NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KITCHING, J.

INTRODUCTION

This case arises from a dispute regarding a 2002 settlement agreement between Kern County Treasurer-Tax Collector1 and Richard Weissman (receiver or Weismann). The trial court found that under the settlement agreement the tax collector cancelled penalties on certain taxes payable after December 10, 2002. Based on this finding, the trial court entered a judgment2 requiring the tax collector to issue revised tax bills without imposing penalties on delinquent taxes. For reasons we shall explain, we hold that the settlement agreement does not provide for a cancellation of penalties on taxes payable after December 10, 2002 and, in any case, the tax collector did not have the authority to waive such penalties. We thus grant the tax collector's petition for a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its judgment.

FACTS

1. People v. Redman

Starting in the 1980's Marshall Redman and affiliated individuals and entities (Redman) perpetrated a massive real estate fraud scheme in the Mojave Desert in Los Angeles, Kern and San Bernardino Counties. The scheme involved approximately 1,500 parcels of land and an estimated 2,500 defrauded individuals who purchased land from Redman. Redman would, among other things, sell parcels that he illegally sub-divided, sell parcels he did not own, sell parcels to multiple purchasers, and sell parcels that were different than the parcels the purchasers had been shown. Most of the victims were unsophisticated Spanish-speaking people.

The district attorneys for Los Angeles and Kern Counties brought an action against Redman entitled People v. Redman in Los Angeles Superior Court (Case No. BC 097765). Pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, the court entered a judgment against Redman on May 31, 1995. The judgment included a provision appointing a receiver whose purpose was to make as whole as possible all of the victims of Redman's wrongdoing. In December 1995 Weissman was confirmed the successor receiver.3

2. Settlement Agreement

In October 2001 the receiver sent a letter to the tax collector requesting the tax collector cancel all redemption charges, interest and other penalties accruing on delinquent property taxes for properties that were part of the receivership estate. The tax collector denied this request.

In February 2002 the receiver filed a motion for an order directing the tax collector to show cause why she should not waive property tax penalties in connection with certain properties involved in the Redman fraudulent scheme.4 The receiver argued that the victims of Redman's fraud should not be penalized for failing to pay real property taxes pending the uncertainty of their underlying transactions. The motion was made pursuant to Revenue and Taxation Code section 4985.2, subdivision (c),5 which we shall discuss post.

On May 1, 2002, the superior court granted the receiver's motion and entered an order cancelling certain property tax penalties. The tax collector appealed that order. While the appeal was pending, in October 2002, the tax collector and receiver entered into a written settlement agreement. On January 7, 2003, the superior court entered an order approving the settlement agreement.

The settlement agreement relates to various groups with property tax liability to the tax collector. One group consists of purchasers of real property from Redman (Redman clients). This group has two subgroups. The first consists of purchasers who owned parcels with no identifiable defects in the title (confirmed Redman clients). The second subgroup consists of Redman clients who could not confirm the validity of their title but who negotiated with the receiver for the purchase of another parcel (exchange clients). The settlement agreement also relates to persons or entities who sold property to Redman and who hold one or more senior underlying deeds of trust secured by the property (senior underlying noteholders). The petition before us relates to penalties charged against senior underlying noteholders.

Paragraph 2 of the settlement agreement provides: "The Parties expressly agree that each and all of the real property delinquency fees, interest, administrative and/or redemption fees and costs of every kind relating to the unpaid and/or delinquently paid real property taxes last payable without delinquency on or before December 10, 2002 (`Penalties') [Fn. omitted] are hereby fully waived, canceled and released . . . ."6 As we shall explain, this paragraph is significant because it defines the term "Penalties," which is used throughout the settlement agreement.

Paragraph 3 of the settlement agreement relates to confirmed Redman clients and exchange clients. It provides in part: "At the Tax Collector's discretion, but in no event less than thirty-five (35) days following execution of this Agreement by all parties, the Tax Collector shall provide a revised tax bill (`Revised Tax Bill') to each of the Redman Clients on the list under Exhibit 1 who is alleged to owe Penalties. The Revised Tax Bill shall set forth only the amount of the principal tax obligation due and owing to date (`Principal Real Property Tax Obligation'). The Revised Tax Bill shall further state that if the Principal Real Property Tax Obligation is paid in full within thirty-five (35) days of the date of the Revised Tax Bill, all Penalties shall be permanently waived, canceled and released." (Fn. omitted).

