OPINION

MAASSEN, Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

A former airline employee sued his former employer for wrongful termination without first attempting to arbitrate his claims under the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement subject to the federal Railway Labor Act. The superior court dismissed the employee's complaint for failure to exhaust his contractual remedies. It also denied him leave to amend his complaint a second time — to add a claim against his union for breaching its duty of fair representation — on the ground that the six-month limitations period for such claims had expired. We hold that the employee's right to bring his claims in state court was not clearly and unmistakably waived under the collective bargaining agreement and he therefore should have been allowed to pursue them. We agree with the superior court, however, that the employee's claim that the union breached its duty of fair representation was time-barred. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the superior court.

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

In June 2011 Alaska Airlines charged that Pierre Bernard, one of its baggage handlers, had taken part in drafting and sending a threatening text message to a co-worker and had then deleted a recorded conversation relevant to the ensuing investigation. The company terminated Bernard's employment.

The employment's terms and conditions were governed by a collective bargaining agreement (sometimes abbreviated "CBA") negotiated by Bernard's union, the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, pursuant to the federal Railway Labor Act (RLA).1 The collective bargaining agreement provided a three-stage process for grieving termination decisions. The first two stages consisted of an "initial hearing" and a "secondary hearing," each presided over by a representative of Alaska Airlines, with a union representative in attendance to represent the employee. The result of a secondary hearing could be appealed to the System Board of Adjustment, a three-member arbitration panel consisting of "a Company member, a Union member[,] and a neutral referee."2

Bernard initiated the grievance process through his union, and over the next two months Alaska Airlines held two hearings, each time in the presence of a union representative. The presiding company officers issued written decisions after both hearings upholding Bernard's termination — though the second decision, in August, offered him "the opportunity to resign in lieu of termination," an offer he did not accept.

A few weeks after the August decision a union representative wrote to Bernard informing him that "[i]f the Union brings your case to an arbitration, there is paperwork you must fill out," and advising him that he "may acquire a lawyer at any time." The union's written notice to Bernard that it had decided not to appeal is dated November 14, 2011, nearly two months after the 30-day appeal deadline had expired. The union informed Bernard that it had thoroughly reviewed his case, concluded that "we could not sustain our position before the System Board of Adjustment," and closed its file.

In August 2013, two years after the unappealed decision of the secondary hearing, Bernard filed a complaint against Alaska Airlines in the superior court. He alleged a background to his termination: that in 2009 he had filed a sexual harassment complaint against a supervisor and was ostracized as a result; that he was later unfairly disciplined after a co-worker imposed upon him with inappropriate personal demands; and that the allegedly threatening text message for which he was discharged in 2011 had actually been "sent in jest" in response to "a hostile and threatening text from another employee." He alleged that his termination was in retaliation for his reports of sexual harassment and therefore violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Alaska Airlines filed a motion to dismiss under Alaska Civil Rule 12(b)(1),3 arguing that (1) the RLA preempted Bernard's claim; and (2) even if not preempted, his claim was precluded because he had failed to exhaust available remedies under the collective bargaining agreement.

Bernard opposed the motion and filed an amended complaint, adding allegations that Alaska Airlines had violated a state employment discrimination statute4 and public policy. Alaska Airlines renewed its motion to dismiss on the exhaustion-of-remedies theory, arguing that because the collective bargaining agreement incorporated the company's anti-discrimination policies, Bernard was required to seek relief through contractual remedies even for statutory claims, which he had not done.

Bernard moved for leave to file a second amended complaint, this time to add a claim that the union had breached its duty of fair representation by failing to notify him of its decision not to pursue arbitration with the System Board of Adjustment until after the appeal deadline. The superior court denied Bernard leave to add this claim, concluding that it was barred by the six-month statute of limitations for "hybrid claims."5

The superior court also dismissed Bernard's state law claims under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It first decided that his state law claims were "not pre-empted to the extent that they plead an independent state law claim for retaliatory discharge" but were preempted "[t]o the extent they rest on contractual rights that Mr. Bernard enjoyed under the CBA." The court went on to conclude that to the extent not preempted, Bernard's state law claims were nonetheless subject to the mandatory arbitration provisions of the collective bargaining agreement because he had clearly and unmistakably waived his right to pursue judicial remedies instead. The court held that he had "a personal right to submit his claim to the National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB)" but had not done so, and that his alleged ignorance of this avenue was not an excuse.

Bernard appeals.

