STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
FREDDIE MAE LAW,
Petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Respondent.
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) Case No. 03-0874
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RECOMMENDED ORDER
Pursuant to notice and in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, a formal hearing was held in this case, on May 15, 2003, in Lakeland, Florida, before Fred L. Buckine, the designated Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: Freddie Mae Law, pro se
402 Northwest Ninth Street Mulberry, Florida 33860
For Respondent: Jack Emory Farley, Esquire
Department of Children and Family Services
4720 Old Highway 37
Lakeland, Florida 33813-2030 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
The issue is whether Respondent should approve Petitioner's family day care license application.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
On January 29, 2003, Respondent, the Department of Children and Family Services, informed Petitioner, Freddie Mae Law, that her application for a family day care license was denied because "From December 26, 2001 to February 22, 2002, you were licensed by the Department as a foster parent. During this short of time, five reports were made to the Florida Abuse Hotline Information System (FAHI) alleging inadequate supervision of children in your foster home."
On February 23, 2003, Petitioner timely requested a formal hearing to challenge Respondent's decision. On March 11, 2003, Respondent referred the case to the Division of Administrative Hearings for assignment of an Administrative Law Judge to conduct the hearing requested by Petitioner.
On March 19, 2003, the Notice of Hearing scheduling the final hearing for April 29, 2003, in Lakeland, Florida, was entered. Respondent's Emergency Motion for Continuance, filed on April 25, 2003, was granted by Order of the same day rescheduling the final hearing for May 15, 2003.
The hearing was held on May 15, 2003. At the hearing, Petitioner testified on her own behalf and also presented the testimony of six witnesses: Diane Dukes, Terriss Stevenson, Gail Reed, Chastity Griffin, John Dukes, and Gloria Mathews. Petitioner's seven exhibits (P-1 through P-7) were received into
evidence. Respondent presented the testimony of three witnesses: Cheryl Dishong, foster care license renewal investigator, and Nacara Daniels and Jayme Sprouse, both abuse reports investigators. Respondent offered two exhibits (R-1 and R-2) into evidence.
At the conclusion of the hearing and by stipulation of the parties, the record was left open for post-hearing submittals of Petitioner's Exhibits P-1 through P-7, after copies were provided to Respondent's counsel. Petitioner's post-hearing submittals were considered by the undersigned in preparing this Recommended Order.
A Transcript of the hearing was filed on May 27, 2003.
Petitioner did not file a proposed recommended order. Respondent's Proposed Recommended Order was filed on June 9, 2003, and has been considered by the undersigned in preparing this Recommended Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Based upon observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying in person and the documentary materials received in evidence, stipulations by the parties, evidentiary rulings made pursuant to Chapter 120.57, Florida Statutes, and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant and material facts are found:
Before December 15, 2000, Petitioner, Freddie Mae Law (Ms. Law) submitted an application for a family foster care license to Respondent, the Department of Children and Family Services (Department). Gloria Mathews (Ms. Mathews), who was at that time assigned to the Department's family foster care license unit, conducted the requisite pre-license investigation and found that Ms. Law met the mandatory requirements and that Ms. Law was qualified for a family foster care license.
Based solely upon the results of Ms. Mathews' investigation of Ms. Law's background and qualifications, the Department issued Ms. Law a family foster care license on December 15, 2000. Thereafter, Ms. Law provided family foster childcare service out of her home in Mulberry, Florida. At some undetermined time after December 15, 2000, Ms. Mathews transferred from the Department's family foster care license unit to the Department's family day care license unit where she is currently working.
Ms. Law's family foster care license was valid from December 15, 2000 to December 15, 2001, and was renewable on or before its anniversary date. On December 15, 2001, the Department took no action regarding the renewal of Ms. Law's foster home license. With the Department's consent and approval, Ms. Law operated her family foster care out of her
home until February 21, 2002, at which time she voluntarily surrendered her foster care license to the Department.
