Filed: Nov. 19, 2019
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: 17-2306 Wang v. Barr BIA Loprest, IJ A205 440 440 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTAT
Summary: 17-2306 Wang v. Barr BIA Loprest, IJ A205 440 440 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATI..
More
17-2306
Wang v. Barr
BIA
Loprest, IJ
A205 440 440
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
New York, on the 19th day of November, two thousand
nineteen.
PRESENT:
REENA RAGGI,
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
HUAN WANG,
Petitioner,
v. 17-2306
NAC
WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Robert J. Adinolfi, New York, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant
Attorney General; Claire L.
Workman, Senior Litigation
Counsel; John B. Holt, Trial
Attorney, Office of Immigration
Litigation, United States
Department of Justice, Washington,
DC.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioner Huan Wang, a native and citizen of the
People’s Republic of China, seeks review of the BIA’s
affirmance of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of Wang’s
application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Huan
Wang, No. A 205 440 440 (B.I.A. July 13, 2017), aff’g No. A
205 440 440 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City May 18, 2016).
Under the circumstances, we have reviewed “both the IJ’s
and the BIA’s opinions for the sake of completeness,” Huo
Qiang Chen v. Holder, 773 F.3d 396, 403 (2d Cir. 2014)
(internal quotation marks omitted), applying well-established
standards of review, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4); Wei Sun v.
Sessions,
883 F.3d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 2018) (reviewing factual
findings for substantial evidence and questions of law and
the application of law to undisputed facts de novo). In so
doing, we assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying
2
facts and procedural history of this case, which we reference
only as necessary to explain our decision to deny the
petition.
To establish eligibility for asylum, withholding of
removal, and CAT relief, Wang had to show that she suffered
past persecution, or had a well-founded fear of future
persecution on account of her race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(1)(A),
(B)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13. It is undisputed that Wang did
not allege past persecution, but only a fear of future
persecution. A fear of future persecution must be both
subjectively credible and objectively reasonable. See
Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004);
Jian Xing Huang v. U.S. INS,
421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005)
(“In the absence of solid support in the record,” an asylum
applicant’s fear of persecution is “speculative at best.”).
Wang could meet this burden by showing either a “reasonable
possibility . . . she would be singled out individually for
persecution,” or a “pattern or practice” of persecution of
3
“persons similarly situated” to her. 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.13(b)(2)(iii); see also Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 325,
332 (2d Cir. 2013). We find no error in the agency’s
conclusion that Wang failed to establish a well-founded fear
of future persecution.
First, the agency reasonably afforded limited weight to
Wang’s evidence that she would be singled out individually
for persecution. Wang’s only evidence that Chinese
authorities were aware of her practice of Christianity in
2011 were letters from her mother and her church leader.
Both authors were unavailable for cross-examination, Wang’s
mother was an interested witness, and the church leader’s
letter did not identify who reported Wang to the police or
explain how the church leader knew about that report. See
Y.C., 741 F.3d at 334 (affirming agency’s determination that
letter from spouse in China was entitled to limited weight
because it was unsworn and submitted by interested witness);
see also
id. (“We defer to the agency’s determination of the
weight afforded to an alien’s documentary evidence.”).
Furthermore, the agency did not err in reasoning that, even
4
if Chinese authorities had been interested in Wang’s practice
of Christianity and aware of her whereabouts in 2011, there
was no objectively reasonable basis for Wang’s fear of
persecution six years later. Wang conceded that she did not
know whether the authorities had looked for her since
telephoning her mother once in 2011, and she was subsequently
able to obtain a visa in her own name to leave China, thus
undermining the plausibility of her fear that police sought
to arrest her. See Jian Xing Huang, 421 F.3d at 129; cf.
Ying Li v. BCIS,
529 F.3d 79, 82-83 (2d Cir. 2008) (declining
to disturb adverse credibility determination where applicant
asserted that she “successfully quit the country using her
own passport (despite allegations of nationwide
persecution)”); Melgar de Torres v. Reno,
191 F.3d 307, 313
(2d Cir. 1999) (finding alleged future fear diminished when
similarly situated individuals are able to live unharmed in
asylum applicant’s native country).
Second, the agency reasonably concluded that the country
conditions evidence did not establish a pattern or practice
of persecution of individuals similarly situated to Wang.
5
To demonstrate such a pattern or practice, Wang had to
establish that the harm to the group was “‘systemic or
pervasive.’” Mufied v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir.
2007) (quoting In re A-M-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 737, 741 (BIA
2005)). But the State Department country conditions reports
submitted by Wang and considered by the agency show that
millions of Chinese Protestants worship without incident in
China’s unregistered congregations. CAR at 483. The agency
reasonably considered these reports to conclude that there
was not systematic or pervasive persecution. See Shao v.
Mukasey,
546 F.3d 138, 166 (2d Cir. 2008)(characterizing
State Department reports as “usually the best available
source of information on country conditions” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
In sum, substantial evidence supports the agency’s
finding that Wang failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear
of persecution. Accordingly, we identify no error in the
agency’s determination that Wang failed to demonstrate
eligibility for asylum, and, therefore, necessarily failed to
6
meet the higher burden for withholding of removal and CAT
relief. See Y.C., 741 F.3d at 335.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. All pending motions are DENIED and stays VACATED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
Clerk of Court
7
