STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
DIANE HASKETT AND BRYAN FLEMING,
vs.
Petitioners,
Case No. 13-0465
THOMAS ROSATI AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,
Respondents.
/
RECOMMENDED ORDER
The final hearing in this case was held on June 11-12, 2013, in Stuart, Florida, before Bram D. E. Canter, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings ("DOAH").
APPEARANCES
For Petitioners Diane Haskett and Bryan Fleming:
Howard K. Heims, Esquire Virginia P. Sherlock, Esquire Littman, Sherlock & Heims
618 East Ocean Boulevard, Suite 5
Stuart, Florida 34994 For Respondent Thomas Rosati:
Nathan E. Nason, Esquire Gregory Hyden, Esquire
Nason, Yeager, Gerson, White & Lioce, PA 1645 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard
West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
For Respondent Department of Environmental Protection:
Patricia E. Comer, Esquire
Department of Environmental Protection Mail Station 35
3900 Commonwealth Boulevard
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The issues to be determined in this case are whether Respondent Thomas Rosati is entitled to the Noticed General Permit and the Letter of Consent to use sovereignty submerged Lands issued by the Department of Environmental Protection ("Department"), which authorize the replacement of an existing private dock with a new private dock in the St. Lucie River in Martin County, Florida.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
On September 19, 2012, the Department issued a Noticed General Permit and Letter of Consent to use sovereign submerged lands ("Letter of Consent") to Thomas Rosati ("Rosati") for a dock in the St. Lucie River. On January 23, 2012, Petitioners filed a petition for hearing with the Department to challenge the authorizations. The Department referred the petition to DOAH to conduct an evidentiary hearing and issue a recommended order.
Rosati filed a motion to dismiss the petition as untimely, which was denied. Petitioners requested and were granted leave to amend their petition twice.
At the final hearing, evidence was first taken on the issue of whether the petition for hearing was timely. After hearing the evidence, the Administrative Law Judge made a preliminary ruling that the petition was timely and, therefore, the hearing proceeded on the merits of the case.
Rosati presented the testimony of Thomas Rosati,
Bruce Jerner, and Ed Weinberg. Rosati Exhibits 1A, 1G-1I, 7B-7C, 10M, and 10Q-10U were admitted into evidence. The Department presented the testimony of Jill King. Department Exhibits 8,
, and 15 were admitted into evidence. Petitioners presented the testimony of Bryan Fleming, Diane Haskett, Thomas Rosati, Bruce Jerner, Coral Vega, and Leonard Nero. Petitioners' Exhibits 2-3, 5, 6A, 7A-G, 8, 13, 25, 25B, 29, 31, and 32 were
admitted into evidence.
Official recognition was taken of Florida Administrative Code Chapters 18-20, 18-21, 62-113, 62-341, and 62-330, as well
as rules 62-110.106 and 62-343.090.
The three-volume Transcript of the final hearing was filed with DOAH. The parties submitted proposed recommended orders that were considered by the Administrative Law Judge in preparing this Recommended Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Parties
The Department is the state agency responsible for regulating construction activities in waters of the State. The Department also has responsibility to process and act on applications for authorization to use sovereignty submerged lands through a delegation of authority from the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund ("Board of Trustees").
Rosati owns real property at 2391 Southwest Riverside Drive, Palm City, Florida. He is the applicant for the authorizations at issue in this case.
Rosati does not currently own a boat, but he wants to obtain a boat that is large enough to use in the Atlantic Ocean.
Petitioner Bryan Fleming owns real property that borders Danforth Creek. He also owns two nearby lots which entitle him to undivided interests in a community dock on Danforth Creek.
Fleming owns several boats, including a 23-foot Penn Yan motorboat which he moored at docks on Danforth Creek.
Petitioner Diane Haskett owns property that borders Danforth Creek. She has been an avid boater most of her life, but currently only co-owns, with Fleming, a 33-foot sailboat which they do not keep on Danforth Creek. She is a frequent passenger on Fleming's Penn Yan.