For more than eight years before she acquired her "foster care license" Ms. Law worked at the Cornerstone Youth Shelter. This residential shelter home, through contract with the Department, and the Department of Juvenile Justice, accepted referrals of children in need of housing and foster care services.
On September 11, 2001, four months before the expiration date of Ms. Law's family foster care license on December 15, 2001, the required renewal investigation was conducted by Cheryl Dishong (Ms. Dishong), who was then a foster care license unit caseworker.
Prior to the initial renewal visit by a foster care license unit caseworker, the Department requires the assigned caseworker to secure a copy of a foster care visit report form that contains the names and ages of the foster children in the foster home to be visited by the caseworker. Additionally, caseworkers are required to record the results of their foster care home visit on the foster care visit report form.
Uncertain of the time of her prearranged visit with Ms. Law and of her arrival time at Ms. Law's residence,
Ms. Dishong recalled arriving at the Law's residence at approximately 3:00 p.m. or 3:30 p.m. in the afternoon.
According to Ms. Dishong, Ms. Law was not home upon her arrival, but arrived within five to ten minutes thereafter. During the short five to ten-minute interval before Ms. Law arrived, Ms. Dishong saw several teenaged children walking home from school. Ms. Dishong observed the two teenaged children approach Ms. Law's home, and she spoke with them outside
Ms. Law's home. Neither Ms. Dishong nor the children entered Ms. Law's home at that time. Upon Ms. Law's arrival, she and Ms. Dishong entered the home while the two teenaged children stayed outside on the porch.
During this visit, Ms. Dishong discussed with Ms. Law her one concern; the five-minute interval between the arrival of the two teenagers home and Ms. Law's arrival home.
Ms. Law explained to Ms. Dishong that the one teenage foster child along with her biological daughter attended school within walking distance from their home. The normal family school day routine was for the teenagers to walk to and from school each day. The entire family would leave home together in the mornings and would normally arrive home in the evenings at about the same time Ms. Law arrived home from work. Ms. Law further explained to Ms. Dishong that her family's school day routine consisted of her transporting the younger foster children to school each morning on her way to work and picking them up from school on her way home each afternoon. This
routine of a mother transporting young children to and from school each day is a routine of many mothers with young school children. The routine of teenaged children walking home from school and arriving a reasonably short time before their parents arrive home from work is also that of normal families.
The Department proffered no rule or known and accepted standard that was violated by the hereinabove Law foster family school day routine. Ms. Law's determination of personally transporting the younger foster children to and from school and her determination that the teenaged foster child and her biological child should walk to and from school do not reflect a lack of supervision nor do they demonstrate faulty decision- making.
Ms. Dishong, the Department's chief witness and a foster care license unit relicensure caseworker for three and one-half years, testified exclusively from memory. Her testimony, with exception of her face-to-face conversations with Ms. Law and her several telephone conversations with Ms. Law, consisted primarily of conclusions and generalizations.
Ms. Dishong was unable to accurately recall names of specific foster children with whom she allegedly had conversations, and she could not recall specific dates, times, or places. Her recollection of statements allegedly made to her by foster children and other children lacks support and, therefore, lacks
credibility. Ms. Dishong's recollection and testimony of statements allegedly made by the several children, foster, biological and others, is unobjected to as hearsay not supported by any other evidence of record and, in itself, cannot support a finding of fact.1 Accordingly, that testimony is disregarded in the preparation of this Recommended Order.
On September 21, 2001, Nacara Daniels (Ms. Daniels), the Department's investigator of abuse report 2001-051113, visited Ms. Law's foster care home for an investigation of allegations contained in abuse report 2001-051113. Before her visit to Ms. Law's home, Ms. Dishong told Ms. Daniels of allegations of a lack of supervision and faulty decision-making purportedly contained in three other unidentified abuse reports.
