SUSAN ILLSTON, District Judge.
Troy Smith, a prisoner at San Quentin State Prison, filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his 2006 conviction in San Francisco Superior Court. This matter is now before the Court for consideration of the merits of the petition. For the reasons discussed below, the petition is DENIED.
On October 20, 2006, petitioner was convicted of four counts of robbery in the second degree in violation of California Penal Code § 212.5(c), each with an excessive taking of funds allegation pursuant to Penal Code § 12022.6(a)(4); four counts of false imprisonment in violation of Penal Code § 236; two counts of burglary in the second degree in violation of Penal Code § 459; and one count of conspiracy in violation of section § 182(a)(1). Second Amended Petition at 3. All counts included an enhancement under Penal Code § 12022(a)(1) for possession of a firearm during the offenses. Id. Petitioner is currently serving a sentence of twenty-six years in the San Quentin State Prison; the warden of San Quentin State Prison is respondent Kevin Chappell. On April 12, 2011, petitioner filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner contends that he is entitled to the writ for two reasons: (1) violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); and (2) violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
The following factual background is taken from the order of the California Court of Appeal:
Petitioner appealed his conviction to the First Appellate District Court of Appeal and on September 29, 2009, the Court of Appeal affirmed the convictions and sentence. On January 13, 2010, the California Supreme Court denied petitioner's petition for review. The appeal and petition for review only addressed petitioner's claim that his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were denied because one of the elements of robbery was not met under the prosecution's theory (plaintiff's claim was raised pursuant to Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), which requires that every element of the offense of conviction be proven beyond a reasonable doubt).
On April 12, 2011, petitioner filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus; it raised only the "Jackson claim" regarding the allegedly lacking element of the robbery charge. Docket No. 1. On June 23, 2011, petitioner inquired whether the San Francisco Police Department had materials in its files relating to former San Francisco Police Department Inspector Daniel Gardner, the lead investigator and a prosecution witness in petitioner's case. Docket No. 32, Ex. C. On August 18, 2011, the San Francisco County District Attorney responded to petitioner's inquiry and stated that the San Francisco Police Department advised them that material in Gardner's personnel file may be subject to disclosure under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Id., Ex. D. The District Attorney filed a motion for discovery in the Superior Court for Gardner's personnel records on September 21, 2011. Docket No. 35, Ex. 1. The motion requested the court to conduct an in camera review of Gardner's personnel file to disclose to the District Attorney and petitioner any Brady material located within the file, and to issue a protective order for the file, which the Superior Court subsequently executed. Id. Petitioner then filed a motion in this Court to hold in abeyance his habeas claim pending exhaustion of his state court remedies on his Brady claim. Docket No. 14.
On March 7, 2012, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court for the County of San Francisco, requesting the court order the District Attorney's office to produce all additional Brady material relating to Gardner, order an evidentiary hearing to determine the full scope of the Gardner Brady material, and vacate the judgment of his conviction. Docket No. 32, Ex. E. In its order, the Superior Court considered and discussed the Gardner Brady evidence but ultimately denied petitioner's writ. Second Amended Petition, Docket No. 25, Ex. 33. Petitioner's subsequent petition for writ of habeas corpus and petition for review were denied by the First Appellate District Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court, respectively. Docket No. 32, Exs. F, G, H, I.
Petitioner then returned to this Court and filed motions to lift the stay and re-open the case, and for leave to file an amended petition. Docket No. 19. The second amended petition was filed, containing both petitioner's Jackson and Brady claims. Docket No. 25. The government answered the second amended petition. Docket No. 31. Petitioner then filed a motion for discovery of documents, which the Court denied, finding that petitioner could not show good cause for his request and that the discovery sought was largely duplicative of the request he made in state court. Docket No. 37. Petitioner subsequently filed a traverse. Docket No. 41.
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this habeas action for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Venue is proper because the challenged conviction occurred in San Francisco County, California, within this judicial district. 28 U.S.C. §§ 84, 2241(d).
Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas proceedings either the fact or length of their confinement must exhaust their state court remedies by presenting the highest state court available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every claim they seek to raise in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). The parties do not dispute that petitioner has exhausted his state court remedies for the claims asserted in the petition.
A federal court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") amended § 2254 to impose new restrictions on federal habeas review. A petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
"The `contrary to' and `unreasonable application of' clauses in § 2254(d)(1) are distinct and have separate meanings." Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002) ("§ 2254(d)(1)'s `contrary to' and `unreasonable application' clauses have independent meaning."). "A state-court decision is contrary to . . . clearly established [federal law] if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] but reaches a different result." Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002)). However, the state court need not cite the controlling Supreme Court cases, "so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them." Early, 537 U.S. at 8. "Under the `contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000).
