ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

WILLIAM ALSUP, District Judge.

In this putative class action alleging violations of the Truth in Lending Act, defendant Wells Fargo Bank moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that TILA does not require lenders to list insurance proceeds on payoff statements. An order denied Wells Fargo's motion, holding that "an accurate payoff statement should have deducted the insurance proceeds still held by the bank and at least should have added a note that the impounded funds potentially could be used for home repair in the event the loan was not paid off" (Dkt. No. 36 at 2-3). Now, Wells Fargo moves for leave to file a motion for reconsideration of that order.

Under Civil Local Rule 7-9(b), a party moving for leave to file a motion for reconsideration must show one of the following:

In addition, the rule states that "[n]o motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration may repeat any oral or written argument made by the applying party."

Wells Fargo argues that the order denying its motion to dismiss came to an "manifestly erroneous" conclusion and relied on false factual assumptions. Specifically, Wells Fargo asserts that the order (1) "mistakenly assumed that plaintiff is entitled to the insurance proceeds," (2) "incorrectly assumed that plaintiff could not determine the amount due on her mortgage," and (3) "ignore[d] valid claims to insurance proceeds by contractors who have performed repairs on the properties" (Dkt. No. 40 at 3-4).

Wells Fargo, however, made these same arguments in its briefing on the motion to dismiss and at oral argument. Wells Fargo covered the first argument, that plaintiff was not entitled to the insurance proceeds, extensively in its motion to dismiss. In fact, the motion contained an entire section, which spanned over two pages, titled "C. Plaintiff's Deed of Trust does not Provide the Borrower a Right to Apply Property Insurance Proceeds to the Loan Balance" (Dkt. No. 20 at 13-15). The order denying Wells Fargo's motion simply disagreed with this argument and rejected it. A motion for reconsideration is not the proper avenue to rehash this previously rejected argument.

Second, Wells Fargo takes issue with the order's statement that due to the inaccuracy of the payoff statement, plaintiff "would get a run-around and forever be fighting with low-level bank staff insisting that the bank already had other funds available for a credit while the staff shrugged their shoulders and pointed to the misleading payoff statement" (Dkt. No 36 at 3). Wells Fargo asserts that this "fact" did not appear in the record and thus should not have been considered. This statement did not constitute a fact. It was merely a common sense observation of how life and experience generally work for borrowers dealing with banks. Moreover, Wells Fargo made the same general argument in its previous briefing, stating "[p]laintiff was fully aware of the existence of property claim proceeds held by Wells Fargo" (Dkt. No. 20 at 12). The order rejected that argument, emphasizing the above example in which plaintiff could be harmed despite knowing the insurance proceeds were available in some way.

Third, Wells Fargo asserts that the insurance proceeds could have been paid to a contractor for repairs. Once again, Wells Fargo has already made this argument. In its motion to dismiss, it stated: "For instance, unbeknownst to the loan servicer, insurance proceeds may be owed to a contractor for repair work already performed" (id. at 2-3). In addition, at oral argument, defense counsel stated that "those funds could be owed to a contractor for work that's already performed" (Tr. 6).

In sum, Wells Fargo already made the arguments now put forth at the motion to dismiss stage. The order denying the motion rejected those arguments. Civil Local Rule 7-9(c) clearly states that "[n]o motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration may repeat any oral or written argument made by the applying party." In violation of that rule, Wells Fargo has simply rehashed its old arguments and has not presented anything amounting to a failure to consider "material facts or dispositive legal arguments" that would warrant reconsideration. For that reason, Wells Fargo's motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

In addition, Wells Fargo has also filed a motion for a certificate of appealability. Under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b), a district court has discretion to make an order immediately appealable if the "order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." It is, of course, possible that the district judge erred, but if this issue is to go up on appeal, it would be best to go up on a full record of what actually happened rather than a thin motion to dismiss. Thus, the motion for a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. 1292 is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.