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

The superior court dismissed Bernard's action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). "We review de novo a superior court's decision to dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction."6 "In exercising our independent judgment, we will adopt the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy."7

This appeal also requires us to interpret a collective bargaining agreement. "Contract interpretation presents a question of law that we review de novo."8 "When interpreting contracts, the goal is to `give effect to the reasonable expectations of the parties.'"9 "In determining the intent of the parties the court looks to the written contract as well as extrinsic evidence regarding the parties' intent at the time the contract was made."10 "Where there is conflicting extrinsic evidence the court, rather than the jury, must nonetheless decide the question of meaning except where the written language, read in context, is reasonably susceptible to both asserted meanings."11

Finally, this appeal requires us to interpret the RLA. "We decide questions of law, including statutory interpretation, using our independent judgment. We will adopt the most persuasive rule of law in light of precedent, reason, and policy."12 "This requires us, when interpreting statutes, to `look to the meaning of the language, the legislative history, and the purpose of the statute.'"13

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Bernard's Claims Were Not Subject To Arbitration.

The superior court ruled that Bernard's claims were preempted to the extent they relied on the contract and not preempted to the extent they existed independent of the contract. Because it went on to hold that Bernard was required to exhaust his contractual remedies as to both kinds of claims, it did not need to differentiate further between the preempted claims and the non-preempted claims. But because we hold that Bernard was not required to exhaust his contractual remedies, we must begin by deciding whether any of his claims were preempted.

1. The RLA did not preempt Bernard's state law claims.

The RLA provides a "mandatory arbitral mechanism for `the prompt and orderly settlement' of two classes of disputes."14 The first class, deemed "major" disputes, relates to "the formation of collective agreements or efforts to secure them."15 The second class, deemed "minor" disputes, includes "controversies over the meaning of an existing collective bargaining agreement in a particular fact situation."16 Alaska Airlines contends that the conflict over Bernard's firing is a minor dispute that may be resolved only through the mechanisms provided by the RLA, including the collective bargaining agreement's internal grievance process culminating in arbitration before a System Board of Adjustment. We agree with the superior court, however, that "the underlying conduct for [Bernard's] claims [was] that Alaska [Airlines] allegedly retaliated against Mr. Bernard for reporting sexual harassment," and that these claims were not preempted to the extent they pleaded an independent state law claim for retaliatory discharge.

As a general rule, "the RLA's mechanism for resolving minor disputes does not pre-empt causes of action to enforce rights that are independent of the CBA."17 In the wrongful termination context, a state law claim may be "pre-empted, not because the RLA broadly pre-empts state-law claims based on discharge or discipline, but because the employee's claim was firmly rooted in a breach of the CBA itself."18 But when the collective bargaining agreement is not the "only source" of the right against wrongful termination — for example, when an employer has a state law obligation not to fire an employee for retaliatory reasons or in violation of public policy — the state law cause of action is not preempted.19

Alaska Airlines argues that "garden variety state-law claims for wrongful termination are absolutely preempted under the Railway Labor Act." Citing Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., it contends that federal law requires this conclusion and that subsequent cases have applied little more than "gloss" over an otherwise sweeping rule.20 But Andrews did not broadly limit independent state law claims for wrongful termination.21 In Andrews it was "conceded by all that the only source of [the employee's] right not to be discharged, and therefore to treat an alleged discharge as a `wrongful' one that entitles him to damages, is the collective-bargaining agreement between the employer and the union."22

We discussed this issue in Norcon, Inc. v. Kotowski, in which we observed that the federal Labor Management Relations Act23 does not preempt state law claims when they are "neither founded on rights created by a CBA nor dependent on the analysis or interpretation of the CBA."24 Norcon involved the Labor Management Relations Act rather than the RLA, but the United States Supreme Court applies that same preemption analysis to both, so we do the same.25 We concluded in Norcon that "[s]tates are free to create and enforce causes of action that vest rights in workers, so long as these rights can be adjudicated without having to interpret collective bargaining agreements."26 We specifically addressed an employee's claim that her termination was due to sexual discrimination in the workplace in violation of AS 18.80.220, concluding that the claim was not preempted because "[t]he question of whether [the employee's] transfer and termination violated AS 18.80.220 `was a question of state law, entirely independent of any understanding embodied in the collective-bargaining agreement.'"27 We held that "[t]he right to a non-discriminatory workplace conferred upon [the employee] by AS 18.80.220 could not be waived by any contrary contractual provision" and therefore "no need exists to consult the CBA to determine [the right's] meaning."28 We went on to conclude that our decision was "consistent with the Supreme Court's reasoning in Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris," in which "the Court observed that purely factual questions about an employer's conduct and motives do not require interpretation of the CBA to answer."29

