MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

KATHERINE P. NELSON, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Shawanda Whitfield, on behalf of JDT, a minor, brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Defendant Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner") denying JDT's application for supplemental security income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq.2 Upon consideration of the parties' briefs (Docs. 13, 15) and those portions of the administrative record (Doc. 12) (hereinafter cited as "(R. [page number(s) in lower-right corner of transcript])") relevant to the issues raised, and with the benefit of oral argument, the Court finds that the Commissioner's final decision is due to be AFFIRMED.3

I. Procedural Background

The subject application for SSI was filed on JDT's behalf with the Social Security Administration ("SSA") on January 13, 2016. After it was initially denied, JDT requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") with the SSA's Office of Disability Adjudication and Review. A hearing was held on October 18, 2017. On January 31, 2018, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on JDT's application, finding JDT not disabled under the Social Security Act and thus not entitled to benefits. (See R. 14-31).

The Commissioner's decision on JDT's application became final when the Appeals Council denied JDT's request for review of the ALJ's unfavorable decision on August 18, 2018. (R. 1-5). Whitfield, on JDT's behalf, subsequently brought this action under § 1383(c)(3) for judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) ("The final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security after a hearing [for SSI benefits] shall be subject to judicial review as provided in section 405(g) of this title to the same extent as the Commissioner's final determinations under section 405 of this title."); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ("Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow."); Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2007) ("The settled law of this Circuit is that a court may review, under sentence four of section 405(g), a denial of review by the Appeals Council.").

II. Standards of Review

"In Social Security appeals, [the Court] must determine whether the Commissioner's decision is `"supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion."'" Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997))). In reviewing the Commissioner's factual findings, the Court "`may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the [Commissioner].'" Id. (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983))). "`Even if the evidence preponderates against the [Commissioner]'s factual findings, [the Court] must affirm if the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.'" Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).

Put another way, "[u]nder the substantial evidence standard, we cannot look at the evidence presented to [an administrative agency] to determine if interpretations of the evidence other than that made by the [agency] are possible. Rather, we review the evidence that was presented to determine if the findings made by the [agency] were unreasonable. To that end, [judicial] inquiry is highly deferential and we consider only whether there is substantial evidence for the findings made by the [agency], not whether there is substantial evidence for some other finding that could have been, but was not, made. That is, even if the evidence could support multiple conclusions, we must affirm the agency's decision unless there is no reasonable basis for that decision." Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022, 1029 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (citations and quotation omitted).4

"Yet, within this narrowly circumscribed role, [courts] do not act as automatons. [The Court] must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence[.]" Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239 (citations and quotation omitted). See also Owens v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) ("We are neither to conduct a de novo proceeding, nor to rubber stamp the administrative decisions that come before us. Rather, our function is to ensure that the decision was based on a reasonable and consistently applied standard, and was carefully considered in light of all the relevant facts."). "In determining whether substantial evidence exists, [a court] must...tak[e] into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the [Commissioner's] decision." Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). See also McCruter v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 1544, 1548 (11th Cir. 1986) ("We are constrained to conclude that the administrative agency here...reached the result that it did by focusing upon one aspect of the evidence and ignoring other parts of the record. In such circumstances we cannot properly find that the administrative decision is supported by substantial evidence. It is not enough to discover a piece of evidence which supports that decision, but to disregard other contrary evidence. The review must take into account and evaluate the record as a whole.").5

Moreover, the "substantial evidence" "standard of review applies only to findings of fact. No similar presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner]'s conclusions of law, including determination of the proper standards to be applied in reviewing claims." MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1986) (quotation omitted). Accord, e.g., Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982) ("Our standard of review for appeals from the administrative denials of Social Security benefits dictates that `(t)he findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive ....' 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g) ... As is plain from the statutory language, this deferential standard of review is applicable only to findings of fact made by the Secretary, and it is well established that no similar presumption of validity attaches to the Secretary's conclusions of law, including determination of the proper standards to be applied in reviewing claims." (some quotation marks omitted)). This Court "conduct[s] `an exacting examination' of these factors." Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (quoting Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)). "`The [Commissioner]'s failure to apply the correct law or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted mandates reversal.'" Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991)). Accord Keeton v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994).

