ORDER RE: DISCOVERY LETTER Re: Dkt. Nos. 76, 77

SUSAN ILLSTON, District Judge.

Now before the Court are two discovery letters submitted by the parties. Docket Nos. 76, 77. These are the third and fourth discovery letters submitted in this case. See Docket Nos. 58, 71. The disputes arise out of the parties' disagreement as to whether plaintiff has provided sufficiently detailed and comprehensive responses to certain requests for admission ("RFA").

A. "Accurate"

In RFA No. 5, defendants ask plaintiff to admit that the information he provided on a medical form was "accurate." Plaintiff objected on the ground that the term accurate is vague and susceptible to multiple meanings. In the discovery letter, defendants argue that accurate simply means "conforms with the truth." Docket No. 77 at 3. Plaintiff responds: "so long as defendant now agrees to define their use of the term `accurate' to mean `conforms to the truth,' plaintiff can respond further to such a request." Id. at 5.

From the face the discovery letter, it appears the parties have come to a resolution on this issue. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS plaintiff to respond to RFA No. 5 under the assumption that "accurate" is defined as "conforms to the truth."

B. Perception vs. Reality

The next dispute arises out of a series of RFAs which ask plaintiff to specify the location of his left foot at the time of the accident. RFA Nos. 11-14, 17. Defendants take issue with the fact that plaintiff qualifies his responses by noting that they represent his "perception" of events, rather than basing his answers on reality.1 Docket No. 77 at 4 ("Yale is not asking plaintiff what he perceived. Rather Yale wants plaintiff to take a position as to what actually occurred."). These RFAs implicitly require plaintiff to rely on his personal knowledge of what occurred; therefore plaintiff may answer them based on his perception of events at the time of the accident. However, if plaintiff's perception has changed since the time of the injury, he must amend his responses to reflect his current understanding of the events that transpired.

C. Sequence of Events

The final dispute arises out of a series of RFAs which ask plaintiff to clarify whether his foot was stuck in a gap before it was crushed by a container, or whether it was the force of the container that wedged his foot in a gap. RFA Nos. 101-03, 105. Plaintiff's responds that "[t]he injury-producing event transpired so quickly" that he is not able to recollect the exact sequence of events. Docket No. 76 at 2. Defendants argue that this contradicts plaintiff's hand-written note and deposition testimony which tend to show that his foot was caught in the gap before it was crushed by the container. Id. at 3-4. However, it is not obvious to the Court that his response is inconsistent with prior testimony; and in any event, a statement that his recollection does not allow him to admit or deny the RFAs is sufficient in this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4) ("The answering party may assert lack of knowledge or information as a reason for failing to admit or deny only if the party states that it has made reasonable inquiry and that the information it knows or can readily obtain is insufficient to enable it to admit or deny.").

IT IS SO ORDERED.