On October 9, 2001, and as the direct result of Ms. Daniels' investigation, interview, and discussion with
Ms. Law regarding her foster care supervision, the Department entered into a Partnership Development Plan (PDP) agreement with Ms. Law. This partnership agreement and its cooperative working relationship between Ms. Law and the Department's caseworkers are designed to provide foster care that is in the best interest of the foster children. The PDP agreement reduced to writing the Department's agreed acceptance to continue its foster care partnership with Ms. Law and Ms. Law's agreed acceptance to continue working with the Department. Ms. Law complied with the
terms and conditions contained in the PDP agreement from the date she signed the agreement on October 9, 2001, to the date Ms. Law voluntarily surrendered her foster care license to the Department on February 21, 2002.
On or after October 9, 2001, and after completing her investigation and discussions with Ms. Law, Ms. Daniels closed abuse report 2001-051113 with a finding that allegations contained in abuse report 2001-051113 were uncorroborated.
Ms. Daniels recalled, at some unspecified time subsequent to October 9, 2001, sharing her abuse report findings of uncorroborated allegations, the conditions and terms of the PDP, and her abuse report closure status with Ms. Dishong.
Before the two-week Christmas break of December 2001, Ms. Law telephoned the Department and spoke to each foster child's caseworker. By mutual agreement between Ms. Law and each caseworker with whom she spoke, a Christmas vacation plan was developed for sharing the daily care and responsibilities for Ms. Law's foster children over the two-week Christmas holiday period.
It was agreed that during the two-week 2001 Christmas break, Ms. Law would leave her foster children at the Department's office each morning on her way to work, and she would pick them up from the Department's office each evening on her way home after she finished work. During this two-week
Christmas holiday period, Ms. Law continued to provide the foster children breakfast before leaving home each morning, and the Department's caseworkers provided each child with their midday lunch meals.
On January 4, 2002, Jayme Sprouse (Ms. Sprouse), a Department investigator, received abuse report 2002-001260. Before her initial visit to the Law family foster care home, Ms. Sprouse reviewed all the information contained in the Department's foster care unit licensing renewal case file.
On February 4, 2002, one month after receiving abuse report 2002-001260, Ms. Sprouse spoke with Ms. Law concerning the general allegations to have occurred during an unspecified time span before December 2001 regarding her use of unscreened foster care sitters. This inexplicable month delay is significant in that it evidences the fact that allegations contained in abuse report 2002-001260 did not constitute an immediate danger to the health, safety, and welfare of the foster children in Ms. Law's foster care home. Had abuse report 2002-001260's allegations been sufficient to create an immediate danger or threat to the safety and well-being of the foster children, Ms. Sprouse was required to conduct an investigation on January 5, 2002, within 24 hours after receiving the abuse report on January 4, 2002.
Ms. Sprouse inquired of Ms. Law's use of an unapproved foster child sitter. Ms. Law explained to Ms. Sprouse that she had a Department-approved foster child sitter, Chastity Griffin, who sat her foster children and who transported both biological and foster children to outings and entertainment activities. During this period, Ms. Law had also submitted an application to the Department for another approved sitter named Jocelyn (whose last name was not provided in the record) for approval. Not knowing that approval by the Department was required before a sitter could be used to sit foster children, Ms. Law permitted Jocelyn to sit with the foster children during the pendency approval of her foster care sitter application.
After February 4, 2002, Ms. Sprouse advised Ms. Law that that the Department had denied Jocelyn's pending sitter screening application. Responding to this information, Ms. Law immediately discontinued the use of Jocelyn as a foster care sitter, evidencing her willing readiness to comply with the Department's requirements once they were made known to her by the Department's staff.
After Ms. Law satisfied Ms. Sprouse's concern regarding the use of an unapproved sitter, Ms. Sprouse closed her investigation of abuse report 2002-001260 with a finding of no indicators of inadequate supervision based on the Florida Statute definition of inadequate supervision for abuse purposes.
Ms. Sprouse voiced no other concerns regarding Ms. Law's foster care supervision to Ms. Law. After the February 4, 2002, meeting with Ms. Sprouse, the record contains no credible evidence that Ms. Law continued to use unscreened sitters at the foster home or used unscreened persons for any other purposes.
Ms. Sprouse shared her abuse report findings of fact and her closure of the abuse report with Ms. Dishong, the case worker assigned the task of the renewal investigation of Ms. Law's foster care licensure process.