In sum, courts "review the Commissioner's factual findings with deference and the Commissioner's legal conclusions with close scrutiny." Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). See also Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) ("In Social Security appeals, we review de novo the legal principles upon which the Commissioner's decision is based. Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). However, we review the resulting decision only to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence. Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158-59 (11th Cir. 2004).").

"Eligibility for...SSI requires that the claimant be disabled. 42 U.S.C. §...1382(a)(1)-(2)." Thornton v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 597 F. App'x 604, 609 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished).6 "An individual under the age of 18 shall be considered disabled ... if that individual has a medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which results in marked and severe functional limitations, and which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(C)(i). "Notwithstanding [§ 1382c(C)](i), no individual under the age of 18 who engages in substantial gainful activity ... may be considered to be disabled." Id. § 1382c(C)(ii).

Parks ex rel. D.P. v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 783 F.3d 847, 850-51 (11th Cir. 2015).7 "The burden lies with the claimant to prove that he meets or equals a Listing." Gray ex rel. Whymss v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 454 F. App'x 748, 750 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citing Barron v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 227, 229 (11th Cir. 1991)). However, "the Commissioner of Social Security has an obligation to develop a full and fair record." Shnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1987). See also Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) ("It is well-established that the ALJ has a basic duty to develop a full and fair record. Nevertheless, the claimant bears the burden of proving that he is disabled, and, consequently, he is responsible for producing evidence in support of his claim." (citations omitted)). "This is an onerous task, as the ALJ must scrupulously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all relevant facts. In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ must consider the evidence as a whole." Henry v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (citation and quotation omitted).

When the ALJ denies benefits and the Appeals Council denies review of that decision, the Court "review[s] the ALJ's decision as the Commissioner's final decision." Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278. But "when a claimant properly presents new evidence to the Appeals Council, a reviewing court must consider whether that new evidence renders the denial of benefits erroneous." Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1262. Nevertheless, "when the [Appeals Council] has denied review, [the Court] will look only to the evidence actually presented to the ALJ in determining whether the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence." Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir. 1998).

III. Summary of the ALJ's Decision

At Step One, the ALJ determined that JDT was an adolescent and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the application date, January 13, 2016. (R. 20).8 At Step Two, the ALJ determined that JDT had the following severe impairments: unspecified disruptive, impulse-control, and conduct disorder. (R. 20). At Step Three, the ALJ found that JDT did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met, medically equaled, or functionally equaled the severity of a specified impairment in Appendix 1 of the Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. (R. 20-31). In determining that JDT did not functionally equal a Listing, the ALJ found that JDT had no limitations in the domains of moving about and manipulating objects, and of health and physical well-being, and "less than marked limitations" in the remaining 4 domains (see R. 20-31)-thus failing to satisfy the requirement that a child applicant demonstrate either an "extreme" limitation in one of the domains or "marked" limitations in two. Accordingly, the ALJ found that JDT was not under a disability as defined by the Social Security Act during the relevant adjudicatory period. (R. 31).

IV. Analysis

A. Teacher Questionnaire

Whitfield first argues that the ALJ reversibly erred in failing to state what weight, if any, was given to a questionnaire completed by Raila Langham, one of JDT's teachers. More specifically, she argues that the "ALJ failed to explain (1) why Ms. Langham's opinion did not support a finding that Plaintiff has a marked impairment in attending and completing tasks or (2) why she gave little weight to this opinion." (Doc. 13, PageID.300).

