OPINION

ROSEMARY M. COLLYER, United States District Judge.

Laura Holmes and Paul Jost challenge the constitutionality of a provision in the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) that limits individual donors to contributing $2,600 per election to candidates running for federal office. Plaintiffs insist that they do not oppose the amount of money that an individual may contribute to a candidate for an election ($2,600), acknowledging that any such challenge would be foreclosed by Buckley v. Valeo and its progeny. Instead, Plaintiffs argue that the central question, which has yet to be addressed by the Supreme Court, is whether FECA's per-election contribution structure is unconstitutional under the First and Fifth Amendments because it allegedly allows some contributors to give twice as much money to some candidates for use in the general election while denying others that same right. Specifically, Plaintiffs state that FECA's contribution restriction did not allow them to combine their primary and general election contributions ($2,600 per election) in order to give $5,200 to successful primary candidates for use in the 2014 general election. Plaintiffs complain that FECA's per-election limit unfairly benefits contributors supporting candidates who were unopposed in their primary contests because those contributors could give $2,600 before the primary, and the unopposed candidate could later use those funds during the general election campaign (for a total of $5,200). Conversely, Plaintiffs argue, the limit disadvantages contributors who wish to support general election candidates who faced substantial opposition in their primaries because those contributors could not give $5,200 for use in the general election.

"In an abundance of caution," this Court initially certified two constitutional questions to the en banc United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See Holmes v. FEC, No. CV 14-1243(RMC), ___ F.Supp.3d ___, 2014 WL 6190937, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 17, 2014) (Certification Order) [Dkt. 19]. The Circuit, however, remanded the case at the request of the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to enlarge the record for appellate review and to determine whether any constitutional questions were appropriate for certification. Plaintiffs filed a motion for certification [Dkt. 25]; FEC opposed, seeking summary judgment [Dkt. 27].1 The parties presented oral argument on March 31, 2015.

After full consideration of the entire record and all arguments, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' challenge to FECA's temporal per-election restrictions on individual contributions to federal candidates constitutes a veiled attack on the contribution limit set by Congress and upheld by the Supreme Court as a legitimate means to combat corruption. Because Plaintiffs' claims rest on issues of settled law, the Court will deny Plaintiffs' motion for certification and grant FEC's motion for summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

A. District Court's Role as a Factfinder

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit remanded this case "in order to provide the parties an opportunity to develop, by expedited discovery or otherwise, the factual record necessary for en banc review of the plaintiffs' constitutional challenge." Order [Dkt. 21]. The Circuit further ordered: "the district court shall complete the functions mandated by [52 U.S.C.] § 30110 and described in Wagner v. FEC, [717 F.3d 1007, 1009 (D.C.Cir. 2013) ], including the development of a record for appellate review, by April 24, 2015. The district court is to certify any constitutional question(s) by that date as well." Id.2 After a period of discovery, this Court ordered the parties to file briefs on the certification issue as well as proposed findings of fact. See Order [Dkt. 24].

The Circuit granted FEC's motion for remand because, in the main, FEC sought a more fully developed record. Accordingly, this Court has included the majority of FEC's proposed facts here with only slight modifications. Indeed, this Court "is inclined to be overinclusive rather than underinclusive when presented with close evidentiary disputes, preferring to convey as detailed a record as possible to the reviewing court." Cao v. FEC, 688 F.Supp.2d 498, 504 (E.D.La.), aff'd sub nom In re Cao, 619 F.3d 410 (5th Cir.2010)); see also Charles Wright and Arthur Miller, 9A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2411 (3d ed.) ("[I]n a nonjury case the court should be slow to exclude evidence challenged under one of the exclusionary rules.").

B. Objections

Both parties have raised numerous objections to their opponents' proposed findings of facts. Plaintiffs chiefly object to the relevance of many of FEC's proposed facts. Pl. Objections [Dkt. 38-3] at 3. Plaintiffs also argue that FEC's "findings of fact contain[] conclusory and argumentative phrases that are both irrelevant and inappropriate for certification," id. at 3 n. 3, and that certain proposed facts are derived from inadmissible hearsay or improper expert opinion, see, e.g., id. at 7. FEC argues that Plaintiffs' facts are "incomplete, inaccurate, or misleading." FEC Responses [Dkt. 30] at 2.