At no time during the period of September 11, 2001, throughout January 28, 2003, did Ms. Dishong inform Ms. Law that the Department's foster relicensing unit had received, in addition to abuse report 2001-051113 and abuse report 2002- 001260, three additional abuse reports alleging that she inadequately supervised the foster children in her home. Petitioner's Family Day Care Application
On or about November 6, 2002, Ms. Law made application to the Department for a family day care license. The
November 6, 2002, application is the subject of this de novo proceeding.
In December 2000, Ms. Mathews was assigned to the Department's foster care license unit. While there, it was she who approved Ms. Law's foster care license application. In November of 2002, Ms. Mathews was assigned to the Department's
family day care license unit. Ms. Mathews again conducted the requisite pre-licensure investigation of Ms. Law's minimum qualifications and criminal background check. For the second time within less than two years, Ms. Mathews again found Ms. Law to have met all statutory requirements and was, therefore, qualified to have a family day care license issued to her.
Specifically, Ms. Mathews confirmed that Ms. Law met mandatory minimum standards as required by statute. She visited and otherwise assured herself that Ms. Law's home met minimum standards. She ascertained that Ms. Law had completed 30 hours of childcare training at Polk Community College upon receiving Ms. Law's certificate of completion from Polk Community College. Ms. Mathews was satisfied the Ms. Law's criminal background check found Ms. Law free from any criminal convictions.
Ms. Mathews satisfied herself the Ms. Law's substitute family day person was qualified and had completed a minimum of three hours of childcare training as required.
Having completed and approved Ms. Law's foster care license application, Ms. Mathews was aware that Ms. Law's long- time employment at Cornerstone Youth Shelter was her sole source of income. Ms. Mathews advised Ms. Law that at the time her family day care license was issued, she would be prohibited from all other employment. To assist Ms. Law in determining the appropriate time to submit her two-week notice of resignation to
Cornerstone Youth Shelter, Ms. Mathews was the person to whom Ms. Law would inquire regarding the status of her forthcoming family day care license.
Ms. Mathews informed Ms. Law of her successful compliance with minimum requirements and told her the Department was in the process of signing her family day care license.
On January 17, 2002, in reliance on Ms. Mathews repeated assurances that her family day care license was forthcoming and to comply with the "no other work outside the home" requirement, Ms. Law gave her two-week notice of resignation to Cornerstone Youth Shelter.
Notwithstanding the fact that Ms. Mathews was assigned to the Law application and was working in the Department's family day care licensing unit, the Department's foster care unit's relicensing investigator, Ms. Dishong, never informed Ms. Mathews that the Department's foster care relicensing unit had concerns of such magnitude that they could be the bases for the denial of her family day care license application.
The Department's foster care license unit did not inform the family day care license unit that since November 6, 2002, the Department purportedly had received three additional abuse reports (bringing the total abuse reports to five) that would ultimately adversely impact Ms. Law's family day care license application. This is significant in that Ms. Mathews
was the person who at that time had determined that Ms. Law met minimum standards for a family day care license. This inexplicable lack of information sharing between the Department's foster unit and its family day care unit continued from January 17, 2002 to January 2003.
Ms. Dishong, Ms. Law's foster care unit investigator and the Department's primary witness, (1) could not identify from memory the three abuse reports allegedly filed against Ms. Law, (2) could not find the three abuse reports in her foster unit renewal investigation file, (3) could not proffer any evidence that allegations contained in those three reports
were investigated and corroborated by Department investigators, and (4) did not inform Ms. Law that allegations supposedly contained in those three unidentified abuse reports would adversely impact her pending family day care application.
