ROY B. DALTON, Jr., District Judge.
This cause is before the Court on the following matters: (1) U.S. Magistrate Judge Carol Mirando's Report and Recommendation (Doc. 15); (2) Objections to Report and Recommendation Dated August 3, 2017 (Doc. 16); and (3) Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (Doc. 17).
In accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff Sharon Marie Dietz ("
After the Commissioner denied the Claim initially (Doc. 11-4, pp. 4-6), and on reconsideration (id. at 12-13), Dietz requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("
Seeking reversal of the Decision and remand to the Commissioner for "a rehearing de novo," Dietz filed her Complaint in this Court after the Appeals Council of the Office of Disability and Adjudication & Review denied Dietz's request for review.
In making a claim for Social Security Disability benefits, claimants have an ongoing duty to prove that they are disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a).
The disability determination is made pursuant to a five-step sequential analysis ("
If the claimant prevails at Steps One and Two, then the ALJ must determine whether the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments "meets or equals the level of severity of a listed impairment" ("
At "
The Social Security regulations require that the Commissioner: (1) "review all of the evidence relevant" to a disability claim (20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b); and (2) issue "a written decision that gives the findings of fact and the reasons for the decision" (id. § 404.953(a)). See id. § 404.1527(f)(2) (imposing the requirement that discussion of opinion evidence allows a reviewer to "follow the . . . reasoning, when such opinions may have an effect on the outcome of the case"); see also Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1987).
The Court reviews the Commissioner's written decision to determine whether it is "supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards." Ellison, 355 F.3d at 1275 (quoting Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1439). Such review "is demarcated by a deferential reconsideration of the findings of fact and an exacting examination of the conclusions of law." Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990).
The Commissioner's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence, which is "relevant evidence" that "a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is "something more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance." Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). Thus, "even if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's findings, [courts] must affirm if the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence." See Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529.
In determining whether substantial evidence exists, the Court must scrutinize the record as a whole but defer to the Commissioner's fact-findings. See Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983); see also Hunter v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 808 F.3d 818, 822 (11th Cir. 2015); Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995) (requiring consideration of "favorable" and "unfavorable" evidence). "[C]redibility determinations are the province of the ALJ,"
No deference is accorded in determining whether the Commissioner correctly applied the appropriate legal standards. See Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988); see also Parks v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 783 F.3d 847, 850 (11th Cir. 2015) (reviewing "de novo the Commissioner's conclusions of law"). Failure to apply the correct law is reversible error. See Keeton v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994). Because judicial review of an ALJ's decision is "not possible" when the ALJ does not provide explicit reasoning—by stating with sufficient clarity the legal rules being applied and the weight accorded the evidence considered" ("
An exception to the Explicit Reasoning Requirement applies to certain evidence that "is inherently neither valuable nor persuasive" ("
(1) the decisions of "other governmental agencies and nongovernmental entities" (id. § 404.1520b(c)(1)); (2) the findings of a "State agency disability examiner . . . about a medical issue, vocational issue, or the ultimate [disability] determination" (id. § 404.1520b(c)(2)); and (3) statements concerning "issues reserved to the Commissioner," including "that you are not disabled" or able to work (id. § 404.1520b(c)(3)(i)). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) (explaining that no "special significance" is given to "[m]edical source opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner").
After setting forth the legal standards applicable to the Sequential Analysis, Judge Terry determined at Step One that Dietz had not "engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 5, 2011." (See Doc. 11-2, pp. 15-17.) He also found that Dietz satisfied Step Two in establishing that she suffers from the severe impairments of degenerative disc disease ("
At Step Three, Judge Terry determined that Dietz's Impairments do not meet or "medically equal the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1." (Id.) In rejecting listing 1.04—Disorders of the spine—Judge Terry found that Dietz "does not have neurological deficits, nerve root compression, spinal arachnoiditis or lumbar spinal stenosis." (See id.)
