Filed: Jun. 15, 2007
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 06-15511 June 15, 2007 Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN _ CLERK D. C. Docket No. 05-00095-CV-HL-7 RICKARD HARLEY SCRUGGS, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus ALLEN LEE, Deputy, WINSTON PETERSON, Sheriff, FERRELL HOWELL, Deputy, RAYMOND PETERSON, Deputy, JOHN DOE, unknown two truck driver acting as agent for Clinch County, et al., Defendants-Appellees, GARY SIMMONS, JOHN
Summary: [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 06-15511 June 15, 2007 Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN _ CLERK D. C. Docket No. 05-00095-CV-HL-7 RICKARD HARLEY SCRUGGS, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus ALLEN LEE, Deputy, WINSTON PETERSON, Sheriff, FERRELL HOWELL, Deputy, RAYMOND PETERSON, Deputy, JOHN DOE, unknown two truck driver acting as agent for Clinch County, et al., Defendants-Appellees, GARY SIMMONS, JOHN T..
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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-15511
June 15, 2007
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 05-00095-CV-HL-7
RICKARD HARLEY SCRUGGS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ALLEN LEE, Deputy,
WINSTON PETERSON, Sheriff,
FERRELL HOWELL, Deputy,
RAYMOND PETERSON, Deputy,
JOHN DOE, unknown two
truck driver acting as agent
for Clinch County, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
GARY SIMMONS,
JOHN T (TREY) BASS,
Defendants.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
_________________________
(June 15, 2007)
Before ANDERSON, BARKETT and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Rickard Harley Scruggs appeals the summary judgment in favor of Winston
C. Peterson, Sheriff of Clinch County, Georgia; Ferrell Howell and Raymond
Peterson, Clinch County Deputy Sheriffs; and Linda Brown, Magistrate Judge of
Clinch County, and against Scruggs’s complaint of unlawful detention. See 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Scruggs also appeals the denial of his motion for costs from James
Green. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On November 26, 2003, Scruggs was arrested for possession of marijuana
following a search of his vehicle at a road block. Deputy Allen Lee, now deceased,
advised Scruggs of his rights and took Scruggs into custody. Deputy Howell
transported Scruggs to the Clinch County jail. Scruggs refused to participate in the
booking process and demanded an immediate judicial determination of whether he
should be detained. Scruggs was transferred to a holding cell, where he remained
for approximately 70 hours.
On November 29, 2003, Deputy Peterson brought Magistrate Judge Brown
to the jail to meet with Scruggs. Brown told Scruggs that she was there to set his
bond and asked him to sign a First Appearance on Arrest form. Scruggs signed the
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form after Brown struck the statement that a hearing was provided within 48 hours
of arrest. Scruggs was then processed through booking and was released on bond
that evening.
On November 23, 2004, Scruggs commenced a civil action against Deputies
Peterson, Howell, and Lee, in their individual and official capacities; Sheriff
Peterson, in his official capacity; Department of Corrections Officers Green and
John Bass, in their individual capacities; Department of Natural Resources Officer
Gary Simmons; Chief Magistrate Judge Annie Ruth Steedley, in her official
capacity; Magistrate Judge Brown, in her individual and official capacities; and
Clinch County Commissioners Strickland, Hart, Corbett, Cross-Scott, and Smith.
Scruggs complained that his arrest and detention violated his federal constitutional
rights and state law. Officers Bass and Simmons were dismissed by stipulation and
a stipulation of death was filed for Deputy Lee. Following discovery, the Clinch
County Defendants and Officer Green moved for summary judgment. Scruggs
also moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment
to the Clinch County Defendants and Officer Green on all federal claims and
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Scruggs’s remaining state law
claims. Scruggs appealed the summary judgment as well as the order denying
Scruggs’s motion for reimbursement of the costs incurred in effecting service on
Green.
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a summary judgment de novo, and we resolve all issues of
material fact in favor of the non-moving party. Cuvillier v. Rockdale County, 390
F.3d 1336, 1338 (11th Cir. 2004). We review the denial of costs for abuse of
discretion. See Cochran v. EI duPont de Nemours,
933 F.2d 1533, 1540 (11th Cir.
1991).
III. DISCUSSION
Scruggs contends that the district court erred when it granted the motion for
summary judgment filed by Sheriff Peterson, Deputies Howell and Peterson, and
Judge Brown. Scruggs does not appeal the summary judgment in favor of Chief
Magistrate Steeley and the Clinch County Commissioners or the judgment against
his federal claims arising from his arrest. Scruggs also maintains that the district
court erred when it denied Scruggs’s motion for the imposition of costs against
Green for Green’s failure to waive service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4(d)(2). We address the summary judgment and order denying costs in turn.
A. Summary Judgment
Scruggs contends that the district court erred when it granted summary
judgment in favor of Sheriff Peterson, Judge Brown, and Deputies Howell and
Peterson. We must evaluate the claims against the sheriff and deputies in their
official and individual capacities separately. We then consider the claims against
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Judge Brown and her entitlement to judicial immunity.