Notice of Agency Action
Rosati arranged for publication of a "Notice of General Permit" in the October 30, 2012, edition of The Stuart News. The notice was in the exact form suggested by the Department in its September 19, 2012, letter to Rosati. The notice reads in
pertinent part:
STATE OF FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION NOTICE OF GENERAL PERMIT
The Department of Environmental Protection gives notice that the project to remove an existing dock, and relocate and construct a new dock with an access walkway measuring 4 ft. by 392 ft. and ending in an 8 ft. by 20 ft. terminal platform, including two associated 12 ft. by 12 ft. boatlifts (total 1,728 sq. ft. structure, total 2016 sq. ft. preempted area), has been determined to qualify for a noticed general permit.
This is the form of publication regularly used by the Department to notify the general public that the Department has determined a proposed project qualifies for a Noticed General Permit and a Letter of Consent.
The exact location of the Rosati property was also included in the newspaper notice.
Petitioners did not see the newspaper publication.
Fleming first became aware of the Rosati dock when he saw it being constructed on January 13, 2013. He went to the Department's offices and inquired about the dock.
Petitioners filed their petition for hearing on January 23, 2013, 10 days after receiving actual notice of the Department's agency action on the Rosati dock.
Background Facts
The east side of Rosati's property borders the St.
Lucie River, which is designated a Class III water. The submerged lands in the area of the Rosati property are sovereign submerged lands of the State of Florida.
The river bottom in the area is sandy. There are no corals, marine grass beds, or other significant aquatic resources.
The south side of Rosati's property borders Danforth Creek. Danforth Creek is a navigable waterbody with normal depths of three feet or more.
Rosati's shoreline along the Creek is approximately 275 linear feet in length and his river shoreline is approximately
125 feet.
Rosati has a dock on Danforth Creek. It is in a basin that was created by excavating the private upland. The bottom of the basin is not state-owned sovereign submerged lands.
Danforth Creek flows into the St. Lucie River near the southeast corner of the Rosati property. At its confluence with the St. Lucie River, there is a shoal or sandbar that most likely formed by the deposition of sediment carried out of the Creek.
Rosati had a small (32 feet long) dock on his shoreline on the St. Lucie River. The Noticed General Permit and Letter of Consent allow Rosati to remove this old dock, which he has already done.
The shoal at the confluence of the Creek and River restricts navigation in and out of Danforth Creek. Navigation in and out of Danforth Creek is usually impossible during low tides, except in a canoe, kayak, or other vessel requiring only a few inches of water.
The most reliable route between the Creek and the River is a narrow channel only 2 to 3 feet deep at higher tides. This channel, which runs close to Rosati's eastern shoreline, shall be referred to hereafter as the "deeper channel."
For many years, Fleming regularly used the deeper channel to take his 23-foot Penn Yan motorboat from Danforth Creek into the St. Lucie River and back again. The Penn Yan has a draft of about 18 inches. Using the deeper channel, Fleming could navigate in and out of Danforth Creek every day on the high tides.
An unknown boater stuck a white PVC pipe into the river bottom at the side of the deeper channel to indicate its location.
The New Dock
Rosati's new dock was substantially completed at the time of the final hearing in June 2013. The new dock is four feet wide, 392 feet long, and terminates at a water depth of minus four feet mean low water.
The other docks in the area are much shorter.
The St. Lucie River in this area is more than 2,000 feet wide. Therefore, the dock extends into the River less than
20 percent of the width of the River.
The total dock square footage of Rosati's dock on Danforth Creek and his new dock does not exceed 2,000 square feet.
The dock, terminal platform, and boat lifts "preempt" 2,016 square feet of sovereign submerged lands, meaning that the dock excludes public use of this area of river bottom.
Rosati's new dock crosses the deeper channel. It would cross the deeper channel even if it were half as long. The Letter of Consent authorizes Rosati to preempt from public use that portion of the deeper channel that lies beneath the new dock.
Now, the only route that can be used by boaters wanting to navigate in and out of Danforth Creek is a narrow channel south of Rosati's new dock, between the dock and a spit of land
about 15 feet away. This route can become dry at low tide and is only about a foot deep at high tides.