"Under the `unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413. "[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the "unreasonable application" inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 409.
Petitioner presents the Court with two arguments: the first as to his Brady claim, and the second as to his Jackson claim.
Petitioner's Brady claim is premised upon the failure to produce evidence involving Inspector Gardner, a key inspector in the robbery case. Docket No. 25-3, Ex. 33. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court for the County of San Francisco. Id. The Superior Court analyzed petitioner's claim, found that the Gardner evidence was not material, and therefore no Brady violation occurred. Id. The state court petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied.
The facts relevant to petitioner's Brady claim are as follows:
In re Smith, Superior Court of California County of San Francisco, January 14, 2013 ("The Superior Court Order"), at 2-3, 6.
"Supreme Court holdings at the time of the state court's last reasoned decision are the source of clearly established Federal Law for the purposes of AEDPA." Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003)). Here, when the Superior Court issued its decision denying petitioner's habeas petition, the elements of a Brady claim were clearly established under Supreme Court law. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). In order to establish a Brady claim a defendant must show: (1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the suppressed evidence was favorable to the defendant; and (3) the suppressed evidence was material. Id.
"Evidence is favorable if it is exculpatory or impeaches a prosecution witness, and suppression occurs when favorable evidence known to police or the prosecution is not disclosed, either willfully or inadvertently." United States v. Lopez, 577 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2009). "Even if evidence favorable to the defendant has been suppressed or not disclosed by the prosecution, there is no true Brady violation unless that information is material." United States v. Olsen, 704 F.3d 1172, 1183 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289-90). "Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Maxwell v. Roe, 628 F.3d 486, 509 (9th Cir. 2010). "A reasonable probability is one that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial." Id. "Reversal of a conviction or sentence is required only upon a `showing that the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict." Olsen, 704 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Williams v. Ryan, 623 F.3d 1258, 1274 (9th Cir. 2010).
The Superior Court found that no Brady violation occurred because the new evidence was not material. Under AEDPA, the Court must defer to that finding unless the decision of the Superior Court is "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States"; or "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Petitioner asserts that the Superior Court's decision was "contrary to" Supreme Court precedent, arguing the court undertook the wrong materiality analysis under Brady by failing to consider the cumulative impact that the Gardner evidence would have had on the trial as a whole. SAP 51. Additionally, petitioner argues that the Superior Court's decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Id.
The Supreme Court has held that suppressed evidence is material "if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). In determining materiality the court must analyze the withheld evidence "in the context of the entire record." Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1053 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976)). Specifically, when analyzing withheld evidence for materiality, the Supreme Court has held that courts should engage in a two-step analysis. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436, n.10 (1995). First, courts should evaluate "the tendency and force of the undisclosed evidence item by item." Id. Second, courts should evaluate the "cumulative effect [of the withheld evidence] separately and at the end of the discussion [.]". Id. The Ninth Circuit has held that a failure to complete both parts of the materiality "equation" will result in a decision that is "contrary to clearly established Federal law." See Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1094 (9th Cir. 2005).
The Superior Court did not render a decision "contrary to clearly established Federal law" by failing to complete the two-step materiality analysis. In its order, the Superior Court identified the correct legal standard under Brady and Strickler and discussed the relevant Supreme Court precedent. Superior Court Order at 6-9. The Superior Court completed step-one of the materiality analysis when it evaluated the withheld evidence and determined that its tendency and force was such that it could only "be used to attack [Inspector Gardner's] credibility in a general sense [because] it is not related to the Petitioner's case." Superior Court Order at 11. Further, the Superior Court's order shows that the court completed step-two by considering what effect a successful attack on Inspector Gardner's general credibility would have had on this case, in light of the other evidence presented against petitioner at trial. For example, the court explained the following:
Superior Court Order at 10-11.
The Superior Court evaluated the inculpatory evidence presented at trial and concluded that the withheld evidence was not "material" because: (1) the withheld evidence was not directly related to petitioner's case, and (2) the prosecution presented additional inculpatory evidence that was not dependent on Inspector Gardner's credibility. Id. In other words, the Superior Court determined that the "tendency and force" of the withheld evidence went to attacking Inspector Gardner's credibility in a general sense and then considered what effect such an attack would have had on the trial in light of the entirety of the evidence presented at trial. This is what is required under Kyles and Barker. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 474; Barker, 423 F.3d 1085. Accordingly, because the Superior Court completed both steps of the Supreme Court's materiality analysis, it did not apply the wrong materiality rule as petitioner suggests.
