United States Court of Appeals
                            For the Eighth Circuit
                        ___________________________

                                No. 19-3114
                        ___________________________

                            United States of America

                                      Plaintiff - Appellee

                                        v.

                                Kevin Ray Smith

                                   Defendant - Appellant
                                 ____________

                     Appeal from United States District Court
                  for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines
                                  ____________

                            Submitted: April 16, 2020
                              Filed: July 29, 2020
                                [Unpublished]
                                 ____________

Before KELLY, WOLLMAN, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
                          ____________

PER CURIAM.

      Kevin Ray Smith pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute a mixture or
substance containing methamphetamine.          See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
841(b)(1)(A)(viii), 846. Based on two prior drug convictions, the district court1

      1
       The Honorable John A. Jarvey, Chief Judge, United States District Court for
the Southern District of Iowa.
concluded that he was a career offender. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. On appeal, Smith
claims that considering his prior convictions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause
and gave rise to a substantively unreasonable sentence. We affirm.

      We make short work of Smith’s double-jeopardy argument. As we have long
held, giving “habitual offenders” a longer sentence based on their past crimes
“do[es] not subject [them] to a second conviction or punishment for [their] prior
offenses.” United States v. Thomas, 

, 1201 (8th Cir. 1990); accord
Witte v. United States, 

, 400 (1995); see U.S. Const. amend. V, cl. 2.
Rather, it is a permissible recidivism-based “aggravating factor” for their current
offense. 

; see 

(describing “the latest
crime” as “an aggravated offense because a repetitive one” (citation omitted)).

        It was also reasonable for the district court to rely on Smith’s career-offender
status when it gave him a below-Guidelines-range sentence of 160 months in prison.
See United States v. Scott, 

, 435–36 (8th Cir. 2016); see also United
States v. Feemster, 

, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (reviewing a
substantive-reasonableness challenge for an abuse of discretion). Even if he believes
that it was “unfair[]” to rely on his prior convictions, there was no error in doing so.
See United States v. Barron, 

, 870–71 (8th Cir. 2009). Nor was it an
abuse of discretion for the court, after granting a substantial departure from the
recommended range of 262 to 327 months in prison, see U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, to decline
to vary downward even further. Cf. United States v. Zauner, 

, 429 (8th
Cir. 2012) (stating that a district court rarely abuses its discretion when it varies
downward, but not as far as the defendant would like).

      We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court.
                     ______________________________




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