Paragraph 5 of the settlement agreement relates to senior underlying noteholders. It provides: "Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, the Receiver will be identifying various land parcels for which the Receiver will be requesting the Court to authorize him to abandon and release from the receivership. Upon the Court's entry of an order authorizing the Receiver to abandon any land parcel encumbered by a holder of a senior deed of trust, but no earlier than thirty-five (35) days following entry of such Order, the Tax Collector shall issue a Revised Tax Bill to each Senior Underlying Noteholder of such abandoned real property in the same manner and time-frame as set in paragraph 3, above. The Tax Collector hereby expressly agrees that each Senior Underlying Noteholder shall be entitled to pay the Principal Real Property Tax Obligation affecting his or her abandoned parcel, provided their respective payments are timely made in accordance with the terms of paragraph 3, above."

This appeal involves a dispute regarding the settlement agreement. The receiver contends that under paragraph 5, the tax collector is required to send to certain senior underlying noteholders a revised tax bill that does not include any penalties for any years. The tax collector contends that pursuant to section 4985.2 she can only cancel penalties on four years of delinquent taxes at any one time and at the time those penalties are cancelled the corresponding principal property taxes must be paid. Accordingly, the tax collector contends that revised tax bills to senior underlying noteholders may include penalties, regardless of how paragraph 5 is interpreted, and any interpretation to the contrary would require her to violate the law.

3. Judgment to Enforce the Settlement Agreement

There is relatively little in the record regarding what took place after the superior court approved the settlement agreement in January 2003. This much is clear. The receiver has not provided a list of the senior underlying noteholders to the tax collector, nor has he provided the tax collector with a copy an order of abandonment.

In early 2010 a group of senior underlying noteholders learned that their parcels had been abandoned and were provided a copy of an abandonment order, presumably by the receiver. These noteholders contacted the tax collector regarding the payment of outstanding property taxes. In response, the tax collector sent to the receiver proposed revised tax bills. The receiver objected to the bills on the ground that they included penalties. Because the tax collector and the receiver could not come to an agreement, the revised tax bills were not sent to the senior underlying noteholders.

On August 31, 2010, the receiver filed a motion to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement. The receiver sought an order requiring the tax collector to send revised tax bills to senior underlying noteholders that did not include any penalties on property taxes payable after December 10, 2002. This would include at least the years 2003 to 2010. The tax collector argued before the trial court that penalties were only forgiven from 1995 to 2002, not beyond 2002.

On November 2, 2010, the superior court entered judgment granting the receiver's motion. The judgment stated: "Within 35 days of receiving the court order authorizing abandonment of the properties, the Kern County Tax Collector shall issue a Revised Tax Bill to each Senior Underlying Noteholder as provided in Paragraph 5 of the Settlement Agreement. These Revised Tax Bills shall include only the principal amount of the real property taxes due from the date taxes were last paid, to the date of issuance of the Revised Tax Bill and to the exclusion of any and all interest, penalties, late fees, redemption charges, or other non-principal tax amounts. The Kern County Tax Collector shall deem timely payment of the principal tax amount stated in the Revised Tax Bill to be full satisfaction of all defaulted taxes, penalties and costs." (Fn. omitted.) The receiver served notice of entry of this order and judgment on the tax collector on November 10, 2010.

4. Proceedings in this Court

On January 6, 2011, the tax collector filed a petition for writ of mandate and a request for a stay in this court. The petition sought, inter alia, a writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its November 2, 2010, judgment.

On January 19, 2011, we issued an order staying the superior court's November 2, 2010 judgment pending a further order of this court. We also issued an order to show cause (OSC) why the relief in the petition should or should not be granted. In response to the OSC and a letter we sent to the tax collector and the receiver dated May 16, 2011,7 the parties filed additional briefs, which we have reviewed.

CONTENTIONS

With respect to penalties due on unpaid taxes after 2002, the tax collector contends that section 4985.2 does not authorize her to waive penalties for future taxes. Alternatively, she contends that under the plain terms of the settlement agreement, she did not waive or cancel penalties for unpaid taxes due after December 10, 2002.