This Court has considered all of the above objections in entering its Factual Findings and overrules most of Plaintiffs' relevance objections. See Cao, 688 F.Supp.2d at 505 ("To the extent proposed facts that are tangential to the instant litigation nonetheless provide useful context for overall campaign finance regulation scheme, the above objections have been overruled. However, to the extent those proposed facts obscure the most relevant issues being put before the appellate court, those objections have been sustained."). The Court also overrules most of Plaintiffs' admissibility objections because the facts to which they object are legislative facts, which are "general facts which help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy, are without reference to specific parties, and need not be developed through evidentiary hearings." Libertarian Nat'l Comm., Inc. v. FEC (LNC), 930 F.Supp.2d 154, 157 (D.D.C.2013) (internal citations and quotations omitted). This Court has omitted or modified any proposed finding of fact that was argumentative or drew legal conclusions.

C. Factual Findings

The Parties

Regulatory Framework: Statutory Contribution Limits

Plaintiffs' Experience with FECA's Maximum Per-Election Contribution Limits

Primary and General Elections

Variations in State Election Procedures

Facts of Plaintiffs' Case

D. Plaintiffs' Arguments

Plaintiffs argue that FECA's per-election contribution limit violates the First and Fifth Amendments, as applied to them, by limiting the amounts Ms. Holmes and Mr. Jost can lawfully contribute to the general election campaigns of their preferred candidates to $2,600, and preventing them from contributing $5,200. Plaintiffs do not seek to contribute to their respective candidates in the primary elections, and do not claim a right to contribute both $2,600 in the primary election and $5,200 in the general election. Rather, Plaintiffs challenge FECA's separate $2,600 per-election limit. Plaintiffs' challenge "is not based on an incumbent/challenger distinction, but rather on the asymmetry posed whenever a candidate who faces a primary challenge competes in the general election against a candidate who ran virtually unopposed during the primary." Sadio Decl., Ex. 1 (Holmes RFA Responses) ¶ 4; id., Ex. 2 (Jost RFA Responses) ¶ 3.4

E. Procedural Background

Plaintiffs filed suit on July 21, 2014, alleging that FECA's contribution limit of $2,600 per-individual/per-candidate/perelection is unconstitutional as applied to them, where Plaintiffs wanted to contribute no money to any primary candidate and instead contribute $5,200 to their preferred general-election candidates — the candidates who won their party primaries. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment and injunction barring enforcement against them of FECA's per-election individual contribution limit. On August 20, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. See Mot. for Prelim. Inj. [Dkt. 6]. After full briefing, this Court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction on October 20, 2014. See Order [Dkt 16].

On November 17, 2014, the Court certified two constitutional questions to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for en banc consideration. See Memorandum and Findings [Dkt. 19]; Certification Order at *3. On January 30, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted FEC's Motion to Remand. The Circuit ordered:

Order Granting Motion for Remand [Dkt. 21]. It further ordered:

Id. The "functions" described in Wagner are as follows:

Wagner, 717 F.3d at 1009 (citations omitted).

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' challenges under First and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. However, a district court's jurisdiction is limited by FECA, which states that a "district court immediately shall certify all questions of constitutionality of this Act to the United States court of appeals for the circuit involved, which shall hear the matter sitting en banc." 52 U.S.C. § 30110. Venue in this Court is proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b)(2) and (e).

FEC argues that jurisdiction is wanting because this case is moot. FEC is incorrect. The Supreme Court set forth the standard for mootness in FEC v. Wisconsin Right To Life, Inc., a case that involved challenges to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act's (BCRA) ban of corporate advertisements prior to the 2004 election. FEC v. Wisconsin Right To Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 127 S.Ct. 2652, 168 L.Ed.2d 329 (2007). Despite the fact that the election had already occurred, the Supreme Court held that it "fit comfortably within the established exception to mootness for disputes capable of repetition, yet evading review." Id. at 462, 127 S.Ct. 2652. This mootness exception applies where "(1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again." Id. (internal quotation omitted). With respect to the first factor, the Supreme Court explained that BCRA's expedited review procedure often was insufficient to allow a plaintiff to obtain complete judicial review in advance of an election. Id.; see also Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 735, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 171 L.Ed.2d 737 (2008) (finding that plaintiff's case was capable of evading review because case preceded 2004 general election season but could not be resolved before the 2006 election concluded).

