Filed: Oct. 08, 2020
Latest Update: Oct. 08, 2020
Summary: USCA11 Case: 20-10805 Date Filed: 10/08/2020 Page: 1 of 8 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 20-10805 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 3:18-cv-01467-HES-PDB HAKIM ABDULLAH, CEOPHIA PERKINS, Plaintiffs-Appellants, versus JACKSONVILLE HOUSING AUTHORITY, ANTHONY JACKSON, employee in an individual personal capacity, FREDERICK MCKINNIES, CEO, in an individual personal capacity, Defendants-Appellees. _ Appeal from the United States District Cou
Summary: USCA11 Case: 20-10805 Date Filed: 10/08/2020 Page: 1 of 8 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT _ No. 20-10805 Non-Argument Calendar _ D.C. Docket No. 3:18-cv-01467-HES-PDB HAKIM ABDULLAH, CEOPHIA PERKINS, Plaintiffs-Appellants, versus JACKSONVILLE HOUSING AUTHORITY, ANTHONY JACKSON, employee in an individual personal capacity, FREDERICK MCKINNIES, CEO, in an individual personal capacity, Defendants-Appellees. _ Appeal from the United States District Cour..
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USCA11 Case: 20-10805 Date Filed: 10/08/2020 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 20-10805
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 3:18-cv-01467-HES-PDB
HAKIM ABDULLAH,
CEOPHIA PERKINS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
JACKSONVILLE HOUSING AUTHORITY,
ANTHONY JACKSON,
employee in an individual personal capacity,
FREDERICK MCKINNIES,
CEO, in an individual personal capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(October 8, 2020)
Before BRANCH, GRANT, and FAY, Circuit Judges.
USCA11 Case: 20-10805 Date Filed: 10/08/2020 Page: 2 of 8
PER CURIAM:
Hakim Abdullah and Ceophia Perkins, proceeding pro se, appeal the district
court’s dismissal of their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. We affirm.
I.
In 2018, Hakim Abdullah and Ceophia Perkins filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claim against Jacksonville Housing Authority and its employee, Anthony Jackson,
alleging that the defendants unlawfully evicted Perkins from her apartment. They
demanded many things: a jury trial, damages, termination of the employment of
both Jackson and Frederick McKinnies (the CEO of Jacksonville Housing
Authority), and referral of the matter to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Although both Abdullah and Perkins signed the complaint, they did not explain
how Abdullah was associated with the eviction of Perkins.
Because Abdullah and Perkins filed motions to proceed in forma pauperis, a
magistrate judge reviewed the viability of their complaint under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B). That section requires a court to dismiss an action by a plaintiff
proceeding in forma pauperis if at any time the court determines the action is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. The
magistrate determined that their complaint failed to state a claim on which relief
could be granted—it contained mostly conclusory statements and few facts. But
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because they were proceeding pro se, the magistrate gave them an opportunity to
amend.
In their amended complaint, Abdullah and Perkins reiterated their § 1983
claims, added McKinnies as a defendant in the caption of the case (but not the
“Parties” section), alleged that Abdullah was evicted from his apartment when
under the protection of a bankruptcy stay, and stated that Perkins is a “disabled
citizen” who lost her personal effects from her eviction. And they attached thirteen
documents (some twice).
After carefully reviewing the amended complaint, the magistrate again
issued a report and recommendation pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B). The magistrate
recommended dismissing the complaint for various reasons—including for failure
to state a claim on which relief could be granted—and denying their motions to
proceed in forma pauperis as moot. But Abdullah and Perkins paid the filing fee
and, because they no longer proceeded in forma pauperis, the magistrate judge
concluded that consideration of their complaint under § 1915 was unwarranted and
vacated the report and recommendation.
Eight days after the magistrate judge vacated the report, the defendants filed
a motion to dismiss, citing six different grounds for dismissal. Not to be outdone,
Abdullah and Perkins filed motions to strike and for default judgment. Among
other arguments, they contended that the magistrate’s “order” was invalid because
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the magistrate did not have jurisdiction to enter a report and recommendation
without their consent.
