MURDOCK, Justice.
Michael Shelley petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Montgomery Circuit Court to vacate its order denying Shelley's motion to dismiss the negligence and wantonness claims filed against him by Michelle Irvin on behalf of Terry Irvin, who is deceased. Shelley also
For purposes of these petitions, the parties agree that the facts are not in dispute. At the time of the incident in question, Michael Shelley was a jailer at the Houston County jail, which is operated by the Houston County Sheriff's Office. Terry Irvin was a prisoner in the custody of the Houston County Sheriff's Office. On July 22, 2008, Shelley—acting in the line and scope of his duties as a jailer—was transporting Irvin from the Kilby Correctional Facility to the Houston County jail. Rice was driving west on Alabama Highway 110/Vaughn Road in Montgomery County when he reached the intersection of Highway 110 and Pike Road. Shelley was driving south on Pike Road when he reached the intersection. Both Michelle Irvin and Rice allege that Shelley ran a red light at the intersection of Pike Road and Highway 110 and, as a result, Shelley's vehicle collided with Rice's vehicle. The accident killed Terry Irvin, and Rice suffered injuries that required surgery.
On October 8, 2008, Michelle Irvin, as administrator of the estate of Terry Irvin, filed an action against Shelley and the Houston County Commission in the Montgomery Circuit Court, alleging negligence and wantonness ("the Irvin action"). Irvin sued Shelley in Shelley's individual capacity, seeking an award of money damages. The Houston County Commission filed a motion to dismiss based in part on Irvin's failure to file a notice of claim with Houston County. Shelley filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, a motion for a summary judgment based on the doctrine of State immunity under Art. I, § 14, Ala. Const.1901.
The trial court dismissed the Houston County Commission as a defendant on the ground that Irvin failed to first file a notice of claim with Houston County as required by §§ 6-5-20 and 11-12-8, Ala. Code 1975. The trial court denied Shelley's motion, however, stating, in pertinent part:
On November 24, 2008, Rice filed an action in the Montgomery Circuit Court alleging negligence and wantonness against Shelley and Houston County ("the Rice action"). As in the Irvin action, Rice sued Shelley in Shelley's individual capacity, seeking an award of money damages.
On December 23, 2008, Shelley filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, a motion for a summary judgment in the Rice action based on the doctrine of State immunity under Art. I, § 14, Ala. Const.
On February 12, 2009, the trial court denied Shelley's motion to stay discovery without explaining its reasons for doing so. Shelley filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate that order on February 27, 2009, arguing that allowing discovery to proceed effectively abrogated his immunity defense. The trial court likewise denied that motion without elaboration.
Shelley has petitioned this Court for writs of mandamus in both the Irvin action and the Rice action, requesting that this Court order the trial courts in those respective actions to vacate their orders denying his motions to dismiss and to grant those motions based on his assertion that he is entitled to State immunity under Art. I, § 14, Ala. Const.1901.
Ex parte Hale, 6 So.3d 452, 456 (Ala.2008).
Article I, § 14, Const. of Ala.1901, states that "the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity." This constitutional provision "has been described as a `nearly impregnable' and `almost invincible' `wall' that provides the State an unwaivable, absolute immunity from suit in any court." Ex parte Town of Lowndesboro, 950 So.2d 1203, 1206 (Ala. 2006) (quoting Alabama Agric. & Mech. Univ. v. Jones, 895 So.2d 867, 872 (Ala. 2004); Patterson v. Gladwin Corp., 835 So.2d 137, 142 (Ala.2002); and Alabama
Article V, § 112, Ala. Const.1901, provides in part that "[t]he executive department" of the State of Alabama "shall consist of a governor ... and a sheriff for each county." Based on §§ 14 and 112 of the Alabama Constitution, this Court concluded in Parker v. Amerson, 519 So.2d 442, 442-43 (Ala.1987), that, aside from certain recognized exceptions not applicable here,
Alexander v. Hatfield, 652 So.2d 1142, 1144 (Ala.1994).