As for the second factor, the Supreme Court found:

Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. at 463, 127 S.Ct. 2652 (internal quotations omitted). The Court further noted:

Id. (internal quotations omitted).

Plaintiffs' case easily satisfies this two-pronged exception to the mootness doctrine. Election controversies like this one "are paradigmatic examples of cases that cannot be fully litigated before the particular controversy expires." Moore v. Hosemann, 591 F.3d 741, 744 (5th Cir. 2009). Indeed, Plaintiffs brought this case in July of 2014, challenging FECA's applicability in the 2014 general election, and do not yet have determination on the merits; clearly, relief could not have been granted in the time it will take to litigate this action.

As for the second prong, there is a reasonable expectation that Plaintiffs will again be subject to FECA's per-election contribution limit. Regardless of whether they will seek to donate in the 2016 election to the exact same candidates, such specific repetition is not required. Plaintiffs note that they have a long history of contributing to their preferred candidates, including supporting those candidates only in their general elections. Pl. Reply [Dkt. 28] at 6. Plaintiffs also aver that they intend to make such contributions in the future. Id. at 5-6; see Unity08 v. FEC, 596 F.3d 861, 864 (D.C.Cir.2010) (finding case was not moot where plaintiff filed "a sworn declaration unambiguously stating a conditional intent to resume activities in a future election cycle if the group wins its lawsuit against the Commission"). Therefore, there is more than a "reasonable expectation" here that FECA will bar Plaintiffs from contributing as they desire in the future and that they will be subjected to the same restriction. See Davis, 554 U.S. at 736, 128 S.Ct. 2759 (plaintiff's claim was capable of repetition because he made a public statement expressing intent to self-finance another bid for a House seat); Branch v. FCC, 824 F.2d 37, 41 (D.C.Cir. 1987) (finding case not moot "even though the 1984 town council election has long passed, since [plaintiff] seeks to preserve his right to run in a future election by preventing a recurrence of these events" and noting that "[c]ontroversies that arise in election campaigns are unquestionably among those saved from mootness under the exception for matters `capable of repetition, yet evading review") (quoting Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816, 89 S.Ct. 1493, 23 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969)); Herron for Cong. v. FEC, 903 F.Supp.2d 9, 14-15 (D.D.C.2012) (requirement of being subjected to same action is "easily met" when challenging electoral regulation).

FEC contends that Plaintiffs have not produced evidence of a "demonstrated probability" that the same controversy will recur. FEC Mem. [Dkt. 27] at 15-16; see Herron, 903 F.Supp.2d at 14 ("Ordinarily, courts require plaintiffs to submit evidence suggesting that their controversy is likely to recur."). However, Plaintiffs have stated their clear intentions to continue contributing to general-election candidates who won contested primaries, and they have provided evidence of the frequency of general elections in which candidates from uncontested primaries will face winners of contested primaries. See Pl. Reply at 5-6.

The cases cited by FEC are inapt. In Herron for Congress v. FEC, an unsuccessful candidate for Congress sued FEC for failing to penalize his opponent for violating campaign disclosure laws, challenging a specific finding made by the FEC as to a specific opponent. 903 F.Supp.2d 9 (D.D.C.2012). The district court noted that the irreversibility of elections did not make a case moot. However, that plaintiff's case was moot because he was only considering a run for office in the future, which he acknowledged was "somewhat conditional" on the court's ruling. Id. at 13-14. Indeed, the plaintiff had "made clear that he [would] not run for office" in the upcoming election, that he had not decided about whether he would ever run in the future, and that his decision turned in part on result of lawsuit. Id. at 13. In contrast, the instant Plaintiffs aver that that they will seek to contribute $5,200 to future candidates.

