Filed: Jan. 07, 2020
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 7 2020 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT KAREN SUTHERLAND, No. 18-35717 Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:17-cv-00302-JTR v. MEMORANDUM* ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington John Tyler Rodgers, Magistrate Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted October 25, 2019 Portland, Oregon Before: FARRIS,
Summary: FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 7 2020 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT KAREN SUTHERLAND, No. 18-35717 Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:17-cv-00302-JTR v. MEMORANDUM* ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington John Tyler Rodgers, Magistrate Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted October 25, 2019 Portland, Oregon Before: FARRIS, B..
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FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
JAN 7 2020
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KAREN SUTHERLAND, No. 18-35717
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:17-cv-00302-JTR
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
John Tyler Rodgers, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 25, 2019
Portland, Oregon
Before: FARRIS, BEA, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) denied Karen Sutherland’s
application for disability insurance benefits after finding that Ms. Sutherland
(1) lacked “deficits in adaptive functioning” manifested during the developmental
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
period as is necessary to meet the criteria for “intellectual disability” in Listing
12.05(C), and (2) could perform both past relevant work and other work that exists
in significant numbers in the national economy despite any illiteracy. We affirm.
The ALJ had substantial evidence to conclude that Ms. Sutherland did not
have the “deficits in adaptive functioning” necessary to meet Listing 12.05(C). See
20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 § 12.05(C) (2016) (“Listing 12.05(C)”)).
Although an examining physician diagnosed Ms. Sutherland with a condition that
in part requires concluding that Ms. Sutherland had such deficits that manifested
during the developmental period, the ALJ permissibly rejected that diagnosis based
on medical expert testimony more consistent with medical evidence in the record,
which concluded that Ms. Sutherland does not have deficits in adaptive functioning
that initially manifested during the developmental period. Ms. Sutherland thus
failed to meet her burden of showing that she suffered from the requisite innate
deficits necessary to meet the criteria of Listing 12.05(C).
The ALJ also reasonably concluded that Ms. Sutherland could find work that
exists in significant numbers in the national economy despite her limitations.
Ms. Sutherland’s principal dispute with the ALJ’s determination on this point is
that the ALJ erred in relying on an impartial vocational expert’s testimony that
Ms. Sutherland could perform various jobs despite her illiteracy. Specifically,
2
Ms. Sutherland argues that the ALJ failed to resolve a conflict between the
vocational expert’s testimony that Ms. Sutherland could perform jobs in various
occupational fields despite her illiteracy and the literacy requirements for those
occupational fields described in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles
(“Dictionary”). See Pinto v. Massanari,
249 F.3d 840, 846–47 (9th Cir. 2001).
We conclude, however, that there was no conflict between the Dictionary and the
vocational expert’s testimony, at least with respect to testimony that
Ms. Sutherland could find jobs in the “laundry worker” occupation. As we have
explained before, the Dictionary refers to “occupations,” and not specific jobs.
Gutierrez v. Colvin,
844 F.3d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 2016). The Dictionary thus
describes “maximum requirements” of jobs as “generally performed,” and not what
every job within that occupational field requires.
Id. (quoting SSR 00-4P,
2000
WL 1898704, at *2–3). Here, the vocational expert testified that some, but not all,
jobs that fall within the relevant occupational category of “laundry worker” require
literacy. That is not an “obvious or apparent” conflict with the Dictionary’s
requirements for the relevant laundry worker occupation, which says almost
3
nothing about literacy.
Id. at 808; see also DICOT 361.685-018,
1991 WL
672987.1
Ms. Sutherland’s remaining arguments on appeal are unpersuasive. For one,
Ms. Sutherland argues that the ALJ erred in concluding that Ms. Sutherland’s
undiagnosed speech and neurological impairments did not warrant additional
restrictions in her residual functional capacity (“RFC”) determination. Contrary to
Ms. Sutherland’s contentions, however, the ALJ analyzed Ms. Sutherland’s
neurological symptoms and relied on reasonable medical expert testimony to
conclude that they were not “medically determinable impairments.” And although
the ALJ did not separately discuss whether Ms. Sutherland’s speech problems were
a medically determinable impairment, the ALJ’s RFC determination included all
speech-based limitations supported by the record. Ms. Sutherland does not identify
any further limitation that the ALJ failed to consider.
Finally, Ms. Sutherland argues that the ALJ erred in finding that she could
return to her past employments because her prior jobs were purportedly “sheltered”
work not performed at national standards. For reasons discussed above, even if the
1
Any failure to reconcile conflicts between the vocational expert’s
testimony and the Dictionary with respect to other occupations was harmless error,
which does not warrant reversal. Buck v. Berryhill,
869 F.3d 1040, 1048 (9th Cir.
2017).
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ALJ erred in concluding that Ms. Sutherland could return to her past employments,
that error was harmless because the ALJ reasonably concluded that Ms. Sutherland
has the residual functioning capacity to work as a laundry worker. Ms. Sutherland
also failed to preserve her argument that her prior jobs were sheltered by not
raising it before the ALJ. See Meanel v. Apfel,
172 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir.
1999).
AFFIRMED.
5