Shelley contends that because he was acting in the line and scope of his employment with the Houston County Sheriff's Office when the accident occurred, he is entitled to "State immunity" under Art. I, § 14. Among other things, he cites Ex parte Sumter County, 953 So.2d 1235, 1239 (Ala.2006),
With respect to Shelley's reliance on Sumter County, we first note that the case of Mosely v. Kennedy, 245 Ala. 448, 17 So.2d 536 (1944), cited in Sumter County
Moreover, in Sumter County itself, the issue of the liability of a jailer was not presented. The import of that portion of the analysis in which the Court quoted the above-quoted statement was to reject the plaintiff's argument that the County was vicariously liable for the acts of its deputy sheriffs; it was only to that end, and not for the purpose of addressing a deputy sheriff's (much less a jailer's) amenability to suit in his individual capacity, that the opinion points out what the Court essentially considered a concession by the plaintiff in that case.
In that portion of the Sumter County opinion that actually addresses the immunity of the sheriff and his deputies, the Court makes no mention of jailers:
953 So.2d at 1239. We therefore do not find Sumter County to provide support for Shelley's position.
We also note that Shelley does not seek any protection from suit under the doctrine of "State-agent immunity" recognized in the plurality opinion in Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392 (Ala.2000),
953 So.2d at 1239-40.
The fact remains, however, that Shelley is neither a sheriff nor a deputy sheriff.
Lancaster arose out of the death of Harold Michael Lancaster while he was in custody at the Monroe County jail. Lancaster had been arrested and jailed for driving under the influence of alcohol. Lancaster's family repeatedly warned a jailer at the Monroe County jail in Monroeville where Lancaster was being kept that Lancaster was going through alcohol withdrawal and that if he did not receive treatment when the alcohol in his system wore off, he would have life-threatening seizures. Despite these warnings, and despite promises from the jailer that he would monitor Lancaster closely, the jailers at the Monroe County jail rarely checked on Lancaster. Lancaster indeed had a seizure and suffered a fatal head injury as a result.
Cynthia Lancaster, as administratrix of Lancaster's estate, sued several defendants, including Monroe County Sheriff Thomas Tate and the jailers who were on duty during Lancaster's stay in the Monroe County jail. She alleged that those defendants were liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating Lancaster's rights under the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments and that they were liable under Alabama tort law for causing Lancaster's wrongful death.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama concluded that both Sheriff Tate and the jailers were entitled to immunity in their official and individual capacities. On appeal, Cynthia Lancaster did not dispute that Sheriff Tate was a State official and that he was therefore entitled to immunity in his official capacity. She argued, however, that the jailers were not entitled to immunity in either their official or individual capacities.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit first observed that
Lancaster, 116 F.3d at 1429 (citations omitted). Thus, the court of appeals reasoned, if the jailers were State officials, they were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in their official capacities.
The Lancaster court noted that
116 F.3d at 1429. Applying the factors from Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521 (11th Cir.1990), the Lancaster court
116 F.3d at 1429-30.
Regarding immunity from Lancaster's state-law claims in the jailers' individual capacities, the Lancaster court stated:
116 F.3d at 1431. It is this ruling from Lancaster that Shelley urges this Court to adopt.
As the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit noted in Lancaster, this Court had not considered whether a county jailer, like a sheriff and his deputies, is
Shelley's argument for extending State immunity to cover a jailer employed by a sheriff hinges on this Court's determination in Hereford v. Jefferson County, 586 So.2d 209 (Ala.1991), that deputy sheriffs are immune from suit to the same extent as are sheriffs. Shelley contends that, like a deputy sheriff, he carries out some of the duties of the sheriff on behalf of the sheriff; he reasons that, therefore, when he is acting in the line and scope of his employment, he should be clothed with the immunity sheriffs possess as executive officers of the State.
Shelley's argument, based on the duties he performs for the sheriff's office, misunderstands, however, the nature of § 14 immunity. A sheriff is entitled to State immunity because of his status as a constitutional officer as detailed in Art. V, § 112, Ala. Const. 1901. Suits against such officers for actions taken in the line and scope of their employment inherently constitute actions against the State, and such actions are prohibited by § 14. See Haralson, 853 So.2d at 932 (reiterating that "[a] sheriff is an executive officer of this State pursuant to the Alabama Constitution of 1901, Art. V, § 112 [and a]s an executive officer, a sheriff is immune from being sued in the execution of the duties of his office under Art. I, § 14, Alabama Const. 1901").
