The Recommended Order, as modified, is adopted and incorporated by reference herein. 15 C. The Department is directed to ISSUE to the Applicant the RMF renewal operating permit in “DEP File No. FLA016637,” subject to the conditions set forth in the draft permit attached to the Intent to Issue dated December 20, 2000. Any party to this proceeding has the right to seek judicial review of the Final Order pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes, by the filing of a Notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, with the clerk of the Department in the Office of General Counsel, 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, M.S. 35, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000; and by filing a copy of the Notice of Appeal accompanied by the applicable filing fees with the appropriate District Court of Appeal. The Notice of Appeal must be filed within 30 days from the date this Final Order is filed with the clerk of the Department. DONE AND ORDERED thid{ day of January, 2002, in Tallahassee, Florida. STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION « FILED ON THIS DATE PURSUANT TO § 120.52, Ceiba FLORIDA STATUTES, WITH THE DESIGNATED D. B. STROUHS DEPARTMENT CLERK, RECEIPT OF WHICH Secretary HEREBY ACKNOWLEDG Marjory Stoneman Douglas Building 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 ai/oz 16 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE | HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing Final Order has been sent by United States Postal Service to: Jonathan Jay Kirschner, Esquire Mark Hair Kirscher & Garland, P.A. 885 Northeast 336" Street 401 North Second Street Okeechobee, FL 34792-3603 Fort Pierce, FL 34960-4403 Jerry R. Holland John G. Abel 32801 U.S. Highway 441 North 24 Northeast 325" Trail Lot 101 Okeechobee, FL 34792-0253 Okeechobee, FL 34792-0271 Ann Cole, Clerk and Donald R. Alexander, Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 4230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 and by hand delivery to: Francine M. Ffolkes, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Blvd., M.S. 35 Tallahassee, FL 32399-3000 this | s+ day or EE 0 STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION JZTERRELL WILLIAMS Assistant General Counsel 3900 Commonwealth Blvd., M.S. 35 Tallahassee, FL 32399-3000 Telephone 850/488-9314 17

Docket for Case No: 01-001030

Orders for Case No: 01-001030