Next, Judge Terry determined that Dietz has the RFC to perform "light work"
(Id. at 18 ("
According to the Decision, the RFC Findings were based on Judge Terry's consideration of: (1) "all symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence;" and (2) opinion evidence. (Id.) In particular, Judge Terry found that the Impairments "could reasonably be expected to cause" Dietz's "alleged symptoms; however, [Dietz's] statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely credible." (Id. at 19; see id. at 24 (stating that "the evidence fails to show objective findings to warrant the claimant's complaints of ongoing pain").)
As to opinion evidence, Judge Terry gave "little weight" to the opinions of the VE and two treating physicians—Dr. Martin and Sergey Turchin, M.D. ("
After describing the analysis underlying his RFC Findings, Judge Terry proceeded to Step Four. As to Dietz's past relevant work, Judge Terry noted the position identified by the VE—"Sales Representative, Business Service: DOT#251.157-014, Light, SVP F, Heavy as Performed." (See id. at 24.) Judge Terry next determined that such work "does not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by" the RFC Findings. (See id.) Thus, Judge Terry concluded at Step Four that Dietz was not disabled because she "is capable of performing past relevant work." (See id. at 24-25.)
Finally, Judge Terry made "alternative" findings at Step Five that "there are other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that [Dietz] can perform." (See id. at 25.) Judge Terry based this finding on the VE's testimony that a 49-year-old person with a college degree, experience working as a Sales Representative, and all the limitations of the RFC Finding, "would be able to perform the requirements of representative occupations such as" Office Helper, Counter Clerk, and Ticket Seller. (See id. at 25-26.) Thus, based on his "alternative" findings at Steps Four and Five, Judge Terry concluded that Dietz "has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from October 5, 2011, through the date of this [D]ecision." (Id. at 26.)
In her Brief, Dietz challenged the Decision on the grounds that Judge Terry "failed to apply the correct legal standards" to: (1) "multiple opinions" provided by Dr. Martin that supported a finding of disability—("
(See id. at 13-19.)
The Commissioner countered that: (1) it was proper for Judge Terry to give "Dr. Martin's statement that [Dietz] was `unable to work'" no "special significance" because the statement constituted Inherently Unpersuasive Evidence (see Doc. 14, p. 7); (2) substantial evidence supported Judge Terry's decisions to "not adopt" Dr. Martin's opinions about "specific functional limitations," and to find that Dietz "was not disabled because she could perform her past relevant work" (see id. at 7-11); and (3) substantial evidence also supported Judge Terry's "assessment of [Dietz's] statements" and the RFC Findings (see id. at 11-13). In her Report, Judge Mirando rejected both the Treating Opinion and Symptoms Arguments and recommended that the Decision be affirmed. (Doc. 15.)
In rejecting the Treating Opinion Argument, Judge Mirando recommended that Judge Terry "properly did not assign any weight to" the January Letter because it was Inherently Unpersuasive Evidence. (See id. at 9 (concluding that the January Letter concerned issues "reserved for the Commissioner").) Judge Mirando similarly recommended that the March Statement addressed "issues reserved for the Commissioner." (See id. at 9-10 (concluding that Judge Terry need not have accounted "for the vocational limitations opined by Dr. Martin").)
Next, Judge Mirando recommended that Judge Terry "properly accorded little weight" to the March Statement because the "inconsistency with [Dr. Martin's] own medical records constitute[d] good cause." (See id. at 13.) She also recommended that Judge Terry "did not make any error" to the extent that Dietz "argues that substantial evidence does not support the . . . reasons for discrediting" the March Statement because Judge Terry: (1) "accurately discussed in detail Dr. Martin's treatment notes" and Dietz's "limited post-surgical treatment" (see id. at 10-11); (2) noted Dr. Martin's medical findings—including the "negative straight leg raise" and grip strength—but made no "medical assessment[s]" of Dietz (see id. at 12); and (3) found that Dietz "engaged in significant activities, including homeschooling her two young daughters" (see id. at 12). Conceding that "contrary medical evidence exists" in the Record, Judge Mirando declined to recommend overturning the Decision because it is "the ALJ, and not the court, who is charged with the duty to weigh the evidence," resolve conflicts, and assess credibility. (See id. at 13.)