This south route was used by Department staff during high tide using a boat drawing 8 to 12 inches of water. At low tide, they were unable to use this route to get from the St. Lucie River into Danforth Creek, but were able to use the deeper channel that now runs beneath the Rosati dock.
Fleming would not be able to take his Penn Yan through the route on the south side of the Rosati dock except in rare high water conditions, such as may occur during or after hurricanes or heavy storms. No member of the general public who formerly used the deeper channel in a vessel drawing more than a foot of water would be able to use the south route except in rare high water conditions.
In addition to the shallow character of the south route, it is in a narrow space between the Rosati dock and the sand spit. This route is only reasonably navigable by canoes, kayaks, and similar small, shallow-draft vessels.
The Department contends that the general public has not been affected by the Rosati dock. However, all persons wishing to navigate in and out of Danforth Creek, including Fleming, other riparian landowners on Danforth Creek, and other members of the boating public are prevented from doing so in vessels which,
just prior to construction of the Rosati dock, they could have used to navigate in and out of the Creek.
Respondents further assert that the shoal may get worse and the deeper channel may become more shallow. This was mere speculation, with no timeframe offered. Furthermore, it was not shown that the deeper channel would not remain the best means of navigating in and out of Danforth Creek.
Rosati's consultant did not make a site visit before submitting the forms for the Noticed General Permit and no Department employee made a site visit before the Department issued its letter of September 19, 2012.
Included in the materials submitted by Rosati's consultant to the Department for the Noticed General Permit is an aerial photograph with a white arrow superimposed on the south side of the proposed Rosati dock to indicate a channel or water route from Danforth Creek into the St. Lucie River. The current or historical elevation of the route indicated by the white arrow was not established in the record. It is now overgrown with upland grass and is not an alternative water route for boaters wanting to get in and out of Danforth Creek.
The information submitted to the Department by Rosati's consultant did not inform the Department that the best (deepest) route in and out of Danforth Creek would be blocked by the Rosati dock. The information implied that the proposed Rosati dock
would not impair navigation in and out of Danforth Creek. Although not shown to be intentional, the information was misleading because it failed to inform the Department of the true site conditions and the impacts on navigation that would be caused by the proposed dock.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This is a de novo proceeding designed to formulate final agency action, not to review action taken preliminarily. See Capeletti Bros. v. Dep't of Gen. Servs., 432 So. 2d 1359, 1363-64 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
Standing
In order to have standing to participate as a party, a person must have substantial rights or interests that reasonably could be affected by the agency action. See St. Johns Riverkeeper, Inc. v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 54 So. 3d 1051, 1054, (Fla. 5th DCA 2011).
Petitioners have a substantial interest in navigating in the area of their riparian properties. That interest has been affected by the Department's action and, therefore, they have standing to initiate this proceeding.
Notice Regarding the General Permit
The publication in The Stuart News constituted constructive notice to Petitioners of the Department's action on the Noticed General Permit. Petitioners waived their right to
petition for an administrative hearing to challenge the Noticed General Permit when they failed to file their petition for hearing within 21 days of the publication. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 62-110.106(3)(b).
Notice Regarding the Letter of Consent
The newspaper publication did not name the Board of Trustees or mention the Letter of Consent. A publication that neither identifies the authorizing agency or the action that was taken is not adequate notice of agency action.
If the newspaper notice had only failed to identify the Board of Trustees as the agency for whom the Department was acting in issuing the Letter of Consent, that omission would not have been fatal. However, failing to mention that Rosati had been authorized by Letter of Consent to use sovereignty submerged lands, an authorization governed by different statutes and rules, is too fundamental an omission for the newspaper notice to be legally sufficient to bar injured persons from contesting the authorization.
Respondents argue that because the newspaper publication mentioned "preempted area," a term that is used in the context of the Board of Trustees' authorization for private use of sovereignty submerged lands, the publication provided notice that such an authorization was also involved. However,
the use of a regulatory term is not an adequate substitute for identifying the authorizing agency and its official action.
