STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE

vs.

DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE,

Respondent.

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FINAL ORDER

This matter is now before the undersigned for issuance of final agency action resolving Petitioners and Intervenor Counties' claims that they were assessed for secure juvenile detention care for fiscal year 2008-2009 in a manner inconsistent

with the provisions of section 985.686, Florida Statutes (2008), and Florida Administrative Code Rules 63G-1.001-.009.

The underlying statutory scheme reflects the policy "that the state and the counties have a joint obligation. to contribute to the financial support of the detention care provided for juveniles." § 985.686(1), Fla. Stat. With exceptions not relevant to the instant proceeding, each county is required to pay for its resident juveniles' detention stays "for the period of time prior to final court dis osition." § 985.686(3), Fla. Stat. Detention stays after final court disposition are the responsibility of the state.

Section 985.686(5) provides a framework by which each county's costs are estimated at the beginning of the fiscal year, and reconciled at year's end. Each county's estimate is based upon its prior use of secure detention. The difference between the estimated costs and the actual costs is reconciled at the end of the fiscal year when actual usage is known.

On August 22, 2012, Administrative Law Judge Lawrence P. Stevenson entered a Recommended Order concluding that the Respondent, Department of Juvenile Justice (hereafter, the Department), performed a December 7, 2009 reconciliation, and a subsequent adjustment, for the subject fiscal year that was improperly based upon actual usage rather than actual costs, and which also used a definition of "final court disposition" that was inconsistent with section 985.686.

The ALJ recommended that those counties that did not challenge the December 7 reconciliation (Alachua, Orange, Escambia, City of Jacksonville, Bay, Seminole and Okaloosa) should have their reconciled amounts reinstated. Those counties that did not challenge the March 23, 2010 adjusted reconciliation (Pinellas, Brevard, Hillsborough and Santa Rosa) should have their adjusted reconciled amounts reinstated. The counties that challenged both the reconciliation and the adjustment (Hernando, Miami-Dade and Broward) must have a new reconciliation performed by the Department which must be based upon "actual costs of providing predisposition secure juvenile detention." (RO.77).

The Department submitted exceptions to the Recommended Order, to which Miami-Dade County, Okaloosa County and Orange County filed responses. Okaloosa County and Pinellas County filed exceptions, which Alachua County adopted as its own.

Orange County also filed exceptions.

Findings of Fact

The Department generally accepts the "Findings of Fact" set out in paragraphs 1 through 123 of the Recommended Order, with the exception of those portions of paragraphs 97, 101, 117, 120 and 123, which contain legal conclusions.

Conclusions of Law

The Department generally accepts the "Conclusions of Law" set out in paragraphs 124 through 153 of the Recommended Order, with the exception of paragraphs 135, 141, and associated

conclusions addressed in response to the Respondent's exceptions, below.

Exceptions1

Respondent/Department:

The Department's exceptions challenge the two main conclusions of the ALJ, finding that the Department misinterpreted the statutory scheme for detention cost-sharing in section 985.686, Florida Statutes. First, the ALJ concluded that "final court C?-isposition" - the statutory dividing line between county and state financial responsibility for a detention stay - must refer to any disposition, and could not be limited to commitment dispositions as interpreted by the Department. The ALJ further concluded that the Department's annual reconciliation was based upon counties' respective usage rates, rather than the "actual costs" of secure detention as described in the statute.

1. The Department's first exception appears to be directed at the conclusion of law in paragraph 135. There, the ALJ rejected the Department's interpretation that "final court disposition" is functionally equivalent to a disposition of commitment to the Department. Concluding that the Department's

   
   

   1 Section 120.57(1)(k), Florida Statutes, requires that exceptions "clearly identify the disputed portion of the recommended order by page number or paragraph," and an agency need not rule on exceptions that fail to do so. Although the Department's exceptions are deficient in this regard, the undersigned has attempted to identify, where possible, the source of the exception.

   
   

   interpretation "is at odds with section 985.686 and should be abandoned in any subsequent calculation of a county's predisposition days" (RO.70), the ALJ effectively determined that the Department's reconciliation improperly inflated the number of days payable by the counties. In support, the ALJ adopted the legal analysis provided in Okaloosa Cnty. et al. v. Dep't of Juvenile Justice, Case No. 12-0891RX (Fla. DOAH July 17, 2012).