Nor are FEC's other cases persuasive. Virginians Against a Corrupt Congress v. Moran involved a challenge to mailings made by a Congressman in the 1992 general election. No. 92-5498, 1993 WL 260710 (D.C.Cir. June 29, 1993). The Circuit found the case moot in part because the election had passed, but more importantly, because the statute at issue had been repealed and the challenged conduct was not capable of repetition. In Bois v. Marsh, 801 F.2d 462 (D.C.Cir.1986), the Circuit found a plaintiff's claim moot where she challenged Army grievance procedures because "the likelihood that she will re-enter active service in the Army either by re-enlisting or by being called up for active duty and the likelihood that she would again have occasion to employ the challenged procedures if she were to return.... is too remote to justify judicial review at this time." Id. at 466-67. Finally, Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 102 S.Ct. 1181, 71 L.Ed.2d 353 (1982), involved a prisoner's constitutional challenge to the denial of his pretrial requests for bail. The Supreme Court held that any claims about pretrial bail were moot; once the prisoner was convicted in state court, the issue was "no longer live because even a favorable decision on it would not have entitled [him] to bail." Id. at 481-82, 102 S.Ct. 1181. Moreover, there was no reasonable expectation or demonstrated probability that the prisoner would again find himself in the same position because there was no reason to expect that all three of his convictions would be overturned and that he would again demand bail before trial. Id. at 482-83, 102 S.Ct. 1181. None of these cases bears any resemblance to the instant matter, where Plaintiffs have made plain their continuing desire to contribute $5,200 to selected candidates for use in their general election contests without "wasting" $2,600 on a primary candidate who may not advance to the general election. See Pl. Mem. in Support of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. [Dkt. 6-1] at 1.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Judicial Review of FECA Challenges

FECA sets forth the following judicial review procedure for any challenge to the statute's constitutionality:

52 U.S.C. § 30110.

The D.C. Court of Appeals has held that 52 U.S.C. § 30110 requires a district court to perform three functions:

Wagner, 717 F.3d at 1009. The Supreme Court has also instructed that Section 30110 "should be construed narrowly, in part because it creates `a class of cases that command the immediate attention of... the courts of appeals sitting en banc, displacing existing caseloads and calling court of appeals judges away from their normal duties for expedited en banc sittings.'" Libertarian Nat'l Comm., Inc. v. FEC (LNC), 930 F.Supp.2d 154, 157-61 (D.D.C.2013) (quoting Bread Political Action Comm. v. FEC, 455 U.S. 577, 580, 102 S.Ct. 1235, 71 L.Ed.2d 432 (1982)), aff'd in part, No. 13-5094, 2014 WL 590973 (D.C.Cir. Feb. 7, 2014).5

The mandatory phrasing of Section 30110 "should not be read to require [district courts] automatically to certify every constitutional question to an en banc court of appeals." Goland v. United States, 903 F.2d 1247, 1257 (9th Cir.1990). Section 30110 does not "require certification of constitutional claims that are frivolous" when they are either "insubstantial" or "settled." Cal. Medical Ass'n v. FEC (Cal.Med.), 453 U.S. 182, 192 n. 14, 101 S.Ct. 2712, 69 L.Ed.2d 567 (1981). Challenges to a core provision of FECA that has already been upheld are permissible only if they present an "unanticipated variation[]" of the law — "not every sophistic twist that arguably presents a `new' question should be certified." Goland, 903 F.2d at 1257. A "district court need not certify legal issues that have been resolved by the Supreme Court." Khachaturian v. FEC, 980 F.2d 330, 331 (5th Cir.1992); Cal. Med., 453 U.S. at 192 n. 14, 101 S.Ct. 2712 (cases that warrant certification involve issues that "are neither insubstantial nor settled"); Goland, 903 F.2d at 1258 ("[W]here the legal issue has been resolved by the Supreme Court, the district court need not certify the constitutional challenge.").

The Ninth Circuit described the district court's role in a Section 30110 case "as similar to that of a single judge presented with a motion to convene a three judge court to hear constitutional challenges" that may "dismiss constitutional claims which already had been decided." Goland, 903 F.2d at 1257. Goland further noted that such a standard may resemble the "failure to state a claim" applied under Rule 12(b)(6); it concluded that "at least where the legal issue has been resolved by the Supreme Court, the district court need not certify the constitutional challenge." Id. at 1257-58. Finally, Libertarian Nat'l Comm., Inc. v. FEC noted that the standard for determining the nature of a claim "was recently articulated as `somewhere between a motion to dismiss — where no factual review is appropriate — and a motion for summary judgment — where the Court must review for genuine issues of material fact.'" 930 F.Supp.2d at 162 (quoting Cao, 688 F.Supp.2d at 503), aff'd in part, No. 13-5094, 2014 WL 590973 (D.C.Cir. Feb. 7, 2014).