Next, petitioner argues that the Superior Court engaged in an improper "sufficiency of the evidence analysis" and therefore its decision is "contrary to clearly established federal law." SAP at 62. In support of his argument, petitioner notes that "the materiality inquiry is not just a matter of determining whether, after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence, the remaining evidence is sufficient to support the jury's conclusion." SAP at 63 (citing Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290). Petitioner then argues that the Superior Court's statement that "[t]he evidence presented against Petitioner at trial is stronger than Petitioner characterizes in his petition" establishes that the Superior Court engaged in this kind of improper materiality analysis. SAP at 63; Superior Court Order at 10-11.
The Superior Court did not engage in the type of forbidden materiality analysis petitioner alleges. Instead, the Superior Court's Order shows that it reasonably determined that the withheld evidence could have been used to attack Inspector Gardner's credibility in a general sense, but was not related to petitioner's case and therefore would not have had a meaningful "discounting" effect on the inculpatory evidence presented at trial. Superior Court Order at 11. The Superior Court reasoned that the undisclosed evidence could not have changed the outcome of petitioner's case because it would not have created a reasonably probability that a jury would have believed the defense theory that Gardner planted the fingerprint evidence and it did not cast doubt on any of the inculpatory evidence in this case. This conclusion was not objectively unreasonable. Moreover, whether the Superior Court was correct in determining that the withheld evidence was unrelated to petitioner's case is not the proper inquiry under AEDPA's "contrary to" prong. See, e.g., Brown, 544 U.S. at 141. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Superior Court did not engage in an improper "sufficiency of the evidence analysis" and did not apply the wrong materiality rule.
Petitioner also contends that the Superior Court's Brady-materiality decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. SAP at 66. Specifically, petitioner contends that the Superior Court unreasonably determined that: (1) petitioner over-emphasized the importance of the newspaper; (2) the video tape showed someone entering the abandoned restaurant holding a newspaper; (3) the poster board fingerprint evidence would not have been undermined by the withheld evidence; (4) George Turner's fingerprint strengthened the poster-board fingerprint evidence; (5) petitioner's failure to self-surrender was inculpatory evidence; and (6) the withheld evidence was unrelated to petitioner's case. Id.
"[A] federal court may not second-guess a state court's fact-finding process unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the state court was not merely wrong, but actually unreasonable." Taylor, 366 F.3d at 999. Here, the record shows that the Superior Court's factual determinations were not unreasonable.
First, the Superior Court did not make any unreasonable determinations with respect to the newspaper fingerprint evidence or the poster board fingerprint evidence. Instead, the court reasonably recognized that the withheld evidence would not have directly affected any of the inclupatory evidence in this case—which includes the fingerprints on the newspaper and poster board—because the withheld evidence does not show that Inspector Gardner did anything inappropriate in this case. Superior Court Order at 10-11. The Superior Court did not make an objectively unreasonable determination by concluding that Inspector Gardner's improper behavior in a completely unrelated case could not cast enough doubt on the newspaper and poster board fingerprint evidence to place this case in a different light.
Second, the Superior Court did not make an unreasonable determination with respect to the videotape evidence. Instead, the Superior Court simply noted that the "prosecutor pointed out that [in the video] one person appeared to be carrying a newspaper." Superior Court Order at 10. Contrary to petitioner's suggestion, the Superior Court's statement appears to be nothing more than recognition that the jury could have accepted the prosecution's characterization of the videotape. This is not an objectively unreasonable statement.
Third, the Superior Court's recognition that George Turner's fingerprints on the newspaper and the poster board strengthened the inculpatory value of that evidence was not objectively unreasonable. AEDPA's § 2254(d)'s "highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings. . . demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The record shows that the jury was made aware that George Turner was found in possession of $650,000 worth of jewelry from the jewelry heist. 3RT 669-70; 4RT 1311-15; 1316-19; 6RT 1550-52,1568. Thus, that Turner's conviction was the result of his Alford plea and that the Superior Court therefore may have technically erred in referencing the plea and conviction does not make its general position regarding Turner's fingerprints unreasonable when considered in light of the entire record. This Court must give the Superior Court the benefit of the doubt and recognize that the record supports the Superior Court's general position that the presence of Turner's fingerprints "strengthens the fingerprint evidence." Superior Court Order at 10. Accordingly, the Superior Court's determination regarding the Turner's fingerprints was not objectively unreasonable.
