PAUL W. GREENE, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff was incarcerated in the Dale County Jail when he alleges he was exposed to a Burmese python by two jailer deputies, and he brings this lawsuit seeking redress for injuries he alleges were caused by that event and subsequent inadequate medical care caused by Defendants. This matter is before the court on the following motions: (1) a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted filed by Defendant Dale County, Alabama ("the County") (Doc. 12); and (2) a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Ron Nelson and Wally Olson (Doc. 13). The motions are fully briefed and are taken under submission on the record and without oral argument.
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as to Plaintiff's federal causes of action, and the court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue, and there are adequate allegations to support both. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391. On August 17, 2015, this matter was referred to the undersigned by U.S. District Judge Myron H. Thompson for disposition or recommendation on all pretrial matters. (Doc. 9). See also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Rule 72, Fed. R. Civ. P.; United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980); Jeffrey S. v. State Board of Education of State of Georgia, 896 F.2d 507 (11th Cir. 1990).
Plaintiff was an inmate at the Dale County Jail and worked in the jail's kitchen as a trustee. (Doc. 36-1 at ¶¶ 10-11). The jail facilities are maintained by Defendant Dale County. (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 4). Dale County Sheriff Wally Olson is responsible for staffing, supervision, and medical care provided at the jail. (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 4, 8). Jailer Ron Nelson was employed by Olson as the jailer and was the immediate supervisor of jailer deputies Zeneth Glenn and Ryan Mittelbach (sometimes collectively "the deputies") at all times relevant to this action. (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 9). On or about August 11, 2013, Plaintiff observed the deputies in possession of a yellow Burmese python, approximately six to seven feet in length. (Doc. 36-1 at ¶¶ 12-13). Plaintiff told the deputies that he was afraid of snakes and did not wish to be near the snake. (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 14). When Plaintiff finished his duties in the kitchen, he returned to his dorm and fell asleep in his bunk. (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 16). Several hours later, the deputies entered the Plaintiff's dorm with the python while Plaintiff was sleeping. (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 17). Glenn placed the python close to Plaintiff's face, and then screamed, waking Plaintiff from his sleep. (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 18). Realizing the snake was in his bunk, Plaintiff was startled, screamed, and hit his head on the rail of his bunk. (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 19). Glenn and Mittlebach were terminated from their employment as a result of this incident. (Doc. 36-1 at ¶¶ 20, 55). Plaintiff alleges that the County has video of the incident. (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 21). Plaintiff further alleges that employees working in the jail are observed by a shift supervisor upon entering and leaving the jail. (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 30). Plaintiff further alleges that "Mittlebach and Glenn were therefore observed by a jail supervisor, possibly Nelson, bring the python into the jail several hours before the incident as described occurred." (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 31).
After the incident, Plaintiff "was sent to a medical facility and saw a therapist at an outside facility where he was prescribed psychiatric medication." (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 38). Plaintiff remained incarcerated at the jail for over a year after the incident. (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 39). Plaintiff alleges that he was "paid off or bribed with a job at a car wash in return for not reporting this case to other law enforcement agencies or filing a notice of claim or a lawsuit" and that "Olson was complicit" in this alleged bribery. (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 40). As a result of the incident, Plaintiff "lived in constant fear, and suffered from depression and post-traumatic stress" and "had trouble sleeping, suffered general anxiety . . . and had nightmares and night terrors on a daily basis." (Doc. 36-1 at ¶¶ 39, 41). "The Plaintiff has been treated for injuries including being prescribed sleeping medications, anti-depression medication and anxiety medicines and being under the care of mental health professionals and a licensed psychiatrist." (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 44). However, Plaintiff claims that he "did not receive proper psychiatric care in the Dale County Jail after this incident and as a result suffered emotionally and physically. It is alleged that the Dale County Jail was motivated by saving money and not insisting that [Plaintiff] receive[] more psychiatric care despite the obvious signs of his anxiety, fear, sleeplessness and fatigue." (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 45). Plaintiff alleges that in August of 2012, Joshua Glenn McVickers, while an employee working in the Dale County Jail, received sexual favors in exchange for providing contraband and "would manipulate jail cameras in an attempt to keep any wrongdoing from being filmed." (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 60). Therefore, Plaintiff alleges, "Olson was put on notice that the security precautions at the jail failed to prevent constitutional violations and he failed to take corrective action." (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 61).