Only evidence from an "acceptable medical source," as that term is defined in 20 CFR § 416.902, can establish that a child has a medically determinable impairment. Social Security Ruling (SSR) 09-2p, 2009 WL 396032, at *3 & n.12 (Feb. 18, 2009).9 However, "[e]vidence from other sources who are not medical sources and who know and have contact with the child"—including "educational personnel" such as "teachers"—"can also be very important to ... understanding ... the severity of a child's impairment(s) and how it affects day-to-day functioning ... Therefore, [the Commissioner] will consider evidence from such non-medical sources when ... determin[ing] the severity of the child's impairment(s) and how the child typically functions compared to children of the same age who do not have impairments." Id. at *4. See also 20 C.F.R. § 416.924a(a)(2). Nevertheless, "opinions from individuals who are not acceptable medical sources are not entitled to deference or special consideration." Everett v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 777 F. App'x 422, 425 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.902(j), 416.913(a)(4), 416.927(f)).

The ALJ stated at the end of her decision that, in general, she had given "some weight to the observations of [JDT]'s teachers[,]" but gave more weight to the opinion of state agency reviewing physician Dr. Harold Veits because "his assessment is more consistent with the longitudinal record as a whole." (R. 31). This is reflected in the ALJ's evaluation of the domain of attending and completing tasks. There, the ALJ specifically discussed Langham's opinion that JDT "had a number of serious problems in this domain" and "that this behavior was a major factor in his problems with completing tasks" (see R. 25),10 but then cited to other record evidence supporting a milder limitation, including Dr. Veit's opinion that JDT had "less than marked limitation in this domain," testimony that JDT enjoyed playing video games and performed chores at home, and medical examinations noting JDT's "alertness, intact attention, intact concentration, and unimpaired concentration..." (R. 25). Ultimately, the ALJ found that JDT had "less than marked limitation" in this domain, thus indicating that she did not give Langham's questionnaire controlling or significant weight on this issue because it was inconsistent with other evidence. Cf. Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 280 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (an "ALJ may reject any medical opinion if the evidence supports a contrary finding"). Because the ALJ's decision adequately demonstrates that she gave due consideration to Langham's questionnaire in addressing the domain of attending and completing tasks, Whitfield's first claim of error is without merit.11

B. Alternative School Setting

Whitfield's second, and final, claim of error is that the ALJ failed to consider evidence indicating that JDT was functioning in an alternative school setting. The undersigned is not persuaded of any error in this regard.

The Commissioner has recognized:

SSR 09-1p, 2009 WL 396031, at *6-7. Because "details about the child's performance in school and other settings (for example, how well the child is performing) are important components of [the Commissioner's] analysis[,]" the Commissioner "will consider the kinds and levels of the support the child receives" in an education setting-i.e., whether the child is in "regular classrooms," "alternative schools," or some other level of "alternative placement." SSR 09-2p, 2009 WL 396032, at *9-10.

JDT's mother testified at the ALJ hearing that JDT was attending Pointe Academy, an alternative school, at the time because JDT had been ""kicked ... out" of Blount High School. (R. 49). However, JDT's mother also testified that JDT (1) had been expelled for fighting rather than academic performance (R. 49), (2) was not receiving "any kind of special services through" Pointe (R. 42), (3) had not been receiving any "alternate programs or alternate school schedules" (R. 50) at Blount, and (4) was not on an individualized education program (IEP) (R. 44). The mother also testified that JDT's placement at Pointe was anticipated to be temporary, with JDT being permitted to return to the previous high school in January 2018 so long as JDT was "not getting into no trouble or anything like that..." (R. 49). Whitfield has cited no record evidence indicating that Pointe was providing JDT was receiving kinds or levels of educational services or support different from those he was receiving at his other schools. Accordingly, Whitfield has failed to show that JDT's placement at an alternative school was a material consideration under SSR 09-2p.

Whitfield has not shown any reversible error in the ALJ's decision; therefore, the Commissioner's final decision denying JDT's application for SSI is due to be AFFIRMED.

V. Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, it is ORDERED that the Commissioner's final decision denying JDT's January 13, 2016 application for SSI is AFFIRMED under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Final judgment shall issue separately in accordance with this order and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.

DONE and ORDERED.