Paul W. Grimm, United States District Judge.
Plaintiff Stephon Magruder, pro se, has brought this claim against Defendant Educational Systems Federal Credit Union ("Educational Credit Union") alleging violations under the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., the Maryland Consumer Protection Act ("MCPA"), Md. Code. Ann., Com. Law § 13-101 et seq., and the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act ("MCDCA"), Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 14-201 et seq., with respect to its investigation and reporting of one of his accounts. Magruder has also alleged that Educational Credit Union has defamed him through the reporting of false information relating to this account. Educational Credit Union has filed a motion to dismiss. Def.'s Mot., ECF No. 6.
Magruder purportedly alleged four counts in his amended complaint: violations of the FCRA, MCPA, and MCDCA and defamation.
Id. ¶ 10. Magruder also states that Educational Credit Union "failed to even note that the account was disputed," and that it was "on notice that the account was disputed." Id. ¶¶ 12-13.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for "the dismissal of a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Velencia v. Drezhlo, No. RDB-12-237, 2012 WL 6562764, at *4 (D.Md. Dec. 13, 2012). This rule's purpose "`is to test the sufficiency of a complaint and not to resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the
Magruder has alleged that Educational Credit Union violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(A)-(E) by failing to reasonably investigate Magruder's disputes and failing to note his continuing dispute with respect to Magruder's closed account with Teacher's Credit Union. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16 & 17. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(A)-(E) provides
Magruder must plead three elements to bring his claim:
Ausar-El v. Barclay Bank Delaware, No. PJM 12-0082, 2012 WL 3137151, at *3 (D.Md. July 31, 2012). See also Johnson v. MBNA Am. Bank, NA, 357 F.3d 426, 431 (4th Cir.2004) ("hold[ing] that § 1681s-2(b)(1) requires creditors, after receiving notice of a consumer dispute from a credit reporting agency, to conduct a reasonable investigation of their records to determine whether the disputed information can be verified."). Educational Credit Union does not dispute that Magruder has pleaded elements (1) and (2). Instead, it argues that Magruder has admitted that it "verified the account as being reported accurately. See Def.'s Mem. 3-7.
Educational Credit Union misrepresents Magruder's allegations where it states that "Plaintiff alleges that [its] investigation results verified the information." This characterization of Magruder's statements does not reflect the full allegation:
Am. Compl. ¶ 9. The full quote makes it clear that Magruder is discussing Equifax's and Experian's characterization of the investigation results and not admitting that Educational Credit Unit "verified the account as being reported accurately."
The differences between what Equifax and Experian were reporting, as pleaded by Magruder, are sufficient to establish for the purposes of surviving this motion to dismiss that Educational Credit Union failed to conduct a reasonable investigation. Educational Credit Union's "investigation was unreasonable for it was reporting the account as an installment account with Equifax and a checking account with Experian." Am. Compl. ¶ 10. This inconsistency between the type of account reported "supports an inference of carelessness on [Defendant's] part" sufficient for "a cognizable section 1681s-2(b) claim." See Alston v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2013 WL 990416, at *4 (finding that alleged inconsistencies between information provided by the furnisher to different credit bureaus sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss). Accordingly, Educational Credit Union's motion to dismiss Magruder's claims under § 1681s-2(b) will be denied.
15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(F) provides "no requirement or prohibition may
In Magruder's amended complaint, he asserts that Educational Credit Union published false information regarding the status of his account that amounts to defamation. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 33-42. Certainly,
15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e); see Beuster v. Equifax Info. Servs., 435 F.Supp.2d 471, 479 (D.Md.2006) (discussing interplay between common law defamation claim and § 1681h(e)). "[E]stablishing willfulness requires showing that a defendant `knowingly and intentionally committed an act in conscious disregard for the rights of others.'" Beuster, 435 F.Supp.2d at 479 (quoting Wiggins v. Equifax Servs., Inc., 848 F.Supp. 213, 219 (D.D.C.1993)). As for malice, "Plaintiff must allege that a defendant published material while entertaining serious doubts as to the truth of the publication or with a high degree of awareness of probable falsity [or actual knowledge of falsity]." Id. at 480 (citing Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 37 F.3d 1541, 1551 n. 8 (4th Cir.1994)). Pursuant to Rule 9(b), "malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally." Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); see Beuster, 435 F.Supp.2d at 480 (citing Rule 9(b); Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co., 416 F.3d 320, 329 (4th Cir.2005)) (holding that heightened pleading standards do not apply to defamation actions).
Magruder claims that Educational Credit Union's "investigation was unreasonable for it was reporting the account as an installment account with Equifax and a checking account with Experian." Am. Compl. ¶ 10. By incorporating this allegation into his defamation claim, id. ¶ 33, Magruder claims that Educational Credit Union acted knowingly and intentionally when it labeled the account as an installment account to Equifax and a checking account to Experian. This reporting is inaccurate on its face, establishing the falsity of Educational Credit Union's report. Therefore, Magruder sufficiently alleged either malice or willfulness to survive the motion to dismiss. See Beuster, 435 F.Supp.2d at 479-80; Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); see also Letren v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. PWG-15-614, 2010 WL 560801, at *5 (D.Md. Feb. 12, 2016).
For the reasons stated above, I will GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART Defendant's motion to dismiss.
Accordingly, it is this 7th day of July, 2016, hereby ORDERED that Defendant's motion to dismiss, ECF No. 6, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows: (1) Defendant's motion to dismiss with respect to Plaintiff's Fair Credit Reporting Act and defamation claims IS DENIED and (2) Defendant's motion to dismiss with respect to Plaintiff's Maryland Consumer Protection Act and Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act claims IS GRANTED. Defendant is ordered to file an answer as to Plaintiff's remaining claims by July 29, 2016, at which time I will enter a Scheduling Order and a Discovery Order and schedule a Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 conference call with the parties to discuss further pretrial proceedings.
So ordered.