   In its exception, the Department points out that its interpretation is consistent with the intent of the Governor in proposing detention cost-sharing in 2004, which modeled detention funding after the county jails. As counties are responsible for housing offenders and alleged offenders until they are sentenced to a term of prison in the Department of Corrections, so too would they become responsible for juveniles in secure detention up to the point that they are committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice for placement in a residential facility. This interpretation is also consistent with the split in funding provided by the legislature, which reflects a county share of 89 percent and a state share of only 11 percent.

   The Department further asserts that its interpretation is consistent with prior administrative rulings sustaining the Department's position that it was only responsible for committed youth awaiting placement, and that youth with probation dispositions remained the responsibility of the counties.

   According to the Department, the subject statute's use of the

   
   

   phrase "final court disposition," rather than the more common term, "disposition," evidences the legislature's intent that probation dispositions should not be included as the state's responsibility. The Department explains:

   Probation, while it is a disposition, is not the final disposition. It is, in fact, probation. If a youth is placed on probation and violates the term of that probation, he or she is brought back before the court and a new disposition on the original charge is entered by the court. The new disposition is not on the violation of probation, but on the initial charge for which the youth was placed on probation. Because there can be another disposition after a disposition of probation, probation cannot logically be a final court disposition.

   (Respondent's Exceptions, pp.5-6). The Department's exception is granted.2

   In section 985.686(1), Florida Statutes (2008), the legislature announced the policy "that the state and the counties have a joint obligation. to contribute to the financial support of the detention care provided for juveniles." The following provisions in section 985.686, effectuate the legislature's announced policy concerning the state and counties' joint obligation to pay for detention care:

   (3) Each county shall pay the costs of providing detention care ... for juveniles for the period of time prior to final court disposition.

   
   

   2 The undersigned has considered the responses in opposition to the Department's exceptions offered by Orange and Okaloosa Counties. For the reasons set out herein, the undersigned is not persuaded by the arguments offered in support of the ALJ's ruling.

   
   

   
   

   (5) Each county shall incorporate into its annual county budget sufficient funds to pay its costs of detention care for juveniles who reside in that county for the period of time prior to final court disposition.

   (Emphasis added). For purposes of the statute, "detention care" is defined as secure detention. § 985.686(2)(a), Fla. Stat.

   However, the critical phrase, "final court disposition" is not defined in the statute, nor is it defined anywhere else in chapter 985.

   Prior to amendment in 2010, the Department's administrative rules defined "final court disposition" as the date the court enters a disposition for the subject referral. Fla. Admin. Code

   R. 63G-1.002(3). This rather uninformative definition does not resolve the current dispute, nor did it preclude the Department from using commitment status to determine whether a specific disposition shifted responsibility for subsequent detention days from the counties to the state.

   Though the precise methodology used by the Department to identify post-dispositional detention stays has changed over the years, the Department has always taken the position that the state was responsible for youths in detention awaiting placement. (T.498, 696-98). This long-standing assertion that a youth's commitment status while in detention is the functional equivalent of "final court disposition" has been addressed in prior DOAH litigation referenced by the ALJ in the instant case, first

   
   

   arising in Hillsborough County v. Dep't of Juvenile Justice, Case No. 07-4432 (DOAH March 10, 2008; Fla. Dep't of Juvenile Justice June 4, 2008), concerning the billing and reconciliation for the 2005-2006 fiscal year. In that case, the ALJ addressed the Department's inability to provide disposition dates for various categories of detention stays, noting that "[p]ost-disposition care of juveniles in a secure detention center is generally limited to juveniles who are waiting for residential placement." (15). "Predisposition care occurs prior to adjudication or final disposition. Post-disposition care occurs after adjudication or disposition but prior to residential placement." (16).

   The question again arose in litigation with Hillsborough County concerning the 2006-2007 fiscal year, where the Department was unable to provide disposition dates for youths who were not committed. In Hillsborough County v. Dep't of Juvenile Justice, Case No. 09-1396 (DOAH June 30, 2009; Fla. Dep't of Juvenile Justice Sept. 17, 2009), Hillsborough County asserted that any court order in a juvenile case is a dispositional order upon which the Department becomes liable for the ensuing detention stay. Rejecting Hillsborough County's argument, the ALJ found as follows:

   Neither the statute nor the previous Final Orders suggest that fiscal responsibility for a juvenile is transferred to the [Department] upon the issuance of any court order, regardless of whether the order assigns responsibility for the care and supervision of the juvenile to the [Department].