With respect to penalties on property taxes payable on or before December 10, 2002, the tax collector contends that under section 4985.2, she did not have the authority to cancel penalties for more than four years prior to the payment of taxes. In other words, the tax collector apparently contends that she did not have the authority to cancel penalties on taxes due from 1995 to 1998 because such taxes were due more than four years prior to the execution of the settlement agreement. The tax collector also argues, with virtually no analysis, that she did not have any authority to waive "delinquencies at all without payment of the principal taxes." For all of these reasons, the tax collector contends that the settlement agreement is void and the trial court's judgment dated November 2, 2010—which prohibits the tax collector from imposing penalties on revised tax bills sent to senior underlying noteholders— must be vacated.

The receiver argues the petition should be denied for both procedural and substantive reasons. He contends that because the tax collector fails to establish that an appeal is an inadequate remedy and that she will suffer irreparable injury if a writ is not issued, the petition should be denied. The receiver further contends the tax collector forfeited her argument that the settlement agreement is void because she did not raise it in the trial court. With respect to the tax collector's substantive claims, the receiver argues that the tax collector's reliance on section 4985.2 is misplaced because the tax collector waived and cancelled penalties pursuant to a contract, not the statute. The receiver further argues that even if the tax collector did not have authority to enter into the settlement agreement, the settlement agreement is enforceable because under the circumstances of this case, the court may enforce an illegal contract. Finally, the receiver contends that under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, the tax collector is barred from collecting penalties against the senior underlying noteholders.

DISCUSSION

1. The Tax Collector May Seek an Extraordinary Writ

A writ of mandate is not available unless there is no "plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086). In general, if the challenged order or judgment is immediately appealable, writ relief is not available unless the petitioner can show some "special reason" why an appeal is "inadequate by the particular circumstances of his case." (Phelan v. Superior Court (1950) 35 Cal.2d 363, 370.) There is a wide variety of circumstances which satisfy this standard. (See Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1266, 1273-1274.) For example, an extraordinary writ is appropriate where "the issue tendered in the writ petition is of widespread interest" and where "the petitioner will suffer harm or prejudice in a manner that cannot be corrected on appeal." (Ibid.) In practical terms, a writ petition is "a device used to `cut into line' ahead of those litigants awaiting determination of post judgment appeals." (Id. at p. 1273.)

Here, the trial court's judgment of November 2, 2010, was appealable. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(1).) Nonetheless, the tax collector may seek a writ of mandate. This is one of those rare circumstances where writ relief is appropriate even though the challenged order and judgment is appealable.

This is a matter of considerable public concern because the case arose out of a massive fraudulent scheme involving thousands of people. Now, a large number of senior underlying noteholders,8 effectively represented by the receiver in this court, have a dispute with the tax collector, an important governmental official who contends that she has been ordered by the trial court to act beyond her legal authority.

Moreover, assuming the tax collector prevails on her substantive arguments, each day that passes the senior underlying noteholders incur additional penalties which they cannot recover. If we wait to adjudicate this matter on appeal, the senior underlying noteholders will suffer irreparable harm. Accordingly, it is in the interests of justice for this court to resolve this matter as soon as possible, and to allow the tax collector to seek writ relief.

2. The Tax Collector Has Limited Authority to Cancel Penalties

A taxpayer is obligated to pay the first half of real property taxes due by November 1 (§ 2605) and the second half of real property taxes due by February 1 (§ 2606). When a taxpayer fails to pay the first half of real property taxes on or before December 10, or the second half of real property taxes on or before April 10, the taxes become "delinquent" and a 10 percent penalty attaches to them. (§§ 2617, 2618, 2704, 2705, 2922). All taxes, assessments, penalties and costs on real property which have not been paid by July 1 are declared in default by operation of law. (§ 3436). Tax-defaulted property, however, "may be redeemed on payment of taxes, penalties, and costs, including `redemption penalties,' until the right of redemption is terminated." (9 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Taxation, § 268, p. 401; see §§ 4101-4103.)