Respondents emphasize that because the published notice described the dock in detail and provided its exact location, Petitioners were not prejudiced by the omission of any reference to the Board of Trustees or the Letter of Consent. However, if there is no notice of agency action, the issue of prejudice is immaterial.
Petitioners claim that the newspaper publication was also deficient for failing to conform to the requirements of the "consolidated notice" described in rule 62-110.106. However, that rule only applies when a Letter of Consent is issued in conjunction with an Environmental Resource Permit.
Petitioners alternatively contend they were entitled to written notice of the proposed dock because the dock required a sovereign submerged lands lease from the Board of Trustees and written notice of the issuance of such a lease must be provided by mail to persons owning property within 500 feet. Showing that a proposed project is ineligible for a Letter of Consent does not transform the Letter of Consent that was issued into a submerged lands lease. The Board of Trustees did not intend to issue a submerged lands lease to Rosati and, therefore, Petitioners were not entitled to written notice by mail of a submerged lands lease.
There appears to be no published court opinion that addresses a consolidated notice of agency actions and these particular facts, but it is concluded that the October 30, 2012, publication in The Stuart News was not notice of the Letter of Consent and Rosati's authorization to use sovereignty submerged lands. The public policies and purposes of chapter 120, Florida Statutes, are better served by requiring such notices to identify each official action taken, rather than imposing constructive notice of an agency action which was not mentioned in a newspaper publication and terminating the rights of affected persons.
Petitioners were not bound to file a petition for hearing within 21 days of the newspaper publication to preserve their right to challenge the Letter of Consent. Instead, Petitioners were required to file a petition within a reasonable time after receiving actual notice of the Letter of Consent. See Wentworth v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 771 So. 2d 1279
(Fla. 4th DCA 2000).
Petitioners filed their petition for hearing within 10 days of their actual notice that a Letter of Consent had been issued to Rosati. The petition was timely under these circumstances.
Burden of Proof and Standard of Proof
Rosati has the burden of proof to demonstrate his entitlement to the Letter of Consent. See Dep't of Transp. v.
J.W.C. Co., Inc., 396 So. 2d 778, 789 (Fla. lst DCA 1981).
The standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence. See § 120.57(1), Fla. Stat.
Compliance with Letter of Consent Criteria
Rule 18-21.005(1)(c)2. states that a Letter of Consent can be issued for "one . . . dock . . . per parcel." Petitioners claim that Rosati is not eligible for a Letter of Consent because he already has a dock on Danforth Creek. The Department interprets the rule as a limit to one dock per parcel on sovereignty submerged lands. It does not treat Rosati's dock on Danforth Creek in a private basin as disqualifying him from obtaining a Letter of Consent for a new dock on sovereignty submerged lands. The Department's interpretation of the rules it implements is entitled to some deference. See Bd. of Trs. of
Internal Imp. Trust Fund v. Levy, 656 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). The Department's interpretation of rule 18-21.005(1)(c)2. is one reasonable interpretation of the rule and, therefore, Rosati was not disqualified by the rule from receiving a Letter of Consent for the new dock.
Rule 18-21.005(1)(c)2. provides that a Letter of Consent is available for private residential single-family dock
and existing and proposed structures that cumulatively preempt no more than 10 square feet of sovereignty submerged land for each foot of the applicant's "riparian shoreline on the affected waterbody." Petitioners contend that, using only the length of Rosati's shoreline on the St. Lucie River, about 125 feet, the Rosati dock exceeds the rule criterion for a Letter of Consent.
The Department used the total of Rosati's shoreline along Danforth Creek and the St. Lucie River, about 400 feet, to determine that the proposed dock met this limit and was eligible for a Letter of Consent.
The Department did not offer an explanation of the policies that underlay its interpretation of rule 18- 21.005(1)(c)2. or how including Rosati's shoreline on Danforth Creek in its calculation is consistent with the wording "riparian shoreline on the affected waterbody." The St. Lucie River is the waterbody affected by the Rosati Dock, not Danforth Creek. The interpretation of this rule by the Department was not shown to be reasonable and, therefore, does not justify use of a Letter of Consent for the Rosati dock.