This complete failure to identify, investigate, inform, and discuss with Ms. Law the three abuse reports is significant when the Department's processing of abuse reports 2001-051113 and 2002-001260 that were filed against Ms. Law is compared to its processing of the three unidentified abuse reports. In processing abuse reports 2001-051113 and 2002- 001260, the Department first investigated each report. Second, the Department discussed the allegations of each report with
Ms. Law. Third, the Department closed each report with a written finding. Lastly, of the three unidentified three abuse reports testified to by Ms. Dishong, and that constituted the primary basis for denial of Ms. Law's family day care license application, the Department did not follow its previous procedure of identification, investigation, advising, and discussion with Mr. Law and the investigator's recorded finding regarding allegations contained in those three reports.
According to Ms. Dishong, the Department's foster care license unit held a foster staff committee meeting during some unidentified time in 2002. Ms. Dishong did not provide the names of her foster care unit coworkers who attended the staffing committee nor did she provide the names of the Department's other employees who attended the staffing committee. It is clear that the Department, in part based upon the foster care staff committee results, determined that
Ms. Law's family day care license application would be denied. It is also clear that Ms. Mathews did not attend the Department's foster licensing care unit's staffing committee meeting.
Ms. Mathews first became aware of the Department's foster care unit's license renewal investigation file on Ms. Law when she reviewed that file in preparation for this final hearing. Upon completion of her review, Ms. Mathews did not
change her prior approval and finding that Ms. Law met minimum standards. Based on her review of that file, she did however qualify her prior approval of granting Ms. Law a family day care license to a "but for" the content of the foster care unit's license renewal investigation file.
The record contains no evidence from which to determine how the Department's foster care licensing unit's conclusions and decision to not renew Ms. Law's foster care license were conveyed to the Department's family care license unit. It is clear, however, that the Department's decision denying Ms. Law a family day care license was based on uninvestigated and uncorroborated allegations purportedly contained in three unidentified abuse reports.
The Department's denial letter of January 29, 2003, unequivocally confirms the fact that the Department's decision to deny Ms. Law's family day care license application was based upon its consideration as fact, uninvestigated and uncorroborated allegations contained in three unidentified abuse reports.
The Department's licensure staffing committee's consideration of Ms. Dishong's personal observations and conclusions contained in her foster care closure form, in its deliberations and its ultimate decision to deny Ms. Law's family
day care application, were not based on fact and are, therefore, not justified.
Ms. Law has, by a preponderance of the evidence, proven that she successfully met the Department's statutory minimum requirements for a family day care licensee.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties to and subject matter of this proceeding pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes.
The burden of proof is on the party asserting the affirmative of an issue before an administrative tribunal. Florida Department of Transportation v. J.W.C. Company, Inc.,
396 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Balino v. Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services, 348 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Petitioner has the burden of proving that she is entitled to a license to operate a family day care facility.
The Department, however, in an administrative hearing, must produce evidence of the underlying facts contained in verified abuse reports and must show that the underlying facts constitute the alleged conduct or offenses upon which its denial of the family day care license was based.
Accordingly, the Department has the burden of going forward and demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that its actions were valid and in accord with the statutory authority granted and/or rules promulgated under the Florida Administrative Code and/or approved Department standards. Petitioner thereafter has the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that the Department's actions were not in accord with its authority and/or that Petitioner complied fully with the requirements of law throughout the application process. See J.W.C., Co., supra.
The Department denied Petitioner's application for a family day care home license on the following grounds:
From December 26, 2001 to February 22, 2002, you were licensed by the Department as a foster parent. During this short span of time, five reports were made to the Florida Abuse Hotline Information System (FAHIS) alleging inadequate supervision of children in your foster home. Investigation of these reports revealed several problems with your judgment and decision-making regarding the safety of children in your care. The FAHIS information is used in this licensing process by authority of Section 39.201(6), Florida Statutes. Therefore, the Department does not believe you meet the minimum standards to assure the health, safety and well-being of children in your home as required by Section 402.301, Florida Statutes.
Section 402.301(1), Florida Statutes, requires the Department to establish minimum standards that all child care
facilities must meet. These licensing standards include minimum standards for child personnel as enunciated in Section 402.305(2), Florida Statutes, which provides the following:
Minimum standards for childcare personnel shall include minimum requirements as to:
Good moral character based upon screening. This screening shall be conducted as provided in chapter 435, using level 2 standards set forth in that chapter.