Because "[s]ome review of the facts is inherently necessary to determine if a colorable claim has been raised," any question that a court finds settled or insubstantial "is also appropriate for summary judgment." LNC, 930 F.Supp.2d at 162 (citing Cao, 688 F.Supp.2d at 502-03). Summary judgment is warranted when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(a). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all justifiable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A nonmoving party, however, must establish more than "the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" in support of its position. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. If the evidence "is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Id. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (internal citations omitted).

B. Campaign Finance Law6

"The right to participate in democracy through political contributions is protected by the First Amendment, but that right is not absolute." McCutcheon v. FEC, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 1434, 1441, 188 L.Ed.2d 468 (2014). Although both are protected as First Amendment speech, the Supreme Court distinguishes between expenditures by candidates, which are essentially unlimited, and limits on contributions to a particular candidate. See, e.g., id. at 1444; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19-21, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). Because "[a] contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support," limits on contributions to a candidate or a political committee entail "only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communication." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-21, 96 S.Ct. 612. Thus, in evaluating contribution restrictions, "[e]ven a significant interference with protected rights of political association may be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms." Id. at 25, 96 S.Ct. 612 (internal citations omitted).

In Buckley v. Valeo, appellants challenged the constitutionality of various provisions in the 1974 amendments to FECA and related tax code provisions. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 6, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Supreme Court considered whether FECA's base individual contribution limit of $1,000 to any single candidate per election was an unjustifiable ceiling that burdened First Amendment freedoms. Id. at 24, 30, 96 S.Ct. 612. Buckley found generally that individual contribution limits advanced a "sufficiently important" state interest if they are appropriately designed to reduce quid pro quo corruption or the appearance of corruption. 424 U.S. at 28, 96 S.Ct. 612. Buckley upheld the $1,000 cap, stating that "Congress was surely entitled to conclude... that contribution ceilings were a necessary legislative concomitant to deal with the reality or appearance of corruption inherent in a system permitting unlimited financial contributions, even when the identities of the contributors and the amounts of their contributions are fully disclosed." Id. Further, the Supreme Court noted that if a court "is satisfied that some limit on contributions is necessary," then it "has no scalpel to probe" the specific level at which Congress has set the limit. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30, 96 S.Ct. 612; see also Davis, 554 U.S. at 737, 128 S.Ct. 2759 ("When contribution limits are challenged as too restrictive, we have extended a measure of deference to the judgment of the legislative body that enacted the law."); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 248, 126 S.Ct. 2479, 165 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006) (Breyer, J., plurality) ("We cannot determine with any degree of exactitude the precise restriction necessary to carry out the statute's legitimate objectives. In practice, the legislature is better equipped to make such empirical judgments, as legislators have particular expertise in matters related to the costs and nature of running for office. Thus ordinarily we have deferred to the legislature's determination of such matters.") (internal quotations omitted).

The Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed Buckley's finding that "the weighty interests served by restricting the size of financial contributions to political candidates are sufficient to justify the limited effect upon First Amendment freedoms caused by the $1,000 contribution ceiling." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 29, 96 S.Ct. 612. See, e.g., Davis, 554 U.S. at 737, 128 S.Ct. 2759 (The "Court has previously sustained the facial constitutionality of limits on discrete and aggregate individual contributions and on coordinated party expenditures.") (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-35, 38, 46-47, and n. 53, 96 S.Ct. 612 and FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 437, 465, 121 S.Ct. 2351, 150 L.Ed.2d 461 (2001)); McCutcheon, 134 S.Ct. at 1442 ("[W]e have previously upheld [base contribution limits] as serving the permissible objective of combatting corruption."). While contributions play an important role in financing political campaigns, contribution limits only pose a constitutional problem if they "deny the individual all ability to exercise his expressive and associational rights by contributing to someone who will advocate for his policy preferences." McCutcheon, 134 S.Ct. at 1448 (emphasis added).