   
   

   
   

   The [Department] has no responsibility for the expenses of detention related to juveniles who were not committed to the [Department's] care and supervision. Nothing in the statute or the previous Final Orders indicates otherwise.

   (<Jl:6, <Jl:13). This portion of the ALJ's Recommended Order was adopted by the Department in its Final Order, and Hillsborough County's appeal to the Second District resulted in a per curiam affirmance. Hillsborough County v. Dep't of Juvenile Justice, 46 So.3d 55 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010).

   Disregarding this ruling, the ALJ concluded that the Department's position erroneously equates "disposition" with "commitment to the Department." (RO.<Jl:135). Here, the ALJ cites section 985.433, Florida Statutes, to establish that the term "disposition" encompasses probation as well as commitment.

   The term "disposition" is not germane to the statute under consideration, which uses the phrase, "final court disposition." The ALJ's argument assumes that the legislature intended the subject phrase, "final court disposition," to equate to any and all dispositions, and that the added words, unique to this statute, were mere pleonasms. But if the legislature had intended so broad a use, then this could have been accomplished by simply employing the generic and ubiquitous term, "disposition," without including these additional words.

   A probation disposition cannot be deemed "final" for purposes of determining whether a county or the state is

   
   

   responsible for an ensuing detention stay. By definition, "probation" is in lieu of commitment to the custody of the Department, and the child is only restricted to noninstitutional quarters. § 985.03(42), Fla. Stat. Confinement in secure detention is not a statutorily permitted consequence of a probation disposition, and secure detention only comes into play when a youth is charged with violating probation. At that point, the court is required to enter "a new disposition order," making it impossible to characterize the initial disposition as "final." See§ 985.439(4), Fla. Stat.

   The ALJ's interpretation dismisses this modifying language as surplusage, thus violating a basic tenet of statutory construction. See Bennett v. St. Vincent's Med. Ctr., Inc., 71 So.3d 828, 841 (Fla. 2011) (avoiding constructions that would render statutory language meaningless).

   The ALJ's interpretation also ignores the purpose and intent of detention cost-sharing. From its inception, the statute was modeled upon the adult jail system, with the intent that the state should only bear the cost of detaining youths awaiting placement. This is reflected in the Governor's Work Papers for fiscal year 2004-2005 where detention cost-sharing was first proposed:

   The Executive Budget recommends that local governments share the costs of serving juvenile offenders in local detention centers....

   Detention centers for juvenile offenders are similar to local jails for adult offenders, which are the financial responsibility of local

   
   

   governments. The Executive Budget provides for a

   $68 million cost savings to the state for its share of the operation of a total of 2,057 detention center beds. Approximately 11 percent of youth served in detention centers have been processed by the court system and are awaiting placement in other juvenile programs and are the responsibility of state government. The remaining 89 percent of juvenile offenders in detention centers are awaiting final court processing and disposition and should be the financial responsibility of local government. The Executive Budget recommends that the state's financial share for secure detention is 11 percent and the local governments share is 89 percent.

   (Respondent's Exh.1) (emphasis added). Thus, the state is only responsible for youths awaiting placement, making financial responsibility for the juvenile detention system similar to its adult counterpart. In other words, the state is responsible when the detention center is the functional equivalent of a Department of Corrections Reception Center; the Counties are responsible for the cost of all other detention stays.

   At the heart of the Department's interpretation is the recognition that unless and until a youth is committed to the Department, he or she remains in the community, and is the responsibility of local government. This is true even when the Department supervises a youth's probation in the community, and the child commits a new offense or violates the terms of probation causing him or her to be placed in secure detention. When a youth is committed to the Department by contrast, any detention stay is the state's responsibility, not simply because the committed youth "belongs to the state," but because the

   --

   
   

   detention stay is itself necessitated by the state's inability to place the youth. A conunitted youth is in secure detention, at least in part, because the Department does not have a residential bed available; therefore, it is reasonable that the state be responsible for the resulting detention stay for such a youth.

   In this context, the Department's interpretation of "final court disposition" is consistent with relevant provisions in chapter 985, as well as with the previous litigation.