Section 402.313, Florida Statutes, authorizes the Department to license family day care homes and to conduct background screenings to determine that its child care personnel meet the requisite qualification to work with children. Section 402.313(3), Florida Statutes, provides in relevant part the following:
Child care personnel in family day care homes shall be subject to the applicable screening provisions contained in ss.
402.305(2). . . .
In this case, the Department denied Petitioner's application based upon the information revealed in its background screening of Petitioner contained in its foster care renewal licensure investigations. The background screening documents upon which the Department relied were five abuse reports, three of which were unidentified.
Section 39.202(2)(a)4., Florida Statutes, allows the Department's employees to have access to abuse reports because
they are responsible for licensure and/or approval of child care facilities. Pursuant to that provision, the Department may consider abuse reports and their underlying facts in deciding whether to issue a license to operate a family day care home.
However, the "underlying facts" must corroborate and/or verify the abuse allegations.
Similarly, Section 39.202(2)(j), Florida Statutes, allows the Division of Administrative Hearings to have access to the abuse reports for purposes of any administrative challenge. However, the statutes do not provide authority for an Administrative Law Judge to treat such reports as sufficient in themselves to support findings of fact. Section 120.57(1)(c), Florida Statutes. Accordingly, in an administrative hearing, the Department must produce evidence to prove that allegations in abuse reports.
In this case, the Department has the burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner's supervision and/or decision-making conduct was abusive and that she failed to adequately supervise foster children as reflected in the five abuse reports upon which it relied. The Department did not produce a scintilla of evidence that three of the five abuse reports upon which the Department relied, in fact, existed. The Department has failed, both through the testimony of its chief witness, Ms. Dishong, and its
two exhibits, to establish the allegations purportedly contained in three unidentified abuse reports.
Moreover, of the two abuse reports that staff identified and investigated, both were closed with no finding of factual allegations that could be reasonably construed to conclude that Petitioner neglected or failed to appropriately supervise the foster children in her care. Therefore, the Department has not established that Petitioner neglected and/or failed to adequately supervise her foster children and that by implication was unqualified to be granted a family day care home license. See Linda Richmond v. Department of Children and Family Services, DOAH Case No. 02-3019 (Recommended Order dated December 13, 2002) (citing the Department's consideration and use of abuse reports and their underlying facts to deciding whether to issue a license to operate a family day care home); Kimberly Strange-Bennett v. Department of Children and Family Services, DOAH Case No. 02-1224 (Recommended Order dated
July 12, 2001) (citing the Department's consideration of abuse reports in deciding whether to license a family day care home facility).
It is the legislative intent to protect the health, safety, and well being of the children of the state and to promote their emotional and intellectual development and care. To that end, the Department is required to establish statewide
minimum standards for care and protection of children in child care facilities and to ensure maintenance of these standards through a program of licensing. See Sections 402.301 through 402.319, Florida Statutes.
Minimum standards for licensing a family day care home are contained in Rule 65C-20.009, Florida Administrative Code, which requires the following:
Personnel.
The family day care home license shall be issued in the name of the operator who must be at least 18 years of age and a resident of the family home. The operator of a family day care may not work out of the home during the hours when the family day care is operating. In the event of rental or leased property the operator shall be the individual who occupies the residence.
Substitute Arrangements. There shall be a written plan to provide at least one other competent adult, who must be at least
18 years of age, to be available to substitute for the operator on a temporary or emergency basis. This plan shall include the name, address and telephone number of the designated substitute.
Staff Training.
After October 1, 1999, prior to licensure, all family day care operators must complete training in the department's 30-clock-hour Family Child Care Training course, documented on the department's CF- FSP Form 5194, May 97, Family Child Care training certificate, which is incorporated by reference. The operator providing care to the children in the family day care home must have a valid training certificate
attesting to completion of the Family Child Care Training course.