In this case, Bernard's first amended complaint raised three state law claims: (1) wrongful termination in violation of AS 18.80.220; (2) wrongful termination in violation of public policy;30 and (3) wrongful termination in breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.31 Each claim, as the superior court noted, alleged the same underlying conduct: that Alaska Airlines retaliated against Bernard for having reported sexual harassment. The first two claims depend on state law and the employer's motives — not the terms of the collective bargaining agreement — and are therefore not preempted by the RLA. The third claim, for breach of the implied covenant, does depend in part on the parties' contractual relationship.32 But we held in Norcon that such claims are not preempted either, at least in the context of claims for retaliatory discharge. We held that "[n]othing in the CBA could have altered, circumscribed, or defined" the employee's right to report safety violations, drawn from state public policy, and "[b]ecause the contours of this right are not defined through the bargaining process, they can be traced out without any reference to the CBA."33

An employee's right to report sexual harassment without fear of retaliation by the employer is grounded in the same public policy we discussed in Norcon, made explicit in the same statute, AS 18.80.220.34 And state public policy provides the same remedy in the form of a claim for retaliatory discharge, a claim that depends largely on proof of the employer's actions and motivations rather than an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.35 Because the collective bargaining agreement is not the only source of the right against wrongful discharge at the base of Bernard's three claims, the RLA did not preempt them.36

2. The CBA did not clearly and unmistakably waive the right to sue in court.

An employee may have the right to pursue a claim in state court — because the claim is not preempted by the RLA — and still waive that right by agreeing to arbitrate such claims instead.37 Bernard argues that the collective bargaining agreement at issue here does not waive his right to pursue his state law claims in court, and we agree.

"We will not infer from a general contractual provision that the parties intended to waive a statutorily protected right unless the undertaking is `explicitly stated.' More succinctly, the waiver must be clear and unmistakable."38 In Hammond we adopted the two-pronged test used by the Second and Fourth Circuits, and later the United States Supreme Court, for finding a "clear and unmistakable" waiver: The contract "must either (1) contain an arbitration clause including `a provision whereby employees specifically agree to submit all federal causes of action arising out of their employment to arbitration' or (2) contain `an explicit incorporation of the statutory anti-discrimination requirements in addition to a broad and general arbitration clause.'"39

The collective bargaining agreement at issue here does not meet either prong of the Hammond test. First, it lacks "a provision whereby employees specifically agree to submit all ... causes of action arising out of their employment to arbitration." Grievances that may "result[] in the loss of pay (suspension and discharge)" are addressed, as described above, through a two-stage hearing process followed by an appeal to arbitration before the System Board of Adjustment. According to the collective bargaining agreement, "[t]he Board shall have jurisdiction over disputes between any employee or employees covered by this Agreement and the Company growing out of grievances or out of interpretation or application of any of the terms of this Agreement." Although "disputes ... growing out of grievances" is a very broad category, the agreement further explains the purpose of the Board as "adjusting and deciding disputes or grievances which may arise under the terms of this Agreement, and which are properly submitted to it after exhausting the procedure for settling disputes." (Emphasis added.) "Proper submission" is further defined: Describing the results of the secondary hearing, the agreement provides that "[i]n the event the issue(s) is not settled satisfactorily, the General Chair may appeal to arbitration within thirty (30) calendar days"; and defining the duties of the System Board of Adjustment, the agreement provides that "[t]he Board shall consider any dispute properly submitted to it by the General Chair of the Union or his/her designee, or by the Representative of the Company." (Emphasis added.) The agreement thus emphasizes repeatedly that, on the employee side, only appeals to arbitration taken by the union or its representatives are contemplated. There is nothing in the agreement's plain language that would lead an employee to believe that the Board was authorized to consider any appeals other than those that were "properly submitted to it" by the union, the company, or their authorized representatives.40

The contract's apparent foreclosure of a grievant's right to arbitrate if the union declines to do so on the grievant's behalf is inconsistent with the first prong of the Hammond test, which requires the employee's specific agreement to submit all claims to arbitration; it is also inconsistent with the second prong of the Hammond test, which requires "a broad and general arbitration clause."41 We emphasize that we are not deciding here whether Bernard, regardless of the language of his collective bargaining agreement, had an individual right to pursue arbitration that he failed to exercise, as Alaska Airlines urges and as the superior court held. We have not decided whether the RLA provides a personal right to demand arbitration when the union fails to do so, and federal courts are divided.42 But that issue is irrelevant to our resolution of Bernard's case, which turns on the language of his collective bargaining agreement and whether it shows a "clear and unmistakable" waiver of his right to pursue state law claims in state court.