Dietz objected that the Report: (1) improperly "relied on the Commissioner's post hoc rationalizations regarding" Judge Terry's disregard of the January Letter and the March Statement; (2) incorrectly found that the January Letter did not provide a Medical Opinion;
Plaintiff's medical condition as a whole."
Given the Treatment Factor, an ALJ must give the medical opinion of a treating physician "substantial or considerable weight unless good cause is shown to the contrary."
Because Dr. Martin was indisputably a treating source for Claimant, Judge Terry was required to either give his medical opinions "substantial or considerable weight" or articulate why there was good cause for not doing so. See Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178-79. Good cause exists when: (1) a treating source opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) the "evidence supported a contrary finding;" or (3) the treating source opinion "was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor's own records." See id.; see also Hudson v. Heckler, 755 F.2d 781, 784 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating that "good cause" exists where the Treating Opinion "lacks persuasive weight, or is unsubstantiated by clinical or laboratory findings").
In giving Dr. Martin's opinions little weight, Judge Terry seemed to focus on the Supportability and Consistency Factors. He did not explicitly discuss the Treating Source Factors, the Duration Factor, or the Specialization Factor. Further, the Decision included no reference to the questionnaire format of the March Statement, no discussion of whether the March Statement and January Letter were "medical opinions" under the regulations,
The Court also finds that Judge Terry's decision to afford "little weight" to the opinions of Dr. Martin—as well as Dr. Turchin and the VE—were not supported by substantial evidence. (See Doc. 16.) In this regard, the Court agrees with Dietz that her post-surgical lumbar MRI ("
Accordingly, upon careful consideration of the arguments, the law, and de novo review of the Record, the Court finds that Judge Mirando's recommendations concerning the Treating Opinion Argument are due to be rejected, and the Decision is due to be reversed and remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings.
In rejecting Dietz's Symptoms Argument, Judge Mirando recommended that Judge Terry "properly" discussed the standard for evaluating Dietz's testimony and "discounted the credibility of [her] subjective complaints for the reasons clearly articulated in [the] [D]ecision, such as [Dietz's] history of limited medical treatments after her back surgery and her extensive daily activities." (See Doc. 15, pp. 15-16.) The Objections do not reference the Symptoms Argument; thus, the Court must review Judge Mirando's rejection of the Symptoms Argument for clear error. See Garvey, 993 F.2d at 779 n.9.
According to the Social Security regulations, symptoms are a claimant's "own description of [her] physical or mental impairment." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(i). Although the ALJ must consider all of a claimant's "symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which [such] symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence," a claimant's statements alone are insufficient to determine disability:
20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a) (advising that the Commissioner determines "the extent to which [the claimant's] symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical signs and laboratory findings and other evidence to decide how [such] symptoms affect [her] ability to work"). Consistent with the Explicit Reasoning Requirement, the ALJ must "articulate explicit and adequate reasons" for not crediting "a claimant's testimony as to her pain." See Foote, 67 F.3d at 1562.
The Decision accurately recites the pertinent legal standards and explicitly states that Dietz's "medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause [her] alleged symptoms; however, [her] statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely credible for the reasons explained in this [D]ecision." (Doc. 11-2, p. 19.) Such reasons included Judge Terry's flawed analysis of the Lumbar MRI and improper weighing of the opinion evidence discussed above, as well as an incomplete summary of Dietz's testimony from the Hearing.
Because the Court already found reversible error under its de novo review of the Treating Opinion Argument, it need not decide that Judge Mirando clearly erred in recommending that that Court reject the Symptoms Argument. Nonetheless, in the remand proceedings necessitated by the Court's decision on the Treating Opinion Argument, the Commissioner should reconsider the record in its entirety—including a balanced assessment of testimony from Dietz.
Accordingly, it is
DONE AND ORDERED.
