ORDER EXCLUDING ADDITIONAL TIME UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT (18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A))

ROBERT E. BLACKBURN, District Judge.

The matter is before me again1 sua sponte to exclude additional time under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74 (the Act). Based on the analysis below, I exclude 30 days from September 6, 2013, through October 6, 2013, from the computation of time for a speedy trial under the Act.

On June 21, 2012, I entered an Order Excluding Additional Time Under Speedy Trial Act (18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A)) [#551].2 The order, inter alia, excluded time for a speedy trial under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A).

I continue to monitor this case carefully. Today I entered an order resolving the last, pending non-CJA pretrial motion and an order setting a trial setting conference for September 12, 2013. Although the case is ready to be set for trial, it is not trial ready. In fact, without the exclusion of additional time, both Mr Rivera and the government would be forced to trial — ironically in the name of speedy trial — well before they can be trial ready. The logistics inherent to this case will require a reasonable time of not less than 30 days by both the government and Mr. Rivera to make the arrangements necessary to produce the witnesses who will testify at trial. Additionally, it is anticipated that both parties will need additional time to finalize preparation for trial which is likely to be lengthy. The totality of relevant circumstances ineluctably cause me to conclude that the failure to exclude at least an additional 30 days would actually shorten the time for a speedy trial; thus, depriving counsel for the defendant and the government of the time reasonably necessary for pretrial and trial preparation with the concomitant risk of a miscarriage of justice. Section 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and (iv). Additionally, the failure to exclude an additional 30 days in this complex case would make it unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for pretrial and trial proceedings in the time otherwise allocated for a speedy trial under the Act. Section 3161(h)(7)(B)(ii). Thus, I conclude ultimately that the ends of justice by excluding an additional 30 days outweigh the best interests of the public and Mr. Rivera in a speedy trial. Section 3161(h)(7)(A).

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED as follows:

1. That an additional 30 days from September 6, 2013, through October 6, 2013, SHALL BE EXCLUDED under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) from the time for a speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974; and

2. That any party that objects to the foregoing findings, conclusions, or orders shall file its objections by September 11, 2013.