1. Sheriff Peterson and Deputies Howell and
Peterson Acting in Their Official Capacity
Under the Eleventh Amendment, a State is immune from suit in federal court
without its consent. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100,
104 S. Ct. 900, 908 (1984). This immunity extends to an “arm of the State,” which
includes agents and instrumentalities of the State. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Doe,
519 U.S. 425, 429–30,
117 S. Ct. 900, 903–904 (1997). “Whether a
defendant is an ‘arm of the State’ must be assessed in light of the particular
function in which the defendant was engaged.” Manders v. Lee,
338 F.3d 1304,
1308 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc). We look at four factors to determine whether an
entity is an “arm of the State”: “(1) how state law defines the entity; (2) what
degree of control the State maintains over the entity; (3) where the entity derives its
funds; and (4) who is responsible for judgments against the entity.”
Id. at 1309. In
Manders, we examined Georgia law and held that Clinch County Sheriff Peterson
was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity as an “arm of the State” when he
established and executed a use-of-force policy at the jail.
Id. at 1328.
Although the policy is different, Sheriff Peterson’s policy and procedure for
processing detainees arrested without a warrant are functionally the equivalent of
the use-of-force policy in Manders. Our analysis in Manders applies, see id. at
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1318–1328, and we conclude that Sheriff Peterson, in his official capacity, is an
“arm of the State” entitled to immunity in executing the function of establishing
policies at the jail for processing arrestees. As employees of the sheriff, deputies
Howell and Peterson, in their official capacities, are also entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity. See
id. at 1311.
2. Deputies Peterson and Howell in Their Individual Capacities
Scruggs contends that the district court erred when it entered judgment
against his claim that deputies Peterson and Howell violated Scruggs’s
constitutional rights when the deputies detained Scruggs for more than 48 hours
without a probable cause hearing following a warrantless arrest. Deputies Peterson
and Howell argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity from Scruggs’s
action brought against them in their individual capacities. We agree with the
deputies and the judgment of the district court.
Federal law provides government officials a qualified immunity when sued
individually for an alleged violation of a constitutional right. “The privilege is ‘an
immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.’” Saucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194, 200,
121 S. Ct. 2151, 2156 (2001). This form of immunity is not
absolute, however.
The evaluation of a defense of qualified immunity involves three steps.
First, a public official who asserts a defense of qualified immunity must establish
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that he was “engaged in a ‘discretionary function’ when he performed the acts of
which the plaintiff complains.” Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th
Cir. 2004). The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to establish that the defendant
violated the Constitution. Hope v. Pelzer,
536 U.S. 730, 736,
122 S. Ct. 2508,
2513 (2002). In the final step, the plaintiff must establish that the constitutional
right was clearly established when the violation occurred.
Saucier, 533 U.S. at
201, 121 S. Ct. at 2156.
Deputies Howell and Peterson were engaged in discretionary functions when
they performed the acts of which Scruggs complains. When we assess whether an
act is discretionary, “[w]e ask whether the government employee was (a)
performing a legitimate job-related function . . . (b) through means that were within
his power to utilize.” Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1265. The acts of processing and
detaining an arrestee qualify as discretionary functions of law enforcement
officers.
We can resolve the qualified immunity issue at step two. Taking the facts in
the light most favorable to Scruggs, Howell and Peterson’s conduct did not violate
the Constitution. Deputy Peterson had no contact with Scruggs until he brought
Magistrate Judge Brown to the jail to see Scruggs on the day Scruggs was released.
Peterson’s only other involvement with Scruggs was the act of taking Scruggs’s
fingerprints before Scruggs’s release. These acts by Peterson do not amount to a
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violation of Scruggs’s constitutional rights.
Neither do the facts support a conclusion that Howell’s conduct violated the
Constitution. Howell was present at the road block where Scruggs was arrested
and transported Scruggs to the jail on November 26, 2003. That same day, Howell
attempted to obtain information from Scruggs for booking. Scruggs refused and
demanded to see a judge. Howell placed Scruggs in a holding cell and turned
Scruggs over to Deputy Lee, the arresting officer, when Lee arrived at the jail.
Howell had no further interactions with Scruggs.
These facts do not support a conclusion that Howell violated a constitutional
right of Scruggs. An individual is not entitled to an immediate probable cause
hearing following a warrantless arrest. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500
U.S. 44, 54,
111 S. Ct. 1661, 1669 (1991). There is no evidence that Howell was
aware Scruggs was detained without a probable cause hearing for longer than 48
hours after his warrantless arrest. Deputies Howell and Peterson are entitled to
qualified immunity from Scruggs’s civil rights action against them.
3. Judge Brown’s Entitlement to Judicial Immunity
Judges are entitled to absolute immunity from civil liability under section
1983 for acts performed in their judicial capacity, provided such acts are not done
in the “‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357,
98 S. Ct. 1099, 1105 (1978) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335,
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351 (1872)). Judge Brown was acting in her judicial capacity when she met with
Scruggs at the jail on November 29, 2003. Because Judge Brown did not act in the
“clear absence of all jurisdiction,” she is immune from civil liability.
B. Motion for Costs
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Scruggs’s
motion for reimbursement of the costs incurred in effecting service on Green.
Scruggs mailed the request for waiver of service to the Valdosta Correctional
Institution after Green was no longer employed there. There is no evidence that
Green received the request for waiver.
IV. CONCLUSION
The summary judgment and order denying costs are
AFFIRMED.
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