The Department contends that, notwithstanding the preempted area limit discussed above, rule 18-21.005(1)(c)2. states that a Letter of Consent can be issued for a "minimum-size private residential single-family dock or pier" as defined in rule 18-21.003(39):
"Minimum-size dock or pier" means a dock or pier that is the smallest size necessary to provide reasonable access to the water for navigating, fishing, or swimming based on consideration of the immediate area's physical and natural characteristics, customary recreational and navigational practices, and docks and piers previously authorized under this chapter. The term minimum-size dock or pier shall also include a dock or pier constructed in conformance with the exemption criteria in Section 403.813(1)(b), F.S. or in conformance with the private residential single-family dock criteria in subsection 18-20.004(5), F.A.C.
The Department contends the Rosati dock meets this definition and, therefore, is eligible for a Letter of Consent.
Rosati did not demonstrate that his dock is the smallest size necessary to provide Rosati reasonable access to the water for navigating, fishing, or swimming. Nor was the Rosati dock constructed in conformance with the exemption criteria in section 403.813(1)(b), because that section requires that the dock have no more than 1,000 square feet of over-water surface area. However, the dock meets the alternative definition of minimum-size dock as one that is constructed in conformance with the criteria in rule 18-20.004(5). Therefore, a Letter of Consent is the appropriate form of authorization for the proposed dock. That still leaves for determination the question whether Rosati is entitled to a Letter of Consent.
Rule 18-21.004 contains a list of management policies, standards, and criteria for determining whether to issue a Letter
of Consent for a private, residential, single-family dock. Rule 18-21.004(1)(a) requires that activities on sovereignty submerged lands not be contrary to the public interest. The Rosati dock, by blocking public access to the deeper channel, permanently eliminated navigation by the general boating public in and out of Danforth Creek by vessels that previously were able to do so.
That is a significant impairment to navigation in the area and is contrary to the public interest. Therefore, the Rosati dock violates rule 18-21.004(1)(a).
The title to lands under navigable waters is held by the State, by virtue of its sovereignty, in trust for all the people. The private use of sovereignty submerged lands may be authorized by law, but only when such use is not contrary to the public interest. See Fla. Const., Art. X, § 11 (2013). The most fundamental public interest in sovereignty submerged lands is a priori the character of the overlying waters as navigable.
The Department argues that a person is not entitled to use a preferred water route, (citing Brooks v. Crum, DOAH Case Nos. 06-2312, 2013, and 2014. (Recommended Order, December 22, 2006)). However, it was found in Brooks v. Crum that access to an unnamed creek was not affected by the proposed dock, except that boaters would have to take a different route to the mouth of the creek. The case stands for the proposition that, if there are two routes of equal depth to gain access to a creek, boaters
have no right to insist on their preferred route and prevent a riparian landowner from improving his dock. In contrast, the riparian landowners on Danforth Creek and other boaters do not have two routes of equal depth to access Danforth Creek from the St. Lucie River. If they had an alternative route of equal depth, they could not insist on using the channel that runs beneath the Rosati dock.
Respondents assert that Petitioners are not prohibited from navigating in canoes and kayaks and, therefore, their right to navigate has not been significantly impaired. However, a material reduction in the public's ability to navigate on a navigable waterbody is a significant impairment. The immediate and permanent blocking of the deeper channel so that many vessel types that could have navigated in and out of Danforth Creek can no longer do so is a material reduction in the public's ability to navigate.
Petitioners contend that the length of the dock causes it to be a navigation hazard to boaters in the St. Lucie River. However, because the dock does not extend more than 20 percent of the width of the waterbody as specified by Board of Trustees' rules, it is presumed to not create a navigation hazard. Petitioners' evidence was insufficient to rebut the presumption.