Fourth, the Superior Court's reference to petitioner being "`on the run' for almost three years," does not establish that the court made an unreasonable factual determination. Petitioner does not dispute that he fled the authorities for almost three years. SAP at 69-70. The Superior Court's reference to this fact appears to be nothing more than an acknowledgement that the jury was made aware of petitioner's flight. Because the Superior Court reasonably determined that the withheld evidence would not have affected the fact of petitioner's flight, the Superior Court was not unreasonable in its determination that petitioner's flight may have been an inculpatory fact in the jury's eyes.
Lastly, the Superior Court's determination that the withheld evidence was "unrelated" to petitioner's case was not unreasonable. The withheld evidence in this case showed that Inspector Gardner lied in connection with a prior police investigation independent from petitioner's case. Accordingly, the Superior Court was not objectively unreasonable in characterizing the withheld evidence as "unrelated" to petitioner's case.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court cannot say that the Superior Court's denial of petitioner's Brady claim was "contrary to" or "an unreasonable application of" Supreme Court law.
Petitioner also argues that the California Court of Appeal's decision violated his right to due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, petitioner contends that because the prosecution's theory of the case was that the jewelry store owner consented to the taking of the jewelry, the "intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property" element of robbery could not have been satisfied. SAP at 76. Petitioner asserts that the California Court of Appeal's conclusion that all of the elements of robbery were met was objectively unreasonable because "[n]o rational trier of fact could conclude that a person who participated in a scheme— with the owner's consent—that provides the owner with $4.475 million acted with the intent to deprive the owner of his property." Id. at 76-77.
The Due Process Clause "protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). A state prisoner who alleges that the evidence in support of his state conviction cannot be fairly characterized as sufficient to have led a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt therefore states a constitutional claim, see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321 (1979), which, if proven, entitles him to federal habeas relief, see id. at 324.
The Supreme Court has emphasized that "Jackson claims face a high bar in federal habeas proceedings. . . ." Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 2062 (2012) (per curiam). A federal court reviewing collaterally a state court conviction does not determine whether it is satisfied that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Payne v. Borg, 982 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 843 (1993). The federal court "determines only whether, `after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Payne, 982 F.2d at 338 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). Only if no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, has there been a due process violation. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324; Payne, 982 F.2d at 338.
After AEDPA, a federal habeas court applies the standards of Jackson with an additional layer of deference. Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005). Generally, a federal habeas court must ask whether the operative state court decision reflected an unreasonable application of Jackson to the facts of the case. Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 2062; Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1275 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). Thus, if the state court affirms a conviction under Jackson, the federal court must apply § 2254(d)(1) and decide whether the state court's application of Jackson was objectively unreasonable. See McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 132 (2010). To grant relief, therefore, a federal habeas court must conclude that "the state court's determination that a rational jury could have found that there was sufficient evidence of guilt, i.e., that each required element was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, was objectively unreasonable." Boyer v. Belleque, 659 F.3d 957, 964-965 (9th Cir. 2011). In sum, sufficiency claims on federal habeas review are subject to a "twice-deferential standard." Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. at 2152 (2012) (per curiam). First, relief must be denied if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there was evidence on which "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324). Second, a state court decision denying a sufficiency challenge may not be overturned on federal habeas unless the decision was "objectively unreasonable." Id. (quoting Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S.Ct. 2, 4 (2011)).
Here, petitioner argues that the key element of robbery—intent to deprive the owner permanently of his property— was not met because the heist was an inside job undertaken at the store owner's behest. SAP at 76. According to petitioner, the Court of Appeal failed to assess "the intent to deprive the owner" element, thereby making its conclusion objectively unreasonable. Id. at 79.
A state court's interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus. See Dixon v. Williams, 750 F.3d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005)). A habeas petitioner may not transform a state law issue into a federal one merely by asserting a due process violation. Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996). The state's highest court is the final authority on the law of that state. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 516-17 (1979). However, even a determination of state law made by an intermediate appellate court must be followed and may not be "`disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise.'" Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 630 n.3 (1988) (citation omitted).
In rejecting petitioner's claim, the California Court of Appeal thoroughly analyzed and construed California law and held that the intent to permanently deprive "innocent employees" of property that has been placed in their control is sufficient to satisfy the "intent to deprive" element of robbery. See People v. Smith, 177 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1491-92 (2009). Specifically, the Court of Appeal held, in pertinent part, as follows:
Id.
This Court is bound by the Court of Appeal's interpretation of California law. Hicks, 485 U.S. at 630 n.3. To the extent that petitioner challenges the legal sufficiency of the Court of Appeal's conclusion, this claim is not cognizable. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal's conclusion was a reasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, this Court finds that a rational trier of fact "could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; see also Payne, 982 F.2d 335 at 338. As such, this Court finds that petitioner has not established a Jackson violation.
For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, and on the basis of the record before it, the Court hereby DENIES the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