After Buckley, McCutcheon held that there is "only one legitimate governmental interest for restricting campaign finances: preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption." McCutcheon, 134 S.Ct. at 1450. Further, "`[i]ngratiation and access... are not corruption" and the only permissible restrictions are those that target "quid pro quo" corruption, i.e., "a direct exchange of an official act for money." Id. at 1441 (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010)). McCutcheon distinguished base campaign contribution limits, which restrict how much money an individual may contribute to a particular candidate or committee per election, and aggregate limits, which restrict how much money an individual may contribute in total to all candidates or committees. Id. at 1442. The Supreme Court invalidated FECA's aggregate limits under the First Amendment because aggregate limits do not further the legitimate interest of combatting corruption, but "seriously restrict participation in the democratic process." Id. McCutcheon did not involve a challenge to individual base contribution limits and thus did not alter Buckley's finding that individual base contribution limits advance an anti-corruption interest. Id. ("[W]e have previously upheld [base contribution limits] as serving the permissible objective of combatting corruption.")

C. Plaintiffs' First Amendment Claim Involves Issues of Settled Law

Plaintiffs argue that FECA's individual per-election contribution limit unconstitutionally prohibits them from giving $5,200 to their preferred candidates in their general elections. They do not dispute that Buckley forecloses challenges to "the general imposition of individual contribution limits." Pl. Mem. [Dkt. 25] at 12 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28-29, 96 S.Ct. 612). Rather, Plaintiffs claim their case is novel because the Supreme Court has not addressed the effect of FECA's "bifurcated" per-election campaign contribution limit, which "prevents Plaintiffs and those similarly situated from giving the full, non-corrupting contribution amount at the time they feel is most critical in the electoral cycle." Pl. Mem. at 19.

As an initial matter, Plaintiffs' repeated description of FECA's per-election structure as "bifurcated" is factually incorrect. FECA does not dictate a maximum contribution limit of $5,200 that may be split between the primary and general elections. Rather, FECA sets a per-election base limit of $2,600: an individual may contribute $2,600 to one candidate for each "election," as defined, in which he participates. See 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a).7 Donating $2,600 to a candidate for his primary-election campaign and $2,600 to that same candidate for his general-election campaign is not the same as donating $5,200 solely to his general election campaign. Congress simply does not allow any contributor to give $5,200 for a general election. Further, Plaintiffs' assertion that there is a $5,200 cap that is "bifurcated" between the primary and generally elections is a false construct. Federal elections cycles vary from state to state, and may include runoffs, special elections, and party conventions, all of which qualify for an individual $2,600 contribution, in addition to primary and general elections. 52 U.S.C. § 30101(1).8

With respect to their First Amendment claim, Plaintiffs are correct that Buckley upheld the dollar value of FECA's individual contribution limit and did not address the constitutionality of setting contribution limits on a per-election basis. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21-22, 96 S.Ct. 612. But Plaintiffs are mistaken that their claim raises an issue of unsettled law. By seeking to combine the permissible contribution amounts for both primary and general election in order to have flexibility to donate that aggregate amount to a general election campaign, Plaintiffs are effectively challenging Congress's decision to set a base dollar limit for individual per-election contributions to federal candidates — a decision that is contemplated and approved by Buckley. Id. at 28, 96 S.Ct. 612 ("Congress was surely entitled to conclude ... that contribution ceilings were a necessary legislative concomitant to deal with the reality or appearance of corruption inherent in a system permitting unlimited financial contributions.").

Plaintiffs argue that FECA's limit is unconstitutional as-applied because they were prevented from contributing $5,200 to the 2014 general-election campaigns of their preferred candidates after they won their primary elections, unlike other contributors who allegedly could contribute $5,200 to their preferred candidates for use in the general election.9 This claim is unsettled, according to Plaintiffs, because Buckley did not address when a contributor could give $5,200 during the election cycle, but instead upheld the base limit of $5,200 itself. Plaintiffs are wrong. The base limit is not $5,200. Congress has decided that the base limit — the maximum contribution to a candidate for his general election campaign — is $2,600, and Buckley mandates deference to that limit. Id. at 30, 96 S.Ct. 612 (If "it is satisfied that some limit on contributions is necessary, a court has no scalpel to probe, whether, say, a $ 2,000 ceiling might not serve as well as $ 1,000."). That Buckley did not consider whether FECA's per-election structure violates the First Amendment does not render Plaintiffs' claim unsettled because, stripped to the bare facts of their case, Plaintiffs are seeking simply to contribute more than Congress has authorized.