Family day care substitutes who work less than 40 hours a month shall complete the department's 3-clock-hour Fundamentals of Child Care course, documented on the department's CF-FSP Form 5155, Jan. 98, Fundamentals of Child Care Training certificate, which is incorporated by reference, and must complete infant and child cardiopulmonary resuscitation and first aid training prior to taking care of children.
Family day care substitutes who work
40 hours or more a month must complete the 30-clock-hour Family Child Care Training course, documented on the department's CF- FSP Form 5194, May 97, Family Child Care training certificate, which is incorporated by reference and must complete infant and child cardiopulmonary resuscitation and first aid training prior to taking care of children.
The operator of the family day care home must sign a statement attesting to the number of hours that the substitute works in their home which will be placed in their file.
Prior to initial licensure, family day care home operators must have a valid certificate of course completion for infant and child cardiopulmonary resuscitation procedures and first aid training. The person providing care to the children in the family day care home must have a valid certificate of course completion for infant and child cardiopulmonary resuscitation procedures and first aid training. Certificates of course completion are valid based on the time frames established by each first aid and CPR training program, not to exceed three years.
Supervision by Staff.
(a) At all times, which includes when the children are sleeping, the operator shall remain responsible for the supervision of the children in care and capable of responding to the emergencies and needs of the children. During the daytime hours of operation, children shall have adult supervision which means watching and directing children's activities, both indoors and outdoors, and responding to each child's needs.
Ms. Mathews, the Department's representative, informed Petitioner that she had successfully completed all qualifying minimum requirements for a family day care license and relayed to Petitioner her conclusion that there was nothing that would prohibit or exclude her from getting her family day care license.
After complying with all the Department's family day care home requirements as specified by Ms. Mathews and relying upon Ms. Mathews' representations that the license would be issued, Ms. Law resigned her sole source of income employment with Cornerstone Youth Shelter to her determent.
A person involved in child care must meet established "minimum standards." As stated in Findings of Fact hereinabove, Petitioner met all known minimum standards required of applicants for family day care license.
Based upon the Findings of Fact hereinabove Petitioner has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she
met and satisfied all established minimum standards. Accordingly, the Department should grant her a family day care
license.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services issue a final order granting Petitioner, Freddie Mae Law, a family day care license.
DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
S
FRED L. BUCKINE
Administrative Law Judge
Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060
(850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675
Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of July, 2003.
ENDNOTE
1/ See Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Ms. Dishong's testimony from memory regarding "other similar examples" intended to prove Ms. Law's character and propensity for inadequate supervision in her decision making process. The
Department, through Ms. Dishong, allegedly had information of "abusive supervision" claims contained in three abuse reports. Those reports were never identified for the record, introduced in evidence, or provided Petitioner ten days before the final hearing. Accordingly, all testimony presented by Ms. Dishong relating to her September 11, 2001, visit to Ms. Law's home and telephone conversations she had with Ms. Law is admissible, but her testimony relating to, inferred from, shared with others or otherwise not contained in the two abuse reports of record is not admissible or sufficient to support a finding of fact. See Johnson v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 546 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
COPIES FURNISHED:
Jack Emory Farley, Esquire Department of Children and
Family Services 4720 Old Highway 37
Lakeland, Florida 33813-2030
Freddie Mae Law
402 Northwest 9th Street Mulberry, Florida 33860
Paul Flounlacker, Agency Clerk Department of Children and
Family Services
1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and
Family Services
1317 Winewood Boulevard
Building 2, Room 204
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within
15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this case.
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Sep. 15, 2003 | Agency Final Order | |
| Jul. 23, 2003 | Recommended Order | Petitioner, haning a foster care license, applied for a day care license. Department of Children and Family Services denied the license, after Petitioner met statutory qualifications. DCFS should grant the day care license. |
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES vs EWING FAMILY DAY CARE HOME, 03-000874 (2003)
SHAGUANDRA RUFFIN BULLOCK vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, 03-000874 (2003)
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES vs GAYE BRINA VESTAL, 03-000874 (2003)
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES vs HOLDER FAMILY DAYCARE HOME, 03-000874 (2003)