On July 27, 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this court alleging seven counts against the Defendants:
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the Complaint against the legal standard set forth in Rule 8: "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
When evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must take "the factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). However, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). "[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the `grounds' of his `entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 663 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). "[F]acial plausibility" exists "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The standard also "calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence" of the claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. While the complaint need not set out "detailed factual allegations," it must provide sufficient factual amplification "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555.
"So, when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, `this basic deficiency should . . . be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.'" Twombly, 550 U.S. 558 (quoting 5 Wight & Miller § 1216, at 233-34 (quoting in turn Daves v. Hawaiian Dredging Co., 114 F.Supp. 643, 645 (D. Haw. 1953)) (alteration original). "[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
The County argues that it cannot be held vicariously liable for the tortious acts of Alabama sheriffs. "Alabama counties are not liable under a theory of respondeat superior for a sheriff's official acts that are tortious." McMillian v. Monroe Cty., Ala., 520 U.S. 781, 789 (1997); Ex parte Sumter County, 953 So.2d 1235, 1238-39 (Ala. 2006) ("Furthermore, counties cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions or omissions of the sheriff or his deputies in operating a county jail. See King v. Colbert County, 620 So.2d 623, 625 (Ala. 1993), and Parker v. Amerson, 519 So.2d 442 (Ala.1987)."). The Plaintiff argues in response that "[t]he Counts against Dale County are for deliberate indifference to medical care. It is simply alleged that by failing to provide medical resources via staffing and services that [Palintiff] suffered once he sustained the injuries from the python incident." (Doc. 26 at 4). However, "any liability of a county resulting from an incident at a county jail must be based on a failure of county officials to provide an adequate facility." Ex parte Sumter County, 953 So. 2d at 1239. Plaintiff's Complaint makes no factual allegation regarding the adequacy of the jail facility nor does he allege that any official policy or custom of the County caused his injuries. "[Plaintiff] has not shown that a county policy or custom was the `moving force' that caused the alleged constitutional violations in this case as [he] must to establish the county's § 1983 liability. See Young v. City of Augusta, Ga., 59 F.3d 1160, 1171 (11th Cir. 1995)." McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1259 (11th Cir. 1999).
Count Two of Plaintiff's Complaint seeks relief directly against Mittelbach, Glenn, and the County based on the holding in Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. `, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants maintained an "unwritten `custom' or `policy'" allowing deputy sheriff's to torture inmates. However, Plaintiff's claim for "Monell Liability" is inapposite to the nature of Alabama's county jails:
Turquitt v. Jefferson Cty., Ala., 137 F.3d 1285, 1291 (11th Cir. 1998). See also Tittle v. Jefferson Cty. Comm'n, 10 F.3d 1535, 1540 (11th Cir. 1994) ("Counties may be liable for violations of constitutional rights only when such violations occur as a result of an official county policy."). The County had no authority to dictate how the jail was run, and neither the County, Glenn, or Mittelbach created an "official policy" that resulted in Plaintiff's alleged injuries.
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's claims under Monell liability are due to be granted on the merits in the Defendants' favor.
Olson and Nelson argue that "the Complaint is absent any averment that Sheriff Olson or Administrator Nelson personally participated or even knew of the Plaintiff's presence in the jail. Thus, because Sheriff Olson and Administrator Nelson were not personally involved in the events giving rise to this lawsuit, the claims against them must be based on supervisory liability." (Doc. 15 at 6). "In a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action—where masters do not answer for the torts of their servants—the term `supervisory liability' is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. Further, "[i]t is well established in [the Eleventh] Circuit that supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability." Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)." Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff fails to allege any personal participation by Olson or Nelson in the August 11, 2013, "snake incident."
As to Plaintiff's remaining constitutional claim alleging deliberate indifference to psychiatric medical treatment against Olson and Nelson, they argue that qualified immunity as government officials bars Plaintiff's claims brought against them in their individual capacities. (Doc. 15 at 9). Qualified immunity limits suit against state officials in their individual capacities. A plaintiff alleging a constitutional violation under § 1983 can only overcome qualified immunity if "(1) the defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) this right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation." Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004).
Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1504-06 (11th Cir. 1991) (footnotes omitted).
Kruse v. Williams, 592 F. App'x 848, 858 (11th Cir. 2014).
In the instant case, Plaintiff alleged deliberate indifference to his psychological and medical needs, but fails to provide sufficient factual allegations to support his claim. "Plaintiff concedes that the facts as currently pled may not be sufficient to properly support each and every claim currently made" and suggests that he "should be given the opportunity to engage in some discovery and remedy any shortcomings in the complaint by amending the pleadings which would be consistent with the heightened pleadings standard required by Twombly." (Doc. 27 at 2-3). Plaintiff was granted leave to amend his Complaint. (Doc. 44). However, the only additional factual allegation presented by Plaintiff in his Amended Complaint in support of his claim of deliberate indifference to his psychiatric care is that Plaintiff was "bribed or paid off" by some unnamed party to not disclose the incident "to anyone including medical staff . . ." (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 106) and that "Olson was complicit" in this alleged bribery. (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 40). Nevertheless, Plaintiff states that he is "arguing that Defendants Olson and Nelson be held liable for their supervisory roles in constitutional violations as well as negligent training, hiring and supervision that allowed these violations to occur and but for would have prevented the injuries from being sustained. Furthermore, the Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Olson is directly responsible for deliberate indifference to medical care as he makes all decisions as to how care is apportioned to the inmates." (Id.). Plaintiff acknowledges that he "saw a therapist at an outside facility" and received treatment, therapy, and medication, but fails to offer any factual allegations to support his conclusory claim that the care he was provided was not "proper." (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 38, 44). Plaintiff does not allege malpractice, systemic and gross deficiencies in the provision of care, a series of related incidents or deficiencies, or that his care was delayed or denied. Rather, Plaintiff acknowledges that he received treatment, therapy, and medication. His bare factual allegation is that he did not receive "proper" psychiatric treatment and that the Dale County jail failed to "insist[] that [Plaintiff] receieve[] more psychiatric care . . ." in an effort to save money. (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 45). Plaintiff's claim of deliberate indifference is conclusory and lacks sufficient factual allegations to support a plausible claim that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated by Olson or Nelson. See Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1989) ("[A] simple difference in medical opinion" does not constitute deliberate indifference.). Because Plaintiff fails to demonstrate a plausible claim of deliberate indifference, Olson and Nelson's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claim for deliberate indifference is due to be granted in their favor.
Olson and Nelson next argue that they are entitled to absolute immunity to Plaintiff's state law claims. Olson is the Dale County Sheriff.
"519 So. 2d at 443. None of those exceptions applies here." Hereford v. Jefferson Cty., 586 So.2d 209, 210 (Ala. 1991). As in Hereford, none of the exceptions apply in this case, and Olson is entitled to sovereign immunity from Plaintiff's state law claims.
Plaintiff's Complaint names Nelson in his capacity as a "jailer" employed by the Dale County Sheriff. (Doc. 36-1 at ¶ 9). In 2009, the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that jailers employed by a sheriff were not entitled to the same § 14 sovereign immunity afforded to deputy sheriffs. See Ex parte Shelley, 53 So.3d 887, 897 (Ala. 2009) ("The doctrine of State immunity under § 14 of the Alabama Constitution, insofar as it operates to provide absolute immunity to certain State actors with respect to suits against them in their individual capacity for money damages, is a doctrine that is applicable to constitutional officers. . . . [A] position as a jailer simply does not meet this requirement."). Following that ruling, the Alabama legislature amended § 14-6-1, Ala. Code 1975, to provide as follows:
In this case, Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that Nelson was acting as a jailer under Olson's supervision and was also acting in the line and scope of his employment at all times relevant to Plaintiff's claims. Based upon a straightforward application of § 14-6-1, Nelson is absolutely immune from Plaintiff's state law claims.
For the foregoing reasons, Olson and Nelson's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's state law claims against them is due to be granted in their favor.
Accordingly, for the reasons as stated, it is the
It is
Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the Magistrate Judge's report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982).
