SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment entered on January 13, 2014, is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff Michael Sloan, proceeding pro se, appeals from an award of summary judgment in favor of defendant United Technologies Corp. on Sloan's claims of racially discriminatory discharge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and the procedural history of the case, which we discuss only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts "in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw[ing] all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Cox v. Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 267, 271 (2d Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Chabad Lubavitch of Litchfield Cnty., Inc. v. Litchfield Historic Dist. Comm'n, 768 F.3d 183, 192 (2d Cir. 2014).

Here, an independent review of the record and relevant case law reveals that the district court correctly granted summary judgment for defendant on Sloan's federal claim. For essentially the reasons stated by the district court, we conclude that Sloan failed to adduce evidence sufficient to admit a finding that his discharge occurred "in circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination," as required to carry his prima facie burden under Title VII. Kirkland v. Cablevision Sys., 760 F.3d 223, 225 (2d Cir. 2014) (analyzing Title VII claims under burden-shifting standard of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). The stray remarks cited by plaintiff were either facially race neutral or too removed from plaintiff's discharge to support an inference of discriminatory causation. See generally Henry v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., 616 F.3d 134, 149-50 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing factors to consider in determining probative value of stray remarks); Tomassi v. Insignia Fin. Grp., 478 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that remarks by someone other than decision maker "may have little tendency to show that the decision-maker was motived by the discriminatory sentiment expressed in the remark"), abrogated on other grounds by Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177-78 (2009). On this record, no rational finder of fact could find that plaintiff was discharged as a result of racial discrimination.2

We have considered plaintiff's remaining arguments, and we conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.