ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION

(Re: Docket No. 314)

PAUL S. GREWAL, Magistrate Judge.

Before the court is a motion by Plaintiff Roda Hiramanek to disqualify the undersigned from this case under 28 U.S.C. § 455.1 Because the court finds that no circumstance requiring disqualification applies here, Hiramanek's motion is DENIED.2

Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a magistrate judge "shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably questioned." The goal of Section 455 is "to avoid even the appearance of partiality."3 Thus, disqualification or recusal may be warranted even in cases where no actual partiality exists.4 A court considering a disqualification request under Section 455(a) must ask "whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned."5 The reasonable person is not "`hypersensitive or unduly suspicious,' but rather is a `well-informed, thoughtful observer.'"6 If the reasonable person would not find a basis for partiality, a judge has an obligation to participate in the cases he is assigned.7 The standard for recusal must not be so broadly construed that recusal becomes "mandated upon the merest unsubstantiated suggestion of personal bias or prejudice."8

Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1), a magistrate judge shall recuse himself "[w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding." Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(i), a magistrate judge must also recuse himself if "[h]e or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relations to either of them, or the spouse of such a person is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party."

As grounds for her request, Hiramanek claims that the undersigned's impartiality might reasonably be questioned in light of the court's rulings in this case. In her declaration, Hiramanek lists a number of instances where she claims the court's rulings in favor of Defendants either contain errors or demonstrate partiality towards Defendants.9 Because these rulings were based on the applicable law, facts introduced in the course of the respective proceedings or the court's inherent power to manage discovery and its docket, they do not offer grounds for recusal.10 Hiramanek alleges that these rulings exhibit so much favoritism that the undersigned must have an extrajudicial source of knowledge, but the cases that Hiramanek cites require more than her conclusory inference to support such an assertion.11

Hiramanek also argues that the court has denied Plaintiffs opportunities to be heard.12 In particular, she objects that she was not allowed to speak at a hearing the court held on August 11, 2015.13 However, the court has considered and ruled on each of Plaintiffs' numerous motions under the same standards—and subject to the same scheduling constraints—as Defendants'. When the court has held oral hearings, Plaintiffs and Defendants have received equal time to the extent possible. For example, at the start of the August 11 hearing, the court instructed the parties that each side would have ten minutes to make its arguments, but Plaintiff Adil Hiramanek used the entirety of Plaintiffs' allotted time.

Hiramanek finally alleges that the undersigned, either directly or through his staff, has engaged in ex parte communications with Defendants or their counsel.14 Because the assertion is untrue and Hiramanek offers no evidence to support it, this basis is insufficient to warrant recusal.

SO ORDERED.