   It is true that the Department's interpretation makes the Counties responsible for the large majority of detention stays. But there can be no doubt that this is precisely what the legislature had in mind, and the proof is found in the funding. The legislature initially funded detention cost sharing so that the Counties would be responsible for 89 percent of detention costs and the State would be responsible for 11 percent. (T.205- 06). Adjustments in subsequent years reduced the disparity to produce a split approximating 80 percent and 20 percent. (R.48). The Department's interpretation roughly corresponds to the funding provided by the legislature. If the Department is incorrect, and the Counties' assertion that any disposition is a "final court disposition" were to be adopted, then many more detention stays would be the responsibility of the Department, and the divide between the funding and utilization would be widened considerably.

   
   

2. The Department's second exception appears to be directed at the conclusion of law in paragraph 141. There, the ALJ concluded that the Department failed to follow the requirements of section 985.686(5) when performing its annual reconciliation for fiscal year 2008-2009. According to the ALJ, the Department failed to calculate the "actual costs" of each county's use of secure detention, and instead treated the Counties as a collective entity responsible for the entire amount of the Shared Trust Fund. The ALJ stated, in pertinent part:

Under section 985.686, each county is responsible for the actual costs of providing predisposition detention care within its jurisdiction. Its obligation should not be increased or diminished because of usage in other counties.

(RO. 72) .

In its exception, the Department points out that the cost of operating secure detention during the pertinent fiscal year as fixed by the legislature was $130 million. (R0.17). Because these costs are fixed, they are not significantly reduced when fewer youth are in secure detention. Under the statute, the legislature determines the counties' overall share for detention and the state's overall share. The Department performs the statutory duty to determine each county's percentage of utilization at the end of each fiscal year. Contrary to the ALJ's assertion that each county is responsible for the actual costs of providing secure detention in its jurisdiction, the

statute makes the county responsible for the time its resident youth are in detention. The Department's exception is granted3.

Section 985.686(5), Florida Statutes (2008), is the provision most pertinent to the issue under review:

(5) Each county shall incorporate into its annual county budget sufficient funds to pay its costs of detention care for juveniles who reside in that county for the period of time prior to final court disposition. This amount shall be based upon the prior use of secure detention for juveniles who are residents of that county, as calculated by the department. Each county shall pay the estimated costs at the beginning of each month. Any difference between the estimated

costs and the actual costs shall be reconciled at the end of the fiscal year.

(Emphasis added). The provision outlines the process by which estimated costs are determined for the coming year, with the emphasized sentence describing the annual reconciliation by which the estimated payments are compared to the "actual costs" at year's end. The phrase "actual costs" is nowhere defined in the statute, nor is it defined in the administrative rule.

By rule, reconciliation reflects "the difference between the estimated costs paid by the county during the past fiscal year and the actual cost of the county's usage during that period." Fla. Admin. Code R. 63G-1.008(1) (emphasis added). In this respect, reconciliation is simply a matter of recalculating each

3 The undersigned has considered the responses in opposition to the Department's exceptions offered by Miami-Dade, Orange and Okaloosa Counties. For the reasons set out herein, the undersigned is not persuaded by the arguments offered in support of the ALJ's ruling.

county's usage rate based upon the county's actual utilization during the reconciled year, as opposed to the estimate performed at the beginning of the year, which reflects utilization over an earlier period.

The ALJ mistakenly asserts that "each county is responsible for the actual cost of providing predisposition detention care within its jurisdiction." (R0.72). A county's jurisdictional boundaries are not at all relevant to its obligation to pay detention costs under the statute; similarly irrelevant are the location of the detention center and the specific center's operating costs. Rather, each paying county is responsible for its resident youths' predisposition detention stays, wherever the youth is held in the Department's statewide detention system, and regardless of whether the particular youth required bare minimal or extraordinary services while detained.

The ALJ's interpretation is rejected, primarily because it treats reconciliation of "actual costs" in isolation, without regard to the estimate that gives rise to it. Section 985.686(5) provides that the estimate is "based upon the prior use of secure detention. . as calculated by the department," leaving no doubt that each county's anticipated utilization is the basis for its payments. When reconciliation is performed at year's end, and utilization need no longer be estimated, but may be factually ascertained, it is entirely reasonable that utilization and usage rates should be the basis for the recalculation. In this

context, the "difference between the estimated costs and the actual costs" must involve each county's estimated and actual utilization, rather than an after-the-fact parsing of bills attributable to pre-disposition detention.