The collective bargaining agreement at issue here also lacks the "explicit incorporation of the statutory anti-discrimination requirements" necessary to the second prong of the Hammond test.43 As noted above, the agreement included a general provision incorporating Alaska Airlines' other rules and policies, stating that employees "shall be governed by the Company's General Policy and Operating Manuals, and the System Regulation and Customer Service Manuals and by all other applicable rules, regulations and orders issued by properly designated authorities of the Company, which are not in conflict with the terms of this Agreement." Among these incorporated policies is the company's Code of Conduct and Ethics, which includes this anti-discrimination provision:

The provision goes on to say that the company "will not tolerate any form of discrimination or harassment that encourages or could create an offensive, hostile or intimidating work environment," and that "[a]cts of discrimination and harassment not only violate our Company values and policies, but may also violate federal, state, and local laws and are strictly prohibited." Other "System Regulations" set out general standards of expected conduct. None of the incorporated provisions to which Alaska Airlines directs us expressly cites Alaska law.

More importantly, the collective bargaining agreement expressly retains Alaska Airlines' right to modify the referenced policies and codes of conduct unilaterally "during the term of the Agreement." Even assuming that the agreement contains, by its reference to general policies and codes of conduct, "an explicit incorporation of the statutory anti-discrimination requirements" of Alaska law,44 we could not find a "clear and unmistakable" waiver of the employee's right to pursue state law claims in state court when the employer retains a unilateral right to modify or eliminate the language on which the waiver is based.

We hold that the collective bargaining agreement did not clearly and unmistakably waive Bernard's right to pursue his state law claims in state court. He therefore had that right and did not need to exhaust his contractual remedies before bringing suit. It was error to dismiss Bernard's claims as either preempted by federal law or barred by the exhaustion doctrine.45

B. Bernard's Hybrid Claim For Breach Of The Duty Of Fair Representation Was Time-Barred.

In his proposed second amended complaint Bernard included a hybrid claim for breach of the duty of fair representation, based on the union's alleged failure to notify him of its decision not to pursue arbitration until after the filing deadline. The superior court dismissed the hybrid claim as time-barred. It found that Bernard "had notice that the grievance process had terminated to his disadvantage" when he received the union's notice "that it would not appeal his case on November 14, 2011," and that his complaint in state court, filed August 16, 2013, "was well outside the six-month window for hybrid claims." We agree with the superior court's decision of this claim.

Employee claims for violation of the duty of fair representation are exceptions to the exclusive jurisdiction of the RLA.46 Like other courts, we recognize that in rare instances "the statutorily-created arbitration scheme is simply insufficient to accomplish the very ends it was designed to further."47 One such instance is "[w]here the employee's failure to personally resort to the Board [for arbitration of an employment dispute] arises solely out of reliance on the union's expertise and is a function of his or her own lack of the same."48 In that event, "failure to afford the employee a judicial remedy is tantamount to a denial of the right to be a party to a legally enforceable collective bargaining agreement."49 In wrongful discharge cases, in order to avoid the RLA's arbitration requirement, the employee must "demonstrate both that his discharge violated the collective bargaining agreement and that his union breached its duty of fair representation."50 This makes the claim a hybrid, even when the employee chooses to sue only the employer or only the union.51 Bernard sought to bring such a claim when he asked for leave to file his second amended complaint.

But federal law subjects all such claims to the six-month limitations period found in § 160(b) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),52 governing complaints of unfair labor practices. In DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters the United States Supreme Court applied the six-month limitations period to hybrid claims brought under the NLRA.53 We followed DelCostello when we applied the six-month limitations period to hybrid claims brought under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA).54 Most federal circuit courts have applied the six-month limitation to hybrid suits brought under the RLA,55 and we see no reason not to do the same. Bernard's claim was brought 21 months after the union declined to appeal his grievance to arbitration, and it is barred by the six-month limitations period.

V. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the superior court's order dismissing Bernard's hybrid claim for breach of the duty of fair representation. We REVERSE the order dismissing Bernard's other claims as either preempted or subject to the arbitration provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, and we REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.