As a general rule, the tax collector has a duty to collect all property taxes due, including attached penalties. (See § 2602.) The tax collector, however, can cancel such penalties in narrowly defined circumstances pursuant to statutory authority. (See e.g. § 2610.5, § 4833.1, subd. (a), and § 4985.3, subd. (a).) Of relevance here is section 4985.2, which provides: "Any penalty, costs, or other charges resulting from tax delinquency may be canceled by the auditor or the tax collector upon a finding of any of the following:

In its May 1, 2002, order cancelling real property penalties, the trial court stated it was cancelling certain penalties pursuant to section 4985.2, subdivision (c). The trial court, however, did not refer to section 4985.2 in its January 7, 2003, order approving the settlement agreement. Thus the record does not clearly indicate the tax collector's statutory authority to cancel penalties pursuant to the settlement agreement. Because section 4985.2 is the only statute brought to our attention that could possibly provide the tax collector with the necessary statutory authority, we shall assume that the tax collector's authority to cancel penalties derived from that statute.

"Subdivision (c) [of section 4985.2] is not a grant of independent judicial authority to relieve taxpayers of liability for tax delinquency penalties." (People ex rel. Strumpfer v. Westoaks Investment #27 (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1038, 1042.) Rather, the subdivision authorizes tax collectors and auditors "to obey court orders directing them to cancel tax delinquency penalties, costs and other charges, and therefore such orders for cancellation must be based on some statutory authority other than subdivision (c) of section 4985.2." (Ibid.) Because there is nothing in the record regarding an "inadvertent error" in the amount of taxes paid on the property controlled by the receiver, it appears that subdivision (b) of section 4985.2 was not the statutory authority relied on by the tax collector. Accordingly, the tax collector's authority to cancel penalties pursuant to the settlement agreement was apparently subdivision (a) of section 4985.2. This provision on its face limits cancellation to a four-year period before "the principal payment for the proper amount of the tax due is made[,]" and states nothing about the tax collector's authority to waive penalties on future delinquent taxes.9

The receiver argues that the tax collector's focus on section 4985.2 is misplaced because the tax collector cancelled penalties pursuant to the settlement agreement. This begs the question. The receiver does not identify any statutory authority for the tax collector to cancel penalties, and thus ostensibly assumes that none is needed. This is not so.

When the Legislature enacted former section 2617.5, the predecessor of section 4985.2, it set forth the purpose of the statute in an uncodified statute, which stated: "It is the intent of the Legislature to provide procedural means for granting relief from property tax penalties when circumstances indicate such relief is appropriate." (Stats. 1976, ch. 431, § 2, p. 1104.) This indicates that prior to former section 2617.5, there was no "procedural means" for a tax collector or auditor to cancel tax penalties. Further, the Legislative Counsel's Digest for the bill which enacted former section 2617.5 in 1976 stated: "Under existing law a 6-percent penalty is imposed on property taxes which are not paid prior to becoming delinquent; and there is no provision for the cancellation of a penalty. [¶] This bill would authorize the tax collector or the auditor to cancel a delinquent penalty on the property . . . due to reasonable cause and circumstances beyond the assessee's control, and occurred notwithstanding the exercise of ordinary care and in the absence of willful neglect . . . ." (Italics added.) (Legis. Counsel's Dig., Assem. Bill No. 2371 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) p. 1.) This, too, indicates that without former section 2617.5 (now section 4985.2) or some similar statute, the tax collector is not authorized to cancel penalties.

3. The Tax Collector Cannot Argue on Appeal That the Settlement Agreement is Void and That She Did Not Have Authority to Cancel Penalties on Unpaid Taxes Due Before December 10, 2002

In general, if a party fails to raise an issue below, he or she will forfeit the issue on appeal. (Barnes v. Department of Corrections (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 126, 130.) "However, this rule does not apply when the new theory on appeal is a pure question of law with no factual disputes." (Ibid.) In such circumstances we have the discretion to consider the issue. (People v. Johnson (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 976, 984.) But we exercise our discretion to excuse forfeiture "rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue." (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.)

In the trial court, the tax collector argued that she did not have authority to cancel penalties on future unpaid taxes, that is, on unpaid taxes due after December 10, 2002. The tax collector, however, did not specifically argue that the entire settlement agreement is void. She also did not raise specific arguments regarding the time periods from 1995 to 1998 and 1998 to 2002. Although the tax collector asserted that section 4985.2 limited her authority to cancel penalties to a four-year period, she did not seek to limit the cancellation in this case to the penalties on unpaid taxes due from December 10, 1998 to December 10, 2002. Rather, the tax collector stated to the trial court: "The [tax collector] agreed only to the cancellations for years prior to the taxes due on December 10, 2002. The County of Kern fully intends to honor [the settlement] agreement — but will not expand that agreement to encompass subsequent tax years." (Fns. omitted.)