Plaintiffs repeatedly maintain that individuals supporting candidates who faced little or no opposition in their primaries can allegedly contribute $5,200 to that candidate's general election campaign.10 However, the fact that $5,200 may be used for a candidate's general election campaign is only a consequence of an FEC regulation that permits a candidate in a general election who has unused primary contributions to transfer those primary contributions to pay for general-election expenses. See 11 C.F.R. § 110.3(c)(3). Neither FECA nor any Supreme Court opinion authorizes an individual contribution of $5,200 for a general election.11

Plaintiffs' argument further reveals that their First Amendment claim challenges FECA's monetary restrictions. Plaintiffs state that FECA's per-election limit "allows supporters of candidates without primary challengers to contribute twice as much money for the general election," and thus "doubles the scope of association that certain contributors enjoy." Pl. Mem. at 32. Plaintiffs also seek to "double the scope" of their association by increasing their own general-election contributions beyond the congressionally-mandated, judicially-approved limit. This challenge is precluded by Buckley's finding that "the weighty interests served by restricting the size of financial contributions to political candidates are sufficient to justify the limited effect upon First Amendment freedoms caused by the $1,000 contribution ceiling." Id. at 29, 96 S.Ct. 612.

Plaintiffs cite McCutcheon for recognizing a legal limit of $5,200 for individual campaign contributions, see Pl. Mem. at 19 (citing 134 S.Ct. at 1452), not limited to $2,600 per election. But Plaintiffs place too much weight on McCutcheon's shorthand comments, particularly in light of McCutcheon's explicit recognition of FECA's $2,600 per-election base limit. McCutcheon, 134 S.Ct. at 1442. Taken out of context, the dicta on which Plaintiffs rely — "Congress's selection of a $5,200 base limit indicates its belief that contributions of that amount or less do not create a cognizable risk of corruption," id. at 1452, — appears to bolster their argument. However, Plaintiffs misread McCutcheon and would take its holding well beyond its facts. In McCutcheon, an individual contributed the same base limit of $2,600 to 16 different federal candidates, and sought to contribute the base limit to an additional 12 candidates, but was prevented from doing so by the aggregate limit on contributions to candidates. Id. at 1436. The Supreme Court noted that for the 2013-2014 election cycle, FECA's base limits "permit an individual to contribute up to $2,600 per election to a candidate ($5,200 total for the primary and general elections)." Id. at 1442. In contrast, the aggregate limits "permit an individual to contribute a total of $48,600 to federal candidates and a total of $74,600 to other political committees." Id. While the base limits "restrict how much money a donor may contribute to any particular candidate or committee[,] the aggregate limits have the effect of restricting how many candidates or committees the donor may support, to the extent permitted by the base limits." Id. at 1443. The Supreme Court found FECA's aggregate limits were unconstitutional, stating that:

Id. at 1448.12

In overruling the aggregate limits, however, McCutcheon did not alter Buckley's finding that congressionally-selected base limits on individual contributions advance an anticorruption interest. Accordingly, McCutcheon does not stand for the proposition that a contribution of $5,200 to a candidate's general-election campaign is non-corrupting as a matter of law. Rather, the Supreme Court confirmed that FECA's base individual contribution limit is $2,600 per-election.

The Court recognizes Plaintiffs' frustration that a contributor cannot give $5,200 to a candidate for use in a general election but may give $2,600 to a candidate the day before the primary and $2,600 the day after the primary, and that the FEC regulation allows a candidate to transfer unused primary funds for use in the general election (if she wins the primary). But the fact that candidates may transfer contributions is a result of an agency regulation. Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has ever authorized individual contributors to give $5,200 to one candidate solely for use in a general election. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has held that FECA's individual limits on base contributions are permissible and Congress set such a limit — at $2,600. Thus, because Plaintiffs' claim rests on settled law, certification is not warranted.13

D. Plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment Claim Involves Issues of Settled Law

Plaintiffs argue that their experience "demonstrates that favored contributors may give their preferred candidates $5,200 for the general election, while Plaintiffs and those similarly situated may not." Pl. Mem. at 6. They seek certification, contending that the Supreme Court has not decided whether the "asymmetry posed when a candidate who faces a primary challenge[r] competes in the general election against a candidate who ran virtually unopposed during the primary" constitutes a Fifth Amendment violation of their right to equal protection.14 Pl. Mem. at 20.