The ALJ further asserts that the Department's interpretation is contrary to section 985.686 because it treats the counties "as a collective entity responsible for the . entire amount of the Shared Trust Fund." An individual paying county's financial responsibility should not, the ALJ protests, "be increased or diminished because of usage in other counties." (R0.72).

The ALJ's confident insistence that the Department's reconciliation is at odds with the statute is not supported by any analysis of the relevant provision in section 985.686:

(5) Each county shall incorporate into its annual county budget sufficient funds to pay its costs of detention care for juveniles who reside in that county for the period of time prior to final court disposition. This amount shall be based upon the prior use of secure detention for juveniles who are residents of that county, as calculated by the department. Each county shall pay the estimated costs at the beginning of each month. Any difference between the estimated

costs and the actual costs shall be reconciled at the end of the fiscal year.

(Emphasis added). The statute has little to say about the precise details of the annual reconciliation, and still less to say about imposing additional financial responsibility upon the state. In fact, its focus is upon the individual counties and their budgeting, with no language suggesting that the state's

responsibility vis-a-vis the counties' is subject to increase or decrease.

The Department's interpretation and implementation of section 985.686(5), is as consistent with the language of the statute as it is with practical necessity. Specifically, the ALJ noted that the costs of operating a detention center are fixed, and that "[s]imply keeping the doors open carries certain costs whether one child or 100 children come into the facility." (RO.50-51). The legislature funds these costs through an appropriation of general revenue and designation of a shared

trust fund. (RO.16-17). For this reason, the "cost of detention care" is defined by rule as "the cost of providing detention care as determined by the General Appropriations Act." Fla. Admin.

Code R. 63-1.002(1).

As implemented by the Department, a county's share of financial responsibility is determined by units of utilization in the form of resident youth days in detention prior to final court disposition. Confusion arises when units of utilization are mistaken for unit costs, and counties that have used marginally fewer or more units expect directly proportional reductions or increases in their reconciled costs. Because costs are fixed, a county will only see reductions if and when they result in a reduced share for that particular county. The Counties' position, adopted by the ALJ, would treat these as unit costs, so that any significant decrease in detention population will result

in significant, proportional reductions in the trust fund. This would result in facility closures and massive disruption, as funding would be insufficient to pay for the fixed costs of secure detention that do not rise and fall with constantly shifting detention populations. Nothing in the language of the statute compels such a result, and the Department's implementation reasonably and responsibly avoids it.

Petitioner/Pinellas County:

Pinellas County's only exception is directed at the finding of fact in paragraph 93 of the Recommended Order. There, the ALJ, after describing competent substantial evidence establishing the fixed nature of detention costs, asserts that "there is a lack of credible evidence that a pure per diem approach would capture a given county's 'actual costs' in keeping with the mandate of section 985.686." (R0.51).

Pinellas County cites competent substantial evidence supporting the use of a state-wide per diem to assess the costs of secure detention. "There is no evidence," it asserts, "that a State-wide per diem amount based on total costs ... divided by the total number of all disposition days, and applied across the board to both the State and the individual counties ... would not be a reasonable approximation for 'actual costs.' (Pinellas County's Exceptions, p.4). The exception is denied.

In the paragraphs immediately preceding the one that is the subject of the instant exception, the ALJ correctly found that

detention is largely comprised of fixed costs. (RO.50-51). For this reason, a per diem, as a unit cost measure, is inappropriate. In addition to contradicting the holding in Hillsborough County v. Dep't of Juvenile Justice, Case No. 07- 4398 (Fla. DOAH March 7, 2008; Fla. Dep't of Juvenile Justice June 4, 2008), the use of a per diem erroneously suggests the existence of a uniform rate. In fact, the evidence cited by the ALJ demonstrates that the cost associated with marginal youth­ days is not uniform.4

Petitioner/Orange County:

Orange County offers four exceptions to the Recommended Order.