Because the tax collector did not claim below that the settlement agreement was void or that she did not have authority, or had limited authority (e.g. from 1998 to 2002), to cancel penalties for unpaid taxes due before December 10, 2002, she cannot make those arguments in this appeal. We decline to exercise our discretion to adjudicate these issues in light of the relative paucity of facts in the record regarding unpaid property taxes and penalties, if any, for the period before December 10, 2002.

4. Under the Plain Terms of the Settlement Agreement, the Tax Collector Did Not Cancel Penalties on Unpaid Taxes Due After December 10, 2002

The interpretation of a written contract is a judicial function to be exercised according to generally accepted canons of interpretation unless the interpretation turns upon the credibility of extrinsic evidence. (Parsons v. Bristol Development Co. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 861, 865.) Where, as here, the relevant facts are undisputed and the interpretation of the contract does not depend on extrinsic evidence, we review the contract de novo. (Ibid.)

Three general principles of contract interpretation are particularly relevant here. First, "[a] contract must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable and lawful." (Civ. Code, § 1636.) Second, "[t]he whole of a contract is to be taken together, so as to give effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the other." (Civ. Code, § 1641.) Third, "[a] contract must receive such an interpretation as will make it lawful, operative, definitive, reasonable, and capable of being carried into effect, if it can be done without violating the intention of the parties." (Civ. Code, § 1643.)

Turning to the settlement agreement, the parties dispute the meaning of paragraph 5, which applies to senior underlying noteholders. This paragraph does not mention the cancellation of penalties. As stated ante, however, paragraph 5 provides that the tax collector shall issue revised tax bills to senior underlying noteholders "in the same manner and time-frame as set forth in paragraph 3, above." It further provides that senior underlying noteholders "shall be entitled to pay the Principal Real Property Tax Obligation affecting his or her abandoned parcel, provided their respective payments are timely made in accordance with the terms of paragraph 3, above."

Paragraph 3, in turn, provides that each revised tax bill shall state "that if the Principal Real Property Tax Obligation is paid in full within thirty-five (35) days of the date of the Revised Tax Bill, all Penalties shall be permanently waived, canceled and released." The word "Penalties" is capitalized as a defined term. The term is defined in paragraph 2 as "all the real property delinquency fees, interest, administrative and/or redemption fees and costs of every kind relating to the unpaid and/or delinquently paid real property taxes last payable without delinquency on or before December 10, 2002 . . . ." Accordingly, when paragraphs 5, 3 and 2 are read together, the settlement agreement provides that with respect to abandoned real property in which senior underlying noteholders have an interest, the tax collector agrees to cancel penalties, interest, costs, and fees on taxes last payable on or before December 10, 2002. This does not consist of a waiver of penalties on taxes due from 2003 to 2011.

The receiver contends the settlement agreement provides that the tax collector agreed to cancel tax penalties, interest, costs and fees on taxes payable after December 10, 2002. We reject this argument. Not only is the receiver's interpretation of the settlement agreement contrary to its plain terms, it is contrary to the stated intention of the parties in the introductory recitals of the settlement agreement. Paragraph 4 of the recitals states: "Before and during the receivership, many parcels under the control of the receivership . . . fell into tax default based on the non-payment of real property taxes due thereon." Paragraph 7 of the recitals states: "It is the desire of the Receiver, on behalf of the receivership, and the Tax Collector to resolve and settle the issues on appeal10 and any and all other disputes between the receivership and the Kern County Tax Collector with respect to the Real Property Tax Penalties due and owing thereon." (Italics added.) "Real Property Tax Penalties" are defined as "the real property tax penalties, late fees, interest and redemption charges and costs that accrued resulting from the aforesaid unpaid real property taxes . . . ." These recitals indicate the purpose of the settlement agreement is to settle issues regarding real property tax penalties that were due and owing when the settlement agreement was executed.