The district court granted the motion to dismiss and denied Abdullah and
Perkins’s motions. Although the pleadings were not entirely clear on what causes
of action Abdullah and Perkins were pursuing, the district court did a thorough job
explaining why dismissal was warranted. It first found that it did not have subject
matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims to the extent they sought appellate
review of completed state court eviction proceedings, citing the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine (which forbids a losing party in state court from filing suit in federal court
to complain of injury caused by the state court judgment). District of Columbia
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust
Co.,
263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923). It then found that the § 1983 claims were barred by
the four-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims and that the claims
based on alleged violations of the bankruptcy stay were barred by collateral
estoppel. Finally, it found that the remainder of the complaint failed to contain
claims on which relief could be granted.
This appeal followed.
II.
We review questions of our jurisdiction de novo. United States v. Pavlenko,
921 F.3d 1286, 1289 (11th Cir. 2019). We also review a district court’s
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application of a statute of limitations de novo. Foudy v. Miami-Dade County,
Florida, 823 F.3d 590, 592 (11th Cir. 2016). And we review dismissal for failure
to state a claim on which relief can be granted de novo. Blevins v. Aksut,
849 F.3d
1016, 1018–19 (11th Cir. 2017). But we need not reach the district court’s grounds
for dismissing Abdullah and Perkins’s complaint because those grounds have not
been challenged on appeal.
The law is now “well settled in this Circuit that a legal claim or argument
that has not been briefed before the court is deemed abandoned and its merits will
not be addressed.” Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330
(11th Cir. 2004). “If an argument is not fully briefed (let alone not presented at all)
to the Circuit Court, evaluating its merits would be improper both because the
appellants may control the issues they raise on appeal, and because the appellee
would have no opportunity to respond to it.”
Id. And while we construe briefs
filed by pro se litigants liberally, even pro se litigants must follow the rules. Albra
v. Advan, Inc.,
490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007).
Abdullah and Perkins’s brief flags one issue for review: whether the district
court erred in dismissing their complaint “without procedural due process of the
Fourteenth Amendment.” In their “statement of the issues” and “arguments”
sections, they contend that the magistrate’s report and recommendation was a void
judgment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and that the district court
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erred in denying their motion for default judgment. Their brief does not address
any of the grounds given by the district court for dismissing their claims. In other
words, Abdullah and Perkins have waived or abandoned any argument that they
might have made on appeal concerning the district court’s dismissal of their claims
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, being time-barred, or failing to state a claim
on which relief could be granted.
III.
We now turn to the issues that Abdullah and Perkins do raise on appeal.
First, Abdullah and Perkins renew their argument that the magistrate’s report and
recommendation was a “void judgment.” Second, Abdullah and Perkins argue that
the district court should have granted them default judgment when the defendants
“failed to answer the Amended Complaint in a timely manner” and that this Court
should award them $150,000,000.00.
As for the first argument, a district court has inherent authority to appoint a
magistrate judge to determine pretrial matters and to file a report and
recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). And when plaintiffs proceed in forma
pauperis, a court is required to dismiss an action that fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Thus, it was proper for the
district court to appoint a magistrate judge to enter a report and recommendation
here. And, perhaps more importantly, the magistrate ultimately vacated the report
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and recommendation that Abdullah and Perkins challenge, making this argument
moot.
Moving on to their second argument, we review the denial of a motion for
default judgment for abuse of discretion. Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Co., 294 F.3d 1309, 1316 (11th Cir. 2002). A defendant must file a
responsive pleading within twenty-one days after being served with a summons
and complaint. Fed R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1). If the defendant fails to do so and the
plaintiff’s claim is for a certain sum, the plaintiff must submit an affidavit showing
the amount due to obtain a default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1). Even then,
entering judgment by default is a drastic remedy which should only be used in
extreme situations.
Mitchell, 294 F.3d at 1316–17.
Here, although the defendants did not respond to Abdullah and Perkins’s
amended complaint within twenty-one days of service, the magistrate had issued a
report and recommendation finding that those claims were facially invalid. And
once the magistrate vacated that report, the defendants promptly filed their motion
to dismiss. The drastic remedy of default judgment was not appropriate here.
Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir. 1985). Further, even if the
defendants were in default, the plaintiffs never submitted an affidavit showing the
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amount due, as required by Rule 55. Thus, the district court was well within its
discretion to deny Abdullah and Perkins’s motion for default judgment.
Because Abdullah and Perkins failed to challenge any of the grounds for
dismissal contained in the district court’s order, and the arguments they do raise
are without merit, we affirm the dismissal of Abdullah and Perkins’s amended
complaint.
AFFIRMED.
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