1. Orange County's first exception is directed at the finding of fact in paragraph 61 of the Recommended Order. There, the ALJ found that Orange and Alachua Counties were among those that did not file challenges to the annual reconciliation and, in fact, accepted overpayment credits in the manner described in the Department's December 7, 2009 letter. (RO.37). Orange County does not dispute the findings in the excepted paragraph, but desires additional reductions not timely sought after the

   
   

   4 For example, if over the course of a year it costs $100 million dollars to operate secure detention, providing 500,000 youth­ days, the per diem would equal $200. But if one more or less youth were served for one more or less day, the overall expense would not increase or decrease by $200. This is due to the fact that costs are fixed, and the marginal cost of a youth-day is a tiny fraction of the calculated per diem. In other words, under the example, a county cannot reasonably expect a $200 refund for each and every youth-day the county happens to forego.

   December 7, 2009 or January 26, 2010 points of entry. The exception is denied.

2. Orange County's second exception is directed at the finding of fact in paragraph 117, where the ALJ finds that the Counties' contention that probation is a consequence of "final court disposition" is more consistent with section 985.686(3). (RO.63). Orange County agrees with the finding, but would supplement it with an additional finding that the Department's position is inconsistent with its rule 63G-1.004(1)(b). The exception is denied.

   The excepted finding is, in fact, a conclusion of law.

   Moreover, the conclusion is rejected for the reasons set out in addressing the Respondent's first exception, above. The cited rule provision addresses the calculation of estimated costs, and merely reflects that the Department will attempt to locate a disposition date so as to match a violation of probation to a referred charge. This does not indicate that the disposition date marks the "final court disposition" that would make a detention stay associated with a violation of probation the responsibility of the Department.

3. Orange County's third exception is directed at the finding of fact in paragraph 104, and essentially repeats the position asserted in its first exception. The exception is denied for the reasons set out above.

   
   

4. Orange County's final exception is directed at the conclusion of law in paragraph 151, where the ALJ concluded that Orange County and the other counties who chose not to challenge the December 7, 2009 reconciliation should have their credits reinstated. The argument is similar to that addressed above, and the exception is denied for those reasons.

Intervenor/Okaloosa County:

Okaloosa County offers three exceptions to the Recommended Order.

1. Okaloosa County's first exception is directed at numerous paragraphs that effectively limit its remedy to the December 7, 2009 annual reconciliation. For the reasons set out above, the exception is denied.

2. Okaloosa County's second exception is directed at paragraph 93, and is virtually identical to that offered by Pinellas County. For the reasons set out above, the exception is denied.

3. Okaloosa County's final exception is directed at paragraph 117, and is virtually identical to that offered by Orange County. For the reasons set out above, the exception is denied.

Petitioner/Alachua County:

Alachua County adopts the exceptions filed by Okaloosa County and Pinellas County. The exceptions are denied for the reasons set out above.

Based upon the foregoing it is hereby ORDERED:

1. The annual reconciliation announced on December 7, 2009, is reinstated for all counties.

2. In all other respects, the petitions are denied.

Entered this !.i day of Tallahassee, Florida.

... .._, , 2013, in

   °'

WANSLEY WAL RS, Secretary

Department of Juvenile Justice

i ,

ChakitaJenk ns, Agency Clerk Filed this \\t\l'-day of

2013

COPIES FURNISHED (addresses on record):

Brian D. Berkowitz, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice

Carly Schrader, Esq.

Nabors, Giblin and Nickerson, P.A.

Edward A. Dion, Esq.

Nabors, Giblin and Nickerson, P.A.

John R. Dowd, Esq.

Okaloosa County Attorney's Office

Terrell K. Arline, Esq.

Bay County Attorney's Office

Carl Brody, Esq.

Pinellas County Attorney's Office

Estephanie Resnik, Esq.

Miami-Dade County Attorney's Office

Linda Brehmer-Lanosa, Esq. Orange County Attorney's Office

Robert Livingston, Esq.

Alachua County Attorney's Office

Charles V. Peppler, Esq.

Escambia County Attorney's Office

Daphne E. Jones, Esq.

Broward County Attorney's Office

Loree L. French, Esq. City of Jacksonville

Shannon L. Wilson, Esq.

Brevard County Attorney's Office

Susan E. Dietrich, Esq.

Seminole County Attorney's Office

Stephen M. Todd, Esq.

Hillsborough County Attorney's Office

Richard Appicello, Esq.

Hernando County Attorney's Office

Docket for Case No: 10-002194

Orders for Case No: 10-002194