Petitioners contend that the Rosati dock interferes with their riparian rights. Riparian rights are defined in
section 253.141(1) as "rights of ingress, egress, boating, bathing and fishing and such others as may be or have been defined by law." In Board of Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., Ltd., 512 So. 2d 934, 936 (Fla. 1987), the court identified the following riparian and littoral property rights: (1) the right of access to the water, including the right to have the property's contact with the water remain intact; (2) the right to use the water for navigational purposes; (3) the right to an unobstructed view of the water; and
(4) the right to receive accretions and relictions to the property." Id., 936.
Other cases have recognized a riparian landowner's right to "wharf out" or build a dock at the shoreline. See Ferry Pass
Inspectors' and Shippers' Ass'n v. White's River Inspectors' & Shippers' Ass'n, 57 Fla. 399, 48 So. 643 (Fla. 1909). A riparian landowner's right of navigation is, likewise, associated with the waterbody adjacent to his shoreline.
Riparian owners have no exclusive rights to navigation in or commerce upon a navigable stream opposite the riparian holdings, and have no right to use the water or land under it as to obstruct or unreasonably impede lawful navigation and commerce by others, as so as to unlawfully burden or monopolize navigation or commerce. The exclusive rights of a riparian owner are such as are necessary for the use and enjoyment of his abutting property and the business lawfully conducted thereon; and these rights may not be so
exercised as to injure others in their lawful rights.
Id., 402.
Petitioners did not prove that their traditional, common law riparian rights are affected by the Rosati dock.
Rosati also asserts his rights as a riparian landowner, but he did not demonstrate that his riparian rights cannot be exercised without interfering with the navigation rights of the general public. See Ferry Pass Inspectors' and Shippers' Ass'n, at 57 Fla. 399, 48 So. 48 (Fla. 1909)("Subject to the superior rights of the public as to navigation . . . a riparian owner may erect upon the bed and shores adjacent to his riparian holdings, bath houses, wharves or other structures . . . but these privileges are subject to the rights of the public to be enforced by proper public authority or by individuals who are specially and unlawfully injured.").
The Letter of Consent does not contain terms or conditions that would provide alternative access to Danforth Creek of equal depth so that public navigation was not significantly impaired. Therefore the Letter of Consent violates rule 18-21.004(1)(b), which requires terms and conditions that protect sovereignty submerged lands.
The Rosati dock was not constructed in a manner which avoids or minimizes adverse impacts to sovereignty submerged
lands and, therefore, the dock violates rule 18-21.004(7). Rosati did not show that it was impossible to provide the general public and the riparian landowners on Danforth Creek a route of equal depth in and out of Danforth Creek.
Nothing stated herein is intended to indicate that the Rosati dock must be torn down. It is only concluded that he is not entitled to a Letter of Consent for his project.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a Final Order determining that Thomas Rosati qualifies for the Noticed General Permit, and denying the Letter of Consent to use sovereignty submerged lands.
DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of July, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
S
BRAM D. E. CANTER
Administrative Law Judge
Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060
(850) 488-9675
Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 2013.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Patricia E. Comer, Esquire
Department of Environmental Protection Mail Station 35
3900 Commonwealth Boulevard
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
Nathan E. Nason, Esquire Gregory Hyden, Esquire Nason, Yeager, Gerson,
White and Lioce, P.A. Suite 1200
1645 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
Howard K. Heims, Esquire Virginia P. Sherlock, Esquire Littman, Sherlock and Heims, P.A. Post Office Box 1197
Stuart, Florida 34995-1197
Herschel T. Vinyard, Jr., Secretary Department of Environmental Protection Mail Station 35
3900 Commonwealth Boulevard
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
Matthew Z. Leopold, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Mail Station 35
3900 Commonwealth Boulevard
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
Lea Crandall, Agency Clerk
Department of Environmental Protection Mail Station 35
3900 Commonwealth Boulevard
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within
15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this case.
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Oct. 29, 2013 | Agency Final Order | |
| Jul. 31, 2013 | Recommended Order | Petition for hearing was timely to challenge the Letter of Consent because newspaper notice only mentioned the Noticed General Permit. Letter of Consent did not comply with the rules of the Board of Trustees because dock impairs navigation in the area. |