Shelley contends that no rational distinction exists between the extension of immunity to deputy sheriffs in cases such as Ex parte Blankenship, 893 So.2d 303 (Ala. 2004), and Ex parte Davis, 9 So.3d 480 (Ala.2008), and his claim to immunity in this case. In Blankenship, this Court deemed a deputy sheriff to be immune from a suit resulting from his involvement in an automobile accident because the allegations in the complaint stated that the deputy was acting in the line and scope of his employment when he caused the collision. In Davis, this Court deemed two deputy sheriffs to be immune from suit in an action arising out of their alleged failure to care for an inmate at the Jefferson County jail who they had been informed had Graves disease and needed medical attention. The inmate died from complications from Graves disease shortly after being released from the jail.
Shelley contends that Blankenship and Davis involve situations where deputies were carrying out duties of the sheriff in a vehicle or as jailers, both of which Shelley says he was doing in the present case. Shelley argues that the Court applied
This Court has stated on several occasions, however, that "deputy sheriffs are immune to the same extent sheriffs are immune because `"[t]he deputy sheriff is the alter ego of the sheriff."'" Haralson, 853 So.2d at 932 (quoting Hereford, 586 So.2d at 210, quoting in turn Mosely v. Kennedy, 245 Ala. at 450, 17 So.2d at 537). An alter ego is, by definition, a second self; the deputy is "`legally an extension of the sheriff.'" Wright, 611 So.2d at 303 (quoting Carr, 916 F.2d at 1526 (emphasis added)).
In Mosely, this Court cited Rogers v. Carroll, 111 Ala. 610, 20 So. 602 (1896), for the proposition that a deputy sheriff is the alter ego of the sheriff. Rogers explained the nature of the relationship between a sheriff and the sheriff's deputy, as opposed to others employed by a sheriff to carry out particular tasks:
Rogers, 111 Ala. at 613, 20 So. at 602 (emphasis omitted). Thus, because "[i]n legal contemplation, [a deputy] and the sheriff [are] one officer, so far as third persons are concerned," it is logical that a deputy shares in the immunity afforded to sheriffs. Id. (emphasis added). Compare Wheeler v. George, 39 So.3d 1061, 1093 (Ala.2009) (acknowledging the "long-standing precedent treating the deputy as an alter ego of the sheriff," but declining to embrace a more general notion that State officials serving in the executive branch are "deputy governors" for purposes of State immunity as to suits against them in their individual capacities for money damages).
In contrast, a jailer working for a sheriff's office cannot properly be viewed "in legal contemplation" as "an extension of the sheriff" or as "one officer" with the sheriff. The Lancaster court itself acknowledged that "jailers may not function as an `extension' of the sheriff to the same degree that deputies do, because a jailer cannot undertake every act that the sheriff could perform." Lancaster, 116 F.3d at 1429. Moreover, as the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit explained in Terry v. Cook, 866 F.2d 373, 378 (11th Cir.1989), the positions appointed by a sheriff of clerk, investigator, dispatcher, jailer, and process server "traditionally revolve around limited objectives and defined duties and do not require those holding them to function as the alter ego of the sheriff or ensure that the policies and goals of the office are implemented." Accordingly, we do not consider a jailer in
The doctrine of State immunity under § 14 of the Alabama Constitution, insofar as it operates to provide absolute immunity to certain State actors with respect to suits against them in their individual capacity for money damages, is a doctrine that is applicable to constitutional officers. Distinguishing between the immunity afforded in this regard by the doctrine of State immunity and that afforded by the doctrine of State-agent immunity, this Court has observed:
Ex parte Davis, 930 So.2d 497, 500-01 (Ala.2005) (emphasis added). Shelley's position as a jailer simply does not meet this requirement.
None of this Court's cases have extended the State immunity afforded a sheriff to any sheriff's employees other than deputy sheriffs. We decline to extend State immunity beyond that limit in this case. Accordingly, we deny Shelley's petitions for the writs of mandamus in both the Irvin action and the Rice action seeking to direct the respective trial courts to set aside their orders denying his motions to dismiss the claims brought against him by Irvin and Rice.
1080588—PETITION DENIED.
1080863—PETITION DENIED.
COBB, C.J., and LYONS, STUART, and BOLIN, JJ., concur.
Parker, 519 So.2d at 443. Our decisions have recognized another category of actions against State officials in which the official is not shielded from immunity, i.e., "`valid inverse condemnation actions brought against State officials in their representative capacity.'" Alabama Dep't of Transp. v. Harbert Int'l, Inc., 990 So.2d 831, 840 (Ala.2008) (other citations omitted). It does not appear that this Court has ever had occasion to consider whether this latter category would, in an appropriate circumstance, apply to a sheriff.