Moreover, the receiver's interpretation of the settlement agreement makes the contract unlawful and inoperative. As explained ante, the tax collector did not have the statutory authority under section 4985.2, or any other statute, to cancel potential penalties, interest, costs and fees on taxes not yet due. Because we must interpret the settlement agreement, if possible, in a manner that renders it lawful and operative, we reject the receiver's argument that the settlement agreement provides for the cancelation of future penalties.11

5. Promissory Estoppel

The receiver argues that the tax collector is barred by the doctrine of promissory estoppel from collecting penalties on unpaid taxes against senior underlying noteholders. "`The elements of a promissory estoppel claim are "(1) a promise clear and unambiguous on its terms; (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise is made; (3) [the] reliance must be both reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must be injured by his reliance." [Citation.]'" (Advanced Choices, Inc. v. State Dept. of Health Services (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1661, 1672.)

Even assuming the elements of promissory estoppel are satisfied the doctrine is not always available against the government. With respect to the related doctrine of equitable estoppel, our Supreme Court has held: "`The government may be bound by an equitable estoppel in the same manner as a private party when the elements requisite to such an estoppel against a private party are present and, in the considered view of a court of equity, the injustice which would result from a failure to uphold an estoppel is of sufficient dimension to justify any effect upon public interest or policy which would result from the raising of an estoppel.'" (Lentz v. McMahon (1989) 49 Cal.3d 393, 400, quoting City of Long Beach v. Mansell (1970) 3 Cal.3d 462, 496-497.) The California Supreme Court has also held: "The government may be estopped in tax matters. [Citations.] However, it is the unusual case in which estoppel will be applied to tax cases; the case must be clear and the injustice great . . . ." (U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. State Bd. of Equal. (1956) 47 Cal.2d 384, 389.)

Here, with respect to penalties on taxes last payable after December 10, 2002, the elements of promissory estoppel are not satisfied as a matter of law. As explained ante, the tax collector did not make a clear and unambiguous promise to cancel such penalties. To the contrary, by its plain terms the settlement agreement only cancels penalties on taxes last payable before December 10, 2002. Because the tax collector did not make a clear promise, the receiver and the senior underlying noteholders did not reasonably and detrimentally rely on a promise. The tax collector therefore is not estopped from seeking to collect penalties on taxes last payable after December 10, 2002.

The receiver's claim of promissory estoppel with respect to taxes last payable on or before December 10, 2002, requires a different analysis. In the settlement agreement the tax collector clearly promised to cancel all penalties for taxes due on or before that date. A reliance on that promise by the senior underlying noteholders was both reasonable and foreseeable. Indeed, the tax collector herself continued to believe that she had cancelled penalties on delinquent taxes for this time period in the proceedings in the trial court. It was only in this court when the tax collector argued for the first time—eight years after executing the settlement agreement—that she did not, in fact, cancel the penalties on taxes due on or before December 10, 2002, because she did not have the legal authority to do so. Further, to the extent the senior underlying noteholders have delayed paying the taxes due on or before December 10, 2002, they have been injured by their reliance on the tax collector's promise because they have incurred accumulating penalties for many years.

We hold that this is a case where the injustice which would result from a failure to uphold the estoppel is of sufficient dimension to justify any effect upon the public interest and policy of collecting taxes in a timely manner. The senior underlying noteholders were the victims of a massive fraud and, as a result of a long series of events, are now in jeopardy of losing their interests real property. Conversely, the tax collector long ago assumed that it would not collect any penalties for the period in question and only recently realized it had an argument to collect such penalties. It is in the interests of both parties to finally put an end to this protected legal dispute in a just and equitable way. An important step in doing so is to resolve the issue of penalties on taxes that were payable on or before December 10, 2002. For the reasons we have stated, the tax collector is estopped from collecting penalties on such taxes.12

6. The November 2, 2010, Judgment Must Be Vacated

The November 2, 2010, judgment requires the tax collector to issue revised tax bills to senior underlying noteholders which "include only the principal amount of the real property taxes due from the date taxes were last paid, to the date of issuance of the Revised Tax Bill and to the exclusion of any and all interest, penalties, late fees, redemption charges, or other non-principal tax amounts." This is, at minimum, too broad. To the extent permitted by law, the tax collector is entitled to collect penalties and other non-principal amounts against senior underlying noteholders with respect to taxes that became last payable after December 10, 2002. The judgment therefore must be vacated.

DISPOSITION

Let a writ of mandate issue directing the trial court to vacate the judgment dated November 2, 2010. In the interests of justice, each party shall bear their own costs related to the petition.

CROSKEY, Acting P. J. and ALDRICH, J., concurs.