Buckley addressed an argument that "the contribution limitations work such an invidious discrimination between incumbents and challengers that the statutory provisions must be declared unconstitutional on their face." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30-31, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Supreme Court rejected the facial challenge because "the Act on its face treats all candidates equally with regard to contribution limitations." Id. at 33, 96 S.Ct. 612. It further stated that "[a]bsent record evidence of invidious discrimination against challengers as a class, a court should generally be hesitant to invalidate legislation which on its face imposes evenhanded restrictions." Id. at 31, 96 S.Ct. 612. Contribution "limitations may have a significant effect on particular challengers or incumbents, but the record provides no basis for predicting that such adventitious factors will invariably and invidiously benefit incumbents as a class." Id. at 33, 96 S.Ct. 612. The "danger of corruption and the appearance of corruption apply with equal force to challengers and to incumbents," and thus "Congress had ample justification for imposing the same fundraising constraints upon both." Id.

That Buckley found FECA's contribution limits constitutional on their face does not mean that the statute could not be unconstitutional in an as-applied challenge. See id. at 31, 96 S.Ct. 612 n.33 (expressing no "opinion with regard to the alleged invidious discrimination resulting from the full sweep of the legislation as enacted"); Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 201, 130 S.Ct. 2811, 177 L.Ed.2d 493 (2010) (rejecting broad challenge to state disclosure law but noting that, as "in other election law disclosure cases," "upholding the law against a broad-based challenge does not foreclose a litigant's success in a narrower one"). Plaintiffs claim that Buckley does not foreclose their as-applied challenge, a characterization with which FEC disagrees. In any event, "[t]he label is not what matters." Doe, 561 U.S. at 194, 130 S.Ct. 2811. "The important point is that plaintiffs' claim and the relief that would follow" — invalidating FECA's per-election individual contribution limit — "reach beyond the particular circumstances of these plaintiffs." Id. "They must therefore satisfy our standards for a facial challenge to the extent of that reach." Id.

As in Buckley, this Court finds no evidence of invidious discrimination against these Plaintiffs or any purported class of individual contributors. FECA treats all individual contributors equally by imposing uniform per-candidate, per-election contribution limits. Although Plaintiffs "may be prevented from contributing $5,200 to their chosen candidates after their primary elections, Plaintiffs [are] only restricted to the exact same extent as any other individuals wishing to contribute more than $2,600 per election." Holmes, 71 F.Supp.3d at 187, 2014 WL 5316216, at *5 (emphasis in original).

As this Court previously stated:

Id. at 187, 2014 WL 5316216, at *6.

Id.

Because there is simply no record evidence that the statute, which "applies the same limitations on contributions to all candidates regardless of their present occupations, ideological views, or party affiliations," Buckley, 424 U.S. at 31, 96 S.Ct. 612, works an asymmetric effect on Plaintiffs as contributors, Buckley's reasoning applies with equal force here. Certification is thus unwarranted as Plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment claim is based on settled law.15

Acknowledging that FECA's contribution scheme "`on its face' does not appear discriminatory," Plaintiffs argue that it works a "disparate impact in favor of contributors to candidates who do not face a primary challenge." Pl. Mem. at 29. But Plaintiffs cannot pursue an equal protection violation by arguing disparate impact when they have made no showing of purposeful discrimination. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 375, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) ("[A]bsent proof of discriminatory purpose, a law or official act does not violate the Constitution solely because it has a ... disproportionate impact.") (internal quotation omitted); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 n. 26, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980) ("The equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment prohibits only purposeful discrimination, and when a facially neutral federal statute is challenged on equal protection grounds, it is incumbent upon the challenger to prove that Congress selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.") ((internal quotations and citations omitted).16

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that no constitutional questions warrant certification because Plaintiffs' claims involve questions of settled law. The Court will deny Plaintiffs' motion for certification and will grant FEC's motion for summary judgment. Judgment will be entered in favor of FEC. A memorializing Order accompanies this Opinion.